METROPOLIS
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP
PROCEEDINGS

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Introduction

The Luso American Development Foundation (FLAD) has been looking into migration processes in Portugal for several years in order to better understand the impacts of migration on the growth and life of multi-ethnic urban communities.

Among the issues of particular interest to FLAD are the formation of ghettos, the ability of poorer minorities, migrant or not, to compete successfully as members of society, and how urban planning - or the absence thereof - affects multiethnic communities.

While Portugal is not yet a country of heavy immigration, many more immigrants have come in recent years than in the past. This is making Portugal increasingly sensitive to the challenges facing immigrant and other low-income and minority communities. FLAD believes these to be among the most important social issues for the coming decades, and ones that can be most effectively addressed through the comparative analysis of situations occurring in other countries. Such understanding can then lead to more informed policy discussions.

It is FLAD's conviction that the Metropolis Project coordinated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and by the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration, offers the proper international framework to expand comparative policy research on migration and the growth of poor communities. Metropolis is a cooperative international policy research effort that includes public and private sector institutions from sixteen countries, as well as four intergovernmental organizations.
The project's founding premise is that there is a common set of urgent, migration-related issues, centered on the effects of international migration on large urban centers, that must receive policy attention and be the object of comparative research that is systematic and inter-disciplinary. This research must be done within and across national borders. Most advanced industrial countries are struggling to develop strategic responses to these effects - both in terms of harnessing the benefits of migration more completely and managing its challenges more effectively.

Together with Metropolis, FLAD is convinced that the effective incorporation of newcomers into a society is the fulcrum on which not only successful immigration programs but also successful societies ultimately rest. This requires that we better understand how immigrants and their children become incorporated into our societies and how they relate to other social groups during the process of incorporation - emphasizing processes and mechanisms that work.

In pursuing this objective, Metropolis has created a procedural and analytical framework for the systematic investigation (and a process for assimilating the results of the investigation) of the effects of immigrants on large cities that are simultaneously experiencing the effects of such forces as technological change, deeply liberalized international trade regions (and its effect on accelerating economic and labor market changes and exacerbating the social effects of such changes), and ever-growing physical and social infrastructure needs. These are also cities typically experiencing fiscal difficulties and increasing inequality. Most critically, perhaps, these forces are released in the midst of a popular sense of a brewing social and cultural crisis that for most Metropolis partners seems to challenge the very foundations of the social compact on which western social democracy has been built.

Ultimately, Metropolis is intended to serve as a vehicle for identifying a set of coherent policy responses to international migra-
tion's effects on the receiving societies' largest cities, where most immigrants concentrate, as well as on the resident population.

While the Metropolis partners recognize that policy responses are not easily transferable across different political and sociocultural settings, they strongly believe that elements of such strategies and, in a broader sense, “best practice” techniques, can be exchanged to mutual benefit. Success in this effort would in turn lay the foundation not only for more thoughtful and measured responses to immigration, but also for the more successful pursuit of the associated public policy goals of successful immigrant integration and, in a more general sense, “good governance” and social peace.

This book summarises the contributions that were presented at the “Metropolis Workshop”, held in Lisbon on September 28 and 29, 1998, organised and hosted by FLAD in collaboration with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. As is the focus of the METROPOLIS Project, the workshop brought together leading researchers in Europe, particularly Southern Europe, and the United States to debate questions concerning four main topics affecting migrants and ethnic minorities in Portugal and the Mediterranean region. The four topics were:

- Cities, Migrants and Minorities
- Migrants and Labour Markets
- Migrants and Urban Planning
- Migrants and Minorities – Citizenship and Participation

The opening addresses were given by the President of FLAD, Dr. Rui Machete, and the High Commissioner for immigration and Ethnic Minorities, Dr. José Leitão. Following this, Dr. Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Co-Director, International Migration Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and International Co-chair, Metropolis, set the stage by focusing on the topics to be discussed during the workshop. The opening papers by Mark Miller, Marco Lombardi, and Donatella Giubilaro
focused on the challenges to policy-makers of increasing migrant inflows and growing ethnic minorities in urban centers. The papers by Maria Baganha, João Ferrão and Jorge Macaísta Malheiros, and Maria Frangouli-Papantoniou reviewed the prevailing modes of incorporating migrants into the formal and informal labour markets, and the obstacles pertaining thereto in Portugal and Greece, respectively. Caroline Brettell, Paul White, Lucinda Fonseca, and Maria Jesús Lago Avila discussed the diverse impacts that urban planning and design, including that of urban infrastructures, have on medium to long term migrant integration prospects in a section chaired by Jorge Gaspar. Finally, Joaquin Arango, Martin Heisler, Yasemin Soysal, David Justino, Maria Margarida Marques, Tiago Ralha, Susana Plácido and Hugo Seabra presented a review of issues and policies concerning immigrant participation, citizenship rights, and the relationship among them.

As pointed out by the High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities, Dr. José Leitão, recalling the final statement issued at the end of the Warsaw Meeting of the Ministers Responsible for Migration, “we need to develop migration policies that simultaneously take into account three main strategic objectives: assure the management of immigration, including efficient controls, but also such longer term concerns as integration and understanding the deeper underlying causes of migration”.

By bringing together researchers concerned with migration issues from both sides of the Atlantic, FLAD intends to contribute to solving “the immigration puzzle (and particularly the immigration/integration nexus)” upon which rests the viability of many of our societies in the coming century.

Charles A. Birchman, Jr.
Member of the Executive Council
Luso-American Development Foundation
Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The scientific expertise of the participants at this meeting is a motive of satisfaction and great expectation. I am sure that this gathering will prove to be a major contribution toward providing us with objective information about migration.

One must remember that Europe has a Human Rights calling and migration cannot ignore these rights which are set down in several international conventions.

The social sustainability and well-being of multicultural societies today and the fight against prejudice that damages harmonious community relations call for a coherent and meaningful political discourse. Yet this discourse must be complemented by education on Human Rights and objective information on international migration and the status of immigrants and their families.

It is crucial to promote the participation of immigrants and their descendants in the economic and cultural development of the receiving countries. It is also vital to promote intercultural dialogue between the different cultural realities existing in society and to demonstrate to the European public that Europe is not only a receiving space, but a departing space for the foreigner as well.

We are currently witnessing a process of vast economic globalisation. This process, along with the growth and spread of audio-visual and electronic media, has linked geographically distant people, transforming the world into a “global village”.

[11]
The VI Conference of the Ministers Responsible for Migration Issues which took place in June, 1996 in Warsaw, unanimously approved the following:

It is evident that European countries will go on facing, in years to come, a strong migration pressure coming either from other European countries or from other parts of the world. This situation is happening at a time when States are being confronted with present economic difficulties and with high unemployment rates, which decrease reception possibilities. The States must find the means of keeping immigration controlled, while respecting the international commitments they have subscribed to: children’s rights, respect for the family, the right to marry freely and to establish a family; protection of refugees as per the Geneva Convention, and of people seeking protection for humanitarian reasons.

It is also very important to remember that cooperative efforts to foster development between emigration and receiving countries is extremely important, since an increasing number of countries are becoming, simultaneously, receiving and emigration countries. Nonetheless, we can still note deep inequalities in matters of development and redistribution of wealth.

Therefore, in the Warsaw Conference, the Ministers found that a global approach would be necessary. This approach would have to acknowledge the need “to assure the management of immigration, including efficient control, but also longer-term concerns such as integration and the deeper underlying causes of migration”. As it was pointed out, “Integration is, today, a prime objective of the policy of all countries where numerous immigrants and their descendants are regularly settled. Moreover, since issues regarding migration and the integration of immigrants have increasingly moved to the center of political and public debate, integration becomes a necessity in all countries”.

[12]
Portugal has traditionally been a country of emigration, with four and a half million people spread throughout the world. However, as you all know, in the last few decades, it has also become a country of immigration. At the end of April 1998, there were 176,225 regularly settled foreigners in Portugal.

The Portuguese government’s policy is very clear today. The rights it seeks for its nationals abroad are the rights it defends for foreigners in Portugal. Thus, differences are valued and respected, family reunification granted, and accesses to work, vocational training, social housing and health are ensured without discrimination. Special attention is paid to success at school and education in general. In addition, support is provided for the harmonious integration of immigrants who, as both foreigners and expatriates, are particularly vulnerable. These are the objectives the Portuguese government has set.

The creation of the post of High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities is based on the need to recognise immigrants as a factor of enrichment for Portuguese society. Yet we also need to acknowledge the challenges we face as a country of immigration, by taking measures to ensure the integration of immigrants.

In this context, the institutionalisation of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries assumes great significance. Within the framework of cooperation, it will undoubtedly contribute toward regulating migratory flows and ensuring the suitable integration of immigrants. In short, we must not forget that any immigrant citizen is, as Mia Couto, a writer from Mozambique put it, “individual humanity.”

Migration forces us to remember that since we are all part of the same human family, part of humankind as a whole, we must act in a spirit of brotherhood toward each other.
1. There is not much concentration in the residential patterns of foreign migrants in Milan and, whenever it occurs, it does not appear to show the negative consequences often ascribed to such concentration.

The term “concentration” as applied to immigration, usually refers to two kinds of situations: (a) urban areas marked by the (residential) presence of migrated populations, or a specific migrated population (ethnically characterised areas); (b) the high percentage of migrants in “problem”, “crisis” or “decayed” quarters: this percentage is considered as an indicator of problems, decay and the crisis of the area. Neither of these situations is common in Milan.

Both situations are usually considered at least problematic. In the case of “crisis” neighbourhoods, the negative connotation lies in the definition of the area. The concentration of poor people in certain areas can be an added factor of poverty and marginalisation. That high numbers of migrants live in these areas is not surprising. Of course, different questions arise when this presence is taken not as an indicator but as a constituent element of the decay or crisis of the area.

As to the areas marked by the presence of migrants, or specific migrants, the attribution of negative features is more complicated – it implies a judgement, whose empirical base is not always clear or explicit: the idea is that these residential pat-
terns are usually connected – according to cause-effect sequences that can be generalised – with certain problem data. Concentration is seen as an obstacle to integration, or showing segregation processes; or as cause of diseases and seems to trigger negative reactions from, and conflict with, the “local” population. As to Milan, none of these consequences seems to be necessary or automatic.

2. This can also be said for most urban cases in Italy (exceptions mainly concern some old town centres, especially in the South): little concentration, little evidence of negative consequences of the existing concentration of migrants in cities.

There are certainly specific local and national elements that are to be taken into consideration to explain the situation in Milan regarding the issue of concentration. A careful analysis, however, leads us to question – as others have already done (Tosi 1993) – the categories used and the whole system adopted to represent the issue. In particular where:

a) it is assumed that concentration is natural, as if it were – rather than one possible residential pattern, and the result of specific conditions and constraints given by the context where dwelling takes place – the natural reaction to “typical” problems of immigration (e.g.: space proximity as a natural solution to the need of supportive relationships, etc.);

b) it is assumed at the same time that concentration is normally problematic and implies risks, as is shown by the common link made between the idea of concentration and those of “segregation”, “ghetto”, etc. – terms whose connotations “solicit the passage from an analytical to an ethical level” (Vieillard-Baron 1995).

[16]
Of course, it is usually accepted that concentration – as has been suggested in the conclusive notes to the Milan Conference – can favour adaptation and integration (“by integrating new arrivals into their ethnic communities before integrating them into the wider society”) and that it can carry out positive functions with respect to the urban context (“a positive role in reclaiming and revitalising urban neighbourhoods”). The question is often asked, quite correctly, and that is, what are the “conditions” under which concentration is negative (“under what conditions do ethnic enclaves become precursors to social pathologies?”). However, the common attitude is fear against concentration, and its negative meanings are more easily taken for granted, and do not seem to require any demonstration. In most countries, horror for ethnic concentration and ethnic enclaves – or for the visibility of immigrants – has characterised a whole tradition of urban policies and city planning.

The ideological characteristic of these representations can easily make use of the uncertainty (and approximation) of the notions of “concentration” and “segregation”. Their application fluctuates, and easily implies a transfer in meanings between a descriptive use of terms and ethically-connected uses. The transfer becomes more ambiguous when we think that technical meanings are sometimes highly abstract. Both concepts are applied as if their meaning does not depend upon the size of differences, scales, distribution models, and the actual circumstances where processes occur. “Concentration” is indifferently applied to the urban area, the neighbourhood, the great shelter, etc., assuming that meanings do not vary, regardless of the size (Tosi 1993). “Segregation” fluctuates between a statistical and descriptive meaning, which can refer to any difference in the presence of a type of population, the isolation referred to by the term “ghetto”, and the ethical connotation of the words.
Immigrants in Milan

Milan, like many other Italian cities, attracts migration flows coming to Italy. Most migrants tend to settle in the metropolitan areas, and within these areas, cities are the favourite concentration places for foreigners, in a process that is often marked by distress and marginality. In the case of Milan, registered immigrants make up about 5% of the population, which means three times above the national rate.¹

Table 1  Ratio of residence permits of some of the nationalities living in Milan to the total in Lombardy and the Province of Milan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Lombardy</th>
<th>Milan Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>86.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey by the Cariplo ISMU Foundation based upon data from the headquarters of Milan Police, 1/12/96. Observatory of the Labour Market – 1996.

¹ People coming from developing countries are about half of the overall number of foreigners. From here on, unless specifically stated otherwise, the terms “foreigner” and “immigrant” will refer solely to persons coming from non-European countries that are held to be “developing”.

Despite this, Milan, unlike other European and North American cities, does not provide as much space visibility of foreign people as one would think. Certainly, this may be due
to the fact that the number of immigrants is not as high as in other European cities. This case cannot be compared yet, in terms of its size, with towns like Paris or London. Even when taking into account estimates for illegal and not fully registered people, the percentage only rises to 7% of the population (Blangiardo, Terzera 1997).

An additional explanation may be looked for in the settling patterns of immigrants. As a whole, their residential distribution is “scattered” throughout the urban territory, and their insertion is in most cases discrete and often hidden. As we shall see below the distribution according to Milan areas does not appear to show any significant process of segregation, nor, more generally, a progressive concentration. Some of the variables linked to geography rule out a strong concentration of immigrants. This does not mean a random dwelling pattern and, in fact, even within the limited dimensions of the situation in Italy and Milan, areas marked by higher numbers of immigrants can be detected. The variance, of course, may be described in terms of the typical choice/constraint models which are currently employed in research on segregation/concentration.

The map of resident immigrants and the localisation ratio\(^2\) (Map 1) show that they are concentrated in urban central areas, with the exception of a few areas (“zona 10” and some peripheral areas). The latter is marked by older (Egyptians) or stabilising immigration (Philippine). Absolute values referring to residents are distributed around the centre in almost perfect circles. The localisation ratio (LR) obviously follows the same distribution.

As we can see, in rare cases the town level doubles (LR=1 means that in the considered area there is the same ratio of immigrants to Italians as in the whole city), and the ratio ranges between 0.5 and 2.6 without showing significant peaks. Basically, this first mapping shows a sufficiently balanced distribution of resident immigrants, without significant concentrations.

\(^2\) The localisation ratio (LR) is the ratio between the immigration rate in an area (ImA/ItA) and the immigration rate in Milan (ImMi/ItMi) (registered immigrants only).
The above is confirmed by the map of ethnic distributions (Map 2), for those populations with at least 10% of their members concentrated in the same area. A 10% threshold as significant level already shows the lack of ethnic concentration. However, in 10 areas out of 20, there are the members of all of the 18 most significant ethnic groups (those that make up 81% of foreigners), in the remaining 10 no more than two ethnic groups are lacking at the same time. Besides, central areas have more than 5 ethnic groups with at least 10% of their members, and no area has been elected as the “dwelling place” of a majority ethnic group.

A further confirmation of this “distribution” trend comes from the map of resident foreigners in each area on the total of foreigners living in Milan (Map 3). Again, some areas (for instance 1, 6 and 10) are reference areas, but their percentages (8.4%, 8.1% and 9.1%) do not make it possible to talk of significant concentration. Single ethnic groups are distributed in Milan without significant aggregations. Milan’s Chinese district is such because 23.9% of this group lives here but the percentage of foreigners in the neighbourhood is comparable to other areas.

As to the ratio between immigrants and Italian residents (Map 4), figures do not show any significant incidence. The city average is 3.3 immigrants for every 100 inhabitants, the peak is 4.5 in areas 10 and 3. A comparison between maps shows in this case one area, 10, marked by high levels in terms of ethnic groups, localisation ratio, density: an area which seems to be more attractive than others, if it were not for the low number of immigrants living there. Area 6, the only one ethnically marked by a relatively strong presence of Chinese people, shows a ratio which is equal to the ratio of the city, and this implies a pattern of cohabitation, a style of living together rather than an ethnically exclusive situation.

[20]
### Table 2  Ratio between immigrants and Italian residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cariplo ISMU Foundation.

A further comment can be made by examining the map of the ratio between foreign pupils at all sorts of schools and Italian pupils (Map 5), seen as the indicator of progressive stabilisation, union and rooting of families. On the whole, there is a low and homogeneous ratio over the whole city. Only areas 7, 6 and 10 are different. They are all marked by the presence of older and more consolidated ethnic groups: Chinese and Egyptians. We believe that monitoring and updating this map might provide a significant indicator to check the stabilisation of national groups.
Table 3  Foreign pupils and Italian pupils enrolled in all kinds of schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>School population Absolute Value</th>
<th>Foreign pupils Absolute Value</th>
<th>Foreign pupils Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>11,460</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7,311</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,652</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,671</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7,449</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7,371</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,535</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,421</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>9,044</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>8,323</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>5,198</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>5,332</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>6,102</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>4,279</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>5,704</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>6,847</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>9,205</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>7,831</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>122,508</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,109</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cariplo ISMU Foundation.

On the whole, the figures shown underline that ethnic concentration is not a landmark of residential insertion of immigrants in Milan.

Within this framework a more substantial residential presence of immigrants may be observed in central areas and in some outskirts in the east section of the city. Except for the case of Chinese immigrants, living in central areas is for most immigrants a consequence of employment in domestic services,
which means in many cases for the workers to live in the workplace. As for the peripheral areas, the neighbourhoods in which immigrants are most likely to live are those which offer (very) affordable housing, or neighbourhoods in decay, or places where informal/illegal accommodation is easier.

The analysis of the maps and a few research studies recently carried out\(^3\) highlight the logic underlying immigrant settlement.

More recent migrant flows - those originating from Maghreb or Eastern Europe - tend to direct themselves towards the outskirts of the city. This migration is still unstable in terms of family - and often professional - connections, and tends to be characterised by large numbers of illegal immigrants. A substantial share of these people find accommodation in decayed areas and precarious housing. However, this does not mark the area from an ethnic viewpoint.

Another pattern is clearly outlined by observing the residential insertion of people coming from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Peru, El Salvador, and the presence of ethnic groups with a considerable presence (at least 10%) in downtown Milan. These foreigners are mostly employed as porters, house workers, assistants and in domestic service - all tasks requiring the worker to live where he or she has been hired, in rather classy buildings and dwellings, and with well-off families. This kind of dwelling thus rules out any possible appearance of “ethnic” areas, bringing about at the same time clear ethnic connotations for public spaces: the “loss” of one’s home is replaced by the occupation and use of squares, gardens or meeting places where people belonging to the same ethnic group can meet. Nevertheless, this migrant flow tends to move out of the city centre and to the outskirts as soon as people reach a stable situation - which often entails family reunion - with a view to finding less expensive dwelling opportunities.

\(^3\) In particular, see the works by Lanzani which include a recent study (1997) carried out on the Chinese community in Milan.
A third residential pattern which is typical of some ethnic groups that have been present in Milan for longer periods – the Egyptian and the Eritrean – is characterised by a highly homogeneous distribution in the various areas by a clear prevalence of a “diffusive” insertion logic. As far as Egyptian people are concerned, they can be found in all the city areas. Even if some concentration may be observed in some areas, we cannot talk about “ethnically marked” neighbourhoods for this specific group.

A quite different pattern is represented by the Chinese, another group that has been present for a long time in Milan. Chinese people are the only ethnic/national group whose residential patterns are to a large extent concentrative: 51.2% live in Zones 2, 6, and 10, with a peak of 23.9% in Zone 6. Here they have constituted the only clear case in Milan of “ethnically marked” neighbourhood. In the Canonica-Sarpi area, various craft activities, dwellings, and typical Chinese food shops are present – still, it would not be possible to talk about a sort of Chinatown. The area has not lost its Milanese features or population and the Chinese community has developed a cohabitation pattern with Milanese people, thus making it impossible to talk about “ethnic neighbourhoods” or ethnic enclaves.

The fact that residential patterns show a non-concentrative trend does not mean that the presence of foreign immigrants does not tend to mark the territory. In some way specular and complementary to the scarce residential visibility of immigrants is their visibility in public spaces.

These are the spaces that show the signs of new and different habits. Piazza Cordusio, in City Zone 1, the open gallery of Corso Vittorio Emanuele, the mezzanines of many tube stations have become trading places – also illegal – as well as meeting, leisure-time places where small services are sold to immi-
grants. Letters are translated and information provided on the procedures for the renewal of permits, money transferred and so on. In particular, squares and gardens have become aggregation places for those ethnic groups carrying out activities which are non-aggregating in character and characterised by a lack of intra-ethnic relations (typically domestic service involving people from the Philippines, El Salvador, Peru). Other communities (for instance Egyptians and Maghreb immigrants) concentrate even less, in spaces such as the Coptic Church or the Islamic centre. Furthermore, it is even less frequent that the various cultures manifest their identity through displays of products in shop windows, or on the boards of typical restaurants and other meeting places, which remain concentrated in limited areas. This can be noticed, for instance, only in the area surrounding Via Canonica and Via Paolo Sarpi for the Chinese community, or in that surrounding Corso Buenos Aires and Corso Venezia for North African people.

The settling patterns of immigrants also suggest the main factors that have “ordered” the spatial distribution in the city. Housing markets and housing opportunities have probably been the most important determinant. In a situation characterised by lack of affordable housing and inadequacy of public provision, localisation strategies have mainly reacted to the spatial structure of the low segments of the market, to the opportunity of informal accommodation in the interstices of the urban fabric (Milan is a city with a fair amount of deindustrialised areas and abandoned industrial buildings) and (for a period) to the public provision of shelters for immigrants.

Table 4, confirming the key role played by a network-like structure, shows the importance of welfare and precarious solutions for groups in which socially marginal components are particularly consistent. Moroccan people – a scarcely integrated group, as was already observed – tend to dwell in the city out-
skirts and often under rather disadvantaged circumstances; 25% live in emergency structures, or in very temporary situations.

As far as the extent of irregular or illegal immigration is concerned, which is usually associated with unauthorised concentration or the initial settlement in various reception centres - it should be pointed out that the dismantling of public “reception centres” and the decrease in the size of camps themselves - partly through actions aimed at repression and dispersion - has rendered “informal” settling still more difficult to depict. According to a map of ‘squats’ dating back to November 1996, 1,018 immigrants (almost all illegal) live in 35 occupied areas, usually in highly disadvantaged conditions due to lack of water, light and sewage facilities.

### Table 4  Housing accommodation of immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Egyptians</th>
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<th>Moroccans</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>71.3</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>45.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>House rented from friends</td>
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<td>19.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
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<td>24.1</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Cariplo ISMU Foundation.

### A few remarks

1. The analysis carried out thus shows that immigrants do not tend to concentrate in Milan - rather (provided we give this
notion a reasonably strong meaning), concentration is the exception to the rule. There are no ethnic neighbourhoods, and areas with specific ethnic features, or marked by a significant presence of immigrant groups, are quite the exception. There are no particular concentrations of immigrants in "crisis neighbourhoods". The analysis also shows that concentration, whenever present, is not characterised by the usually associated negative features - it does not hinder integration and does not bring about conflict (this is the case of the Chinese community), and when conflicts arise which are associated with residential insertion of immigrants, they are due to factors which go beyond mere concentration. In the case of the Chinese community, we should rather speak about the "positive" character of concentration, both in terms of the migrant population and cohabitation with other ethnic groups.

2. This data can be extended to embrace most Italian cities, in particular those in the Northern and Central areas of the country. The territorial and settling processes associated with immigration are definitely influenced, on the one hand, by the specific features of immigration itself and the integration models prevailing locally and in Italy as a whole, and on the other, by general factors such as the work and real estate markets, urban structure and urban transformation processes (gentrification and so on), etc. (Waldinger 1993). The limited territorial scattering of migrant flows - both in Milan and Italy - can be easily associated with a series of features typical of the Italian framework, in both senses: the considerable informal extent of the immigration process, the great heterogeneity of the ethnic/national origin of immigration to this country; a housing market which is less segregating than in other countries; the fact that Italy has not seen any "ethnic management" of social housing (one of the main concentration/segregation factors in other countries), the social mix which still characterises the
urban context, the dispersion policies implemented in various cities and so on.

3. A basic element in this context is the territorial character of poverty. The situation analysed highlighted a certain immigrant tendency to settle in more or less decayed areas. Yet, most of these areas do not correspond to the “crisis neighbourhoods” typology - that is, an area which is extensively deteriorated and where poor and socially excluded people tend to concentrate. This kind of situation is less frequent in Italy than in other countries. Even less frequent are “urban ghettos” as intended for France when speaking of the banlieues. In many Italian regions, poverty and exclusion are not particularly “localised”, which is not surprising considering the aforesaid factors. The concentration of poor and outcast people is a small-scale phenomenon in many Italian regions (particularly in Northern and Central Italy), and does not absorb most indigence situations. In other regions (with “widespread” poverty), concentration takes place on a larger scale as compared with urban districts. In both cases, poor people do not usually settle in such a way as to characterise the entire area. Districts with widespread problems tend to be characterised by mixed situations from a sociological viewpoint. Eventually, as was already pointed out, concentration in most cases is not characterised by the presence of immigrants.

4. It is of course possible that, as was suggested various times already, the scarce concentration of immigrants which characterises Italian cities depends on the fact of the flow being recent and relatively limited in size (Palidda 1996, Granata and others 1996). It would seem reasonable to admit, generally speaking, that a more substantial and stable presence of second-generation immigrants would entail more extensive concentration processes. Still, if we look into the reasons underlying the above-mentioned lack of concentration, we may well suggest that they
are to continue also in the future. Should “ghettos” appear in
the future, this would probably be a result of inadequate urban
housing policies, rather than of the size of concentration and
of “natural” spatial processes.

5. These data give rise to many puzzled reactions as to the
appropriateness of the current ideas on the concentration and
segregation of immigrants. Of course, there are differences which
are tied to local/national specificities. But if we consider the
explanations provided we can say that the debate on concen-
tration is marked by exaggeration and misunderstandings, and
not only here. As a consequence, a series of doubts arise as to
whether the subject of concentration really deserves the attention
focused on it within the current debate. The probability
that these categories are part of an ideological debate has been
repeatedly expressed. The fact of associating concentration and
the creation of ghettos, concentration and non-integration may
pool together all the “pseudo-evidence” that “continues to ins-
pire the debate on the difficulties of multi-ethnic cohabitation
within the urban context” (Blanc and Garnier 1984).

- We should reflect on the fact that anti-concentration argu-
ments mainly result from “external” worries, which concern
the overall context and the interest of local population groups,
rather than immigrants themselves. The ideological founda-
tions of this debate are obvious: “the refusal to allow any new
‘social’ settlement on the municipal territory is ascribed to
the risk of ghettoization. In the name of the law and good
quality of life, the poorest are refused a home” (Vieillard-
Baron 1995). This is also true in Italy: the application of the
“ghetto argument as a communication device” needs neither
great concentrations, nor concentrations as such.
- From within the immigrant experience, concentration may
be a reasonable situation and a rational strategy. The “posi-
tive functions” of the ghetto have been emphasised by many authors. For newcomers, drawing a frontier “helps to preserve their culture and to propose it to outside” (La Ceca 1995). No settlement model exists for immigration – not even if we consider it as a model on immigrants, or we investigate it considering the well-being of immigrants. From the viewpoint of the advantages for immigrants, there are various ways to obtain “corresponding” results, which are well illustrated by the territorial patterns of immigrants in Milan: network relations maintained through significant mobility, an extensive use of public areas as meeting places and so on. After all, most immigrants have been socialised to urban cultures and most share the orientation to selective, non-locally-based relationships which are typical of urban culture. Even when the contact with people of the same origin plays an important role, this may happen without implying residential proximity.

1. Of course, segregation and “ghettoization” are real facts in the relationships between immigrants and the local society in which they arrive. These are not the consequences, however, of the “number” or the “physicality” of spaces processes: the reasons are to be looked for in some kind of social processes. Both the “negative” and the “positive” attitude to concentration “have in common the fact of not investigating the social factors determining the birth of ghettos” (Lapeyronnie 1990). The physical/environmental determinism which supports the attribution of a causal role to concentration per se as a mere quantitative fact, is well known. The “myth of environmental influence” has deeply influenced social sciences. From a theoretical point of view, the idea of concentration being an obstacle to integration has been supported by a long tradition of urban sociology (Ampeys 1993).  

4 Similar remarks can be made for the question of the relationships between concentration of immigrants and conflict with local groups of population. Looking for an explanation in social processes would easily show what is obvious: that the presence of immigrants does not imply any specific type of reaction, and local protest and conflict need to be interpreted in terms of the social structure and problems, and of social history of the local area.
2. Many misunderstandings on immigrant flow and concentration are the effect of inappropriate transfers of theoretical themes and patterns from one country to another. The popularity of the notion of "immigrant ghettos" within the framework of the recent European debate has been definitely influenced by the prevailing model of the debate in the US, which brings together the new forms of social exclusion and ethnic and racial conflict/segregation. To counter this "imported model", L. Wacquant (1992) has shown that the "colour" character of territorialised poverty can be a major element differentiating the US and Europe. The case of Milan shows the importance of tackling the problem of poverty and immigration in a locally- and country-specific way. "In Milan, both immigrants and the native population are protagonists of the drift into impoverishment, in different conditions but which rarely give rise to substantial and stable local concentrations. It is possible to speak of two polarised models: the US and northern Italy. In the case of Northern Italy, local concentration of those involved in exclusion drift is not characterised by such a strong ethnic/racial 'closure' as can be found in the poor American ghettos" (Mingione 1997).

3. Finally, there is the risk that the fact of emphasising spatial concentration turns attention away from other segregation processes, and fails to recognise the importance of the processes underlying segregation and exclusion which have no clear or remarkable impact on space (for instance, the segregation of social networks), or those processes extending over space but lacking a residential basis (for instance, processes entailing the appropriation of public spaces).
### Table 5
Main foreign communities (from “developing countries”) dwelling in Milan by nationality on a decentralisation area basis on December 31, 1996

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>53.435</td>
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<td>671</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>528</td>
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|               | 3008 | 957 | 846 | 2676 | 1335 | 1013 | 2339 | 1614 | 2195 | 2299 | 43.828 |
Map 1  Resident immigrants and localisation ratio

Source: 31/12/96.
Map. 2  Ethnic distribution (at least 10% concentration)

Source: 31/12/96.
Map 3. % of residents foreigners per area on the total of for. res. in Milan

Source: 31/12/96.
Map. 4  Ratio between immigrants and Italian residents (per area)

Source: 31/12/96.
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IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: STILL A MODEL FOR EMULATION?

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Abstract

How pertinent is U.S. incorporation of immigrants to European integration questions and vice-versa? This paper contends that transatlantic comparison of immigrant integration is less one of apples to oranges than one of tangerines to clementines. There is more similarity and congruence than frequently assumed. This endows transatlantic comparison of immigrant integration with public policy meaningfulness. What Americans or Europeans do in this realm has public policy-learning implications across the Atlantic.

The paper consists of four sections. The first contends that the extension of residency and employment rights to foreign workers and their dependents in Europe between 1970 and 1990 narrowed transatlantic differences. The second summarizes recent developments in U.S. immigration law and policy which have tended to erode the liberal status afforded resident aliens which demarcated the U.S. system of legal immigration from European guestworker policies. The third contends that recent legal and policy changes in the U.S. have not fundamentally altered the U.S. model of immigrant incorporation. Indeed, in certain key respects, the recent changes are consistent with a historical pattern of governmental “benign neglect” of immigrant incorporation. The concluding section contends that, despite important historical, policy and legal differences, Europeans and Americans have much to learn from one another in the realm of immigrant integration.
Europeans and immigrants in Europe perhaps look too much to government for solutions to integration barriers and problems. Perhaps solutions and remedies are available through civil society and the immigrants’ own resources and organizations. The passage of time and intergenerational change foster incorporation. Perhaps assessments of integration success or failure require longer timelines. One could argue that the European social state provides protection and integration assistance that is lacking in the US. Maybe Americans need to realize that the barriers encountered by so many post-1965 immigrants are aspects of broader societal problems arising from glaring inequalities in life chances. Can immigrant integration problems be addressed without broader reforms that would narrow transatlantic differences between European social states and the liberal, laissez-faire US?

The question of how to ensure integration or incorporation of international migrants is newer for some societies than others. The United States and European states, with perhaps the exception of France, often are viewed as sharply dissimilar, like oranges and apples, when it comes to immigrant integration. It is a very old question in the United States whereas it is quite new in a case like Italy. Quite naturally, Europeans turn to US historical experience to identify processes and strategies facilitating immigrant integration. Are there lessons to be extracted from US history that could help Europeans achieve the goal of immigrant integration? In other words, is there a US model of immigrant integration suitable for European emulation?

At the risk of appearing chauvinistic, we argue that there is indeed a US model of immigration suitable for emulation. The first section of this essay contends that many European states, in fact, did move towards that model in the 1970s and 1980s, perhaps more unwittingly than consciously. Moreover, we feel that many European states would do well to adopt a US-style
legal immigration policy which makes visas available for permanent legal residency on an annual basis.

The second section examines recent immigration policy and law developments in the US, particularly the 1996 immigration law, which are widely viewed as calling into question or eroding immigrant integration in the US. While the rights of legally-admitted resident aliens in the US were adversely affected by the 1996 immigration law, and by two other laws pertaining to political terrorism and welfare, one can argue that much of this change actually is quite consistent with a tradition of benign neglect by the US government of immigrant integration. Historically, the US government has not provided special services and benefits to immigrants. There is no tradition per se of integration policy or immigrants policy in the lexicon of Tomas Hammar. [Here, immigrant policy refers to what happens to immigrants in America, while immigration policy refers to how many and what kind of immigrants are allowed entry. Clearly, the emerging concern with immigrant policy shapes immigration policy.] Instead, immigrant integration has been achieved through civil society - families, churches, synagogues and now mosques, formal and informal immigrant assistance, immigrant self-help and, perhaps most importantly, the passage of time. No one is quite certain why the Irish or the Italians became Americans but it was not the result of proactive governmental policy. Rather, the keys seem to be the liberal legal status afforded legally-admitted immigrants, their ability to become US citizens and then their eventual ability to vote.

The third section examines the contemporary US paradox. Increasingly, there is advocacy of European-style governmental intervention to promote immigrant integration. The paradox arises from the novelty of such advocacy in an old immigration land. Despite a centuries-long history of immigration,
many sections of the U.S. are encountering immigration-related problems and issues for which solutions are not readily available. It is the fear that the huge wave of post-1965 immigrants will not end up like the Irish and Italians that motivates the calls for U.S. governmental intervention to facilitate immigrant integration. Hence, transatlantic dialogue over immigrant integration should not be viewed as one way but as two way.

The closing section suggests that European states are in some instances better equipped institutionally to integrate immigrants than the U.S. While the welfare state is under attack in both Europe and North America, long-term prospects for immigrant incorporation may be better in Europe because European governments intervene more extensively to provide services and social protection.

An American Viewpoint on Immigrant Integration in Europe

A quarter of a century ago, imagining a solution to Europe’s immigrant integration question seemed quite easy to an American. European states needed to adopt U.S.-style legal immigration policies. The problem in Europe was guestworker policy which did not work. Indeed, it was the inherent quality of European democracy which helped unravel policies which sought to shuttle human beings through jobs and labor markets as if they were merely another production factor.

A large fraction of foreign workers in Europe did not return home. Rather they settled and were joined by family members, necessitating in the view of many Europeans, integration policies. Immigrant settlement and integration in Europe, however, was viewed by many as problematic because it was largely unplanned and undesired. For too many Europeans, immigrant
settlement and integration was tinged with illegitimacy. After all, parliaments and national assemblies had not voted for European states to become lands of immigration. Guestworker policies typically arose in an ad hoc fashion. No one imagined that they would one day lead to massive settlement.

To their credit, European democracies gradually, if grudgingly, granted permanent residency and employment rights to most legally-admitted foreign workers who chose to stay on. There is little evidence of European governments successfully securing repatriation of legally-admitted foreign workers on a non-voluntary basis. Of course, several major recruitment states tried to force legally-admitted foreign workers and their dependents to leave, but these efforts were stymied. The best example of this was the French governmental effort during the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to force out hundreds of thousands of Algerian residents of France. By 1984, the French government would adopt the titre unique which gave legally resident aliens quasi-automatic, ordinarily non-revocable renewal of status. One can justly state that the French government had gone a long way towards emulation of legal resident alien status in the US by 1984. While the French still attempted to lure foreign residents home via cash inducements, it was clear that repatriation had to be voluntary. And, of course, very few immigrants chose to return home under a variety of cash for repatriation policies.

Two other cases were emblematic of a broader pattern of convergence between Europe and the US in immigration matters by the mid-1980s. In 1964, when Switzerland and Italy signed a new bilateral agreement governing recruitment of Italian workers, the Italians persuaded the Swiss to allow long-term seasonal workers to adjust to permanent residency in Switzerland. Swiss conservatives railed against the treaty for transforming Switzerland into an immigration land. To a considerable extent, they were
right. Under the new modalities, Italian seasonal workers would become eligible for an annual permit, which eventually could lead to family reunification on Swiss soil, after about five periods of employment in Switzerland. (Later the formula became a total of 36 months of employment over five years.) As a result, the number of resident aliens in Switzerland began to grow rapidly. Eventually, other seasonal worker groups like the Spaniards and Portuguese would benefit from a similar reform.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the proportion of legally-admitted aliens possessing short-term renewable residency and employment permits dwarfed those having permanent resident alien status – so-called consolidated status – in the 1960s. The residency and employment status of most legally-admitted foreign workers was revocable. Indeed, the government of Bavaria would try to administratively induce “rotation” home circa 1974 but this effort was blocked. Instead, more and more legally-resident aliens steadily acceded to permanent resident alien status to the point that over 90% of alien residents had consolidated status by the 1990s. This was a remarkable transformation, one which made Germany and the US look less like apples and oranges than they did circa 1970.

While the legal status of legally-admitted resident aliens manifestly showed signs of convergence across the Atlantic by the mid-1980s, important, indeed fundamental, differences remained. In many European states, naturalization barriers remained very high. The anomaly of long-term residency by aliens in democratic settings gave rise to advocacy of special voting rights for immigrants in Europe. Generally less stringent naturalization requirements in the US, where immigrants normally qualify for the grant of US citizenship after five years of residency, meant that the question of special immigrant voting rights would be less important in the US. However, US officials have worried about the long-term effects of millions of resident aliens living
in the US without becoming US citizens. INS Commissioner Doris Meissner declared increasing naturalization her number one priority when taking office in the Clinton Administration.

The appeal of the US system of legal immigration is apparent in the broad consensus that immigrant naturalization is good. It is the expected outcome of the immigration process, although immigrants are not required to become US citizens. Once they become US citizens, immigrants can register to vote, although many do not. Immigrant voters quickly make their weight felt in elections. Political parties vie for immigrant votes. Eventually even outcasts like the Irish become seen as and accepted as Americans. Irish identity might remain. But, with the passage of time, the immigrants and their offspring meld into US society. They can attend mass, celebrate St. Patrick’s Day, perhaps even agitate for reunification of Ireland or insist that their children learn Gaelic. They may end up hyphenated Americans but they are viewed as a legitimate part of US society and of the US polity. They are integrated or incorporated. No one is quite certain how or why, but the process, until quite recently, was seen as working.

What remains above the national debate over Americanization is the notion that American nationality is defined by individual and not group rights. So being as the U.S. does not define rights on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or membership in any group, Americans ought not have to fear that the diversity brought by immigration will lead to ethnic diversion and disunity. From this perspective, the prospect of a probable victory of the Indian People’s Party in India these days is profoundly disturbing to many of the country’s 120 million Muslims, and to other Indians who reject Hindu nationalism as a fair basis for governing this vast country, with its mosaic of faiths (John F. Burns, “Hindu-first Party Expected to Gain in India’s Election”, NYT 2/16/98).
The US model of immigrant integration is but one aspect of US immigration history. Americans do not typically dwell much on the sufferings undergone by so many immigrants to the US and the hardships and prejudice they have encountered. We do well to recall that many, if not most, US citizens have regarded immigration as problematic. The anti-immigrant rumblings of the 1990s represent more of a constant than a departure in the broad sweep of US immigration history.

The US government’s role was limited to immigration policy. Already by 1882, with the Chinese Exclusion Act, it began to close the door to immigration by non-Europeans. The vast bulk of immigration prior to 1965 originated in Europe. But successive waves of European-origin immigrants, like the Irish before them, encountered public hostility and governmental indifference. European immigrants were subjected to strong pressures to conform which culminated in the Americanization campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s which were largely targeted at Italian immigrants.

US immigration history, for many, has been far from idyllic. And, along with the visa system, there has been massive recourse to guestworker-style policy – the so-called Bracero Programs of World Wars I and II and the H-2 program, all of which admitted foreign workers for employment mainly in agriculture on a temporary basis. Moreover, there has been extensive illegal immigration. The US government estimated that over five million aliens resided illegally in the US in 1996. Indeed, it was above all political backlash against illegal immigration that set in motion anti-immigrant legislation in the 1990s. Did measures like Proposition 187 and the 1996 immigration law fundamentally alter US immigration policy? How should one assess the implications of the mid-1990s changes for immigrant integration in the US?
Revisiting the US Model of Immigrant Integration

The 1990s began with a reaffirmation of the value of legal immigration – expressed through adoption of the Immigration Act of 1990 which increased legal immigration by 35 percent. As a result, nearly one million immigrants per year have been admitted to residency in the US on average in the 1990s. In addition to the annual allocation of visas authorized by immigration law, an annual quota for refugee admissions is agreed upon each year. Additionally, there have been significant inflows of asylum-seekers. Foreign policy considerations and court-ordered measures have led to special designations for hundreds of thousands of aliens in the US. A federal court ruled, for example, that the US government systematically rejected claims by Guatemalans for asylum and ordered rehearings of those treated unfairly. On top of this, quite rampant illegal immigration continued.

Many observers believe that the 1994 elections marked a turning point. In California, Governor Wilson was re-elected after a campaign centered on immigration issues. He strongly supported Proposition 187 which passed by a large margin. The key concept in Proposition 187 was the notion that governmental welfare attracts international migrants. If access to governmental services were barred to immigrants, their numbers would decline.

The most controversial features of Proposition 187 applied to illegally resident aliens. For instance, it sought to bar illegally resident children from attending public schools. But a federal judge quickly prevented its implementation and has since found most aspects of Proposition 187 unlawful. Nevertheless, the political message sent by the 1994 elections in California resounded in Washington, D.C. and inspired a flurry of legislative activity with anti-immigrant overtones.
Efforts to reduce the number of immigrants admitted legally each year were rebuffed. However, three pieces of legislation were adopted – The Illegal Immigration Reform and Legal Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, welfare reform and a counter-terrorism law which cumulatively greatly affected the status of both legally-admitted aliens and illegally resident aliens. What perhaps was most striking was the conflation of legal and illegal migration in much of the political discourse whereas, heretofore, a careful distinction between illegal and legal migration generally was maintained.

Some of the provisions of the three laws overlapped with one another. A key concern was growing utilization of certain welfare provisions by legally-resident aliens. Congress calculated that it could save several billion dollars each year in welfare expenditures by denying benefits to heretofore eligible legal resident aliens. For instance, many aged legal resident aliens were receiving supplementary social security benefits. The 1996 Act discontinued access to these benefits for most resident aliens.

Another provision of the 1996 Immigration Act made the sponsorship of legal immigrants a legally binding contract. Governmental agencies were empowered to hold sponsors responsible for public disbursements made to legal immigrants and to recover those costs. Heretofore, public authorities generally could not enforce sponsor pledges to be accountable for public expenses incurred by legal immigrants.

The counter-terrorism act empowered the US government to deport resident aliens suspected of supporting terrorist organizations expeditiously and without normal judicial review. It also proscribed fundraising that supported terrorism, a vague notion that some viewed as threatening to constitutional rights like freedoms of assembly and speech which traditionally have been enjoyed by US citizens and aliens residing on US territory alike.
Other provisions of the mid-1990s laws affecting immigration included hiring of thousands of additional enforcement agents, the building of additional detention facilities, streamlining of the asylum application process and the barring of aliens determined to have unlawfully resided in the US from legal re-entry for long periods of time. All in all, the three measures were viewed as significantly eroding the generally liberal status afforded legal resident aliens in the US.

A major response to the changes was an upsurge in naturalization. In 1996, some 1.2 million legal resident aliens became US citizens. In part, this was due to facilitated naturalization processes. In part, the upsurge was due to the arrival of aliens legalized in the 1987-1988 period to eligibility for US citizenship. But many resident aliens seemed to apply to naturalize to remain eligible for various social security and welfare benefits. Indeed, a number of state, county and municipal governments encouraged resident aliens to naturalize in order to maintain eligibility for federal benefits. As a result, the significant savings foreseen by major proponents of the 1996 immigration law have not materialized to the extent anticipated.

The Clinton Administration succeeded in modifying or attenuating some of the harshest provisions of the 1996 immigration law. The perception that new immigrant voters overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party, and that the immigrant vote vitally affected electoral outcomes in many constituencies in 1996, has prompted backtracking by some Republican proponents of the 1996 law. Still, much had changed since 1990 when legal immigration was increased and celebrated. Misgivings and doubts about immigration had re-emerged. Another cycle in a long history of American ambivalence over immigration had begun.
The Future of Immigrant Integration in the US

Despite the anti-immigrant measures of the mid-1990s, the fundamentals of the American recipe for immigrant integration were still in place by 1997. Hundreds of thousands of aliens are admitted to permanent residency each year and they generally become eligible for naturalization after five years of residency. Certain classes of asylum-seekers, quasi-refugees and long-term illegally resident aliens are allowed to accede to legal resident alien status. About one million resident aliens become US citizens each year and many of them quickly become voters. The perceived influence of immigrant voters affects political outcomes in numerous states and municipalities. This tends to attenuate restrictive measures.

Legal immigrants in the 1990s included a growing percentage of poor and minimally educated persons. Many fear that the historic pattern of upward economic and social mobility experienced by previous waves of immigrants may not endure. Many legal immigrants confront barriers to integration in education, language and employment. This has led to advocacy of governments intervening much more explicitly and extensively to promote immigrant integration.

Traditionally, however, immigrant integration has not been the task of the US government. A policy of benign neglect has prevailed. Hence, the paradox of public authorities in a state and society forged by immigration grappling with serious integration problems. Americans are debating how best to integrate and incorporate immigrants anew. There is historical precedent for this but what is largely new is the expectation that public authorities intervene to facilitate immigrant integration.

The appeal of the US model of immigrant integration was partly to be explained by the perception that immigration involved no significant public costs. The US immigration debate
of the 1990s has largely been about the public costs of immigration. Legal and illegal immigration are increasingly conflated. This has called into question one of the United States’ most remarkable achievements - its ability to transform immigrants into Americans seemingly effortlessly.

The American door remains open to law-abiding immigrants. Frustration over illegal immigration and the inability of government to curb it satisfactorily has eroded support for legal immigration. It is possible that more exclusionary public policies will develop in the future, especially in a period of economic recession. However, US immigration history and the important role played by immigrants in the US economy, society and politics suggest that the door will remain open to legally-admitted immigrants. Other migrants, especially illegal immigrants, face much bleaker prospects.

The integration barriers faced by many recent immigrants arise from their poverty and low levels of education as well as from cultural distance and language problems. Research by Borjas and others shows a bifurcation of immigrants into highly skilled and low skilled and educated, with the former not facing many problems whereas the latter do. Benign neglect has been an adjunct of laissez-faire ideology and this does not bode well for immigration policy in the US.

Paradoxes of Transatlantic Comparison of Immigrant Integration

A number of European scholars and leaders have viewed the success of Proposition 187 and its federal-level echo in 1996 as “Europeanization” of US immigration policy and law. Anti-immigrant sentiment in the US is viewed as something novel and almost anti-American. Proposition 187 and the 1996 immi-
igration law are difficult to reconcile with a vision of US society and history which is frequently held up for emulation. In this vision, the openness of US society to diversity and change and its celebration of its immigrant heritage is contrasted to European states that are closed to immigrants, adverse to diversity and maladapted to a rapidly changing transnational world in which international migration is a key dynamic in globalization.

This caricatural vision is flawed. European states are scarcely closed to immigration and, of course, were historically forged by processes of migration and settlement, albeit quite different in timing and nature from those affecting the US. But it is, above all, the understanding of US immigration history that is deficient. Americans have always been ambivalent about immigration and its effects. The 1996 law does not represent a radical departure. Europeans who embrace a politicized and historically questionable vision of US immigration might be surprised by the report issued by the Commission on Immigration Reform in 1997 that advocates americanization of immigrants. Yet, the US has never been a multicultural society like Canada, where it is the purpose of government to maintain cultural diversity. Moreover, immigrants and non-immigrants have always encountered enormous pressures to conform to a cultural norm dating from the colonial period. De Tocqueville wrote about American conformism by the 1830s. During the 1920s and 1930s, Italian-Americans constituted a principal target of americanization campaigns.

There are, however, legitimate grounds for alarm and concern over immigrant integration in the US. Many recent immigrants are very poor and inadequately educated. Many do not have a legal right to residency and employment in the US. Massive illegal immigration casts a pall over legal immigration. Ordinary American citizens often do not distinguish between
legal and illegal immigrants. A European-style legitimacy of settlement problems may be emerging.

The massive arrival of tens of millions of legal and illegal immigrants since 1965 no longer affects just the major cities and ports. Small towns and rural areas around the US are confronted by enormous integration problems for which they are ill-prepared. Local school districts face growing costs to provide bilingual education. Immigrant children, nevertheless, face educational barriers. Millions upon millions of immigrants from culturally and geographically distant societies are groping to find a secure place in American society. In certain areas, violence-prone gangs become a kind of refuge for immigrant teenagers. Alejandro Portes has warned that old-style assimilation might be untoward if immigrant children adopt the anti-social norms of their US citizen peers who view academic achievement as something for gringos and a short violent life of crime and drugs as the way things are.

Wealthy and well-educated immigrants to the US integrate easily. The problem is the growing number of poor and poorly-educated immigrants. The US is less equipped institutionally than European states to provide a social net for them. At a time when demand for social services has expanded, the typical response has been to pare down on what services are provided. Hence, maybe Americans have more to learn from European experience than vice-versa. Legal residency in a Western European state generally entitles an immigrant to a broader range of governmental protection and services than is the case in most US states. The availability of child care services, for instance, sharply demarcates some European states from the US and illustrates the broader point that legally resident aliens who are parents of young children are better off, even better integrated, than in the US. No one knows for sure how many immigrant households there are in the US where one or both parents work.

Historically, US society has been rent by slavery, segregation and racism. Social and economic exclusion of African-Americans has generated apparently insurmountable pathologies. What is at question now in many parts of the US is whether the recent immigrants and their progeny will become equal citizens with equal opportunities or an additional layer in a racially, culturally and economically highly stratified society. During World War II, the Swedish sociologist, Gunnar Myrdal wrote *The American Dilemma* about the enduring tension between American ideals and the status of African-Americans. By 1975, American students of international migration to Europe asked whether it would forge a “European dilemma”. Now one asks with some trepidation whether there will be American dilemmas. All indications suggest that transatlantic comparison along these lines will increase rather than decrease in importance in the future.
Introduction

The phenomenon of migration must be examined in two respects: first, the migration taking place and second, the potential future influx. Examining the first point, I will illustrate the flows of migration from the Maghreb countries and Turkey in Europe and the situation of the migrant population already living in Europe. On the basis of this, I will discuss potential future influx; I will take into consideration the macro-economic determinants of the migration pressure and in particular the demographic and the employment situation in the Maghreb countries and in Turkey. I will also illustrate the impact on the labour market of the opening up of the Maghreb economies and thus the economic relations between the EU and the Maghreb countries.

The issue of migration into the EU must be seen in its European political context. It is from the moment that the countries affected realised that they could no longer control the phenomenon of migration, that migration became a real political challenge, and came to be considered one of the most important socio-economic questions of today. It is also from this moment that the concept of migratory pressure was developed.

The countries of Europe are beginning to realise that while a less timid common policy in the matter of immigration is essential, it is insufficient. It must be accompanied by measures dealing with the underlying factors which influence immi-
It is important therefore that European policy-makers take into account the views of the countries from where immigrants come, and of their long-term interests which are largely determined by their development needs.

The flows of migration

From the 1960s to the mid-1970s, the Maghreb and Turkish immigrants entering Europe went to France, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Sweden, and the flows were controlled by agreements between the countries of origin and those receiving the immigrants. These immigrants were young unskilled workers, fulfilling the labour needs of European industries. Such workers undertook hard, badly paid work which was unacceptable to the indigenous labour force and even to well-established immigrants.

Following the closure of frontiers in 1973-74, immigration was restricted to the families of workers entering under family reunification auspices as well as a small number of highly skilled workers. In these countries closing the frontiers was to some extent an illusion. Most steady inflows cannot be reduced because they are legally based on the fundamental right to family life. At least in part, the remaining inflows, both legal and illegal, can also be considered as irreducible, since they are a solution to the shortage of workers in some sectors of the European labour market (see annex 1 for France). However, since 1990, the scale of family reunification flows from the Maghreb countries entering France, the Netherlands and Belgium have decreased or stabilised compared with previous inflows. If this phenomenon is confirmed in the coming years, it will mean that family reunification is losing its importance.

The countries of southern Europe have only recently been confronted by the phenomenon of migration inflows. The flows
of immigration, above all of Moroccans towards Spain, and Moroccans and Tunisians towards Italy, began at the start of the 1980s. This was partly the result of the stopping of immigration into countries traditionally allowing it, and partly of the demands of companies engaged in subcontracting and of the informal economy, seeking workers who would accept low pay and "flexible" working-conditions. To start with, immigration was encouraged by the absence of legal controls over entry and residence. Once this trend had started, it tended to be self-perpetuating, being fed by immigrant networks. Now that regulations exist, and that frontier controls have become more effective, the numbers of immigrants seem to have stabilised. Nevertheless there remains the problem of illegal immigration.

Up to now, flows directed towards southern Europe have consisted of individual young unskilled workers, but the phenomenon of family reunification is already under way, notably among the Moroccan immigrants in Italy, and will require an adequate policy response.

We can say that in general the labour market in the European countries requires immigrant labour which is more adapted to their needs, better qualified or more mobile than the internal labour force or than the immigrant workers already legally settled.

If the current rates of immigration seem to be decreasing, the potential rate of immigration will continue to be considerable, given the high pressure to emigrate inside the countries of origin. This phenomenon will be discussed later.

**Maghreb and Turkish populations in Europe**

For the European Union the classification of foreign population (non-EU) by country of origin shows that the Turkish population is the largest, ahead of the Maghreb community
The fact that Turkish immigrants take first place, and that Germany has the highest number of resident immigrants (non-EU) in Europe (5,474 million in 1996) ahead of France (2,285 million in 1996), results not merely from past inflows of immigrants, but also from the special features of German nationality law.

The phenomenon of the growth in the number of immigrants has two explanations (depending on when it started) (see Annex 3). In countries with a long-term immigration tradition, the growth in the number of immigrants from 1973-74 onwards is due to family regrouping as well as the consequential natural growth of the population. We can, for instance, observe that the principle factor in France affecting the increase in its alien population is natural growth: immigrant women from the Maghreb countries have a higher fertility rate than French women. As a result, the percentage of immigrants in the total population has increased solely because of this natural growth. Nevertheless the fertility rate in the second generation of immigrant women approximates France's national average.

In a fairly short space of time, the numbers of foreign residents in Italy and Spain have reached high levels, especially after the "regularisation" law in 1985-86, 1991 and 1996 in Spain, and in 1986-87, 1990-91 and 1995-96 in Italy. In Spain the number of Moroccan residents was estimated at 5,800 in 1985, and at 77,200 in 1996. In Italy the number of Tunisians, estimated at 4,400 in 1985, had grown to 44,800 in 1996, while the Moroccans, some 2,600 in 1985 had increased to 119,500 in 1996.

Current challenges in EU migration policy

A common social and economic policy concerning the immigrants living in the territory of member countries has yet to
appear at the European Union level. It is to be hoped that member countries will at least agree on a system to co-ordinate their existing policies. Harmonising these policies would allow, among other matters, the free movement of workers within the Union to become reality.

It is said that as a matter of policy, both EU and the Maghreb countries must jointly handle the question of migration, but this aim has up to now remained more theoretical than practical.

The first series of co-operation agreements were signed in 1976 between the European Community on the one hand and Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria on the other. An association agreement was signed between the European Community and Turkey. These bilateral agreements foresaw social measures to establish non-discrimination in working conditions, pay and social security benefits of migrants from these countries in any member-nation of the Community. These agreements have remained dormant, given the bilateral agreements with EC countries of origin. Nevertheless the European Court of Justice has taken account of these measures in several of its rulings.

The new association agreements signed in 1995 between the EU and Tunisia and the EU and Morocco, include provisions concerning migrant workers which are no different from previous treaties. Nevertheless these agreements attempt, even if somewhat timidly, to go beyond existing policies concerning workers in Europe, by addressing questions relating to the development of their countries of origin.

To consolidate social co-operation the new agreements have given priority to measures aimed at reducing migratory pressure, notably through programmes for creating employment and developing vocational training in emigration areas, as well as reinstating repatriates returned because of their illegal status in the Economic Union. At the same time in the last few years, it has been the hope that policies such as collaboration for de-
development, trade liberalisation and incentives for private investment could be regarded as an alternative to migration.

**Macro-economic determinants of migration and of migration pressure**

At the international level in general, a migration potential of an economic nature develops among a number of countries, when these countries present different levels of development. Where this imbalance is accompanied by factors influencing individuals by inciting them to emigrate, it will produce would-be-emigrants. The main factors influencing individuals are the limited job prospects or low wages in the country of origin, and the possibility of higher wages and greater employment opportunities in the destination countries.

If we consider only the macro-economic factor existing within a country, the phenomenon of migration pressure can be seen as the result of the interaction of demographic and economic dynamics.

In this chapter of the paper and for comparison purposes, I will include some demographic data concerning Egypt.

The demographic impact

The Maghreb countries, Egypt and Turkey are currently in the process of demographic transition. However, despite rapidly-falling fertility rates, the population pressure is not expected to lift for a long time yet, until the transition is over and the population has stabilised. The impact of this on the labour market is considerable. The pressure on the 15-64 age group will only ease over the long term. In the short and medium term, it will increase as millions of young people already born will be entering the labour market. In the five countries (Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey) studied, the population of 15 to 64 year olds has doubled in absolute terms over two decades (1970s and 1980s); This age group is set to multiply again, by 1.8 between 1990 and 2010 (see Annex 4).

The demographic transition affects the age structure of the population. The working age population (15 to 64 years), as a percentage of the total population, has been increasing since the early 1970s. The percentage, which is currently between 55 and 58 percent in the Maghreb countries and Egypt and 61 percent in Turkey, will reach 70 percent by around 2020-25. The 15-24 age group in particular, which made up about 18 per cent of the population in the period 1950-1980, had risen to 21 percent by 1990 and is set to peak at 22 percent of the population by the end of the century before declining. For comparison purposes, the working age population in Western Europe currently represents 68 percent of the population while the 15-24 age group represents 14 percent (see Annex 5).

Activity rates
The crude activity rates (total labour force as a share in the total population) observed in the Maghreb and Egypt over the last forty years are generally low compared with the European Union countries. This is due to the young population and the low numbers of women in the labour market. In 1990, the overall crude activity rates were 30 per cent in Algeria, 38 percent in Morocco and 35 percent in Tunisia and Egypt. Female activity rates were 15 percent in Algeria, 26 percent in Morocco, 21 percent in Tunisia and 19 percent in Egypt (ILO, 1995). These activity rates are lower than those of other Mediterranean countries. They were 45 percent in France and 40 percent in Italy and Spain in the early 1990s. For the same period, female activity rates were 39 percent in France and 29 percent in Spain and Italy. In Turkey, the activity rates recorded in 1990 were
very high, 44 percent for men and women taken together and 31 percent for women alone, higher even than in some European countries (ILO, 199).

Activity rates are set to rise because of the gradual change in the structure of the population and the increasing number of women entering the job market as a result of socio-economic pressures, higher educational attainment and the growing demand for female labour.

Change in the labour force
As a result of the increase of the working age population (demographic impact) and of the rise of the activity rates, more people have entered the labour force (either with a job or unemployed) and this phenomenon will grow in the future (see Annex 6).

The labour force grew in the 1970s and 1980s at average annual rates that outstripped the growth rate of the total population. In the period 1990-2000, these rates are expected to be 3.4 percent in Algeria, 2.9 percent in Morocco, 2.5 percent in Tunisia, 2.7 percent in Egypt and 1.9 percent in Turkey. Fuelled by rural exodus, urban rates are higher than national ones.

Over the period 1990-2000, the labour force is set to increase from 7 to 14 million in Algeria, 9 to 16 million in Morocco, 3 to 5 million in Tunisia, 20 to 34 million in Egypt and from 25 to 36 million in Turkey. In the case of the Maghreb and Egypt, the figures forecasted for 2020 will mean a doubling of the labour force since the 1980s, and in the case of Turkey, a doubling of the labour force since the late 1970s. The annual flows of new labour force groups have grown and will continue to grow steadily. Taking all the Maghreb countries together, the labour force has been increasing by 700,000 per year in the 1990s and is set to increase by about 850,000 per year in the period 2000-2010. In Egypt, the figures are around 600,000 and 780,000 respectively.

[62]
This increase in the number of economically active persons could represent a growth potential as the dependency ratio will reduce accordingly. In 1990, each working person had 3.4 economically inactive dependants in Algeria, 2.1 in Morocco and 2 in Tunisia, while in the year 2010 the figures will be 2.4 in Algeria and 1.5 in Morocco and Tunisia.

These general labour force projections could be exceeded if the economic situation were to deteriorate. An increase in unemployment could prompt parents to remove their children from school and to send them out to work to swell the family coffers. Moreover, older adults would remain in work beyond the normal retirement age. Finally, the changes currently taking place in the production sectors could lead to a faster-than-predicted increase in female participation because of the development of activities that normally use female labour.

The employment situation
While unemployment rates were generally low in the 1960s and 1970s, they started to climb in the 1980s and 1990s and are now very high and still rising sharply. Urban unemployment rates are generally higher than national ones because the increases in the labour force and female participation rate are above the national average in towns. In Morocco, the urban unemployment rate was reaching 30 per cent in 1995. Unemployment particularly affects young people under 25 and people entering the labour force for the first time.

Neither the current situation nor the trends of employment creation in different sectors give reason to hope that the countries will be able to create sufficient jobs to absorb new jobseekers. Within the framework of structural adjustment measures, the opening of the economy and trade liberalisation could have the long-term effect of increasing employment in unskilled labour-intensive export sectors. In the short term,
however, trade liberalisation, greater imports and structural changes would be more likely to mean an increase in the labour surplus nationally and a rise in unemployment. Labour, particularly new entrants to the labour market, might, in the short term, be absorbed through the informal sector, often in seasonal or part-time jobs. However, the informal sector, particularly the manufacturing industry, could experience a downturn due to competition from imported goods and, in any case, reach a saturation point in terms of its labour absorption capacity.

The labour market situation is the central issue in these economies and job creation is one of the most urgent problems to resolve. The large number of unemployed and under-employed is a socio-economic problem because, besides the connection between unemployment and poverty, unemployment also fosters social and political conflict. The fact that unemployment affects young people more than any other group makes matters even worse.

The opening up of the Maghreb country economies and its impact on the labour market

The long-term aim of the countries under consideration is to restore growth and attract direct foreign investment through structural adjustment. In the short term, however, the cost of adjustment, albeit necessary, could be very high. This constitutes a challenge for the governments concerned. On the one hand, they need to restructure the economy in order to achieve sustained and durable growth and, on the other, they have to reduce poverty and maintain living standards if they are not to be penalised politically and/or prevented from continuing the reforms. Faced with the risks that this challenge raises, the
governments might opt to slow down implementation of adjustment measures despite the negative economic effects that this could have.

Economic policy is currently based on trade liberalisation and on orienting economies outwards. Firms targeting the domestic market will need to succeed in keeping their production costs low and in improving their productivity if they are to withstand competition from imports. On an international level, for this policy to succeed in terms of development, firms will have to be capable of conquering or increasing their share of the world market in the face of competition from other producers. However, in the Maghreb countries, the policy of industrialisation through export promotion is still very weak.

Export strategies and the desire to develop activities for which these countries have comparative advantages at the international level are encouraging the development of labour-intensive activities in the manufacturing industry. Economic development and the expansion of new export-oriented industries require an increase in investment, particularly direct foreign investment. However, the results have not been as good as expected to date. Potential investors in the domestic or foreign markets could be put off by the constraints of the labour market, partly because output prices are higher than in other competing countries. If the goods produced are to be competitive on international markets, labour costs need to be kept as low as possible.

The new free trade agreements between the Maghreb and the European Union

The new association agreements signed in 1995 between the EU and Tunisia and the EU and Morocco postulate the creation of a free trade area. The external trade of the countries is
very largely with Europe. For this reason, within the framework of programmes for structural adjustment and economic growth, free trade agreements with the countries of the EU are seen as essential for the countries of the Maghreb, so as to allow them to enter the world trading system.

A free trade zone should be established progressively over a period of twelve years. The new agreements confirm the preferential treatment currently given by the Community to products from Turkey and the Maghreb countries, and in practice open fully the European markets to Maghreb exports of industrial products and make concessions on the bulk of farm exports. An improvement in this regime is foreseen for farm and fishing products, concerning quotas for duty-free imports and the levels of duty payable above such quota limits.

With the gradual bringing into effect of these agreements, Maghreb businesses will be able to enjoy to the full their comparative advantages thanks to lower labour costs. The Maghreb countries will thus have the incentive to specialise in labour intensive areas like manufacturing against similar imports from elsewhere.

While these agreements, and the close proximity of their markets should encourage the expansion of production in Turkey and the Maghreb countries, and even the relocation of European companies to these areas, the competition from East European and Asiatic production must not be underestimated. In fact the EU markets will also gradually be opened up to imports from Eastern Europe, thanks to preferential agreements, as well as to imports from Asia, as a result of bringing the GATT agreements into effect. Further, in the very sensitive sector of textiles, and with the ending of the multi-fibre agreement, the Maghreb countries will lose their privileged position in comparison with other regions. Competition in this sector is strong, given that in some other geographical areas, production costs are often
lower than those of Turkey or the Maghreb countries. Companies in these last mentioned areas can only expand their exports and attract direct foreign investment if they improve their productivity and marketing, and the countries must maintain a particularly favourable political and economic climate.

Within the framework of the trade agreements, the liberalisation of free trade will be reciprocal. Because of this, the Maghreb countries which up to now have given no concessions to the Community, will progressively eliminate the obstacles to the import of EU manufactured goods and grant it preferential rights for the import of agricultural products. Beyond the loss of tax revenue, the coming into effect of these measures will oblige existing Maghreb companies to endure the competition of European imports.

In the short term, free trade could give rise to the growth of imports into the Maghreb, the deterioration of its balance of trade, the imposition of additional measures to limit public expenditure, a lowering of the standard of living, and in consequence an increase in the pressure to migrate. Despite these negative effects, the opening up of the Maghreb markets to European companies is nevertheless one of the steps necessary to encourage foreign investment. Only in the long term, if the creation of a free trade area succeeds in attracting investment and favours continued economic expansion, can such an area be seen as offering alternatives to emigration.

The question which now arises is the duration of likely harmful effects of the opening up of trade, and how to guarantee that as a second stage there will be an economic lift-off, able to create sufficient employment to satisfy each country's needs. The whole process depends upon there being a sufficiently favourable climate to attract foreign investment, and the relocation of European companies. Targeted steps in co-operation or trade liberalisation can only be considered as accompanying
measures in support of investment projects which must be created by private industry, and they must not be regarded as a substitute for such projects.

**Prospects for future migration**

While the actual definition of migration pressure raises a problem, it is practically impossible to measure it directly. As regards the various factors and their effects on migration pressure, it can be difficult to anticipate their importance. The demographic factor has a bearing on the long term and is fairly easy to measure, given that tomorrow’s working population is already born, and that we can therefore forecast the future increase (up to 20 or 30 years) in the economically active population from the present birth rate. On the other hand, the influence of the economic situation, which has its effects in the short term, is more difficult to assess and forecast. Socio-political changes can also have their effects, and in the very short term.

From the study on migration pressure realised for the ILO, I could conclude that the percentages of migration potential in relative terms presented by these countries are high, which is an additional proof that imbalances in the employment market are still one of the fundamental problems of their economies. Given the absence of appropriate measures designed to support employment growth, the fact must be faced that migration potential will increase rapidly in the future.

This situation could give rise to a certain economic and social instability in the countries to the south of the Mediterranean. European countries should act to support the capacity of the Maghreb countries and Turkey to absorb their labour supply.
If we consider the analysis of the absorption of the labour supply by foreign markets, we see that, while emigration could represent a “buffer” solution in the past, it is clear that, since the closure of the European frontiers, migrations, whether legal or illegal, have provided only a marginal contribution to solving the problem of labour absorption.

Conclusion

With respect to the first issue dealt with in this paper, the phenomenon of migration from the Maghreb countries and Turkey in Europe, we can conclude that, at present, in almost all European countries the migration balance with developing countries is positive. Nevertheless, experiences differ according to the earlier or current scale of the phenomenon, the length of the time the immigrants in question have been in the country, the structure of the flows and the type of policy pursued with regard to immigration population.

The evolution of the migration phenomenon shows that the policy of the host countries can affect the flow of migrant entries, but only in part. In the first place, in traditional immigration countries, the policy of closing frontiers has resulted not in a halt to migration but in a modification of the composition of flows. In the second place, in recent immigration countries, there has been a rise in the flow of workers in an irregular situation.

Generally, we can say that the new flow of authorised worker immigration in Europe is almost exclusively composed of workers with skills in demand. At the same time, unauthorised and seasonal workers seem better able to fulfill the need for mobility, which coincides with the development of small firms, and thus meet current needs in the agricultural and construction sectors.
With respect to the second point taken into consideration in this paper, the potential future influx and the macro-economic determinants of the migration pressure, we can say that if the current rates of immigration seem to be decreasing, the potential rate of immigration will continue to be considerable, given the high pressure to emigrate inside the countries of origin. As we have seen, this is mainly due to the inability of the employment markets in the Maghreb countries and Turkey to create enough jobs to satisfy the increasing numbers of those seeking employment, as young people reach working age.

It is clear from reviewing future labour force trends that the labour market situation is the key issue in the economies of these countries and that the creation of jobs, with acceptable wages, is the greatest challenge facing them in the coming decades. The current situation in the different sectors of the economy, and the economic policy measures taken, suggest that job creation capacity will be inadequate to integrate new job-seekers.

Structural adjustment programmes and economic policy oriented toward trade liberalisation, also have multiple impacts on the labour market, employment and potential migration. Economic development and the opening of the economy could succeed in attracting foreign investment, even though there may be doubts as to whether European production will actually relocate and what foreign investment strategy will be. This might lead to an increase in additional labour demand and hence reduce the migration potential of these countries. Although economic development would be likely to have widespread benefits throughout the population, the short-term effect could be different.

However, modernisation and an outward-oriented economy, if not accompanied by adequate direct foreign investment, could lead to increased imports, lower growth and greater migration.
potential, notably for well-educated young people. Given the absence of appropriate measures to sustain employment growth, it is obvious that the migration potential will quickly increase. This could also lead to a certain degree of economic and social instability in the southern Mediterranean countries.

Bibliography


ANNEX 1

Immigration to France

A: Moroccans

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### Prospects for Future Migration from the Maghreb to Europe: Impact of Economic Policies

#### Immigration to France

C: Turks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>568</td>
<td>2735</td>
<td>82.8</td>
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ANNEX 2

Main groups of developing country nationals residing in the EU (1995)

- Pakistanis
- Iranians
- Indians
- Poles
- Ex-Yugoslavs
- Maghrébians
- Turks

Evolution of Turkey and Maghreb nationals residing in the EU (1954-1995)

- Algerians
- Moroccans
- Tunisians
- Turks

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE MIGRATION FROM THE MAGHREB TO EUROPE:
IMPACT OF ECONOMIC POLICIES
## Annex 3

### France

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<td>44800</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3656</td>
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ANNEX 4

Working Age Population
Evolution (in millions) during the period 1950-1990

Estimates of future increase 1995-2010
Differences between high, medium and low variants of future increase

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE MIGRATION FROM THE MAGHREB TO EUROPE:
IMPACT OF ECONOMIC POLICIES

[81]
Estimates of future increase 1995-2010
Differences between high, medium and low variants of future increase

**TUNISIA**

- 1950: 500
- 1960: 600
- 1970: 700
- 1980: 800
- 1990: 900
- 2000: 1000
- 2010: 1100

**MOROCCO**

- 1950: 500
- 1960: 600
- 1970: 700
- 1980: 800
- 1990: 900
- 2000: 1000
- 2010: 1100
Estimates of future increase 1995-2010
Differences between high, medium and low variants of future increase

Source: data from UN (1994 Revision).
ANNEX 5

Evolution of the Age Structure of Population

ALGERIA

MOROCCO
Evolution of the Age Structure of Population

TUNISIA

TURKEY

Source: data from UN (1994 Revision).
ANNEX 6

Variation in absolute values
Average yearly values

ALGERIA

Working age population
Working age population (low variation)
Working age population (high variation)
Working population
Working population (low variation)
Working population (high variation)
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE MIGRATION FROM THE MAGHREB TO EUROPE: IMPACT OF ECONOMIC POLICIES

Variation in absolute values
Average yearly values

IMMIGRANTS AND THE LABOUR MARKET: THE PORTUGUESE CASE

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Centro de Estudos Sociais, University of Coimbra

João Ferrão
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, University of Lisboa

Jorge Macaísta Malheiros
Centro de Estudos Geográficos, University of Lisboa

Introduction

Portugal, like the other Southern European countries of the EU, has experienced significant growth in the number of working foreigners between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s\(^1\). Despite this increase, the number of foreign workers in the Spanish, Italian and Portuguese labour markets is still relatively low, when compared to the situation in most EU countries.

In Portugal, legal economically active foreigners represent less than 2.5% of the total labour force, whereas this value is close to 4% at the EU level. However, if we segment the analysis by regions, and look particularly at some regions like the Lisbon metropolitan area, and by economic sector (and look at sub-sectors like construction and public works, personal and domestic services, professionals and executives), the significance of the foreign working population within the total labour force is much greater. Furthermore, there is the specific problem of informal work among foreigners, not only because of the estimated numbers of them involved in certain economic activities (e.g. construction and public works), but also because this kind of irregular worker is highly vulnerable.

\(^1\) In 1997, the number of legal foreigners working in Portugal was three times the number recorded in 1983.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the ways in which the foreign working population is integrated into the Portuguese economy. The paper starts with a short overview of recent developments in the labour market, assessing the opportunities for immigrants and their main features as a labour force. We will identify activities where immigrants take the place of domestic labour and others where they are complementary. The second part of the paper is based on information collected in a direct questionnaire applied to economically active foreigners in Portugal and discusses the different categories of active immigrants according to their specific modes of integration into the Portuguese labour market. Because some categories are strongly associated with the informal labour market, the last part of the paper deals more closely with the particular relations and conditions of vulnerability of illegal immigrant workers. Using an interpretative framework, we will outline a critical approach to the relationship between informal unskilled work and immigration.

The information used in this paper was gathered in two research studies on migrants and the labour market in Portugal. Apart from information derived from the Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF) - the government department within the Ministry of Internal Affairs responsible for Immigration, a direct questionnaire was applied to a sample of foreigners working in Portugal. In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with illegal immigrant workers and a diversity of key informants.

Immigration, the transformation of the economy and the labour market in Portugal

Although there have always been some foreigners active in the Portuguese labour market, foreign communities only began to acquire significant visibility after the mid-1970s.

[90]
The de-colonisation process which took place in the aftermath of the revolution of 1974 led to a boom in the arrivals of Africans from the former Portuguese colonies. Between 1975 and the early 1980s, immigration resulted less from the internal pressures of the sectoral Portuguese labour markets affected by high levels of unemployment, and more from the pressure generated by the sudden and disorganised transfer of administrative control in the colonies.

The phase following the early 1980s may be regarded as a second phase in Portugal's immigration cycle. The number of foreigners kept rising at a reasonable rate, but the relative growth in the numbers of Asians (mainly Indians, Pakistanis and Chinese) and South Americans (particularly Brazilians) became more significant (Table 1). Following this pattern, the number of nationalities identified by the SEF increased from 102 (in 1981) to 129 (in 1991). This diversification of the origins of immigrants points to a change in the position of Portugal in the context of international migration, and to a more significant role for the demands of the Portuguese labour market in the recruitment of foreign workers. As has been demonstrated by Bagana (1996, 1998), the role of the informal labour market here should also not be neglected. Currently the opportunities generated in some segments of these markets (e.g. construction, restaurants) provide the basis for migratory networks and for the integration of several African and Asian foreigners into the Portuguese economy.

The performance of the economy between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s was fairly good. In this period both GDP growth and unemployment levels showed very favourable trends when compared to the EU average. The period between 1992 and 1995 was marked by a slow-down in the economy (Fonseca, 1997), but in the last three years economic indicators have again been more favourable.
Table 1  Rates of Change in Numbers of Documented Foreigners, by Geographical Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>-3.08</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>14.46</td>
<td>-17.32</td>
<td>24.59</td>
<td>42.38</td>
<td>42.84</td>
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<td>76.88</td>
<td>57.34</td>
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<td>2.38</td>
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<td>12.60</td>
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<td>85.15</td>
<td>90.63</td>
<td>56.67</td>
<td>80.65</td>
<td>50.22</td>
<td>48.87</td>
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<td>5416.50</td>
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<td>-3.19</td>
<td>122.38</td>
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<td>62.01</td>
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<td>Oceania</td>
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<td>-1.64</td>
<td>106.67</td>
<td>20.16</td>
<td>83.22</td>
<td>30.77</td>
<td>33.61</td>
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<td>146.67</td>
<td>48.65</td>
<td>34.55</td>
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</table>

As far as economic policy is concerned, this period was marked by two major options: economic liberalisation and increasing openness to the outside world. The development of certain strategies aimed at increasing the flexibility of the labour market (temporary work contracts, compulsory retirement and others) was in line with these two main guiding principles.

These two main policy options were backed up by several measures and initiatives which had significant effects on economic variables and therefore, clearly, on the main features of the labour market. The re-privatisation of companies nationalised in the post-revolutionary period, together with a climate of political stability and a liberal party in office, in a favourable international economic context, enabled investment to take off. Moreover, formal accession to the EEC in January 1986 accelerated the internationalisation of the Portuguese economy. Companies started to regard Portugal as a part of a wider market. In addition, the flows of millions of ECU coming from the European Community by way of structural funds bolstered some sectors of economic
activity, like construction and public works. The dynamic growth of the economy, in the late 1980s, accounted for the low rate of unemployment (around 5% in 1990) and the demand for foreign labour in some occupations.

It is important to stress three trends which emerged as a result of the restructuring of the Portuguese economy and which are associated with the development of the labour market. These trends have a number of implications on the recruitment of working foreigners:

i) Male employment decreased at an average annual rate of 0.3%, whilst female employment increased at a yearly rate of 2.4% (during the 1980s). Throughout the 1980s as a whole, jobs created outnumbered jobs lost by more than 250,000;

ii) There was a decline in manufacturing employment, to some extent compensated for by the increase in tertiary employment, both modern and traditional, and, especially after 1986, in construction and public works, particularly in the Lisbon metropolitan area. In this region, employment in this sub-sector of activity increased by 23% between 1986 and 1994 (Employment data of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security);

iii) There was an increase in temporary/unstable employment, as shown by the growing number of short-term contracts (10.9% in 1993 and 12.4% in 1996) and part-time workers (7.2% in 1993 and 8.7% in 1996).

In order to verify the relationship between the features of the Portuguese labour market and the occupational profiles of working foreigners, we will present a short analysis of trends in the numbers of these immigrants by occupational areas, from the mid-1980s onwards.
Table 2  Economically active Foreign Population by Occupational Group

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<td>Professionals and technicians (0/1)</td>
<td>4082</td>
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<td>Directors and managers (2)</td>
<td>1483</td>
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<td>Clerical employees (3)</td>
<td>1508</td>
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<td>Employees in wholesale and retail trades, shopkeepers and vendors (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal and domestic services (5)</td>
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<td>1824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and agricultural workers (6)</td>
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<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and industry workers (7/8/9)</td>
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<td>23552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of workers</strong></td>
<td><strong>22990</strong></td>
<td><strong>49186</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras, Portugal.

The data in Table 2 shows a higher growth rate for skilled professionals (mostly Europeans and Brazilians - Table 3) in relation to the growth rate for unskilled labourers in industry and particularly construction, throughout the 1980s.

This situation can be related to the first stage in the process of internationalisation of the Portuguese economy, which led to an increase in capital flows and greater penetration of foreign enterprises. The latter not only transferred capital but also

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3 As shown by Ferrão and Fonseca (1989: 256) and Duarte, G. (1994), foreign investment in this period grew at a very high rate.
human foreign resources, namely managers and highly skilled professionals (PEIXOTO, 1998). In addition, the modernisation of the Portuguese entrepreneurial fabric, partially underpinned by the in-flow of EU funds, led to a need for more experts in certain areas which were not highly developed in Portugal (design, marketing and others).

Table 3  Occupational structure (%) of the foreign working population by continent - 1996

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<td>- EC (12)</td>
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<td>12.9</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>48.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.98</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1 Around 95% of the African and of the Latin American working population comes from Portuguese-speaking countries.
2 For the designation of the groups, see Table 2.
3 RBANA stands for Relationship between active and non active population.

In the first half of the 1990s there was a reduction in the growth trend for skilled professionals (Table 2). After the initial stage in which the Portuguese economy was opening up, the rate at which foreign enterprises are currently setting up in Portugal has decreased, and internal training programmes have started to include those occupational areas which were previously lacking. By contrast, the dynamic growth of construction and public works in the 1990’s has contributed to a growth in
the numbers of unskilled workers of foreign origin, not only in the formal labour market (Table 2) but also in the informal market. Despite the increase in the number of unskilled immigrants arriving from Asian countries (India and Pakistan), most of these workers are still coming from the Portuguese-speaking African Countries (Table 3).

However, it is the personal and domestic services sector which has shown the highest employment growth amongst the foreign working population, especially in the present decade. This process is closely related to the presence of African women in the domestic and industrial cleaning sectors and reflects significant regulatory and economic changes. The opportunities granted to illegal immigrants in 1992 and 1996 to apply for legal residence in the country, together with the publicising of the advantages of having work contracts and social security, brought to light the existence of a large number of domestic employees who had previously been working on a completely informal basis. In addition, several private firms as well as public services decided to contract out services such as cleaning. This led to the expansion of firms active in this field.

Another feature of the 1990s is the overall increase in activity rates of the foreign population (Table 3). This is particularly noticeable among African foreigners, and raises two issues: the image of foreign immigrants as being increasingly a “foreign labour force,” and the reinforcing of the image of immigrants as being under-educated and unskilled workers. This last issue ties in with the extremely low numbers of individuals from the PALOP who are registered as employers and self-employed. In fact, for the 1990-1995 period, employers and self-employed represented only 4.2% of the total PALOP economically active population.

Apart from this overall image, it is important to make some final remarks about the occupational structure of the economically active foreign population in Portugal. Currently
this structure shows over-qualification and polarisation as between the highly qualified professions and low-skilled jobs (PIRES, 1993; BAGANHA 1996 and 1998; PEIXOTO 1998; MALHEIROS, 1996). When comparing the occupational structure of active immigrants with the occupational structure of the domestic population in 1991⁴, we obtain a relative value three times higher for the first group. Currently occupational groups 0/1 and 2 represent slightly more than 30% of active immigrants and around 12% of the total population of the country. This over-qualification of the active foreign population is not entirely surprising. On one hand, it fits in with the global theory of labour market polarisation in developed countries as presented by authors like Sassen (1989). On the other hand, the situation in other European countries like the United Kingdom or some Nordic Countries is identical (SALT, 1992 and SALT, 1997).

At the other end of the labour market ladder, foreigners are also over-represented, particularly in the residual category of industrial, construction and building workers. This group included around 45% of legal foreign workers, but represented only 32% of the total economically active population in 1991.

In conclusion, we may say that qualified foreigners were, until very recently, largely complementary to the Portuguese economically active population (BAGANHA, 1996 and 1998). Currently Portugal still has the lowest educational levels of all the EU member states, despite the progress made over the last three decades⁵. Furthermore, there has until very recently been a shortage of skilled labour in some specific professional areas (marketing, design and others), thus explaining the arrival of foreign professionals. However, there is evidence of increasing competition between highly skilled foreigners and nationals in some specific sectors (dentists, medical doctors). In these cases complementarity is, apparently, giving way to substitution.

⁴ This is the last year with relatively comparable data. After 1991, the distribution of the active domestic population by activity sectors follows a classification very different from the one applied by the SEF to active legal immigrants.

⁵ In 1991, two-thirds of the Portuguese active population had minimal levels of education (primary schooling or less).
Unskilled foreigners present in activities like construction and domestic/industrial cleaning make up for some labour shortages and replace the domestic population. Currently the limited number of Portuguese applicants for this kind of job in regions like Lisbon is explained by structural as well as conjunctural factors. On the one hand, the increase in average educational levels of the younger generation leads these persons to look for jobs which have greater economic (and particularly social) value than construction or cleaning. On the other hand, the wage differentials between Portugal and other EU countries like Germany, Belgium or Spain account for the emigration and especially the temporary migration of unskilled Portuguese, thus reinforcing the trend towards opening these labour market segments to unskilled foreign workers. Furthermore, once the first waves of African immigrants become established in sub-sectors like construction, the community network effect starts to operate and progressive ethnicization takes place.

**Migrant categories and their modes of integration into the Portuguese labour market**

Explanations and methodological issues
The relationship between economic change, policy options, outward and inward migration compensation effects and migrants' networking provides the global framework which explains the limited but progressive internationalisation of several labour market sectors. However, in order to understand fully how immigrants are absorbed into the Portuguese labour market, it is important to carry out a deeper and more subtle analysis of the factors leading migrants into specific employment segments and also of the processes associated with their presence in each of the segments.
The goal of this section is therefore to establish a typology of the ways in which immigrant workers who have settled in Portugal are integrated into the labour market. This categorisation seeks to merge two kinds of variables: individual strategy variables (reasons for migration, job search strategies and others) and more “independent” variables associated with the structural operation of the labour market (type of contract, working regime, job stability).

Because the information provided by the available sources is not sufficiently diversified to enable us to carry out this kind of analysis, it was necessary to apply a questionnaire to a sample of working foreigners living in Portugal. This approach also has the advantage of enabling us to analyse fully the basic types of labour market in an interactive way: the primary labour market, the secondary labour market and the informal labour market. Because an extremely high level of informality characterises the economic incorporation of immigrants in Portugal, we have included a section which deals exclusively with this particular issue.

The questionnaire was applied to a stratified sample of 241 working foreigners and included blocks of questions on education and professional training, migration patterns, features of the labour market, future prospects and international contacts.

The sample was broken down according to the following characteristics of the legal economically active population recorded in SEF data for 1990-1996: age, nationality (Table 4), occupational structure and job changes. The number of PALOP citizens included in the sample is proportionally lower than the PALOP citizens in the total number of legal economically active foreigners as recorded by SEF. This situation is intentional and results from two factors: the repetition effect that we get after a certain number of questionnaires applied to the

\[ \text{For a confidence limit of 95%, the standard error associated to the sample (n=241) lies between 1.2% and 6.2% for answers in the proportions of 1% and 50%, respectively.} \]
active workers from the PALOP, and the slow but steady increase in the numbers of foreigners coming from countries outside the EU and the Portuguese-speaking African countries. This strategy was chosen in order to improve the chances of capturing the largest number of forms of integration in the labour market from a relatively small number of interviews.

### Table 4 Basic sample features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Sample fractions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (groups)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 years</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34 years</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49 years</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;49 years</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalities (main groups)(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALOP citizens</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total size of the sample</strong></td>
<td><strong>241 individuals</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The information gathered in this survey underwent the usual bi-dimensional scaling as well as a Factorial Analysis of Multiple Correspondences (FAMC). The final result of the application of this statistical method is a typology of immigrants according to their different modes of integration into the labour market. In the present analysis, labour market variables (occupational trajectory, type of contract, complementary activities, working regime, labour market integration strategies) were introduced as active variables, while other variables (biographical data, future prospects) were left as illustrative variables (supplementary attributes projected over the factorial axes defined by the categories of active variables).

Although the method was applied in its usual statistical formulation, the results presented are an interpretative approach.
to the direct statistical product of the FAMC procedure. The 9 groups retained for analysis after the application of the FAMC and the cluster technique are described and labelled according to the over-represented categories of active variables that define them. Each one of these groups represents a particular mode of labour market integration, as summarised in Table 6.

Table 5  Occupational Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Professionals &amp; similar</th>
<th>Managers &amp; similar</th>
<th>Administrative &amp; similar</th>
<th>Trade and services</th>
<th>Unskilled &amp; Agriculture</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Semi-skilled services</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>Professionals &amp; similar</th>
<th>Managers &amp; similar</th>
<th>Administrative &amp; similar</th>
<th>Trade and services</th>
<th>Unskilled &amp; Agriculture</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Semi-skilled services</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 to 24</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 49</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and more</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continents of Nationality</th>
<th>Professionals &amp; similar</th>
<th>Managers &amp; similar</th>
<th>Administrative &amp; similar</th>
<th>Trade and services</th>
<th>Unskilled &amp; Agriculture</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Semi-skilled services</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa - Palop</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa - Others</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                     | 21.8                   | 4.2                | 5.6                     | 22.2               | 13.4                   | 0.5          | 0.5          | 25.0                  | 6.9   |

Source: Questionnaire applied to a sample of active immigrants (January/February 1998).

Immigrant types and modes of integration into the labour market

Before comparing the different modes of integration in the Portuguese labour market, it is important to remember some features of the occupational structure of foreigners in Portugal (Table 5). Four categories (professionals and similar, those wor-
king in the wholesale and retail trades, unskilled service workers and construction workers) represent more than 80% of active workers interviewed. This distribution, which is highly concentrated in the two extremes of the occupational ladder, reinforces the polarised image of active foreigners settled in Portugal: highly qualified professionals, mostly from Europe and America at one end, and unskilled labourers, overwhelmingly PALOP citizens, at the other.

However, the significance of commercial activities, namely in the case of the Asians, points to an increase in the number of foreigners in occupational fields where their presence was not traditional. The growing presence of Chinese and South Asians in some sectors of trade (e.g. import-export), street vending, restaurants and market fairs is the joint result of the development of networks involving these migrants and of the inclusion of Portugal in Asian migratory systems. Furthermore, recent changes in the retail trade sector, especially in the large urban centres, on both the demand and the supply side, have released some sub-sectors of these activities from the traditional local web of social and family relations which is so typical in small business. The expansion of ethnic restaurants, especially Chinese and Indian, the growing presence of franchising and of national and international retail trade chains, and the ethnicization of some branches of retail and wholesale trade, especially in Lisbon, have opened the door to the employment of foreigners in these activities. This has happened either by way of the networks associated with ethnic businesses, or by way of the retail chains, where the recruitment of workers is largely impersonal, including all kinds of applicants and not just those associated with the network of family and friendship relations.

In order to overcome the limitations of an analysis centred exclusively on national groups and their occupational tasks and
to get a comprehensive overview of the different modes of integration of active immigrants in the Portuguese labour market, we now turn to Table 6. This table enables us to make a comparative reading of the 9 groups obtained with the use of the FAMC.

**Table 6** Typology of Active Immigrants According to Their Modes of Integration in the Portuguese Labour Market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration Modes</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marginal Situations</td>
<td>Unemployed/Uprooted (A1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(employment-non employment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermittence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Marginal Situations</td>
<td>Student-workers (A2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(employment-school)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Marginal Situations</td>
<td>Self-employed women in unskilled services (A3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(employment-domestic sphere)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situations of Vulnerability/Insecurity</td>
<td>Construction workers/overstayer (B1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situations of Stability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Qualifications (wage earners)</td>
<td>Ethnic and unskilled service/retails and wholesale trade employees (B2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>Women employees in unskilled and semi-skilled services (B2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Skilled and Employers</td>
<td>Highly skilled professionals (B3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Directors and highly skilled managers (B3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic entrepreneurs (B3.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first distinctive element is the degree of permanence/intermittence in the labour market. Groups A1, A2 and A3 alternate periods of being in the labour market with periods of being out of it. Group A1 (the unemployed/uprooted) includes the most serious cases of vulnerability and individuals who are on the edge of society. Their exclusion from the labour market is not the product of their own individual decisions but rather
the result of economic circumstances or of specific negative processes affecting those individuals (inability to adapt to the country of destination, illness, workplace accidents). In these circumstances, getting back into the labour market is normally a difficult process leading, frequently, to situations of social deviance (drug addiction, criminal activity...). Groups A2 and A3, although showing a certain level of labour market vulnerability (especially A3), are made up of individuals who implement strategies which lead to alternating between periods of employment and periods in school (youngsters) or employment and the domestic space (especially women).

The 6 groups identified under letter B are present in the labour market on a continuing basis, which does not necessarily mean that they are totally secure. For instance, group B1 (construction worker/overstayer) is made up of males who are in highly insecure jobs. This is shown by the high number of active workers without a contract as well as in the degree of mobility between different places of work and different employers.

As far as the situations of greater labour market stability are concerned, the most favourable modes of integration in the Portuguese labour market are to be found in those groups which include individuals in positions of power or authority resulting from dominant knowledge (Group B3.1 – highly skilled professionals), possession of capital (Group B3.3 – Ethnic entrepreneurs) or both (Group B3.2 – Managers and highly skilled entrepreneurs). Even the members of group B3.1, where wage dependency and limited capital may be regarded as handicaps, they seem to develop successful initiatives to overcome these difficulties.

As far as professionals working in Transnational Corporations (TNC’s) are concerned, their skills and experience are fundamental in understanding their advantageous position in the labour market. In the case of these professionals, the high value of skills and experience increase the costs of replacement born...
by employers and increase employees’ bargaining power. Alongside these, foreign self-employed professionals tend to possess a high level of initiative and to develop tasks which complement their main working activity (Peixoto, 1998).

Although our sample survey does not show the true statistical significance of the types uncovered, it is indisputable that the most frequently encountered type of economic integration of foreign males (construction worker/overstayer – B1) corresponds to the dominant form of economic integration among male immigrants coming from the PALOP.

In our survey, the overwhelming majority (74%) of those working in the above-mentioned sector of the economy did so without a valid contract. This result is hardly a surprise, since all studies on immigration and ethnic communities in Portugal carried out in the last decade point to the same evidence. If we bear in mind that this is not the only type of integration that favours the informal economy (e.g. unemployed/uprooted – A1 – and, partially, self-employed women in unskilled services – A3), it becomes clear that for unskilled occupations, the integration of foreigners in the Portuguese labour market takes place, to a very significant extent, in the underground economy.

In the following section we explore in greater detail the linkage between unskilled immigrant work and the informal labour market in Portugal.

**Immigrants’ options and the informal economy in Portugal**

Discussion of the concept

During the 1980s two competing definitions of the informal economy emerged. The first, adopted by the ILO, identifies the informal economy mainly with urban poverty and underem-
ployment. The second definition sees the informal economy as the “erruption of real market forces in an economy strait-jacketed by state regulation” (in, PORTES, 1994:427).

These competing notions of the informal economy were created and developed to cover realities and the behaviour of economic actors and agents regarded as typical of under-developed societies. The industrial world was supposedly not totally free from economic informality, but the share of the informal economy was considered insignificant, a residue or left-over of pre-modern economic behaviour. Macro-economic as well as micro-economic analysis, and several case studies during the 80s, not only demonstrated that the share of the informal economy was far from insignificant in the industrialised world, but, furthermore, that contrary to what was postulated it was not a residual survivor of past economic forms of labour organisation, production and distribution, but was an expanding segment of the economy, encompassing both traditional and modern economic sectors and activities.

In this new vein, FEIGE (1990: 990) defined the informal economy as covering “those actions of economic agents that fail to adhere to the established institutional rules or are denied their protection” and alternatively, CASTELLS and PORTES (1989:12) defined it as “all income-earning activities that are not regulated by the state in social environments where similar activities are regulated”. As FEIGE (1990:990-992) further elaborated, the informal economy comprises economic actions that bypass costs and are excluded from the protection of laws and administrative rules covering “property relationships, commercial licensing, labour contracts, torts, financing credit, and social security systems”. Given the objectives and aims of the agents involved in informal activities, this segment of the economy generates a fraction of the national income that evades or circumvents tax laws and is not recorded by national accounting systems because

[106]
the economic actors involved do not comply with the established reporting requirements of governmental statistical agencies.

Clearly, the existence and extension of economic informality depends essentially on what at any given time the state and some of its agencies, namely the tax collecting departments and the statistical departments, define as informal. In this sense the informal economy is above all a politically constructed reality. After this reality comes into being, however, it becomes a social phenomenon which can be described in terms of the legal placement of employers and firms as well as of the types of employment such placement generates vis-à-vis the formal and the illegal segments of the economy.

The structure of the labour market, the level of effectiveness of state controls, and the degree of social acceptance or rejection of economic informality varies from country to country, creating different social and economic contexts, some of which are more conducive than others to the development of informal economic activities. Not only does the combination of these factors create different national, social and economic contexts, but within the same economy they may or may not also promote opportunities for informality according to the economic sector involved. And, clearly, integration of immigrants in the informal economy will depend greatly on the social and economic context and on the economic sectors that at any given time and place are involved in it.

The informal economy can be a privileged ground for carrying out several strategies and for the prosecution of different goals by both entrepreneurs and workers. Portes (1994:428-429) proposed a functional classification of informal activities according to their goals that can be summarised as follows:

1. **SURVIVAL** - involves activities connected to "direct subsistence production or simple sale of goods and services in the market" (e.g. construction, home-repairs, street vending).

[107]
2. **DEPENDENT EXPLOITATION** – that “may be oriented towards increasing managerial flexibility and decreasing labour costs of formal firms through off-the-books hiring and subcontracting of informal entrepreneurs”.

3. **GROWTH** – they may be organised for capital accumulation by small firms, through mobilisation of relationships of solidarity, greater flexibility and lower costs (e.g. the highly successful network of artisan micro-producers in central Italy).

Portes’ typology seems to generically cover the goals of entrepreneurs and firms submerged in economic informality, but it is not as all-encompassing on the workers’ side. Baganha (1996) points out that three main reasons for entering into informal arrangements seem to be decisive for workers:

1. **NO CHOICE OPTION** – available job opportunities are only available to job seekers on the informal market. Be it because the job seeker is an illegal immigrant or a minor, or because his/her skills are not required or are blocked in the formal market. The worker in this situation is vulnerable to exploitation.

2. **SAVINGS** – Maximisation of disposable income to increase savings. This type of motivation can be found in those carrying on a second activity in the informal market but having a primary activity in the formal market, and in rural households for building up what Villaverde Cabral has called “defensive savings” (Cabral, 1983:228). But this type of motivation can also be observed in workers whose social security benefits are provided by the household, and who enter directly into informal economic arrangements, and in immigrants who migrate with a very specific purpose (e.g. to build a house, to buy land, to put together a dowry), and want to
return to their countries of origin as soon as possible. In principle, those in this category who enter into informal arrangements are less subject to situations of exploitation than the previous category.

3. CONSUMPTION – this last form of motivation may be found among the same type of actors described in 2, but it is probably more likely to occur among professionals carrying on a second economic activity. This seems to be the category where exploitative behaviour on the part of the employer is very likely to be absent, given the bargaining power of the employee.

With the help of the two typologies presented above, it is possible to develop a comprehensive approach in order to identify the types, motivations and strategies associated with the presence of active foreign workers in the Portuguese labour market.

Immigrants in the informal labour market
A glance at Table 8 shows the importance of illegal immigrant labour, in particular among Asians and PALOP nationals. Using as a reference point the national rate of undeclared employees for 1991 (20.8%), the percentages of Asian and PALOP citizens working without a contract (and therefore classified as undeclared workers) found in our survey are much higher (Table 8). Despite the limitations of such a comparison, due to the differences in the source criteria and in the years of collection, this gives us a preliminary picture of the significance of illegal immigrant labour in the sectors that require significant numbers of unskilled labour.

Despite the significant percentages of foreign workers who do not have a contract in unskilled services and trade, construction and public works is the activity where there is the
highest number of low-skilled illegal immigrants. Currently almost 75% of the immigrants working in the construction sector stated that they had no kind of contract with their employers (Table 8). Even considering the high level of informality in this sector, the placement of immigrants in the informal side of the construction market is clearly higher than the situation experienced by domestic workers.

In these two sectors, the mobility of capital is relatively low due to the limited possibilities for the geographical transfer of outputs (restaurant meals or buildings and infrastructure, for instance). Therefore the international re-location of the production units in search of cheap labour basins - a process so frequent in manufacturing - is hardly possible in sectors like construction or the catering trade. The solution is to import cheap foreign workers, who are even cheaper when enmeshed in the dealings and strategies associated with illegal immigrant labour.

Furthermore, the level of vulnerability of illegal immigrant workers is normally greater than that of nationals in the same situation. First, many illegal foreign workers are staying in the country illegally and are therefore subject to the threat of being reported to the authorities and of possible expulsion, even if expulsion rates among the major immigrant nationalities are extremely low. Table 9 confirms that among Asians and PALOP citizens, not only are there high numbers of "workers without a contract," but that it is also amongst these that there is the lowest instance of applying for and acquiring legal immigrant status.

Secondly, some illegal immigrant workers have limited or no understanding of the regulatory systems of the countries of destination and therefore tend to rely on mediators who frequently take advantage of the newcomers' lack of knowledge. In other cases, they do develop independent strategies, but are
sometimes subject to situations of exploitation or to complex bureaucracy which they are unable to sort out by themselves.

Finally, it is important to stress three basic features of the integration of immigrants in the informal labour market:

• Compared to the domestic population, the foreign population is more vulnerable to job insecurity. In fact, only 39% of the active foreigners interviewed worked with a valid contract. Even considering the workers recorded by official sources, while 89% of domestic workers had a permanent contract in 1995, this value was only 64% for PALOP workers and 82% for foreigners of other nationalities (BAGANHA, 1998).

• The integration of immigrants in the labour market is taking place in sectors where informal employment is rife (retail trade, personal and domestic services...). However, in the construction sector, informality among foreign workers reaches higher levels than among domestic workers.

• Women seem to have a higher degree of job security than men. The percentage of permanent contracts is higher and the incidence of working without a contract is lower. This situation results, first, from their quasi-absence from the economic sector where informality is highest: construction and public works. However, we may assume that the leading role of women in maintaining the stability of households leads them to regard job security as an important issue when choosing a job. Differences in the percentages of PALOP males (70%) and females (94%) registered for social security in 1995 substantiate our hypothesis (BAGANHA, 1998).
### Table 8  Types of Contract

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employees Type of contract</th>
<th>Employers/ Self-employed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Short-term</td>
<td>No contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 24</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 49</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and more</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary or less</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic (6 years)</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic (7 to 9 years)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary/ Professional</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession. &amp; similar</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers &amp; similar</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; similar</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce &amp; hotel.</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled services</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled services</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continents of Nationality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa – PALOP</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa – Others</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire applied to a sample of economically active immigrants (January/February 1998).
Table 9  Residential status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continents of nationality</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Waiting for a final decision</th>
<th>Not legal</th>
<th>No answer/Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa - PALOP</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa - Others</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Waiting for a final decision</th>
<th>Not legal</th>
<th>No answer/Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Waiting for a final decision</th>
<th>Not legal</th>
<th>No answer/Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 a 24</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 a 34</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 a 49</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and more</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years living in Portugal</th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Waiting for a final decision</th>
<th>Not legal</th>
<th>No answer/Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 or less</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 3</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 to 5</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 9</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 19</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 and more</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire applied to a sample of economically active immigrants (January/February 1998).

Taking into account what has been said and the results of the two studies that underpin this paper, the following types of illegal foreign worker in Portugal emerge:

- **The overstayer**: This is the most common type of illegal immigrant and accounts for the majority of cases from the PALOP. This type of immigrant enters Portugal with a short-term visa.
and just stays. The male overstayer is mainly young, with a poor educational background, and goes to work in the construction sector, backed up by contacts within the chain of migration. The major places of settlement are the shantytowns of the Lisbon metropolitan area, although other concentrations may be found in the Porto region and in the Algarve.

- **The asylum seeker**: Although the number of asylum seekers in Portugal is relatively small, several situations where immigrants are working illegally may be found among them. Some of the African, Asian and Eastern European applicants for asylum are, in fact, bogus refugees, who try to use one of the legal ways of entering the country. However, even those who make valid applications have no chance of working in the formal labour market. Under the Portuguese Law on refugees, asylum seekers (those waiting for a final decision on their applications) are not allowed to work in Portugal. Because the subsidies received by asylum seekers are very small, and some final decisions take time, these people are obliged to seek work in the informal market. In some cases, the final decision is negative and the person remains in the country illegally, continuing with his/her occupational activity.

- **The self-made survivor**: This type includes immigrants who are in many cases legal, but carrying on some activity in the informal labour market. There are two main sub-types. On the one hand, women who arrive with their husbands, or alone, and decide after a certain time in the destination country to develop an informal part-time activity on their own (baby-sitting, hairdressing, translations and others). On the other hand, we have males who arrive in the country and join systems of street vending which are more or less controlled by certain groups. This is the case of the Moroccan carpet and leather vendors and of the South Asian peddlers of electronic goods or flowers.
• **The ethnic employee:** This type consists mainly of immigrants coming from China and South Asia entering Portugal with the assistance of organised webs of contacts and traffickers. Sometimes from an urban background, relatively well-educated, their goal is to succeed economically and to set up business in the restaurant trade or commerce; however this takes time and the first years may be spent paying off the initial migration debt.

• **The student-worker:** Frequently, national and foreign students try to develop a part-time occupational activity in order to increase their purchasing power by complementing family funds or grants. This is more frequent in summer, and although the students are legally resident foreigners they frequently go into the informal labour market. The extreme and most vulnerable example is represented by high school and university students from the PALOP (especially Angola and Guinea-Bissau) who are compelled to work because they lose their grants or their governments are unable to pay them in due time. In these cases, the web of contacts of the male students leads them to the construction sector, where several fellow-countrymen work. Frequently, studying and working results in successive exam failures, and leads eventually to their dropping out of school.

• **The uprooted/explorer:** This type also uses the mechanism of overstaying but is of a different background and has a different motivation. Several are young males from Angola, frequently of urban origin (Luanda region) with a relatively high level of education (secondary or even university). They leave Angola for political reasons and often to escape conscription. Despite their education levels and urban habits, their illegal situation coupled with the prejudices against African foreigners and their lesser involvement in the networks that support the integration of immigrants in the labour market seriously limit
their opportunities. Therefore they are frequently confined to the construction sector and some members of this group become involved in deviant behaviour.

Matching the above-mentioned typologies of motivations for employers and for employees to enter into informal arrangements and placing the six types of immigrants integrated into the Portuguese underground economy in the resulting matrix, our findings can be summarised as follows:

**Table 10** Categories of illegal active immigrants according to motivations for joining the informal labour market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firms</th>
<th>Survival</th>
<th>Exploitation</th>
<th>Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants (Individuals)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Choice Option</td>
<td>• Overstayer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Asylum seeker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>• Self-made survivor</td>
<td>• Ethnic employee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Uprooted/Explorer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Student-worker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Final remarks**

This analysis clearly shows clearly that the pressures associated with the demands of the Portuguese labour market played a key role, especially after the mid-1980s, in defining the trends in the composition of the economically active foreign population. However, the market-oriented explanation adopted in this paper only addresses one fundamental side of the question, and does not take into consideration other relevant factors, namely those associated with places of origin. Assuming
that the best explanations for international migration are to be found within the systems approach (Fawcett, 1989; Zlotnik, 1992), it is important to make a few remarks about the factors that interact with the economic issues that form the bulk of our analysis.

First, the over-representation of PALOP\textsuperscript{11} citizens, still dominant in the 1980s and 1990s despite some trends towards the diversification of the foreign communities settled in Portugal, shows the relevance of both cultural links and the networks of migrants established in the second half of the 1970s. The significance of the Brazilian community is partially explained by the same set of factors. Furthermore, the economic crisis in Brazil in the late 1980s, together with Portugal's becoming a full member of the EEC, increased both the desire to leave and increased the attraction to Portugal.

Secondly, changes in Eastern Europe from the late 1980s onwards led to the development of international migratory flows originating in those countries. Portugal was only slightly affected by these movements, but small groups of Romanians, Russians and others settled in the country. In this case, labour market opportunities generated in Portugal play an important role, but it is the information circulating in the migratory channels as well as the actions of the international networks dealing in the traffic of illegal immigrant labour which is decisive.

Our aim in giving these two examples is just to demonstrate the increasing complexity of the Portuguese immigration system. Although our approach is primarily based on the features of the internal labour market, non-economic issues as well as external factors must also be taken into consideration, especially in a progressively more open world, where individual decisions are made on the basis of different sorts of information, collected from several different places.

\textsuperscript{11} PALOP stands for Portuguese Speaking African Country.
As far as the modes of integration of working foreigners into the Portuguese labour market are concerned, this paper has shown that the basic dichotomy between highly skilled professionals and unskilled workers is just one of the features of a complex phenomenon. The identification of nine basic modes of integration into the labour market corresponding to nine types of profiles of active foreign workers enabled us to provide a more comprehensive picture of the ongoing processes of integration, because each of the profiles summarises different features (occupational status, profession, type of contract, strategies associated with job-seeking and others).

Integration of a significant percentage of the African (especially PALOP) and Asian workers carrying on unskilled activities takes place in the informal sector. In the construction sector, there are far more informal foreign workers than in the domestic work sector. The tradition of informality, the lack of effective regulation and the complex chain of relations that is established between the actors involved in construction and public works (big enterprises, small firms, labour recruitment firms, subcontractors, workers and even State institutions) are key explanatory factors for this situation. Furthermore, labour market informality among foreign workers is just one aspect of the overall vulnerability to which they are exposed, a process that frequently involves a lack of understanding of the institutions and bureaucratic procedures of the destination country as well as situations of staying on illegally in the country.

It is possible that the situation today may offer certain immediate advantages, not only to public and private employers (e.g. short-term cost reductions) but also to the foreign workers, because it makes it easier for them to generate savings fast. However, an inability to change the present situation may have very negative consequences for the future. For instance, a crisis in the sectors where there is a higher degree of informal
work among foreigners may lead to a situation in which they are unemployed and without welfare protection. This in turn leads to social tension, especially if Portuguese emigrants temporarily located abroad are unable to renew their contracts.

The new law on foreign workers (Law 20/98 of 12 May) seems to be a positive step in the fight against illegal immigration and the exploitation of illegal immigrant labour. Besides laying down monetary penalties to be applied to companies using illegal immigrants, this law also foresees the possibility of preventing the offending companies from taking part in public tenders and from receiving public or EU funds. Eventually, this new legal device may contribute to a change in the political action of the state authorities and particularly to a new attitude on the part of employers.

References


[119]


MODES OF INSERTION OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS IN THE LABOUR MARKET: THE CASE OF GREECE

Maria Frangouli-Papantoniou
Sociologist

In contrast to the well-organized intra-European migration, the new migration is a spontaneous one, neither solicited by the receiving countries nor desired. Consequently there is no place reserved for migrants in their regular labour market. That is not to say that there is no actual space for migrants to integrate into the labour markets of the receiving countries. At least in the case of Greece they have been integrated in a natural way in response to existing needs.

In order to examine the modes of incorporation of, mainly illegal, migrants into the Greek labour market, certain aspects have to be taken into consideration: the particular characteristics of immigration in Greece, the characteristics of the Greek labour market and the characteristics of migrants as a labour force. It is with these that we will start our presentation.

1. The characteristics of immigration in Greece

Greece as an immigration country belongs, together with the other Southern European countries, to the new immigration countries, that is to the countries which used to be sending countries and have now been transformed into immigrant receiving countries. Among them Greece constitutes an extreme example, in the sense that it was the last country of all to start receiving migrants and at the same time the one that
has become, in the very short time span of two or three years, the country with the largest number of immigrants in relation to its population. According to estimates the number of foreigners in Greece is currently between 800,000 and 1,000,000. And this for a country with a population slightly over 10 million!

Greece has, in the past, only received waves of ethnic Greeks, who arrived in Greece usually in a refugee-like situation. Besides these ethnic Greeks, the other category of foreigners arriving in Greece en masse has been that of refugees. In the years following the Second World War, Greece has received limited waves of refugees, mainly from the Middle East, who have settled in Greece and have been gradually integrated into the society and labour market. Refugees continued to come to Greece, but these were mandate refugees, found in Greece in transit, waiting to be later transferred to overseas immigration countries and not entitled to the right to work.

The number of legal foreigners in Greece has always been limited. Even the estimates of legal foreigners appear very different depending on the statistical source, ranging from 50,000 to 250,000 (not varying very much from one year to another, during recent years)\(^1\). A residence permit does not automatically entitle the holder to a work permit. Many of the foreigners legally residing in Greece did not have the right to work. European Community citizens acquired the right to work in Greece only after the end of the seven-year transition period following the membership of Greece in the European Community, which was only in 1988. If we also take into consideration the significant number of unemployed people among certain categories of legal foreigners in Greece and of the unemployed overall\(^2\), the number of legal foreigners who are integrated into the labour market is even lower.

\(^1\) In the statistics, which present large figures, the people of Greek origin holding dual citizenship are included. However, even if we subtract them from the total figure, the number of legal foreigners appearing in these statistics still remains very high in comparison to the numbers appearing in other statistics. For further details on the statistics about legal foreigners in Greece see

PAPANTONIOU, Antonios,
FRANGOU- 
I PAPANTONIOU, Maria and Artemis
KALAVANOU: First 
Report of the 
comparative research project MIGRINF (Migrants insertion in the informal economy, deviant behaviour and impact on receiving society) financed by the European Commission-TSER Programme. Athens 1996.

Acquiring the right to work as foreigner in Greece has always been very difficult:

Work permits, both under the previous legislation concerning foreigners and the new aliens law 1975/1991, can be issued only when the applicant is still in his/her country of origin. Every year the Minister of Foreign Affairs issues a circular announcing the number of persons per country who can acquire a work permit. Applications for a work position are made only through the employer and are considered only for sectors where there is an insufficient supply of indigenous labour force and no interest on the part of European Union citizens. The number of people from third countries accepted to work in Greece was further reduced when European Community citizens acquired the right to come and work in Greece. Greece has signed, at various times, bilateral agreements with certain countries and it is mainly from these countries that workers have been arriving.

It is only in the middle of the seventies that we can properly speak of foreign labour being present in Greece. The number of "migrant workers" was estimated at that time between 15,000 and 20,000. Since then, the number of legal foreign workers has not significantly increased. For the period 1978-1994 it fluctuated around the 28,000 level with the highest figure, 30,400 work permits, appearing in 1992. For many years, the only sector in which a significant number of foreigners had been employed was that of the merchant marine; but this is a sector apart. People working on ships became visible to Greek society and a reality for the local labour market only when, due to the crisis in the merchant marine in the mid-eighties, they lost their jobs and came ashore. These constituted the first group of illegal workers,
together with some refugees waiting to be resettled or having overstayed after the failure to find a country that would accept them.

It is at the end of the eighties, when changes began to occur in the socialist regimes of the East European countries, that a significant number of people of foreign origin began to flow into Greece. The process has been accelerated in the nineties, due to the fall of the socialist regimes and in particular the opening of the borders between Greece and Albania.

Almost all of the people coming were seeking employment, thus constituting a large potential for the Greek (informal) labour market.

The Greek State was taken by surprise and reacted accordingly. In the beginning it tried to hide the extent of the immigration, putting forward official estimates seriously understating the phenomenon. Its reactions were not well thought out and sometimes absurd. For example, when anxiety arose over the increase in the number of illegal migrant workers, the state, as a counter measure, decided to decrease the already extremely small number of legal foreign workers!

When migrants became so obvious that their existence could not be denied and it proved senseless to artificially disguise their numbers, the reactions of the state became diametrically opposite: it started to exaggerate the numbers and the consequences of the presence of foreigners, putting forward xenophobic arguments – exactly those arguments which have been used in the receiving countries of Central Europe against the Greek Gastarbeiter, except that these arguments were irrelevant in the case of immigrants in Greece. It was, for example, the authorities who first stated that the migrants were taking jobs from the Greeks and were responsible for the increase in unemployment, at a time when no Greek shared this opinion.
It is based on these attitudes of the state that the institutional framework for the migrants has been defined. In 1991 a new aliens law 1975/1991 was passed\(^3\), having as its sole aim the control of migration. Through this law the situation of undocumented migrants has become even more precarious. Not only are they denied the possibility of acquiring a legal status, but they are denied any rights, even the most basic rights safeguarded by the Greek constitution for anyone to be found on Greek soil. The offer of services to illegal migrants -by both public and private institutions- is penalized. This includes health services, except in emergency cases. The situation of legal foreigners was not improved and the law made no provision for their social integration, which remains a concept unknown to the lawmakers.

At the level of society and the economy, however, things went their own way and a very different one at that. They developed in an unplanned natural way.

2. The labour market in Greece

We will now turn to the labour market in Greece in order to document the characteristics which favor the insertion of foreign labour into it.

The Greek economy is characterized by a large sector of underground economy. The contribution of this shadow economy is estimated to be between 30-50% of the GDP. Some authors have reservations about such high figures, suggesting that for approximately 40% of the economic activity in Greece it is not possible to speak of shadow economy as it refers to activities in the extended public sector. Whatever the exact part attributable the underground economy, it is an undeniable fact that it is very large and that, as certain authors put it, it does

\[^3\] Law 1975/191 on “Entry-exit, residence, employment and deportation of aliens and procedure for the recognition of alien refugees and other provisions”.\]
not constitute a byproduct of the economy, but runs through the entire social and economic fabric, the state mechanism included.

It becomes evident that this underground economy is not homogeneous. We have an upper layer of shadow economy where people occupying a job in the formal economy are evading taxes, or have a second economic activity in the underground economy. In their case this happens either because, due to the deterioration of the economic situation in Greece, one salary is not sufficient to cover current expenses, or because they are in pursuit of wealth. In the latter case, these activities are not infrequently linked with infractions of the law beyond those concerning labour legislation and tax evasion. The lower layer of shadow economy is that to which the people who do not have the opportunity to be integrated into the formal labour market have access. It consists of very low level jobs, without social security coverage, in most cases underpaid.

The second relevant characteristic of the Greek labour market, has to do with those seeking employment. In recent decades Greek workers have become less willing to take just any kind of job. The mentality that has developed is one of easy gain with little effort. At the same time they expect to attain through their economic activity an increased spending power. As a result they are not ready to take on just any kind of job, sometimes preferring to remain unemployed or turning to certain types of underground economy of dubious legality rather than taking a low status, strenuous job. Thus, despite the increased unemployment during recent years, a shortage of labour can be seen in certain sectors and certain jobs.

The existence of an extensive domestic underground economy renders the introduction of a large number of illegal
foreign workers into the Greek labour market an almost accepted phenomenon, one which takes place without friction. This is even more so as the demands of the underground economy are of the kind that can be best met by an illegal, foreign work potential. If it is further taken into consideration that at first there was no clash between the positions occupied by foreigners and the positions which would be considered by a Greek employment seeker, things seemed to run very smoothly, though this was taking place at the margin of formal society, of the formal economy, and at the margin of what is lawful.

3. The characteristics of immigrants as a labour force and their place in the Greek labour market

While the number of legal foreigners and legal foreign workers is very restricted, the number of illegal migrants is very significant and most of these belong to the labour force. Consequently, the percentage of foreign workers in the labour force in Greece is higher than the percentage they represent of the total population.

Evidently, as they constitute for the most part an illegal labour force, it is very difficult to establish the exact participation of foreign labour in the Greek labour force. On the basis of the findings of a survey conducted in Northern Greece, the foreign labour force has been estimated to constitute 13% of the total labour force, while the foreign population was estimated at 4% of the total population. If we take into consideration that the foreign population has increased and is now between 800,000 and 1,000,000 and that most are workers, the participation of foreign labour in the total labour force is to be estimated as much higher.

Further, the characteristics of migrants as a labour force are as follows:

As is obvious, the foreign labour concentrates in certain sectors.

According to the Labour Force Survey in the Attica area for the year 1995 the main sectors in which foreign workers are employed are the following:

- the construction sector, with 21%
- housekeeping, with 21%
- the production sector, with 15%
- trade and repairs, with 11%
- hotels and restaurants, with 8%

The rest is distributed in other sectors. The underrepresentation of the primary sector in the results of this Survey can be attributed to the fact that this data is based on the Prefecture of Attica to which the city of Athens belongs and consequently on a high percentage of urban population. Nevertheless, there is available evidence that in the villages of Attica a significant number of foreigners are occupied in agricultural work, in market gardens and in livestock farming.

The distribution of migrant workers per sector appears a little different in the results of the previously mentioned research conducted in Northern Greece. According to that survey:

- The greatest numbers of migrants were employed in agriculture, in particular the seasonal migrants
- In second place, in construction
- In third place, in industrial and service firms mostly operating within the informal economy outside the direct control of fiscal authorities.
Other aspects of the employment of migrants are as follows:

• The wages of illegal migrants are lower than those of Greeks and lower than those of legal migrants. Illegal immigrants usually receive around half of the wage of the corresponding Greek worker, and sometimes even less. Obviously the profit made by the employer is even greater because he also economizes on the cost of social security contributions.

• The illegal migrants concentrate in unskilled labour-intensive sectors

• They take on, in most cases, casual, seasonal jobs

• They have a high turnover

• They are, however, rarely unemployed and the unemployment periods between two jobs are usually short.

The above presentation gives us an overall picture of migrant labour. Of course there are differentiations on the basis of certain significant variables, the most important of which are their status as legals or illegals and their nationality. Specific types of economic activities are represented by specific nationalities. For example, the Africans are very frequently itinerant traders. Such activities do not appear in statistics, either because they are represented in small numbers or because their nature is such that they elude both statistics and surveys.

As for their profile, migrant workers are more frequently male than female, they are often unmarried or their family is still in the country of origin and they are certainly very young. This profile is based on the recent nature of immigration in Greece.

Their educational profile merits particular attention. As is always the case with migrant workers, they are employed in jobs below their educational level and professional qualificati-
ons. But their educational level appears high not only in comparison to the kind of jobs undertaken but also in absolute terms:

The Labour Force Survey gives a positive picture of foreigners with respect to education, and it becomes evident that those having an education of higher level originate also from countries which do not belong to the Western World.

Of special interest with respect to the educational level of foreigners are the results of the research conducted in the Athens prisons in the frame of the MIGRINF research. The educational level of foreign prisoners was found to be higher than that of the Greek prisoners and higher than the Greek national average!

4. The significance of the foreign labour force and how it is valued

Of the most significant positive aspects of the contribution of migrant labour, the following two are to be considered:

- The occupation of work positions which would remain vacant if foreigners were not there, because employers often do not have the financial means to cover the cost of Greek workers in terms of salary and social security contributions, or because no Greek workers apply for the job. To this category belong jobs such as housekeeping, caring for children or old people, and also house repairs. As we have seen from the Labour Force Survey, the participation of foreigners in these kinds of jobs is important, at least in the city of Athens.
The preservation of certain economic activities which would otherwise cease to exist. This is connected with activities in the primary sector and in the production sector. A prominent example in the primary sector is crop harvesting. The high wages demanded by Greeks make harvesting fruits unprofitable and owners frequently choose to let them rot if they are not able to manage the harvest themselves with the assistance of family members. In the production sector, it is mainly the case of small enterprises that would not be viable had they to pay salaries for Greek workers. Foreign illegal labour offers them the possibility of remaining competitive and thus surviving.

In all of the above cases the benefit for the employer is evident and employers promptly recognize it. Most authors seem to be of the opinion that there is a benefit to the local and national economy too, as keeping certain economic activities alive reinforces other economic activities. Rather than increasing unemployment among Greeks, foreign labour is thought to contribute to the maintenance of work positions by Greeks and even to the creation of new ones.

From the point of view of migrants themselves, they are quite satisfied with what they have got. Though many are disillusioned with respect to what they expected the Western World could offer to them mainly in terms of general improvement of their quality of life and participation in a free society where social justice prevails, their opportunities for gain are quite satisfactory in comparison to what they could achieve in their respective countries. The low daily wages they receive in Greece are equivalent to what they might earn for a week or more's work in their own country. Of course, at the same time, given the absence of any protection and their extreme vulnerability, they fall victim to exploitation.
ranging from receiving very low wages to being refused the wages due them under the threat of being denounced to the police in order to be deported. It should, however, be mentioned that this vulnerability of the illegal foreigner often leads to exactly the opposite situation – that of the development of very good and close relations between employers, or other Greeks, and their foreign employee. The employer protects the migrant and provides him with everything that he has no access to, or no formal right to have access to, ranging from providing him with food and shelter to taking him to the doctor, helping him in his contacts with public services and in all crisis situations he might encounter.Neighbors might also behave in a similar way. One of the most amazing findings of the research we conducted in the Athens prisons has been that employers not infrequently continue to show interest in their former foreign employees, even when these are in prison.

It is the authorities and the political world who have been the last to recognize the positive function of migrant labour, or at least to dare to accept it publicly. The tendency has been to tacitly accept the positive elements, to publicly denounce migration, to do everything to derive the greatest possible profit, and to use primitive mechanisms of control. A non-rigid application of the strict provisions of the aliens law -rendered possible by the general situation of informality prevailing in Greek society- allows the situation to be manipulated by the authorities in an “underground” way. But the state not only applies the law according to its discretion and in an opportunistic way, but also often acts at the margins of legality. As an illustration of the tendency of the state to take advantage of the migrants by using means of dubious consistency under current legislation, we present the following example: As a compromise between three Ministries, each with divergent inte-
rests, it has finally been decided that employers employing undocumented workers have to declare them to the social security department and pay the corresponding social security contributions from which, however, the worker is not entitled to the benefits which are normally linked with them, as he himself is an illegal, is officially non-existent, and deprived not only of any rights but also of the possibility of having rights. A more pronounced example, this time, however, not directly related to the labour market, but rather to the overall situation of migrants and with serious repercussions for the labour market too, is that the Greek State has been indulgent in granting (selling) visas to Albanians through the Greek consulate, thus making it possible for them to come and stay in Greece legally. The attitudes of the state appear fundamentally contradictory: on the one hand it denounces the presence of Albanians and holds them responsible for everything bad happening in Greek society and, on the other, not only indulges their presence, but also facilitates it. This attitude of 'promiscuity' towards Albanians would not be possible without its counterpart, which is deportations acting as the most effective and instant control mechanism. Whenever it is considered that Albanians have become too numerous, have outgrown what are assumed to be the needs of the Greek labour market, or for other reasons which are never made public, or even explained to those expected to carry out the orders, the Minister of Public Order orders the police to conduct a sweep away operation, that is an immediate massive deportation of Albanians arrested on the spot. From 1991 until today we have had 1,500,000 cases of deported Albanians. In this way the number of Albanians is -at least temporarily- drastically reduced and this simultaneously reinforces the character of Albanian migration in Greece as a circular, pendulant migration, which is probably considered to better fit the needs of the Greek
labour market. This is a specific situation applying to Albanians, but as Albanians constitute the overwhelming majority of foreigners in Greece this becomes a significant part of the overall picture of immigration in Greece.

Though the situation described above may seem very depressing, in fact, it leaves a margin of manoeuver for migrant workers who in their turn try to get as much profit out of the situation as they can. Of course, their situation remains extremely fragile and precarious, but they adapt their way of acting, of living and of making their living accordingly.

The unsystematic manner of dealing with the situation on the part of the state and the authorities leaves the interplay of the (informal) market forces unobstructed. Whenever and wherever there is a demand on the part of the underground economy there is a response by illegal labour, undocumented migrants taking advantage of the opportunities offered. Of course, through the application of the mechanisms of suppression of migration, certain illegal workers are removed physically from their jobs and Greece, at least temporarily. Their jobs will, however, not remain vacant. Others will come to replace them, while they themselves, most probably, will find other ways to come back to Greece making use of the informal possibilities offered, such as crossing the borders illegally, taking on new identity and/or a new visa.

At a certain moment politicians and authorities started timidly to speak of the positive aspects of the presence of foreigners for the Greek economy. They made reference to all the elements related to the illegal employment of foreigners; they, however, did not dare to declare in an unambiguous manner that it is the illegal labour force from which the economy benefits.

The Greek labour force for its part has tolerated the presence of foreigners well, until recently, because their participation in the labour market did not have serious and extended nega-
tive repercussions on the conditions of employment of the Greeks:

- Until recently there was no major competition between Greek workers and foreign workers because, as we have already said, they tend to concentrate in sectors and jobs of no interest for the Greeks. The competition has taken place at the lowest levels of the labour market, for example, between foreigners and gypsies, concerning the harvesting of crops. The only sector in which there was, in fact, competition has been that of construction. This is the reason that, right from the beginning, the trade unions of construction workers have been in favor of the regularization of migrants. However, the recent deterioration of the Greek economy and the rapid increase of unemployment, which now also affects people who have been working for years has led some of the Greeks, particularly people with families to raise, to accept a job under conditions much below what they would consider as tolerable. This decline in the status of Greek workers has led to increasing competition.

- The presence of migrants does not seem to have had a significant effect in keeping salaries down for Greek workers, as long as there is no substantial competition.

5. Towards ‘regularization’ of illegal immigrants?

From what has been described above it becomes apparent that it is exactly in their quality of being illegals that foreign workers have been valued, along with the fact that they do not disturb the Greek labour force.

This being the situation, one can reflect about the significance and the repercussions of the first regularization campaign in
Greece, which started in January 1998 and is still underway. Questions such as the following arise: Why, at exactly the moment that even the politicians and authorities have started to accept the positive contribution and the indispensability of illegal labour, is regularization decided? How will the situation described above be affected if the irregular labour force we have referred to above turns into a regular one? Is there a place in the formal market for migrant workers and do employers desire them?

We are not going to attempt to answer these questions. It is a debate which is still open and to which we will only try to contribute by bringing relevant evidence from the present situation in Greece, from the experience derived from other countries which have already applied regularization(s) and by presenting certain hypotheses of our own.

Concerning the labour market and employers we could present the following evidence:

- Migrant workers are valued not only because they cost less and because they constitute a flexible and easily exploited work potential. They are also valued because they constitute a hard-working work potential, something which Greeks have long ago ceased to be. Many employers consider them as being reliable and as having a developed work ethic. Some employers satisfied with the migrant(s) they have employed and anxious not to loose them have already expressed in the past a desire to regularize them.
- The regularization campaign has, nevertheless, revealed that the most prevalent tendency remains the opposite: the employers resist the regularization of their employees, not being ready to take on the cost of social security contributions. The greatest difficulty met by undocumented migrants in the process of regularization has been that
of acquiring the required number of working days covered by social security.

- A specific incident is of particular interest, revealing the real forces behind the appearances: In a rural area we have had what could be considered the first 'strike' by irregular workers. The workers stopped working in the fields threatening that they would not come back to work unless their minimum wage was increased. The first reaction on the part of employers has been that if they had to pay them as much as the Greek workers, they did not need them, “they would rather engage Greek people in their place”. The resistance of the employers, however, did not last long and they ended up by accepting the demands of the foreigners.

Input from the experience of other countries that have applied regularization(s) could be of significance in estimating how things will develop in Greece regarding the employment of migrants as regulars. According to the findings of the research conducted in Italy in the framework of MIGRINF\(^7\), regularization has not been successful in achieving the integration into the formal labour market of the regularized illegal migrants. After having managed to provide the authorities with proof of holding a job or a work contract, many migrants changed to another irregular job and were fired by the employer who was not ready to take over the cost of social security, or the work contract or work offer used for the legalization were fake and the migrants went on with their previous irregular jobs. Further, in between the regularizations many have fallen back to irregular status, as they proved unable to continue to meet the requirement of having regular work for renewing their permits.

The aim of regularization undertaken in the various countries was initially to clear the field: illegal migrants and workers without a work permit were not an acceptable phenomenon.

\(^7\) REYNERI, Emilio: Second Report of the comparative research project MIGRINF (Migrants insertion in the informal economy, deviant behaviour and impact on receiving society) financed by the European Commission-TSER Programme. Parma 1998
Through regularization part of them would be turned into legals and the state would feel legitimized to proceed with expulsions for the rest as it believed it had already given them a chance. However, the fact that the various countries have resorted to repeated regularizations together with the presence or persistence of a significant number of illegals in the countries shortly after each regularization, proved that regularizations had fallen short of the expectations invested in them. The recent decision of Italy to proceed with a fourth regularization in the aftermath of the third constitutes a flagrant manifestation that things have not worked as foreseen. It could, however, be maintained that the regularizations did in fact contain, right from their conception, the seed of their failure. Regularizations did not provide the migrants with the possibility of settling, the attribution of legal status was only for a specific period of time, the migrants had to continually prove that they meet the required conditions in order not to loose the status acquired or in order to be eligible for a renewal of the residence/work permit. Predictions have also been disproved due to another mistake, that of believing that borders could be secured and that deportations could constitute an effective measure.

Given this reality which has developed around regularization campaigns, what could be assumed to be the intent and the reason for applying a regularization campaign in a country which is the last to apply one, and which has on its soil the largest number of illegals in comparison to any other country, at the time regularization is applied? Does it express an authentic desire to concede to its migrants a series of rights? We have seen that the spirit of the aliens law of 1991 did not include any idea of improving the situation of legal migrants, even less any intention of promoting integration. Does it really intend and expect to turn a significant part of those constituting a large illegal labour potential into a legal labour force to be
absorbed into the regular labour market? The authorities have presented the regularization campaign in Greece as the most liberal in Europe, because the formal conditions to apply for regular status were minimal. This, however, is true only for the first stage through which the “temporary” right to remain in Greece is accorded. For the second stage of the procedure, which would lead to the acquisition of what is called a “provisional” residence and work permit, decisions about whom to regularize and whom not to are expected to be taken on the basis of the needs of the labour market. The lack of clarity and precision of the Presidential Decrees regulating the legalization procedure make it possible for the state at any moment to change the course of the process in any direction it wishes. The registering of large numbers of foreigners who have entered the first stage of procedure has increased the power of control by the state. How will it use this power? For the moment, the only feedback we have from the regularization process underway consists of the following:

Concerning the numbers, there are 373,000 people who have applied for regularization. The number is very significant, but still covers only about half of the undocumented migrants present in Greece and the main nationality, that of Albanians, is underrepresented. This constitutes the final figure as the application period for legalization was formally closed at the end of May 1998. The number who were able to enter the second stage of the procedure at the end of the Summer of 1998 was only 59,613 resulting in the consecutive postponement of deadlines.

Concerning the behaviour of the state, on the one hand it has conceded an extension of deadlines and on the other it has gone on with deportations of illegal migrants, though it had
been decided to suspend them during the application of legalization procedures. Even migrants who have applied for legalization have been expelled.

The most credible scenario concerning the outcome of regularization and its impact on the incorporation of migrants in the Greek labour market is that no spectacular changes will take place: migrants will continue to work in the informal economy with perhaps short intervals during which they would be engaged under regular conditions. At the moment, even in the countries of Central Europe, where the phenomenon of the underground economy has been, until now, unknown and suppressed, a shadow economy for both indigenous and foreigners is emerging and even increasingly tolerated. It is unrealistic to expect that the incorporation of migrants into the Greek labour market will look much different from what is described in this paper after the regularization campaign has been completed. Nor is it realistic to assume that there is a genuine desire to drastically transform it.
THE CITY AS CONTEXT: APPROACHES TO IMMIGRANTS AND CITIES

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Three weeks ago, a headline on the front page of the Dallas Morning News (September 7, 1998, p 1, 8a, 9a) read “Global Village: Visiting Brooklyn, NY is a bit like taking a trip around the world”.

Passers-by chatter in Russian, while a mother in a sari watches her little girl ride a coin-operated Mickey Mouse in front of a Brighton Beach Avenue store. The two-bit ride clinks an almost incongruous “I’m a Yankee Doodle Dandy”. On the southern tip of Brooklyn, this ocean front neighborhood has become Little Moscow. But take a five-minute drive and the area is Chinatown or the largest Italian community outside of Italy... ... On Labor Day, more than 1 million are expected to attend the West Indian American Day Parade and Carnival. The celebration of Caribbean culture is New York’s largest ethnic parade, surpassing the St. Patrick’s Day Parade... Welcome to Brooklyn, where a person can go around the world, culturally, in 80 hours.”

This single paragraph captures succinctly the face of much of urban America in the late 20th century and has forced us, as social scientists, to explore new ways of describing and theorizing about cities and the ways in which they have incorporated increasingly diverse populations. In the United States, most of this diversity is the result of the so-called fourth wave of immigration that was precipitated by the National Immigration
Act of 1965 and was accelerated after 1980 by further legal reforms in immigration and refugee policy, as well as global economic change and the forces of transnationalism.

My own thinking about the relationship between immigrants and cities dates back almost twenty years. In 1981, I published an article titled “Is the Ethnic Community Inevitable?” The article, which compared the situation of first generation Portuguese immigrants in Paris, France with those in Toronto, Canada (both places where I had carried out anthropological field research) was sparked by the discomfort I felt in applying theory that had been developed to explain the settlement and incorporation of immigrants in cities of North America to the situation in Europe. I wrote of this discomfort as follows:

When I arrived in Toronto to conduct my research, I brought with me all the baggage of traditional participant-observation anthropology. I looked for an ethnic neighborhood, and my search was rewarded by the Kensington Market area in downtown Toronto. In Kensington, Portuguese stores, a Portuguese Church, Portuguese restaurants, and Portuguese families are all clustered together. I had found my “Little Portugal” just as Herbert Gans and William Foote Whyte had found their “Little Italies” and others their “Chinatowns and Cabbagetowns”. But when I arrived in Paris, I found no “Little Portugal” which had carved out its own social niche within the great French metropolis. Not only was I forced to adopt new methods of research (what I called, by the way subway anthropology), but I also had to revise my entire theoretical perspective on immigration and on the patterns of settlement of foreigners in cities. It was necessary to come to terms with the urban structures themselves as they influence the lives of newcomers. It was also necessary to view the formation of a “community”, be it a geographical community or one based on social networks, as a stra-
tegy appropriate in some situations and inappropriate in others. Individuals choose to associate or identify themselves with one another. What factors make such a choice advantageous? What institutions make it possible or likely? (Brettell 1981)

The article went on to discuss the distinct forms of cities as these are related to variables such as: the history and patterns of growth, the place of the city vis-à-vis the nation of which it is a part, the level of industrialization, the location of labor markets, the nature of housing, and the social composition of city residents. I contrasted Toronto as a grid city that is horizontally stratified with the vertical stratification patterns of some parts of Paris within the périphérique. [It should be noted that I was looking at something different from the decidedly ethnic bidonvilles that were also characteristic of the first wave of post-war immigration to the Region Parisienne and that caused great consternation at the time.] I compared the different employment patterns of Portuguese immigrants in these two cities in relation to the structural differences outlined and focused on the residence patterns that they generated. While Portuguese newcomers settled in the houses immediately surrounding Kensington, many Portuguese families in Paris lived in concierge lodgings or sixth floor rooms scattered throughout central Paris. This dispersal was linked in particular to female employment.

In the article I also compared the political and cultural content of national immigration policies, essentially contrasting the pluralistic multiculturalism of Canada – a policy that promotes and nurtures ethnic distinctiveness – with the more assimilationist emphasis on “becoming French” that characterized French policy at the time. In general, the French policy promoted residential dispersal and was linked to an expressed fear of the emergence of ‘ghettos à l’américaine’. At the time efforts
were made even in the public housing projects that were built in the Parisian suburbs (the so-called habitation à loyer modéré) to avoid the concentration in any one building of families of similar national background.

I also addressed the institutions of the ethnic community, arguing that community or community relations implies a set of institutions or organizations within which social interaction can occur or with which group membership can be identified. I was thinking particularly of voluntary associations such as clubs, churches, special schools and commercial establishments. At that time I noted:

The restaurants, small stores, and travel agencies which are ethnic domains in America remain French in France as a result of a law prohibiting non-French citizens from opening and operating such establishments, and as a result of the traditionally heavy concentration of the French themselves in the tertiary sector of the French economy and society.

I also noted the presence of fully Portuguese parishes in Toronto as compared to Portuguese language masses inside chapels of basically French churches in Paris.

All of this led me to the conclusion that the ethnic community, in either a geographical or a social network sense, was not necessarily inevitable and that we, as scholars, had to focus carefully on the conditions for its emergence.

I believe that Paris today has changed, and that certainly the Portuguese, who have by now produced a second, if not a third, generation, have changed although to my knowledge there is still no “little Portugal”. I am also aware of the fact that there are some distinctly ethnic neighborhoods in Paris and that even at that time - in the mid 1970s - other ethnic groups (particularly those of North African origin) had their ethnic neigh-
borhood, the Goutte d’Or of the 18th arrondissement being the prime example (White 1989). Finally, this research was carried out in an era of anthropology that preceded concepts of unbounded and transnational cultures and communities (Appadurai 1991; Basch et. al. 1994; Glick-Schiller et. al. 1995; Gupta 1992; Rouse 1991) and one might want to rethink the arguments I made in light of some of these new conceptualizations.

But none of this invalidates the call to examine critically the theories that we develop to analyze the incorporation of immigrants into cities in one cultural context as we draw on them to sharpen our understanding of similar processes in another urban cultural context. In other words, taking account of “the city as context” is absolutely vital to the comparative study of immigration. Do cities, be it Paris, Vancouver, New York, Miami, London, Sydney, Mexico City, Singapore, Minneapolis, Dallas, or Lisbon, offer the same environment for newcomers just because they are cities?

The concept, “the city as context”, was formulated within my discipline of anthropology when the subfield of urban anthropology was still in its infancy and was part of the challenge to distinguish between anthropology in cities and the anthropology of cities. Jack Rollwagen (1975a:3), in his introduction to a special issue of the journal Urban Anthropology devoted to “the city as context”, questioned the assumption that all cities are similar and therefore that a city into which immigrants settle has no bearing on the life of the members of a group, while John Gulick (1975:11) noted that “the literature is full of references to ‘the city’ or ‘urban society’ as if a homogenous or monolithic entity were being talked about” (See also Smith 1975).

These issues were left relatively unexplored until recently within US sociological and anthropological work, but with the new wave of immigrants they are reemerging. Foner (1987)
revives the “city as context” in the introduction to a series of essays on new immigrants in New York City. More recently, two important monographs have appeared, one an in-depth analysis of Miami and its diverse immigrant populations by Portes and Stepick (1993) and the other a study of “Ethnic Los Angeles” edited by Waldinger and Bozorgmehr (1996). In addition, several authors contributing to the recent OECD publication, “Immigrants, Integration and Cities: Exploring the Links” make particular cities (Berlin, Sydney, Stuttgart, Birmingham) the focus of attention. On an international scale, we have, of course, Saskia Sassen’s (1991) work on the global city, a center of technology, financial production, and support services, and where urban economies are shaped more by translocal economic forces than by local policies.

Clearly each city constitutes a particular social and economic field that has been shaped as much by history as by present-day local, regional, national, and often global forces. As receiving areas for immigrants, cities therefore differ in a number of ways.

1. They can have a shallow or deep history of dealing with immigrants and a balanced or unbalanced distribution of immigrants from one or a number of different sending societies.

If in a particular city one immigrant group is numerically, financially, and possibly politically dominant – for example, the Cubans in Miami – what does this mean for the presence or absence of a sense of commonality with other immigrant groups, particularly the Nicaraguans who share the same language (Portes and Stepick 1993)? How do we compare cities such as New York, Chicago, or Toronto, which have traditional receiving areas for new immigrants that date back to the nineteenth cen-
tury, with cities like Dallas and Atlanta which have only recently begun to experience ethnic heterogeneity? Similar comparisons could be drawn between European cities, Paris versus Lisbon perhaps, or among European nations – a country such as Italy which historically is a sending society has now become a receiving society. My anthropological colleague Jeffrey Cole (1997) has recently addressed this issue, exploring the ambivalent responses of Sicilians to immigrants by contrast with the more politicized anti-immigrant stance of northerners.

2. Cities can be characterized by the presence or absence of residentially-segregated immigrant receiving areas.

An emphasis on “city-as-context”, as Rollwagen (1975b:58) has suggested, permits exploration of the relationship between residential segregation (present or absent) and the cohesiveness of an ethnic population on the one hand, and such issues as the size of the city into which it has settled and the attitudes of long-time residents toward newcomers. If a city has a form of what Massey and Denton (1993), writing about several US cities, have labeled “residential apartheid” or what Loic Wacquant (1994) has described as “hyperghettos” – racially and socioeconomically segregated sections of the inner city characterized by an informal economy, violence in everyday life, and the absence of organizations and institutions – what does this mean for so-called “immigrants of color” – the Haitians in Miami (Stepick 1998) or the Dominicans in New York (Pessar 1995a)? Indeed, Wacquant has compared the stigma and racial divisions of the black belt of Chicago’s south side with the red belt of the Parisian urban periphery where many such immigrants reside. Goode and Schneider (1994), based on research in Philadelphia, describe a divided city where vital ethnic neigh-
borhoods complete with specialty shops, festivals, ethnic churches and local associations exist within an urban center overlaid with tensions between whites and blacks?

3. The immigrant labor market of a city can be heterogeneous or homogenous, segmented or more diverse and the emergence of ethnic enclave economies should be empirically verified in any particular urban context.

The “city-as-context” approach draws attention to variations in the urban labor market and the economic niches into which immigrants can enter. In addition to the service economy, three areas of the urban economy that shape immigrant entrepreneurship have been identified: under-served or abandoned markets such as those in the inner city; low economies of scale such as the taxi business; and the market in ethnic goods and services. It appears that immigrant entrepreneurs have moved into urban economic niches that the native-born overlook, under-exploit, or shun (Light and Sanchez 1987; Light and Rosenstein 1995b). But the extent to which any immigrant population takes advantage of one or all of these opportunities, and the extent to which enclave economies (Bonacich and Modell 1980; Light et. al. 1992; Pessar 1995b; Portes and Manning 1986; Wilson and Portes 1980; Waters and Eschbach 1995; Zhou 1992) emerge varies from group to group as well as from city to city because the economic environment of any particular city is distinct. As Light and Rosenstein (1995a) have observed, the Koreans in New York went into the greengrocer business specializing in ready-to-eat fruits and vegetables in bite size pieces; but not in Los Angeles where they have focused on gasoline service stations, dry cleaning and liquor stores.

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New research has also subjected the supposed benefits of the ethnic enclave as an avenue for social and economic mobility to more careful examination. Kwong (1998), for example, suggests that while this might be the case for Korean entrepreneurs in several cities in the United States (Min 1998) or for the Chinese in San Francisco (Wong 1998), for many of those who live and work in the Chinese enclave in New York, it is a source of enslavement, exploitation, dependence and limited opportunity. I raise the issue of enclave economies and ethnic entrepreneurship because these phenomena are also being documented among immigrant groups in various European countries as well (Boisssevain and Grotenberg 1986; Westwood and Bhachu) and there is therefore ample opportunity for comparative research. Such research will allow us to test and refine models that have been developed largely based on research in North America.

4. Cities can have a particular urban ethos (a dominant set of values) that shape economic and institutional life and attitudes toward immigrants (including the presence or absence of discrimination).

Out of a particular history of economic and political growth, many cities have developed their own ethos. However, rarely addressed are questions such as the extent to which immigrants appropriate the underlying ethos and how it affects economic activity, interethnic relations, immigrant-host relations, and institution-building. In her research on Philadelphia, Judith Goode (1990) describes two important city-wide models of difference that are important to the process of incorporation – one of the city as a pluralistic mosaic composed of different cultures and the other as a place polarized by race, racism and xenophobia.
While the literature has suggested that ethnic small business is often a strategy pursued by immigrants to cope with racism and unemployment (Waldinger, Aldrich and Ward 1990), it could be argued that in cities such as Dallas, where we are developing a project that takes this variable into account, it is instead, or additionally, generated by a business culture ethos and a sense of itself as the "can-do" city. One Pakistani informant who is self-employed told me that he was influenced in his decision to come to Dallas because word had traveled all the way to his village in Pakistan that Dallas offered lots of opportunity and was a good place to start a business.

In an effort to move the "city as context" model in a somewhat different direction, but still based on the same premise that cities are characterized by varying social relations and political economies and often by distinct cultures and symbols, Setha Low (1996, 1997) has formulated a typology of cities. Although ideal type models have their limitations, they do at least orient thinking and certainly Low raises some worthy and provocative questions in the course of her discussion. She begins with delineations of the ethnic city, the gendered city, and the global city.

"There are two dominant streams of research in the study of the ethnic city: the ethnic city as a mosaic of enclaves that are economically, linguistically, and socially self-contained as a strategy of political and economic survival and studies of ethnic groups that may or may not function as enclaves but are defined by their location in the occupational structure, their position in the local immigrant structure, their degree of marginality and/or their historical and racial distinctness as a basis for discrimination and oppression" (Low 1997:405).

Her analysis of gendered cities focuses on issues of homelessness and poverty and global cities are those described pre-
viously by Sassen. To these three she adds a number of other types: the contested city - a site of urban struggle and resistance or where particular groups make social statements through festivals and parades; the deindustrialized city (e.g.: Flint, Michigan); the border city (Alvarez 1995 has written about border culture); the sacred city (many of which exist in the Islamic world); and even the post-modern city (Disney World in Orlando, Florida).

The level of generalizing that this typology encompasses will undoubtedly cause discomfort to some scholars, but in relation to the ethnic city in particular, it is worth asking what European cities have become so recently and what that has meant for interethnic relations as well as host/immigrant relations.

To conclude, what does all this mean for why we are gathered here in Lisbon to address how Portugal can be brought into the Metropolis project? First let me say that while I have carried out research among Portuguese immigrants in Providence, Rhode Island, Toronto, Canada and Paris, France my deep knowledge of Portugal is focused on the rural north as a place of outmigration. I know less about the social structure, and urban housing and labor markets of Lisbon than I do about that of Dallas where I am launching, in collaboration with two colleagues, a study of the insertion of new immigrants into that urban economy. But, as a city that more than twenty years ago received a dramatic influx of retornados from the former African overseas territories; as a city that more recently has become a destination for immigrants from places like Brazil which had traditionally been the welcoming ground for Portuguese emigrants; and as a city that will no doubt experience, if it is not already, an inflow of population from other parts of Africa and the so-called “Third World”, Lisbon should be the subject of research that addresses similar questions raised in other urban contexts, and in other countries - Ireland is a good example -
that only recently have been adjusting to their new status as a place to which people want to come rather than a place they need to leave.

Bibliography


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MINORITY RESIDENTIAL HISTORIES IN THE CITY: CONTEXT, PROCESS AND OUTCOME

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Abstract

The history of minority settlement in European cities is extremely diverse. Descriptive studies tend to ignore the importance of a broad range of influences. Some of these act as general structural underpinnings to the evolution of contemporary European economies and societies, and also differentiate the continent from other world regions. Other forces apply more at the level of individual cities, and act as mechanisms and processes under which minority residential histories evolve. The paper argues that four such meso-level forces are of greatest significance: the economic conjuncture of the city, the ideologies of host society in the face of minorities, the characteristics of the minorities and migrants themselves, and the specific context of the existing urban structure (with a particular emphasis on the housing market and housing geography of the city). The paper considers selected minorities in London, UK, highlighting the diversity of circumstances resulting from the operation of the processes just described. Whilst it is possible to identify the most important factors influencing minority group circumstances, their detailed operation is ultimately specific to individual groups and individual cities.

Introduction

Cities are the product of migration. In the historic past, cities have maintained their populations more by the in-movement of
new residents than through an excess of births over deaths. Today, the rapid growth of urban populations in Third World cities is the direct product of population movement, indirectly also creating high urban natural growth through the constant rejuvenation of the urban population age structure. In the developed world the contemporary role of migration in urban evolution is more complex. Whilst some developed world cities continue to grow through new arrivals, in many other cases, processes of counter-urbanisation are today the norm, with urban population totals stagnating. Migration is not a uni-directional process, and in counter-urbanising societies the net balance has shifted to emphasise departures from the city rather than arrivals.

In all contemporary cases, however, migrants arriving in the city have different characteristics from other population groups – from those who already live in the city, and from those who constitute the migration streams that may be leaving it. The elements of difference between these groups cover the whole range of human attributes – different in terms of demographic structure (particularly involving age and family status), in terms of occupational experiences and backgrounds, in terms of their early milieux of socialisation and education, in terms of the information resources on which they rely, and often in terms of culture. Some of these differences are measurable and directly quantifiable whilst others are more subtle yet equally pervasive. All of the identifications of difference, however, are susceptible to processes of social construction and labelling whereby certain attributes lead to the “othering” of those possessing them whilst other attributes are more “accepted”, particularly by the societies into which the migrants move.

The destination city for migratory movements provides a very important part of the context for what happens once a migratory group has arrived. Professor Brettell has examined this argument, but has also, through her work, demonstrated that the nature of the built environment, and the activities going on within
it, do not provide the only contextual elements for the development of migrant histories. I recognise that this section of the workshop is entitled “Migration and Urban Planning”, with its focus on the impact that urban design and infrastructure has on the integration prospects of migrants. But I want to tackle these issues within a broader model of the various forces at work conditioning the possibilities of integration. After discussing such a broader model, I want to go on to take one part of it, emphasizing housing markets, to highlight the importance of local variations that apply between countries, between time periods, between nearby cities, and between individual minority groups. This contributes towards the overall thrust of my general argument, that each major migrant arrival scenario has its own elements of uniqueness and complexity. Certainly there are strong undercurrents of structural similarity at a certain level of reasoning and explanation, but actual outcomes are contingent on particular local circumstances drawn from urban context, migrant characteristics, the ideologies of host society (which I recognise are largely the topic of discussion at this afternoon’s session), and the economic conjuncture of the period under discussion.

I therefore want to argue that we cannot proceed towards the creation of general policies for the enhancement of migrant integration. The comparative perspective shows that this is not a plausible objective. However, what we can offer to wider spheres of policy discussion is an understanding of the elements at work, and a sort of checklist of the factors that need to be borne in mind in the formulation of policy.

Towards a structural model

The social theoretical framework that I want to adopt this morning is drawn in part from the ideas of Anthony Giddens (1984),
and from the developments of those ideas by geographers. A key suggestion that results from consideration of Giddens’ arguments concerning the duality of structure and agency is that, when applied to the places within which human activities occur, we are dealing with “local variability within a general context” (Johnston, 1984).

That general context can be conceived in the broadest terms and taken as operating at a global, continental or sub-continental scale. I recognise that I am being very simplistic in doing so, but I would put before you the contemporary general context of change in European cities (in other words, at a continental scale) as including a number of factors:

- Globalisation, bringing with it the processes of economic restructuring. Throughout much of Europe this involves de-industrialisation, although in certain areas that we can identify as “semi-peripheries” there have been opportunities created through new industrial growth. Everywhere, however, the service sector has seen rapid advance.
- Changing opportunities for different sectors of society. Some sectors lose out through the forces of globalisation, others gain. A net effect is that the social compositions of European urban populations are changing rapidly. For example, social class mixes are altering, reflecting changing economic activities, employment opportunities, and skill levels required in different sectors of evolving economies.
- A third, partly independent, contextual factor (although some might argue that there are causal links with other elements in my list) concerns demography. European populations are now stagnant in terms of population growth, with the most drastic reductions to below replacement levels of fertility having occurred in the last twenty years in Southern Europe (with Italy and Spain leading the way). In addition, longer-standing
demographic and related social changes are resulting in alterations in norms of household sizes and compositions. Paradoxically, this means that incipient population declines are not to be taken as signs of the solution to urban housing shortages: instead, households continue to increase rapidly through a variety of processes such as the earlier setting up of independent households by young people, more old people staying in their own homes, and family breakdown and divorce.

• A fourth contextual factor for contemporary urban societies in Europe can be labelled as “changing social ideologies”. I am taking the word “ideology” here to mean the series of rules and attributes of signification that tend to serve sectional interests in society, and which are closely linked to concepts of hegemony (Thompson, 1984; Giddens, 1979). If we consider contemporary Europe we find that the presence of rapid ideological change is commonplace, although with a number of very varied trends which overlay each other in different ways in different places. Such trends include the growth of individualism, the accentuation of consumerism, secularisation, claims for ethnic pluralism, and the acceptance of alternative sexualities and shifts in the identification of “others” and “otherness”. We shall return to the role of ideology at a more limited scale in a few moments.

• My fifth general European contextual factor concerns the modification of welfare regimes. Ideologies of privatisation are shifting expectations of the supply of certain welfare elements from the public to the private sector. Esping-Andersen (1990) has identified different models of welfare state, particularly in Europe – the corporatist, the social democratic, and the (neo)liberal. All are changing under the influence of the other contextual factors I have earlier identified – in response to changing economic, demographic and ideological circumstances.
My sixth and final contextual factor is the existence of the EU itself, such that innumerable forms of human societal evolution are now played out within supranational frameworks affecting, for example, economic activity, regional policy, social policy, immigration regulation and so on. And the strength of the EU agenda, particularly in its “single market” and “EMU” guises is such that the EU forms an important part of the contextual structure even in countries that do not currently belong.

I am arguing that these general contextual factors apply to a greater or lesser extent in whatever detailed local situation of urban change we are considering in contemporary Europe. However, there are also a more local series of factors that play a crucial role in determining particular outcomes. We shall now turn to these more local influences relating to the minority residential histories that evolve within particular places and particular urban contexts.

Figure 1 shows the model that I am developing here. The general structural context that I have just outlined for all European cities has an enveloping role. At the more local scale four factors stand out. These, as we shall see in a moment, are significantly variable between places (even within a single country), and they can also change through time in a manner that creates elements of instability. The four factors have here been labelled as: the state of economic conjuncture in the city of settlement; the ideologies of host society; the specific urban context or detail of the city of settlement; and the characteristics of the migrants or minorities (migrants become minorities through time). We can argue that there are interconnections between these four local factors. The state of the economy may play a role in influencing prevailing social ideologies, for example; or the urban context is changed by the presence of minor-
ity groups in certain districts rather than others. Obviously the links between the four factors are complex and two-way, but no attempt to calibrate them is made here.

**Figure 1** General structural context

All four factors, however, working both independently and through their inter-relationships, affect the circumstances of minority groups present in the city. This should not be taken as meaning that all such groups within a single city will find themselves in the same circumstances. Using the model as a guide, a number of reasons can be put forward as to why minority residential histories develop in different ways, and why minority group circumstances are then highly differentiated.

Firstly, date and periods of arrival are crucially important. The enveloping general structural context that I sketched out earlier is in a state of evolution. Many migrant groups arrived in European cities under earlier phases - for example when globalisation was not yet as major a force as it is now, or when deindustrialisation was not yet operative. Within the more local
factors both the state of local economic conjuncture and the details of urban context are in a state of constant change.

Secondly, it is important to disaggregate migrant flows and minority groups according to more detailed characteristics. Whilst in the early days of “Gastarbeiter” flows to Germany it was common to use such a title across all arrivals, it quickly became clear that there were important differences between migrants from, say, Italy, Greece and Turkey which led to different processes of societal evolution among the different groups, resulting in rather different outcomes in terms of issues of integration, adaptation and lifestyle.

This point leads into the third observation – that amongst the various ideologies of host societies, those relating to racism are the most socially constructed, producing strong differentiations in the degree of “otherness” ascribed to particular groups (White, 1998).

The degree of over-generalisation that sometimes occurred in early European discussions of the emergence of migrant communities has been subjected to criticism, as has an early dependence on North American models of ethnic segregation and minority community development (e.g. Glebe and O’Loughlin, 1987). But there has always been a danger of the creation of a particular “European” model of urban ethnic minority evolution which is equally implausible. In particular, any attempt to generalise from the past experiences of north-west European destination societies such as those of France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany and to extrapolate findings to the countries of Southern Europe where large-scale migrant arrivals have been more recent is based on a series of false assumptions. I have argued that there are particular European contexts, influences and processes at work, but the outcomes are variable according to blends of local features. This argument can be taken further by reference to the four major local forces shown in my model.
The four local forces

I. Economic conjuncture

Massive migration flows have been a constant feature of post-war Europe as a whole, but with shifting major destinations, and occurring under a variety of economic circumstances. The earliest post-war years were marked by the “return” (or expulsion) of millions of Volksdeutsche from East-Central Europe in circumstances of political persecution in their places of origin and economic devastation at their destinations (White, 1984).

The mass of movement into the cities of much of North-West Europe (in some cases, such as France, including internal population movement as well as international flows) occurred in conditions of labour shortage in Fordist economic structures at times of high growth rates from the mid 1950s to the early 1970s. In such circumstances migrants were quickly drawn into existing economic activities and participated in established labour structures, albeit often through processes involving the replacement of indigenous labour (Castles and Kosack 1973).

The onset of slower economic growth in the mid 1970s, and progressive restructuring since then, have not halted migration flows into North-West Europe. Firstly there were the well-known flows of family members to convert migrant groups into settled minority communities with more balanced compositional structures (Castles et al. 1984). Such flows bore little direct relationship to economic conjuncture, but the changing economic fortunes of the cities of destination, and their progressive shift towards Post-Fordist structures, meant that newly arriving migrants were faced with altered employment opportunities in comparison with earlier arrivals. Such economic circumstances also meant that subsequent generations of individuals born to former migrants in destination cities were unable to follow their parents into the same employment sectors.
A second feature of the last 25 years in Europe has been the rapid growth of what had previously been a relatively unimportant migration flow – that of personnel (generally of high skill levels) transferred between cities by international organisations or by transnational corporations. Such transfers reflect globalisation processes, and therefore also reflect and contribute to the accentuation of differences in economic fortune between different levels of society, and between different places. The flows of highly skilled migrants between the cities of the developed world may well be adding to aspects of polarisation in urban society (White, in press), but they are only strongly marked in the small number of cities that have pretensions to some form of global city status. There have been very few arrivals of such new migrants in most of the industrial cities of Europe that hosted earlier labour migrant flows: instead it has been London, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt (among others) that have been the beneficiaries of in-movement.

The final element of local economic conjuncture that I want to raise here, and the most obviously significant one for the city in which we are today, concerns large-scale movement into Southern Europe over the last twenty to thirty years (King and Black, 1997). Such movement has occurred in very different conditions from the labour movements of the past into other European countries such as Germany or Switzerland. Whilst certain southern European regions have presented the conditions of “semi-peripheries” which have had some attraction to manufacturing activities, they have not needed imported labour. Instead much international movement into southern European cities has involved the creation of new, or in some cases the re-establishment of old, service activities. To take Rome as an example, the Bangladeshi community there has established complex and highly market-sensitive networks of street trading
(Knights, 1997) whilst the Filipina group has revitalised the domestic service sector (Chell, 1997). A common finding throughout southern European cities has been of the very high levels of self-employment amongst the new migration streams (e.g. Malheiros, 1997, on Lisbon), this being a direct reflection of the overall economic conjunctures they find themselves in. The contrast with the Fordist industrial workers imported into Germany in the 1960s by major employers is immense.

My argument here is that economic opportunities for migrants and minority communities are strongly differentiated according to sector, and have been variable through time. In the circumstances of what have been termed “new spatial divisions of labour” (Massey, 1984) there are also profound variations between cities even within individual countries. Considerations of the circumstances of migrant communities at any time or place need to pay full attention to the histories of the economic conjunctures that have affected them and to which they have responded.

II. The ideologies of host society
Under this heading I want to concentrate briefly on the ideologies that most directly affect minority groups. Obviously a number of ideological dimensions play important roles – such as ideologies of patriarchy, of democracy, or concerning the role of civil society. Michael Walzer in a brilliant recent book (1997) has produced a stimulating critique of ideologies of toleration, and has illustrated these by reference to society’s attitudes to minorities.

I want briefly to discuss here three types of direct ideology in host society as it concerns ethnic groups of migrant origin. And I also want to stress the importance of locality, and of disjunctions within ideologies. The role of human agents becomes very important in such discussions (relating to ideas raised
earlier in this paper flowing from Giddens’ interpretations of the duality of structure and agency). Ideologies can be challenged, reinforced, or modified through the ways in which human agents respond to them, and such challenges occur within localities in relation to the circumstances of those localities and the human agents who people them. Ideologies may thus vary at different spatial scales, with the prevailing national ideology (for example of exclusion) sometimes being overturned (for example by ideologies of multiculturalism) at more local scales or as everyday rules in the lives of individuals.

The three prevailing ideologies of societal response to minority group presences in Europe can be labelled “differential exclusion”, “assimilation”, and “pluralism”, taking these labels from Castles (1995). Entzinger (1994) earlier identified the same responses but with slightly different labels. We might note that the “melting-pot” ideology that has had some currency in the USA is not represented in Europe, although Canadian “multiculturalism” is similar to European “pluralism”.

Ideologies of differential exclusion operate in an extremely functionalist manner to make “use” of minority groups through incorporating them into certain areas of activity (generally the labour market) whilst maintaining their exclusion from other areas (particularly citizenship). Germany is perhaps the classic case of a European state retaining this ideology. In the German case its roots lie in the origins of ideas of German citizenship and of the German nation, which have strongly ethno-cultural groundings (Halfmann, 1997). Immigrants and their descendants (for whom the acquisition of German citizenship remains extremely difficult) remain “others”, with little prospect of full integration or official acceptance.

Nevertheless, we may note that even in Germany there have been shifting boundaries of differential exclusion. For example, whereas immigrants were once kept out of social housing by
restrictions on entry criteria, and attempts were once made in West Berlin to prohibit their movement to certain districts of the city (Holzner, 1982), both of these restrictions have now long since been removed.

The second type of response to minority group presence is through an ideology of assimilation, involving policies seeking to incorporate minorities into host society through encouraging them to adapt. France is the major European example of this response. A crucial clause in French naturalisation legislation explicitly states that the candidate must “demonstrate his or her assimilation to the French community”: the latest legislation (dating from 1993) provides for a faster track to naturalisation for those from French-speaking countries who are thus seen as more easy to assimilate (Costa-Lascoux, 1993).

An ideology of assimilation refuses to make separate provision for minority groups other than through measures that will aid assimilation. Education is a classic sphere of conflict here, such as has been demonstrated in France through the affaire du foulard in which Muslim girls have been forbidden to wear the scarf in schools since this is a demonstration of a cultural “difference” that is abhorrent to the authorities.

One problem with both the ideologies of differential exclusion and of assimilation lies in the discordance between the legal definitions and the practical implications of citizenship. Legal definitions of the “included” and the “excluded” may not accord with everyday practices of “othering” within society, where much finer distinctions are commonly made than occur within legal statutes. Thus, certain groups in certain places and at certain times may effectively be “included” within many aspects of civil society yet remain “foreign” in legal terms. Such a circumstance now effectively applies in both France and Germany for many migrant groups of European origins, amongst them those of Portuguese, Spanish and Italian ancestry.
The third ideology on the part of host societies is that of "pluralism" or "multiculturalism", under which policies seek to promulgate the acceptance of minorities as "separate" entities (White, 1998), not expected to give up their differences from host society, but granted equal rights. Such policies have often been pursued at local levels, for example in the UK where left-wing local authorities have favoured such ideologies whilst other authorities have shunned them: in Germany the Land of Berlin has recently adopted multicultural objectives (Vertovec, 1996). The Netherlands has a record of promoting equal rights for minority communities, for example in housing and welfare rights, whilst there has also been full recognition of Islamic schools (Dwyer and Meyer, 1995).

My examples of the three ideologies have been taken from Northern European situations, where such ideologies have perhaps been most established. Within the newer migrant destinations of Southern Europe it is arguable that the full emergence of such ideologies has not yet occurred, or at least not in fully worked out form. Public opinion appears sometimes to be still ambivalent (Misiti et al., 1995), although there are also signs of the rise of more exclusionary rhetoric, particularly in Italy (Zincone, 1993), which would suggest the establishment of ideologies of "differential exclusion".

The existence of changing ideological positions within host societies, and the selectivity of the issues where minority groups are "included" or "excluded" creates considerable complexities for the circumstances of minority groups in individual cities. Few groups today are completely excluded (gypsies perhaps being the closest to this situation in many places): certain degrees of incorporation or legitimation have occurred for almost everyone - whether it is through economic roles played, through exotic foods and restaurants, through cultural festivals, or through the approval of individuals as sports personalities or entertainers.
But the extent of incorporation is highly variable between different places and for different groups.

III. Migrant and minority characteristics
A number of points have been made earlier in this paper concerning variations in the characteristics of migrants and minorities within Europe. We have seen how, at the macro scale, different periods and different regions have witnessed different migrant arrivals - Fordist guestworkers, post-industrial petty traders, skilled corporate transients. In the introduction to this paper I argued that arriving migrants were always likely to be different from existing urban population groups.

We can measure a number of these differences through censuses or social surveys - for example distinguishing age structures, sex balances, family sizes, nationalities, places of origin, employment structures, household incomes and so on. These obviously play a role in conditioning a number of the demands that minority groups place on their environments - for example for housing, or education. However, it is also important to recognise that part of the significance of minority group characteristics lies in the social constructions that are placed upon the minorities and how they are “labelled”. Thus their circumstances are conditioned not just by what their characteristics actually are, but also by how they are perceived to be. Within contemporary Europe one obvious example of this argument occurs in the general labelling of disparate migrants from very diverse origins as being “Islamic” when this may actually be only a secondary aspect of their identity, and when the term itself represents an over-generalisation ignoring considerable internal variation and even antagonism between sub-groups (Gerholm and Lithman, 1988).

Because of the complexities of migration streams into European cities (both in terms of timing and of migrant char-
acteristics), and because processes of social construction, labelling and racialisation have been determined differently in different places (as a result of complex European histories of colonialism) the nature of minority group identities varies from place to place. This, therefore, forms another set of local controls on migrant circumstances.

IV. Urban context
Finally I come to the major theme of this morning’s session - urban context. There is no one model of the European city, such that urban contexts vary across the continent. Certainly European cities share certain features - they are virtually all of considerable antiquity so that recent migrants have arrived in well-established urban structures; almost all European cities have had significant planning controls in operation over extended periods of time such that free market development has been mediated by planned intervention; and in almost all European countries a backdrop to urban evolution in recent years has been the existence of welfare state mechanisms of which the most significant for our present discussion relate to the provision and availability of social housing. However, beyond these broad similarities, European cities display a dazzling variety of configurations, attesting to the very diverse cultural traditions and historical legacies present. The configuration, perception and use of urban space is highly variable even between cities within individual countries.

Certain elements of urban context are of particular importance in conditioning the circumstances of ethnic minority groups, and a number of these are also related to the other three local forces I have been describing. To take a single example, the location of industry within the city, taken alongside the economic conjuncture of the city at the time of arrival of the migrants, and the ideology towards their presence have
formed a powerful set of forces acting on migrant residential histories. In many German cities the peripheral nature of the large industrial plants that migrants were drawn to was overlain with an ideology of differential exclusion that wished to maintain migrants primarily in their role as a labour force and to keep them unintegrated with German society. Employers were thus required to provide accommodation for their migrant workers which they customarily did close to their plant. Even thirty years later the legacy of these early influences is present in a situation where, although many migrants have now moved to more “classic” inner-city districts, the suburbanisation of minorities is still greater in a number of German cities than it is elsewhere.

Alternative reasons for suburbanisation occur in Dutch cities, for here the very high level of social housing provision (the majority of housing units in Amsterdam, for example), coupled with the early acceptance of minorities as having rights of access to such housing (a result of Dutch pluralistic ideologies) means that the concentrations of foreigners are often at their greatest in suburban housing estates (Musterd et al., 1998), such as Bijlmermeer at the edge of Amsterdam.

These two examples have a wider significance, because they also show that similar outcomes in different cities can result from very different processes. It is important that consideration of the urban circumstances of minority groups should not proceed simply via description but should also seek to analyse patterns of causality.

Whilst the operation of the existing housing market is obviously of great importance, a further attribute of local urban context consists of the actions of “planning” in its broadest sense – in other words, not just urban planning but social and other forms of planning, along with attempts at social engineering within the city. In this respect many European societies have
looked to what are perceived as the “evils” of North American cities and have set their faces against the creation or maintenance of “ghettos”. Such objectives have lain behind planned interventions in a number of cities, despite the fact that analysis has consistently shown that the extent of segregation in European cities (at least in residential terms – the aspect of the ghetto that is most feared) is very much lower than in the cities of the USA (e.g. Peach 1996 on London; Musterd et al. 1998 on several cities). The measures taken to tackle the problem of incipient ghetto formation have varied from place to place. In Paris the Goutte d’Or neighbourhood, dominated in the public imagination by North Africans, was specifically targeted for urban renewal, with consequent displacement of the residents, with the interesting feature that all planning images of the reconstructed district showed an entirely white replacement population (Vuddamalay et al., 1991). In Birmingham, England a policy was briefly applied of refusing to allocate social housing tenancies to ethnic minorities in areas where there were already minority group households (Flett, 1982). The attempts made by the Berlin authorities to withhold residence permits from foreigners wishing to move into three districts of the city have been mentioned earlier in the paper.

In actual practice, the degree of control that planners can exercise over where individuals will live is relatively limited – at least in terms of direct controls. Indirectly, planning has an influence through its effect on free market rents and property purchase values. But in situations where host society ideologies see minority groups as “others”, it is arguable that prices partly reflect the distributions of minorities anyway. This is not to say that more major forces such as gentrification can not rewrite, via free market mechanisms, previous minority group distributions: such has clearly been the case in central Amsterdam in recent years (Musterd et al., 1998).
Housing and residential segregation

As a final section of this paper it is illuminating to concentrate on the residential segregation of ethnic minorities in European cities and the relationship of such segregation to the housing market. Such a focus demonstrates both the importance of the processes identified earlier, and the degree of variety in the outcomes that are present today. Minority group residential histories have certain structural influences in common, but the detailed processes within places have led to rather different results.

"Segregation" is a term which itself needs problematising (Brun and Rhein, 1994). It is too often used without real consideration of meaning, or used in a negative sense as something that is undesirable (Kesteloot et al., 1997). "Integration" is sometimes taken as its antithesis, but this is not a supportable position since this concept is also very loosely used, too often in the sense of "assimilation". Some form of integration could be argued to exist under all three of the prevailing ideologies defined earlier - it may only be in limited sectors (such as the labour market) in the ideology of "differential exclusion", whilst in "pluralistic" ideologies integration could be argued to exist even where there is very limited contact between groups.

Despite these recognised problems with terms, I will retain a concept of "segregation" within the city here as having a certain significance because of the point made a little earlier - that a particular concern of public policy in many European cities, and a feature of vernacular discourses, has been anxiety over the developing characteristics of certain neighbourhoods inhabited by ethnic minority populations.

The diversity of patterns of minority group distributions in European cities is immense. In a recent comparative evaluation of
such distributions in eight European cities, Musterd et al. (1998) identify four types of distribution. These (ibid. pp. 184-5) are:

1. Patterns where minorities are found in many locations throughout the city, but with particular concentrations near the city centre.
2. Patterns where minorities are found in many locations, but with the particular concentrations being away from the city centre.
3. Patterns where minorities are predominantly found in city centres.
4. Patterns where minorities are predominantly found away from the centre.

These are descriptive categories which, as suggested earlier, leave on one side the question of process. They also generalise across the experience of a diversity of ethnic minority groups.

Let me illustrate these points by reference to a single case – that of London. I am here using data on spatial distributions derived from the population census of 1991. The British census is the only one in Europe to ascertain the self-defined ethnicity of respondents (rather than their citizenship status), and it does so only for rather broad and unsatisfactory groups. For certain minority communities recourse is still needed to place of birth information. What I am trying to do here is to provide a broad brush view of the urban circumstances of selected groups in London, demonstrating the significance of the wider factors discussed earlier in this paper.

The minority groups I have selected for discussion are: those identifying themselves as having a Black Caribbean ethnicity; those identifying themselves as of Indian ethnicity; those of Bangladeshi ethnicity; and finally a group defined in terms of place of birth – the Japanese. Table 1 gives some basic information about these groups. The four groups concerned estab-
lished themselves in London at different periods, these also relating to the macro-scale economic conjuncture of Europe as a whole. Thus the Black Caribbeans and Indians arrived during a period of labour shortage in Britain, the Bangladeshis during a period of stagnation, whilst the Japanese are the product of London's role as a global city under processes of globalisation.

Table 1  Circumstances of selected minority groups in London, 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population (000s)</td>
<td>291.0</td>
<td>347.1</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of origin of community</td>
<td>1950s/1960s</td>
<td>Late</td>
<td>1960s/1970s</td>
<td>1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic circumstances at time of origin</td>
<td>Service employment</td>
<td>Varied employment (services, manufacturing, commerce)</td>
<td>Small-scale manufacturing</td>
<td>Transnational corporation employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host society ideology</td>
<td>Negative but with selective incorporation (e.g. through sport, music)</td>
<td>Selective incorporation (particularly food)</td>
<td>Strongly negative</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing sectors</td>
<td>44% owner occupied</td>
<td>79% owner occupied</td>
<td>26% owner occupied</td>
<td>over 90% private rented*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5% private rented</td>
<td>7% private rented</td>
<td>6% private rented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39% social housing</td>
<td>10% social housing</td>
<td>58% social housing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe overcrowding (more than 1.5 persons per room)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>less than 1%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of segregation (from 0=no segregation to 100=complete segregation)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = information derived from community interviews rather than the census.
Local community ideologies have been negative towards three of the groups (those of ex-colonial origins) although with signs of progressive change in some cases. Selective incorporation into wider society has occurred, partly via various cultural artefacts such as music and food, but partly also through sport in the case of those of Black Caribbean ethnicity. Official attitudes have also varied markedly between the local governments of different London boroughs (or districts). Amongst Indians upward social mobility through education has been particularly marked, with increases amongst this group in the numbers of the professionally qualified practising throughout society (Robinson, 1996). Bangladeshis are strongly negatively stereotyped (often actually as “Pakis” or Pakistanis), and are generally “tainted” by associations with Islam. Feelings towards the Japanese are neutral – indeed, they represent a generally unnoticed minority, except in the areas where they live.

In Britain, and to some extent elsewhere, it has been common to place emphasis on ethnic minorities’ relationships with housing markets (Rex and Moore, 1967). The political ideologies of housing in Britain (particularly during the 1980s immediately prior to the date of the census data in Table 1) see owner occupation (with its connotations of long-term capital acquisition) as the “norm” to be aspired to. Social housing is being increasingly marginalised as a residual sector for those who themselves constitute the more vulnerable elements in society. Patterns of housing are therefore an interesting indicator of ethnic minority circumstances. The picture for the four separate groups is very different. Indians have progressed into owner-occupied accommodation to an even greater extent than the “white” population (58 per cent), whilst owner-occupation amongst Black Caribbeans is also increasing, overtaking social housing tenancies during the 1980s. By contrast, the most important single sector for Bangladeshis in London is that of
social housing. The very high levels of overcrowding among Bangladeshi households reflect more generally poor housing standards in this community.

The Japanese provide a strong contrast with the other three groups. Constraints on their activities derived from economic position or host society ideology are clearly less. However, the nature of the migration system they are involved in, with its short-term relocations as internal transfers within corporate organisations, produces only a very narrow interface with a London housing market in which in 1991 only 12 per cent of all households lived in privately rented accommodation. Amongst the Japanese this was the almost exclusive sector of residence.

These differences in the circumstances of the four groups are translated into very different distribution patterns within London (Figures 2 to 5). Figure 2 shows the patterns of over and under-representation of Black Caribbeans through the use of an index – the location quotient. Three strong areas of over-representation occur, surrounding the inner city in which such residents are largely absent. These areas of over-representation do not generally overlap with the areas of concentration of the Indian population (Figure 3), London's largest ethnic minority group. Amongst the Indians, the areas of concentration occur further away from the city centre, emphasising areas of older suburban owner-occupation. This contrasts with the Black Caribbeans who live in both social housing estates and older owner-occupied properties in the fringes of the inner city. In Figure 4 the Bangladeshi community is seen as highly spatially concentrated, partly in the inner city (although not within the financial heart of the City of London itself). In fact it is one census ward (or district) close to London's old docklands area that the Bangladeshi population actually constitutes the majority of residents – the only ward in the whole of London where “whites” are not in the majority. The degree of residential separation of the groups
under consideration is shown as a row in Table 1, where it can be seen that the index of segregation of the Bangladeshis is considerably higher than that of the Black Caribbeans or the Indians.

We might expect the distribution of the Japanese to be free from many of the locational constraints imposed on the other three groups, but in practice their levels of residential concentration are as high as among the Bangladeshis, albeit in two or three clusters rather than in only one area. Given the fact that private renting is an unimportant tenure sector in London, the Japanese are in fact constrained to certain areas where it occurs; and given their income levels (resulting from their economic position), they are exclusively interested in high quality rented properties. In addition, the short-term nature of their stay in London (normally three years) encourages them to stay closely integrated within the Japanese community, sending their children to the Japanese school, patronising the Japanese shopping mall and so on. Thus Figure 5 shows a pattern of Japanese residential concentrations that is very different from the other groups, but which shows similar concentration levels, albeit within districts of London from which the other groups I’ve considered are largely absent.

Let me try to sum up my conclusions from this brief consideration of minority group circumstances in a single city. What we see here are the diversities of outcomes that result from different residential histories amongst migrant groups and their descendants. The whole range of macro-scale structural influences and meso-scale mechanisms working at the level of individual cities come together to produce varied contemporary patterns. And at the micro-scale, beyond the level of detail that I have been working at today, I would argue that human agencies play a role as individuals and groups respond creatively to the circumstances in which they find themselves and to the influences and constraints as they understand them to be.
Discussion

What I have tried to do in this paper is to argue that in seeking to gain knowledge of the situation of minority groups in contemporary cities (and I have here been concentrating on European cities), we have to be aware of both the breadth of vision needed and of the limitations to our work.

I have argued that descriptions of minority circumstances, whilst having a certain value as a snapshot at a point in time, tell us nothing about causal processes, nor about the trajectories of change in those circumstances. In order to understand the situation of particular migrant groups in particular cities, we need to contextualise our understanding in a very broad manner. We need to recognise that urban models imported from other major world regions may be unhelpful. We need to be aware of the large-scale structural influences at work as backdrops to all contemporary change in Europe, but also to accept that the translation of these influences into urban “events” and patterns is mediated by a variety of mechanisms and processes that are changeable through time and space.

Such an argument accentuates the potential importance of comparative studies of the situations of minorities in different urban contexts, since it is through such studies that the broader structural forces can be evaluated. However, it also produces a warning that detailed urban modelling in an attempt to produce predictive models is likely to be unhelpful or positively misleading. The limits to the general or comparative approach must be recognised. But in moving down to more detailed policy-oriented studies of individual cities, and of particular minority groups, there is value in considering the local variations on the general themes put forward in this paper – economic conjuncture, host society ideologies, migrant or minority characteristics, and the local urban context (par-
ticularly highlighting the housing market). Each of these factors creates both opportunities and barriers to particular trajectories for the future. If they are taken into account in our research and not simply taken for granted then we can all learn from each other's work, and local issues of ameliorating the conditions of minorities can be addressed from a position of conceptual strength rather than partial and imperfect understanding.

References

MINORITY RESIDENTIAL HISTORIES IN THE CITY:
CONTEXT, PROCESS AND OUTCOME


Figure 2  Location Quotients, Black Caribbeans, 1991
Figure 3  Location Quotients, Indians, 1991
MINORITY RESIDENTIAL HISTORIES IN THE CITY:
CONTEXT, PROCESS AND OUTCOME

Figure 4  Location Quotients, Bangladeshis, 1991

- 0 to 0.5
- 0.5 to 1.0
- 1.0 to 2.0
- over 2.0 (maximum 47.3)

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[185]
Figure 5  Japan-born as a percentage of all residents

- Less than 0.12%
- 0.13 to 0.25% (0.25=LQ 1)
- 0.26 to 0.51%
- 0.52 to 1.28%
- Over 1.28% (maximum 7.68)

10 km
IMMIGRATION, SOCIAL-SPATIAL MARGINALISATION AND URBAN PLANNING IN LISBON: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES

Maria Lucinda Fonseca
Centro de Estudos Geográficos, University of Lisboa

Economic restructuring and urban spatial segregation

The restructuring of Western Europe's urban economies of the last two decades has occurred side by side with deep demographic changes in the social and ethnic composition of its inhabitants and territorial organisation. Economic restructuring was mainly based on the expansion of service activities, on technological innovation, on the change of entrepreneurial structures and on the flexibility of working processes and labour markets.

In the context of social change, the most striking phenomena are the bipolarisation of income due to increasing disparities in the wages of hyper-skilled workers and unskilled workers, and the emergence of new social rifts based on job position, gender, race and ethnicity.

Labour market flexibility is shown in precarious employment, increasing unemployment - mainly among young people and women trying to enter working life - and in long term unemployment due to lack of adjustment between the skills of the unemployed principally those who are older- and emerging job opportunities.

In this restructuring process, metropolitan economies try to simultaneously attract large private and public investment and new inhabitants, generating new forms of poverty and social marginality (Sassen, 1991; 1996; Mingione, 1996; Salgueiro et al., 1997). This new emerging poverty in developed societies of the 80's and 90's is intimately connected to increasing unem-
ployment and demographic ageing, in a context in which social security structures are less and less able to assure survival income for the unemployed, their dependents, the ill, and the elderly.

In addition to being one of the most vulnerable groups, immigrants from Third World countries, some of them living in the country illegally, are often victims of discrimination by the autochthonous population or immigrants from other ethnic groups.

Recent research carried out in a number of cities in developed countries has shown that living conditions among immigrant communities have worsened. First, there is unemployment, which affects the immigrant population more deeply than it does national workers. This is largely due to the high proportion of foreign workers with low skills, working in the industrial sectors more affected by economic crisis and which have contribute more to the decline of industrial employment (Mingione, 1995; 1996; Sassen, 1996; Kesteloot, 1995; Tripier, 1990). On the other hand, a large number of unskilled foreign workers joining the labour force increases the precariousness of jobs and keeps wages in industry, construction, and most unskilled jobs at levels which are unacceptable to national workers (Malheiros, 1997).

Employment vulnerability, higher unemployment among less skilled immigrants often residing in the country illegally; inability to speak the language of the destination country; difficulty in accessing health and educational services, and lack of information about the social support available in reception regions, all lead to marginalisation and the social segregation of these communities. This, in turn, reinforces the social segregation of the space in the urban settlements where they live.

The trend is for immigrants and poor ethnic minorities to concentrate in ghettos with high internal homogeneity, located near the centre or on the outskirts of large cities. This is, in turn, enhanced by spatial-self segregation mechanisms, based on solidarity networks developed by these communities.

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Immigration in Southern European countries is a recent phenomenon with specific features that make it different from the migration flows that supplied developed Northern and Central European countries with cheap labour from the close of World War II to the beginning of the ‘70s:

- Side by side with immigration from Third World countries, which is often illegal, there are highly skilled labour migration flows from developed countries, namely from Western Europe. These flows are closely connected with the internationalisation process and economic expansion of these countries’ economies. The immigrants perform extremely skilled activities mainly in transnational enterprises;
- The development of immigration to Spain, Greece and Portugal coincided with the economic restructuring process, the growth of foreign investment, and the launching of huge public utility projects and projects for building basic infrastructures (water and electricity supply, sewage, transport and communications networks). These projects were co-financed by European Community structural funds and involved large-scale construction development in the main urban areas;
- As labour migration to Southern European metropolises was taking place, there were migration flows of primarily British and German retirees to coastal southern areas of Portugal and Spain. The move was sparked by the excellent climate in these areas and a difference in the cost of living which allowed retirees greater purchasing power. (Eaton, 1996; Esteves, 1991; Fonseca, 1997; Guibentif, 1996; Gozálvez Pérez, 1996; Malheiro, 1996; Williams and Patterson, 1998).

The increase in geographic and social diversification of migration flows to large Southern European cities, plus the economic and urban restructuring processes of the ‘80s and ‘90s have con-
tributed toward enhancing the economic, social and ethnic segregation of urban spaces: tertiarisation of central areas, economic revitalisation and improvement of derelict neighbourhoods, riverside and declining industrial areas have been rehabilitated while the long-time inhabitants have been moved to the suburbs and the rehabilitated areas appropriated by the well-off. (Tello and Martinez, 1994; Leontidou, 1990; Salgueiro et al., 1997).

Keeping these problems in mind, we will try in this paper to study Lisbon, in order to learn how the economic and social restructuring processes and migration phenomena interact with urban planning. How does urban planning create territories of exclusion and social and ethnic segregation in Metropolitan Lisbon? How can urban planning help politicians solve some of the integration problems experienced by immigrants and ethnic minorities in urban areas?

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part contains a short summary of international migrations to the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon and attempts to outline relationships among immigration, economic and urban restructuring and socio-ethnic differentiation of the metropolitan territory. We will then discuss the legal context and reception practices used with foreign immigrants and the role of local authorities and non-governmental organisations in the integration of immigrants and poor ethnic minorities. Finally, in the last part, we give our contribution toward defining urban planning and immigrant integration policies.

Immigration to Metropolitan Lisbon

On December 31, 1996, 111,333 foreign citizens\(^1\), legally resided in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. This number represented 66.4% of the immigrants registered in mainland Portugal and only 4.4% of the population living in the Metropolitan

\(\text{\[190\]}\)
Area in 1991. According to the 1960 Census, there were 15,317 foreigners living in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, 12,891 of whom were Europeans and 2,134 Americans. Together they represented only 1.0% of the region's total inhabitants.

The most significant community of European origin was made up of Spaniards, mostly from Galicia, who worked in taverns, the coal business, restaurants and other areas of trade. The other communities were very small and were essentially made up of highly skilled workers from transnational enterprises and persons working at foreign embassies and consulates in Portugal. Brazilians and Americans residing in greater Lisbon were basically counter-flows from Portuguese emigration to Brazil and the US before the European migration cycle had begun (Malheiros, 1996; Fonseca, 1997).

The number of international migrants remained relatively stable during the '60s and continued to be composed primarily of Europeans. By the end of the '60s, the cumulative effects of European emigration, the colonial war, and the urban and industrial expansion of Metropolitan Lisbon had led to employment opportunities in construction and in the unskilled services for the first wave of emigrants coming from Cape Verde. However, these immigrants were only registered as foreigners after their country's independence in 1975 and thus, are not referred to in the official statistics.

Owing to the process of de-colonisation, 1974 and 1975 saw the arrival of refugees, mainly to the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. These were immigrants coming from Portuguese Speaking Countries in Africa (called the PALOPs in Portuguese) and some Indians and Pakistanis living in Mozambique. Although many of these refugees chose to keep Portuguese nationality, they played a very important role in the subsequent development of new migration flows coming from those countries. They established informal networks to support the settling of
relatives, friends and fellow-countrymen, and set up, in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, real communities with the same territorial basis of origin and with many social, professional, cultural and ethnic similarities (Fonseca, 1997).

In the 1981 Census, the number of Africans living in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area registered by the local authorities, already outstripped the number of Europeans (27,415 and 12834, respectively). In 1986 the Capeverdians were the largest foreign community in the region, representing 42.3% of legal immigrants registered by Portugal’s Customs and Immigration Service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras).

During the ‘80s, immigration of an economic nature was intensified with immigrants, many of whom entered the country illegally, coming from a wider range of areas of origin. While the Capeverdian migration flow gathered strength, after the mid-‘80s there was also a strong upswing in immigration flows from other Portuguese Speaking Countries in Africa and from Brazil, which between 1986 and 1991, outstripped the growth rates of Capeverdian immigration (Table 1).

Although Brazilian migration is also linked to questions of labour, it is essentially different from African migration, since incoming Brazilians have a much higher social and economic level than PALOP and Asian immigrants.

Although the Portuguese economy entered a new depression cycle during the ‘90s, with a growing decline in gross domestic product and a rise in unemployment – mainly among youngsters looking for their 1st job –, the number of foreign immigrants with residence permits in Portugal between 1991 and 1996 grew at a faster rate than in the previous 5 year period (51.7% and 31.0% respectively). Although part of that increase was the result of the 1992/1993 legalisation campaign, the huge number of legalisation requests (35,082) presented during the second period of legalisation between March 31 and 1993.
December 11, 1996 clearly shows the scope of migration pressure on Portugal and the volume of illegal migration.

Table 1  Evolution of foreign population in Lisbon Metropolitan Area, by regions and countries of origin, (1986-1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>Growth rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>86/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54,190</td>
<td>69,642</td>
<td>111,333</td>
<td>28.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>13,482</td>
<td>16,954</td>
<td>22,909</td>
<td>25.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>15,311</td>
<td>21,026</td>
<td>37.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European countries</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>1,883</td>
<td>14.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>31,996</td>
<td>39,447</td>
<td>66,929</td>
<td>23.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALOP</td>
<td>31,279</td>
<td>38,005</td>
<td>64,168</td>
<td>21.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>22,946</td>
<td>25,718</td>
<td>34,256</td>
<td>12.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2,616</td>
<td>3,964</td>
<td>13,172</td>
<td>51.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2,047</td>
<td>3,399</td>
<td>9,028</td>
<td>66.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2,237</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>3,866</td>
<td>32.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Tome and Prince</td>
<td>1,433</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>3,846</td>
<td>36.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>5,736</td>
<td>9,296</td>
<td>15,756</td>
<td>62.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>4,372</td>
<td>51.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>31.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2,793</td>
<td>4,981</td>
<td>9,503</td>
<td>78.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>31.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2,686</td>
<td>3,603</td>
<td>5,321</td>
<td>34.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>909</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>857</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless and double nationality people</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>10.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not available; 1 referred to EU 12.
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs – Foreign and Frontier Services.
In only ten years, between 1986 and 1996, the number of foreigners with a residence permit living in the districts of Lisbon and Setúbal grew 105.5% with Angolans and Guineans having the highest growth rates. They were followed by Brazilians and people from Saint Tome and Príncipe. Albeit to a much smaller degree, during the same period of time, the number of Asians, mainly Chinese, Indians and Pakistanis, almost doubled.

Simultaneously, the number of legal immigrants, coming from a wider range of locations increased and could be seen in the growing number of people from the European Union, Eastern Europe and other African nationals who settled in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. By the end of 1996, the largest immigrant communities in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area were made up of citizens from the former African colonies, mainly from Cape Verde, followed at a great distance by people from the European Community and Brazil (Table 2).

Table 2  Foreign population, with legal situation, living in Portugal and in Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA), in 31st December 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>LMA</th>
<th>% of LMA in the country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172912</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>111333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>47315</td>
<td>27.36</td>
<td>22909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>43732</td>
<td>25.29</td>
<td>21026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>81176</td>
<td>46.95</td>
<td>66929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALOP</td>
<td>77114</td>
<td>44.60</td>
<td>64168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Verde</td>
<td>39546</td>
<td>22.87</td>
<td>34256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>36516</td>
<td>21.12</td>
<td>15756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>20082</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>9503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>8503</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>4372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>7140</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>5321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2380</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs – Foreign and Frontier Services.
The high concentration of immigrants, mainly Africans and Asians, in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (Table 2) is due to job opportunities. As the capital and the country's main centre of economic activity, it is also where the construction and public works sectors enjoyed the most dynamic growth after the mid-'80s (Expo98, Vasco da Gama Bridge and train crossing on the April 25 Bridge, urbanisation projects, infrastructures and public utilities).

Immigration to Portugal, and especially to the Lisbon region, is predominantly labour migration. This is readily seen in the predominance of young males of a fairly young age and an activity rate that is higher than that of the Portuguese population. The social and employment structure of the working population shows that the largest group is made up of industrial, construction and transport workers (48.87%), followed by highly-skilled professionals and technical staff and related (23.7%). Each of the remaining professional groups represents between 4% and 8% of the total, with the exception of agriculture which only employs 1.3% of the foreign workers (Fig. 1).

This professional structure is slightly biased since it does not include illegal workers, yet it shows that in Portugal, foreigners can be divided into two segments of the labour market. The larger segment is made up of unskilled individuals who perform the hardest and worst-paid tasks in construction work, cleaning and transport services, and domestic work. On the other extreme of the social and professional hierarchy, we have administrators, directors, board managers, and highly educated professionals from developed European countries, the U.S, and Brazil who accompany the deindustrialisation process taking place in rich Central and Northern European countries and the industrial relocation in Mediterranean countries.

Asians, primarily those of Indian origin, differ from the other groups in that there are a large number of people employed in trade who have set up two kinds of ethnic commercial enclaves.
which are easily identifiable in Lisbon. This is the case of the furniture shops belonging to the Ishmaelite community, and the goods coming from the Far East (toys, crockery, small appliances and fripperies) controlled by Hindus and Muslims (Malheiros, 1995).

More recently, there has also been an appreciable increase in Chinese restaurants which reflects the expanding migratory flow from China. The success of Indian and Chinese immigrants in the trading sector is due to professional experience acquired before arriving in Portugal, and the business opportunities generated by economic growth in Portugal as well as increased spending among Portuguese families during the last two decades.
The differences in the social composition of immigrant communities in Portugal are invariably linked to motivation, expectations, and different migration routes. The trends in African and Asian immigration have followed a course that in many ways is similar to Portuguese emigration to France and Germany in the '60s and early '70s. This is long-term or definite immigration, that hinges largely on information and personal contacts provided by relatives, friends and fellow-countrymen. In the receiving areas, immigrants tend to concentrate in very specific territories, setting up fairly closed communities with the same territorial origin and with strong personal and professional affinities.

On the other hand, immigration of highly skilled professionals is, in most cases, short-term temporary migration and involves individuals, hired by transnational companies, who are looking for fast avenues for career advancement.

Brazilian immigration reflects a more complex process. On the one hand, we have highly skilled professionals seeking the opportunities that the development of foreign investment and business growth in Portugal may provide. On the other hand, we see a growing number of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, namely in the trading sector, restaurants, hotels, and other services who have left Brazil because of that country's serious economic problems and social instability.

Immigration and socio-ethnic differentiation in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area

The Lisbon Metropolitan Area: spatial organisation

The Lisbon Metropolitan Area is composed of 18 municipalities with a total area of 4,643.26 square km or 5.2% of mainland Portugal's surface area and 2,535,669 inhabitants who make up 27.1% of the country's population.
Fig. 2 The Lisbon Metropolitan Area: population density, 1991

The distribution of the population the metropolitan area is quite unbalanced with 26.16% living in the municipality of Lisbon, 48.58% in the suburban municipalities of the Tagus River's northern bank and 25.26% on the Setúbal peninsula. As figure 2 shows, Lisbon's suburban growth went hand in hand with the development of transport and is reflected in the different shapes of the urbanised areas. On the north bank we see a bird-foot shape, where the "toes" correspond to railway lines and main road axes (Cascais, Sintra, Loures and Vila Franca de Xira). On the Setúbal peninsula, the fact that river transport was the only way to get to Lisbon before the April 25 Bridge was built in 1966, led to ring-like urbanisation parallel to the river.

In the '80s the municipality of Lisbon suffered a sharp demographic decline with a drop of 144,543 inhabitants (-17.9%) whereas the other municipalities of the Metropolitan Area experienced a 10.5% growth (Fig. 3). The decrease in Lisbon's inhabitants was mainly caused by the number of young working people moving to the suburbs and was reinforced by the tertiarisation of central areas and by the skyrocketing prices of land in prime and more centrally located areas.

Central Lisbon was the area most affected by the population decrease and only four peripheral parishes with recent residential buildings underwent a positive demographic evolution (Fig. 3). The desertification of the city centre is reflected in demographic ageing, the concentration of service sector employment, an increase in daily commuting, traffic jams, real estate speculation, suburban residential expansion which is extremely dependent on Lisbon for jobs and services, and rising crime, specifically in areas which are more deserted at night (CML, 1992).

The territorial pattern of economic activities is closely related to transport development and still shows a huge concentration in the municipality of Lisbon, not only on employment but also in gross value added.
Fig. 3  The Lisbon Metropolitan Area: population growth (1981-91)

Source: INE - Population Census 1991 (with own calculations).
Although there was a decline after the mid '80s, in 1993 workers in manufacturing in the municipality of Lisbon still accounted for 23.8% of all regional employment in this sector. This is because many companies have their headquarters inside Lisbon and their production units in other municipalities belonging to the Metropolitan Area. Outside the capital, three important industrial areas can be defined: the Setúbal peninsula; the Amadora - Sintra axis including some areas in the municipalities of Oeiras and Cascais; and the Tagus Valley, including the east part of Loures municipality, Vila Franca de Xira municipality, the Carregado area and Azambuja municipality (Fonseca, 1998, p. 160).

The service sector is the main economic sector in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. During the '80s it experienced an 18.8% growth rate and in 1991 accounted for 69.8% of this region's active population.

Even though there was an increase in the population working in the trade and service sectors in all municipalities belonging to the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, according to estimates published in the Lisbon Strategic Plan, at the beginning of the '90s, more than half of the employment in this sector was still concentrated in the Lisbon municipality. Thus, the tertiarisation of the working population living in the remaining municipalities of the metropolitan territory is mainly due to Lisbon's suburban expansion to more distant areas. This expansion has only been possible because of improved access and lower housing costs in these areas. In many cases these nearby suburbs have more facilities, attractive landscapes and lively social and cultural environments.

The steady demographic growth that has occurred in the Lisbon region since the '50s, successively fed by migration flows from other Portuguese regions, by returning people from former African colonies in 1975 and 1976, and by the steady
growth, since the mid-'70s of foreign immigration, meant a growing demand for housing. This demand could not be satisfied by formal and private markets or by the social housing built by local and central authorities. Consequently, there has been an accumulated shortage of housing and a parallel market for room subletting, subletting parts of flats—mainly in Lisbon’s historic and old neighbourhoods, shantytowns and illegal residential areas (Table 3) aimed at those who are unable to buy a house on the official market.

### Table 3 Occupied family dwellings by type (1981-1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lisbon</th>
<th>N. bank without Lisbon</th>
<th>South bank</th>
<th>Lisbon Metropolitan Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>95.99</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>97.43</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98.11</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>97.15</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>96.71</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98.44</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98.96</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98.13</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gaspar, 1995, p. 95.

Between 1942 and 1985 rent on housing in Lisbon was frozen. This led to a growth in suburbs. It also almost caused the rental market to disappear, and resulted in the development of an owner-occupied, condominium-system housing market, and heavy real estate and land speculation in Lisbon that was largely responsible for the desertification of the city’s central areas and concentration of service employment in the Lisbon area (Table 4).
### Table 4  Family dwellings by type of occupation in Lisbon Metropolitan Area (1981-91)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Lisbon</th>
<th>North bank without Lisbon</th>
<th>South bank</th>
<th>Lisbon Metropolitan Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>34910</td>
<td>140936</td>
<td>77102</td>
<td>261948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>195873</td>
<td>179916</td>
<td>98853</td>
<td>474742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>239783</td>
<td>320852</td>
<td>176055</td>
<td>736690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>79782</td>
<td>250350</td>
<td>132349</td>
<td>462481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>139015</td>
<td>129622</td>
<td>69183</td>
<td>337820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7683</td>
<td>13996</td>
<td>6600</td>
<td>28279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>226480</td>
<td>393968</td>
<td>208132</td>
<td>828580</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Growth rate  
1981/91 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>128.54</th>
<th>77.63</th>
<th>71.65</th>
<th>76.55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rented and others</td>
<td>-25.11</td>
<td>-20.17</td>
<td>-23.34</td>
<td>-22.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>-5.55</td>
<td>22.79</td>
<td>18.22</td>
<td>12.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gaspar, 1995, p. 95, with own calculations.

On the other hand, the productive restructuring, the changes in the social, professional and ethnic composition of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area due to economic changes and the rise in immigration, together with large-scale urban construction in Lisbon and its suburban area, all stressed the economic and social disparities of the metropolitan area.

After the mid-’80s, important transportation and communication infrastructures were built, mainly with European Union structural funds. Structures such as the Vasco da Gama Bridge, the railroad crossing on the April 25 Bridge, the CRIL belway, the CREL belway, the north-south axis and the expansion of the metropolitan network, helped to widen the disparity, in the metropolitan context, between the areas served by these infrastructures and those that were not.

[208]
On the other hand, major, often foreign-backed real estate investment, such as the Expo ’98 World Exhibition, was made in urban renewal and development in some of the most central areas of Lisbon. This, and heavy investment in the choicest and most accessible suburban municipalities, further segregated the various economic activities and areas where different ethnic and social groups were residing.

There were a number of efforts by the central and local authorities to re-house people living in shantytowns and other derelict neighbourhoods. Until very recently people were moved en masse into social housing neighbourhoods, which served to improve housing conditions but did not reduce their social and economic segregation. Moreover, when people are moved to a distant place, it interferes with their territorial identity and severs the ties they had with their previous place of residence. In addition, the architecture of the new buildings makes it more difficult to maintain sociability networks and support ties among neighbours. The result is often dissatisfaction, and sometimes rejection of the new residential area (Guerra, 1994).

If we compare J. Malheiros’ 1997 analysis of the spatial distribution of location quotients in the parishes of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area in 1991, of foreigners from Europe and North America, to the spatial distribution of Africans (Figs 4 and 5), we note extremely contrasting spatial distribution patterns.

In Lisbon, Europeans and North Americans are mainly concentrated in those areas of high social prestige, such as Lapa/S. Mamede and Belém/Restelo and the coastal areas of Cascais, Oeiras and Sintra municipalities. Africans show a very different pattern inside Lisbon. Unlike Europeans and North Americans, they often reside in shantytowns; neighbourhoods of illegal or social housing in the eastern and northern parishes; in the suburbs, either on the north bank or in the Setúbal
Fig. 4 Location quotients (LQ) of African citizens living in the parishes of the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon (1991)

Fig. 5 Location quotients (LQ) of the European and North American citizens living in the parishes of the Metropolitan Region of Lisbon (1991)

peninsula. They also occupy marginal areas that are difficult to reach and lack basic infrastructures and social utilities (Fig. 4).

The social and spatial segregation of African communities is reflected in the positive correlation between the percentage of Africans and the percentage of people living in shacks in the different parishes of the Metropolitan Area (Malheiros, 1997, p. 19). If we bear in mind the differences in social status between Africans and Europeans or North Americans, and the fact that both communities show marked spatial segregation indexes, we can conclude that ethnicity interacts with social differentiation and therefore, that ethnic, spatial segregation is fundamentally one of a social and economic nature.

Legal context of Portuguese immigration and immigrant reception practices

The subject of immigration only started to gain political relevance at the beginning of the ‘90s. Various factors contributed to the sudden interest on the part of the government and politicians in Portugal. These were: the huge growth of African communities living in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area; the instability caused by the poverty and social marginality in which many immigrants live, namely those residing in Portugal illegally; the strain in inter-ethnic relations; incidents of xenophobia and racism, which were broadcast by the media; and the growing role of immigrant associations and non-governmental organisations advocating the rights of immigrants and ethnic minorities.

The large-scale operation to legalise illegal immigrants, that took place between October 13, 1992 and March 5, 1993, was the first sign of a change in the attitude of the Portuguese government in relation to the immigration issue. The growing
attention national governing bodies have given immigration issues since the beginning of the ‘90s, is also clearly shown in President Mario Soares’ appointment, in March of 1993, of a presidential adviser on immigrant communities and ethnic minorities in Portugal.

The Socialist Party victory in the 1995 Parliamentary elections did not bring about profound changes in the immigration policy outlined by the previous administration headed by the Social Democrats. This policy had primarily targeted the need to step up efforts to combat illegal migration and control the entry of non-European Union citizens given Portugal’s location as a Western European border, the rise in crime rates, and the resulting feeling of unsafety among the Portuguese population.

However, it must be stressed that the present Socialist government has been trying to put greater emphasis on the conditions of economic and social marginality in which many immigrants from the PALOPs live. The present administration has also been showing a deeper commitment to recognising the rights of immigrant citizens and creating conditions to ease their integration into Portuguese society, in an effort to promote social cohesion and reduce ethnic and racial clashes.

In line with this, the government set up, in February of 1996, a High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities directly accountable to the Prime Minister’s Office. In addition, from March 31 to December 11, 1996, a second campaign to legalise the status of illegal immigrants was carried out, this time with input from immigrant associations.

Further efforts were made to assure the rights of immigrant communities and improve their living conditions. Among these we should stress: efforts that were made to combat illegal labour, mainly among workers without residence permits; moves to assure that foreign workers living in Portugal enjoyed the same labour rights as Portuguese workers; eligibility of immigrant
families for a guaranteed minimum income; and the Special Re-housing Program (PER families), on an equal footing with Portuguese families.\footnote{Re-housing Special Program (PER), set up by Decree-Law 79/96, of July 20, allows families living in shacks located in the Lisbon and Porto Metropolitan Areas to benefit from subsidies and special credit conditions to buy a permanent residence of a suitable size for their families or make home improvements on a house they own in another area, as long as it is used as a permanent residence.}

At the local level, concern for the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities can be seen primarily in the municipalities of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area where most of these communities are settled. Here, the measures to improve housing conditions and access to education deserve special mention. Also worth stressing are the efforts that have been made to encourage immigrant participation in policies to promote their integration in Portuguese society, to combat xenophobia and racism, and to further inter-cultural dialogue.

Immigrant associations, trade unions and NGOs like the Obra Católica das Migrações, SOS Racism and the Portuguese Council for Refugees have also been active in the drive to promote integration and defend the rights of immigrants and ethnic minorities.

However, in spite of recent efforts by the central and local authorities, immigrant associations, trade unions, and NGOs, immigrant communities have participated very little in the political sense. As evidence of this, we have the small number of eligible non-European citizens registered to vote, according to the polling lists made from May 2 to 31, 1996 (9,686 non-European Union citizens, of which 9,432 from Cape Verde). Indeed, the “politicising” of ethnicity is also a recent phenomenon in Portugal. Unlike other more developed European countries with deeper-rooted immigration traditions, in Portugal there are no political parties or ultra-nationalist movements with xenophobic or racist features. However, the existence of skinheads and clashes between Portuguese and foreign youngsters of different ethnic origins, mainly in the Lisbon area, are clear signs of an increase in racial tension and are a motive for growing concern for politicians and citizens alike.
Immigration and urban planning

In Portugal, urban planning developed very late and without a consistent, global urban policy. Yet Lisbon's various urbanisation plans, the plans for a number of sub-regions of the Metropolitan Area, and the Development Plan for the Lisbon Region, though still not approved, have clearly left their marks on the orientation of urban growth, the location patterns of economic activities, and the social differentiation of residential areas.

Highly regulated, extremely rigid, and distant from those they were supposed to serve, these plans led to such chaos in the urban planning system that between 1944 and 1971 not a single general urbanisation plan was approved. As a closed system, distant from reality, they were urbanisation plans, instead of being orientation principles for urban growth and different land uses. This finally led to changing territorial dynamics that were opposite from those that were laid out in the plans. The development of illegal housing in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon is a practical example of the situation we have just described.

As Fernando Nunes da Silva and Margarida Pereira mention, the visible results of the General Plans of Urbanisation, can be summed up as building the proposed road network, reduction of the areas initially planned for facilities and general use, and a greater densification of residential areas. The plan, under the guise of technical efficiency and concern for people's well-being, mainly serves to maintain and legitimise real estate speculation, and damage the residents' quality of life (Silva and Pereira, 1986, p. 20).

The April 25 Revolution in 1974 made it possible for municipal authorities to take a leading role in territorial planning, mainly after the Local Financing Law in 1979, and the esta-
blishment of the Municipal Master Plan in 1982. Indeed, the Municipal Master Plan is the only plan under municipal government authority that is not limited to zoning land uses and that deals with economic and social development issues. However, few local authorities have had the ability to define a coherent and serious urban policy that has allowed them to resist urbanisation pressures.

In addition, the lack of co-ordination and compatibility between municipal and regional planning has had particularly serious effects on metropolitan areas. The resolution of a number of problems demands combined action of a metropolitan or super-municipal scope: public transportation systems, basic sewage, water supply, and public utilities.

The crisis persists and the economic and urban restructuring process of metropolitan areas that try to adjust to economic globalization and increasing competitiveness among cities make it so that economic goals come first in urban policy and territorial planning.

The European Commission and national governments are joining forces to develop infrastructures and projects that promote urban success, attract investment, create jobs and promote the internationalisation of urban economies. In Lisbon, as we have already mentioned, examples of these policies are: mega-projects such as Expo '98, the Vasco da Gama Bridge, the Tagus River railroad crossing on the April 25 Bridge, the Lisbon Regional Outer Beltway (CREL), the Lisbon Regional Inner Beltway (CRIL), the North-South axis, expansion of the subway network, and huge development projects (housing, retail trade and services), many of which are foreign-backed.

Yet, at the same time, a rift has developed between urban planning and national and community social policies. New forms of poverty and social exclusion have appeared and economic and socio-ethnic spatial segregation in Lisbon is on the
rise. On one hand we have tertiarisation of Lisbon’s central areas, rehabilitation of historic quarters around the centre, renovation and revitalisation of the EXPO ‘98 intervention zone and other dilapidated industrial and harbour areas, and on the other, the removal of long-time residents and economic activities to peripheral areas with a worse reputation, and re-appropriation of the now-upgraded areas by wealthier social groups.

Non-European immigrants and other less privileged groups of the population continue to be concentrated in clandestine quarters, shacks, and large social housing complexes. Even the relocation operations which aimed to diminish the number of shanties, resulted, essentially, in massive transfers of population from slums to large quarters of social housing (Malheiros, 1997, p.16).

In summary, we can say that although there is no explicit relationship between urban planning and immigration, there is no doubt that urban land use values have been affected by differences in accessibility and unequal infrastructure distribution. This, in turn, has interacted with spatial self-segregation mechanisms of immigrant communities and ethnic minorities, thus increasing social and ethnic fragmentation in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon.

References


1. Introduction

Every day it becomes more obvious that housing policies are a key factor in integration to combat social isolation. One of the situations that better shows what social isolation really means is to be homeless and the normal answer to that homelessness for some families is to build a shack. Among the ethnic minorities not as many families have high enough incomes to afford a house and their only choice is to live in shack settlements.

The existence of shacks settlements in a city has important implications for the urban environment, city planning and for the city's image. The shacks are built on urban lands that with the passing of the time have begun to be needed for future urban development. Powerful social and economic groups are interested in removing those families from their current locations to the suburbs. In this context the different concerns of each group about the settlement lands have enormous influence on the public decisions concerning the future of those families.

Frequently, in Spain, we have witnessed wrong public policies that have been pushed through by different socioeconomic agents. Some of these public decisions ultimately resulted in social housing programs that have removed shack residents from shantytowns to temporary housing located in inappropriate areas of town (far away from any neighborhood, close to industrial zones, without public transportation, etc). The official argument used to justify these decisions have been the land values.
However, these kinds of policies are only an easy solution to the problem in the short term, but never in the long term; because later on, in the new neighborhoods designed for these families, the same social problems that occurred in the shantytowns come up again.

The problem is not new. Shantytowns (using this word for shack settlements) appeared in Spain after our civil war at the end of the fifties, with the arrival of thousands of rural migrants to the industrial cities. In the 1960s a census bureau report shows that 70,000 shacks were built in the country and in 1973 that the number rises to 98,793.

Ninety percent of these families were poor country people without enough economic resources to buy a small apartment or a house on the free market, but they did not belong to an ethnic minority and they had no social problem of exclusion or isolation. The government developed different policies for them to try to cut down on the number of shacks. In 1980 the number dropped to only 15,019 shacks in the entire country. However, the social programs were never designed for people with isolation problems, such as the ethnic minorities. Gypsy families continued to live in shacks and during the nineties the migrants that arrived in the country from North Africa, with a very low economic level, built their homes on lands closer to the Gypsy settlements. The principal industrial urban cities were the main areas chosen by the ethnic minorities for living, such as, for example, Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Sevilla. These towns offer better job opportunities for poor people. In 1986 in Madrid a census was taken of 2,674 Gypsy families living in shacks in 54 zones.

Madrid is a perfect example of how city planning has been affected by the presence of shacks in the last two decades and how the local and regional governments have tried to solve the problem as it has been in the rest of the country. In 1986 the
three levels of the administration – national, regional and local – decided to created an institute, the so-called Consorcio. This institute had to count the number of families living in shacks and create special policies for them, not only a housing program but educational, socioeconomic, labor, etc. The persons in charge would be required to remove the shacks from Madrid in no more than six years. Similar policies have been designed all over the country to try to solve the problem of the isolation of the ethnic minorities.

2. The shack settlements of the ethnic minorities as a real problem for city planning and a source of social conflict

In 1990 there were in Spain 29,497 shacks, as shown by the census from a Gypsy association (Grupo PASS). One hundred percent of their resident population belongs to an ethnic minority (Spanish and Portuguese gypsies, migrants from North Africa or gypsies from Eastern Europe). Since 1990 no other institution, public or private, has made any other count of the housing problems of the ethnic minorities.

As shown in the last study done by the FOESSA foundation (FOESSA, 1982) in Spain, at this moment 19.4% of the families (2,192,000 homes) are under the poverty level (8,509,000 persons) 4.5% of them live in shacks, and 100% of the residents are Gypsies or migrants. Not all of the Gypsy families or migrants live in shacks. However 20.9% of the Gypsies and 13.7% of the migrants do. The settlements are located, in the majority of the cities, in three different areas around the central neighborhoods:

- The first ring, where the shacks appear, is an area without any infrastructures and not prepared for residential use. The space
surrounding the Gypsy homes is full of rubbish, trash, and other goods that delimit family possessions or properties.

- In a second ring, adjacent to the first ring, we find open spaces that normally are used for scrap iron and cardboard storage, or as a chicken, horse or pig farm.
- The third ring is the land between the neighborhood and the second ring. In these open spaces, as in the second ring, normally we find industries and highways.

Especially in the two first rings, the impact on the surrounding environment is enormous and has generated one of the principal issues of discussion about whether or not to remove the shantytowns. The landscape shows an image similar to third world poor urban areas and represents a fourth world within the first one. The reason for this landscape, in which the open space is used as storage for different goods, has a lot to do with labor behavior. The families, in the majority of the cases, are scrap iron merchants or salesmen (ambulant sales). In some shantytowns the first and the second rings eventually become a real shopping area where the people arrive every day to buy different products, particularly building materials.

The implications for city planning and urban social relations in the city are very important. Nearby regular neighborhood residents want the shacks removed to far away from their houses, precisely because of the negative image and the labor activities that take place there.

The use of the area surrounding the shacks for storage shows the need for enough space for that in their homes. This is one of the several aspects that the person in charge of social housing has to consider in order to design new houses for them. However, while the Gypsy families have to continue to live in shacks, one of the better solutions could be to build storehous-
ses for their merchandise. This proposal has never been accepted by the Administration. The persons in charge of the programs believe that if they build storehouses for the residents, the shantytown areas will be consolidated and more Gypsies will move in. Because of the conflict between the shantytown residents and the nearby neighborhoods, the Administration in some settlements has obliged the Gypsies to sell all their scrap iron merchandise and has prohibited them from storing any kind of building material.

The lack of infrastructure and urban services is one of the principal characteristics of these inadequate areas. The residents try to use nearby neighborhood services for electricity and water supply, sewer system, etc. We find three different types of shack settlements based on the proximity and use of these supplies.

We find small settlements right in the middle of urban areas surrounded by standard neighborhoods. In this case the Gypsy families make use of the nearby paved streets, the street lighting, the water fountains, and the street sewer system. However, as we move farther away from the urban center, there is a second group of shack settlements. Here the conditions for the residents are worse. Their homes are surrounded by open spaces without pavement, street lighting, or sewer services. Even so, they still can go near the standard neighborhood, not far away from their home, and use water fountains from the street, electricity (that they take illegally from nearby power plants), etc. Finally, at the periphery of the town are the biggest shack settlements with no infrastructure or urban services.

Particularly in the last two cases, until those families can be moved from their shacks to a regular apartment or house, provisional solutions could give them minimum public services and basic infrastructures such as water and electricity for their houses. However, the local governments, as in the case of the
storehouses, prefer that those families continue living in those conditions for years with the argument that if they do provide services, not only will settlements never disappear but more Gypsy families from other areas will probably move there and build their shacks next to the older ones, attracted by the better conditions in the area.

In fact, the problem of the shack residents is not only the land surrounding their homes. The real problem is their own houses, built with scrap iron and other kinds of junk, with no more than 30 square meters of area, with no floor, no water, no electricity, no heating system, with dampness, and other similar problems. The Administration’s answer for those families has been to design a special housing program for them in different cities of Spain.

3. Public housing as a key solution to the problem of ethnic minority isolation

The official solution to the problem of the ethnic minorities living in shacks has been to rehouse them in new neighborhoods in three different kinds of buildings located in the suburbs. The different solutions have been:

- Apartments: built for socially integrated families that, because of their labor characteristics, do not need a storehouse.
- Semi-detached houses: built for those socially integrated families that, because of their labor characteristics and duties, need a storehouse. At this moment there are 4 neighborhoods of semi-detached housing as shown in Figure 1.
- Provisional housing settlements: built for socially-isolated families that need a transitional period to get used to living in a regular house. As shown in Figure 1, in Madrid there are 4 of these settlements.
For example, just now, in the municipal Madrid area, 1,908 overflow houses have been awarded, built in different locations throughout the city. These include 1,152 apartments, 347 semi-detached houses and 409 provisional settlements of prefabricated houses. In the case of Madrid, a first look at the results of this program highlights the success of some of the relocation neighborhoods such as the one known as Plata y Castañar.

This neighborhood, or special overflow unit, was built in 1989. It was the first one of a long list included in a program that began in 1986 for those living on the margins of the “normal” society with no access to regular housing on the private market. The Unit is located in the Villaverde district, in the south capital area, and is composed of 80 semi-detached houses.

The tenants, all of them belonging to the Gypsy ethnic minority, lived in overflow prefabricated provisional houses (called UVAs) located in the same district before being relocated to Plata y Castañar. They came to the provisional houses in 1974 from several of Madrid’s shantytowns. Living in a prefabricated house for 15 years was an important step in the process of

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**Fig. 1** Number of rehousing units in different public social housing programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>No. of Provisional Houses</th>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>No. of Semi-detached Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cañaveral</td>
<td>82 (20 more in a few years)</td>
<td>La Quinta</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Liebres</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>La Celsa</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Fermín</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>La Rosilla</td>
<td>88 (50 more in a few years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jauja</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Plata y Castañar</td>
<td>80 (70 more in a few years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cañada Real</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>347 (120 more in a few years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Las Mimbreras</td>
<td>38 (90 in a few years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>409 (110 more in a few years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

adjusting to a regular house and a very positive part of their social integration progress (all the children attend school and the parents enter the labor market).

At this moment, 37% of the tenants work in itinerant retail jobs, 20% are pensioners, and the rest are scrap iron vendors. They have stopped illegal and unlawful activities (selling drugs, begging, etc.) and they have recognized their obligation to send their children to school. Now, all of the school-aged children attend school (even those under 4 years old go to the day nursery) and their absenteeism is very low. In the Unit, the social workers have started up a literacy campaign to teach people to read and write, and some of the Gypsy family members have been in training to learn a trade.

Their high level of social integration has made it possible for them to use all the public services of the district. They are changing their labor behavior from marginal jobs to normal ones. Because these new jobs do not require storage units, the tenants will probably be transferred to apartments rather than the semi-detached houses. Families from other provisional settlements will come to occupy the houses left vacant after the original families move. The change from shacks to provisional settlements, and from those to semi-detached houses represents an evolutionary process that leads to important progress towards their social integration. The tenants leave behind the traditional behavior that mainstream society finds unacceptable and get used to living in a normal house. The improved social integration that the families from Plata y Castañar have managed to attain proves that housing policies are an important tool in combating social exclusion. However, regardless of the success of some public policies, the Administration needs to look at its programs with a more critical eye.
4. The need for changes in the public housing programs for ethnic minorities

So far, we have seen that shantytowns have changed significantly over the years, in terms of both a decrease in their number, and their ethnic composition. Since the eighties, the problem has affected only ethnic minorities (Gypsies and populations from North Africa and some Eastern European countries). These groups’ problems are not limited to housing; they include a basic lack of social and economic integration. Rehousing them is branded by the Administration as the solution to the problem.

The important question is to establish the degree to which abandoning a marginal habitat influences the social and occupational integration process. Our thesis is basically that abandoning the marginal residential space is the beginning of the social incorporation process. Even though housing policies alone cannot achieve the total integration of a human group with such particular characteristics, rehousing is an indispensable policy that must be used in conjunction with social and assistance development programs. Improved housing quality has a tremendous influence on the residents’ integration into the labor market. Because of this, the following issues must be considered:

• If Gypsy families were able to arrange regular and sufficient income, they would be able to abandon the shacks. They could probably move to regular housing or be incorporated into public housing programs, the way rural migrants living in shacks during the seventies and eighties were relocated.
• One of the most important outcomes of the success of the rehousing program is that family descendants normally maintain the occupational and social behavior habits of their progenitors, never going back to shacks as a housing solution.
• New job opportunities must be created for ethnic minorities at the same time that a housing policy for them is imple-
mented. The prohibition of ambulant sales in some municipalities forces the shantytown residents to marginal or illegal activities, such as drug trafficking. Drug trafficking has been on the increase especially since the early nineties. At that time many Spanish municipalities prohibited ambulant sales in their territory. Drug commerce generates an easy money image—a simple profit-making activity that requires little effort, compared to other activities. The result is the immediate abandonment of the traditional occupational activity that generates fewer resources. This perception of the drug word and its marketing image has created an extremely serious negative trend since all the inhabitants under thirty years of age want to be part of such a lucrative business.

But the families involved in drug trafficking do not use the money to buy houses and they do not move up in their social situation. Furthermore, drug trafficking has a strong effect on their behavior. Some members, later on, fall in with the drug addicts. Drug traffic has other serious economic consequences. It interferes in the relations between the shantytown residents and the local authorities and hinders the social workers in their work.

As the sale of drugs is adopted quickly by the newer generations of shantytown residents as the principal source of income, they do not see the need to attend school and lose all interest in their own education. School absenteeism plays a part in their lack of social integration. In addition, when the Gypsy children turn 13 or 14, they drop out of school to help in the family business, leaving them with a low level of education.

All these characteristics lead the neighboring communities to ask the Administration to remove the Gypsies to places far away from the city. To be more precise, whether the nearby
communities tolerate the minority groups or not is more related to their residential behavior than to their race per se. As a consequence, most of the families are rehoused in provisional homes located in neighborhoods in segregated zones far away from the city proper. The fact that the areas are isolated and the only people living there are other Gypsies results in these shantytown residents' being excluded from public housing programs, and the rest of the people living in these rehousing neighborhoods do not wish to stay in them.

5. Conclusions

In analyzing the above, we arrive at a number of conclusions that allow us to propose the following:

- The public administration's responsibility to the shantytown resident is not limited to the housing program. Those in charge of the programs need to continue with the necessary social integration policies to support and help solve their social problems.
- Social integration will be facilitated if the shantytown residents get a job in the labor market during the process. Offering them valid occupational alternatives is essential. Regularizing and authorizing ambulant sales could curb the increase in drug trafficking in the relocation areas.
- At the same time, the level of training of the residents needs to be increased so as to allow them to be incorporated into the labor market. To achieve this, it will be essential to increase school support to children under 14, since that is the time when they usually abandon their studies. Teachers must provide very intensive training during those years. Furthermore,
the school program must be adapted to the real needs of the shantytown residents.

- The Administration must avoid placing new social housing neighborhoods in open areas that are far from the city center, with no public transportation and no accessibility because, in the end, these isolated neighborhoods usually become ghettos of poverty and delinquency. Up until now locations have been chosen at the convenience of the Administration but not of the shantytown residents. It is clear that decisions have been adopted to suit bureaucratic, economic or social interests, without regard to the needs of the ethnic minorities. Those in charge of the programs must not be influenced by different pressure groups. It is clear that any attitude that the Administration adopts is going to be criticized by the different groups of individuals affected. Because of this, the final decision must be the most balanced one. The relocation of shantytown residents to better houses in regular neighborhoods should be fundamental for reasons of human dignity, social equity, etc., and not only for economic reasons, or to resolve esthetic or environmental problems for the city. Decisions about the location of the new settlements must not be dependent on the opinion of the nearby populations, who are always opposed to having these families nearby.

- Shantytown residents should be not displaced from the residential zones where they have lived for many years, because it can damage their economic and family stability. Many of the people affected do their labor and occupational activities in the areas near their shantytowns and they do not know the rest of the city: where to obtain scrap, cardboard, etc., and where they can sell their merchandise. On the other hand, scattering the shack residents throughout the municipal area presupposes the destruction of the Gypsy family structure, which is based on clans. The result can be serious pro-
blems in the future, especially if they need help from relatives or friends.
• In granting the new houses the Administration must be aware of this family structure and potential conflicts between family groups that could lead them to abandon the new houses. Those in charge of the program will need to transfer rival families to other nearby zones.
• A calendar should be established for rehousing the families, otherwise those affected may lose hope in their future or in the Administration. At the same time, the construction of new shacks on the land where they lived before must be controlled.
• The length of time that families stay in provisional housing must be limited, since it hinders their social integration.
• Social housing policies must be coordinated among local municipalities to keep shack dwellers from moving from other zones into the municipality where housing programs are taking place. Also, the persons in charge of the different organizations need to coordinate their decisions on issues that will affect the population.
• In designing the structure of the new neighborhood for relocations, the Administration has to abandon ideas and traditional concepts about the internal design of the housing or the structure of the new neighborhoods, because some of those ideas will not work. Ethnic minorities want to live in houses with similar characteristics (both external aspect and inside setup) to those of the rest of the population.
• Demographic information about their occupational, cultural and other characteristics must be processed periodically, if we want to be able to analyze their evolution and the changes that are taking place.
• A follow-up study should be done of the families to see how their incorporation into society is progressing.
• The concession of new houses must be done according to the number of families rather than by the number of shacks since, in many cases, we see the phenomenon of cohabitation. If this is not considered in the new houses, the same situation will be reproduced.

• New alternatives to all the shacks in the capital city should be planned, even for families that have arrived in the last year.

• Important problems like delinquency, the sale of drugs, etc., cannot be ignored. Global solutions are needed along with effective social and police action to discourage drug trafficking.

• In sum, we believe that housing policies are a key tool against social isolation but only if these policies are coordinated with social and labor programs for integration. These suggestions do not claim to be a definitive solution to the problem of isolation of ethnic minorities but we hope that our suggestions serve to help the Administration towards a new understanding of the problem and the social integration process of shantytown residents, and open the door to new research.

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IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE:
BETWEEN INTEGRATION AND EXCLUSION

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Introduction

A few years ago, Daniel Franklin, then European editor of the weekly, The Economist, described a day in the life of a middle-class Londoner in the following terms:

First thing in the morning, the newspaper is delivered by the Indians who run the corner shop (nobody in the area could be bothered to do such an early service any more). Then the cleaner arrives; she is Polish, and will in time almost certainly return home. The walk to the underground station takes him past restaurants run by Chinese, Italians, and Indians, and a Jewish bakery. He buys his underground ticket from a West Indian. He arrives at the office, where the security guard is Irish. He shares a room with a South African, the secretary is Canadian, his ultimate boss is a Rhodesian. Most days he has lunch at the local Italian restaurant or sandwich bar, and supper is often a pizza delivered by any one of a dozen nationalities, but never British.

“This example”, he added, “happens to be my own, but I have no reason to believe that it is not fairly typical” (Franklin, 1993). Indeed, the social landscape that constitutes the background of the picture painted by Franklin is not very different from the one that one would obtain, mutatis mutandis, of a similar exercise in Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, Zürich, or a score of other European cities. The national and ethnic mix would be different in each case, but a considerable degree of human
heterogeneity would be common in all of them. In fact, a similar story could be told of the daily experience of citizens living in many European cities, especially big ones and metropolitan areas. Only fifty years before, however, the corresponding picture in each and all of these places would have been markedly different.

The foregoing attests to a profound, far-reaching transformation that several European societies have undergone in recent decades, and that a few others are undergoing nowadays: their conversion into multiethnic, pluricultural societies. It has happened for the simple reason that a large number of migrants – many of whom came as temporary workers – have stayed and become permanent settlers, whether de jure or de facto.

This societal transformation is second to no other in importance and implications. To highlight but a few, it deeply affects the labor market; the provision of basic public services; social infrastructures, including the welfare system; the social structure – through the creation of new inequalities or the perpetuation of old ones; and may affect cultural, linguistic, and religious pluralism. Even more, it affects ethnicity, feelings of national identity, and the definition of the polity – who are “we” and who are “we” not. It tests the strength of some of the enlightened principles on which democratic societies were founded, such as basic equality, social cohesion, or universal citizenship. It entails the accommodation of heterogeneity.

Obviously, such transformation is not an easy one. Other societies have preceeded Europe along this path, and nowhere has it happened – or is still taking place – without tensions; not even in the traditional immigration-receiving societies of North America or Australasia, where immigration has been an essential mechanism in nation-building. It should come as no surprise that this conversion is particularly difficult in Europe, where a past of out-migration and a tradition of exclusionary
conceptions of nationhood have left strong cultural underpinnings that militate against the full incorporation of migrants in society.

Historical influences and predispositions notwithstanding, the inescapable fact is that immigration and ethnic diversity have become a permanent feature of the human landscape of European societies. As a result, the integration of migrants has therefore become an important issue of public policy and a political matter of the utmost concern (Castles, 1994; Piché, 1998).

The urge to integrate migrants who are permanent residents stems from the combination of moral and political obligations – including loyalty to fundamental democratic principles and respect of human rights – and self-interest, i.e. the realization that society cannot live harmoniously if a substantial part of the population is marginalised and socially excluded. Yet, this engine is often not powerful enough to remove the main obstacles that stand in the way of integration: attitudes unfavourable to immigrants, or anti-immigrant feelings, and a deeply-ingrained exclusionary conception of the polity.

The outcome of integration efforts depends on the interplay of these contradictory impulses, and because of that it is bound to be mixed: a certain degree of integration that runs side by side with varying measures of exclusion – in the two meanings of the word, political exclusion and plain social exclusion.

This is the line of reasoning that I shall try to develop in this paper. I will start with a brief, cursory look at history, to see how European countries became immigration receiving societies, and how ethnic minorities were formed. An effort will then be made to characterize prevailing citizens’ attitudes and policy orientations, and to ascertain if there is anything specifically European about them. In turn, the cultural and histor-
ical underpinnings that contribute to understanding these atti-
tudes will be briefly explored. Then the paper will look at the
overall experience of integration in Europe, in what cannot be
but a broad and sweeping generalization. Finally, implications
of the present state of things as far as integration is concerned
will be discussed.

A brief historical overview

The relatively brief story of European immigration has been
told many times, but it may be worth remembering once again,
underlying those facts that contribute to shape perceptions and
attitudes, and to condition policies. From this vantage point,
three periods can be discerned:

1) 1950-55 to 1973-74. In the course of the third quarter of
the twentieth century, several European countries became de
facto immigrant societies. Due to an exceptional combination
of manpower shortages - stemming from war losses and low
fertility in the interwar years - and vigorous economic growth,
fueled first by a “recovery bonus” and then by an unrepeatabile
sociopolitical context, the booming economies of
Northwestern Europe demanded a seemingly unlimited supply
of foreign workers. Colonies or former colonies, and sur-
plus-labor countries in the Southern European periphery
and later across the Mediterranean, provided the human
resources required. No doubt, there were precedents - the
Irish in Britain, the Spanish and Italians in France, the Italians
in Switzerland, the Poles in Germany, the Finns in Sweden -
but neither the numbers involved in previous moves nor the
diversity in the composition of the flows could be compared
with present ones. In Europe's past, emigrants had always
greatly outnumbered immigrants – with the partial exception of France. For the first time in centuries, Europe was ceasing to be the foremost exporter of labor to emerge as a major immigration receiving region. Until then, prototypical migration flow had gone from labor-intensive countries to land-intensive regions. For the first time in history, a traditionally labor-intensive region was being transformed into an immigration receiving one.

2) 1974-1985. The Yom Kippur War, and the ensuing first oil shock, marked the end of an unusually large period of sustained economic growth – so vigorous that some economists coined the term ‘super-growth’ to distinguish it from ordinary growth (Kindleberger, 1967). The winds of bonanza which had presided over the economic – and hence social and political – atmosphere for a quarter of a century gave way to stormy, unstable weather. At the same time Europeans born during the baby boom were coming of age and entering the labor market (Werner 1986). The era of full employment was over, maybe for good, and unemployment and inflation became a permanent feature of the landscape. One after the other, European governments decided to halt recruitment and close their borders to foreign workers, adopting restrictive entry policies that would prove permanent. They also promoted diverse schemes to induce the return of guest-workers which generally met with little success. Indeed, soon thereafter, European societies realized that guestworkers had taken seriously the invitation extended to them and had decided to stay, in what constituted a typical case of unexpected and unintended consequences. Moreover, they called their relatives to join them. Despite the closure, the number of foreigners did not go down. Family reunion, higher birth rates and the passage from the first to subsequent stages of the migration cycle made the composition of migrant
populations more akin to native ones – as well as more visible, as they gradually moved from industry to the service sector. As a result of compositional changes, the labor market participation of foreigners began to resemble that of native workers. Indeed, between 1975 and 1987, the proportion that immigrants made of the workforce decreased, while that of the general population remained stable (Soysal 1994). This, together with an increased use of public services by migrant families, made the fiscal balance of immigration less attractive for receiving societies. Besides, a ‘second generation problem’ was beginning to emerge, due to family reunion and demographic trends (Werner 1986). In these years, the proportion of people from non-European stock among migrants gradually increased, as flows from Southern Europe got ever more scarce and a number of previous guestworkers from Italy and Spain returned home. As a result, the ethnicity of European societies was transformed in a short period of time. As migrants were not being easily or swiftly integrated, ethnic minorities began to be formed. Hostility and feelings of rejection against foreigners began to mount, and conflicts exploded around 1980 in several countries. A number of policies were adopted at the same time of integration and were restrictive of further entries.

3) 1985-present. After a long recession, economic growth picked up again from the mid-80s to 1992. Immigration flows increased markedly between 1985 and 1993 (Salt 1997), and the number of asylum demands skyrocketed, multiplying by ten between 1983 and 1993. The fall of the Berlin Wall lifted former limitations on mobility from Central and Eastern European countries. Fears of massive migration set in, and the Cassandra-like forecasts of massive flows from the South and the East proliferated, contributing to a state
of paroxism around 1992-93. At that time, an economic downturn with marked rises in unemployment compounded feelings of insecurity and popular anxiety. Indicators of racism and xenophobia swelled, and extreme-right parties in several countries increased their electoral support. Violent incidents of a xenophobic nature have proliferated ever since. The contradiction between the official stance of closed borders and persistent entries of migrants fuels the impression that governments have lost the control of borders. A new restrictionist drive has taken place since around 1990. For the first time, starting in the mid-80s, immigration has become a political issue, and a very divisive one. After 1993, the state of anxiety and alarm seems to have been somewhat attenuated, but not entirely. Migration flows seem to have stabilized somewhat (Salt 1997), and the ominous forecasts of massive floods of migrants have not materialized. Restrictionist orientations continue to preside over immigration policies, but integration seems to attract increasing attention. It is unclear whether or not 1994 marks the start of a new, less climatic period.

Citizens’ perceptions and attitudes towards immigration

The viewpoint of receiving societies towards migrants expresses itself mainly through the attitudes harbored by their citizens and the policies put forth by their governments - at all levels of government, central, regional and local. Attitudes and policies are interrelated in various ways, and influences operate in both directions. In turn, attitudes are affected by perceptions, and, to complicate things, also condition them.

Citizens’ attitudes can be directly gauged through surveys, and attitudes towards migrants and foreigners on a European
scale are periodically monitored by the European Commission’s Eurobarometer, carried out twice a year on the 15 countries that make up the European Union. Questions about these matters were included in 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1997 (Melich, 1995).

The picture that these surveys consistently reveals is hardly favourable or friendly to immigrants. No doubt, a majority declares that “society should be inclusive and offer equal rights to all citizens, including those from immigrant and minority groups” (European Commission, 1997:5). Yet, more specific questions provide a more nuanced picture, with many respondents favoring further restrictions or the limitation of migrants’ rights.

To start with the baseline of perceptions in the matter, roughly one in two Europeans thinks that there are ‘too many’ migrants in their country. This perception strongly rose at the end of the 80s, peaked in 1993, declined slightly the following year and has stabilized ever since.

Given the above, it can hardly come as a surprise that a large majority is not willing to accept foreign workers “without restrictions”. Those who do are between 12% and 15%. One out of four Europeans prefers not to accept their entrance in the country at all. The majority of respondents of all countries prefer to accept them “with restrictions” (60% in 1997). Asylum seekers command a slightly larger degree of acceptance.

Figures for people coming from the South of the Mediterranean or from Eastern Europe do not differ markedly. Accordingly, the origin of immigrants does not seem to count very much. Yet, in some countries there is a clear preference for one of the groups - or a stronger rejection of the other.

The majority of European citizens not only are not in favor of allowing the unrestricted entry of immigrants, but also are not in favor of enlarging migrants’ rights either. On the contrary,
one in three would like to see those rights reduced, while only one in six favors enlarging them.

As might be expected, few citizens openly recognize that in their daily lives they feel disturbed by the presence of people of another nationality, race, or religion. Race and religion matter more than nationalities, but the difference is almost negligible. Yet, a minority of between 13 and 15 percent declares its annoyance. Clearly, in this most sensitive matter, the extent of unsympathetic feelings may be somewhat masked by a tendency to conform to patterns of social desirability.

Those who declare that they do feel disturbed by the opinions, customs and way of life of people different from themselves, i.e. migrants and foreigners, have a much greater tendency to perceive that these “others” are “too many”. On the contrary, those that are not disturbed by the presence of different people have a lower propensity to find that there are too many of them. Indeed, perceptions and attitudes are clearly correlated. Yet, it has to be said that the perception of the number of migrants is not exactly a perception, or at any rate not a factual or value-free perception. In fact, value-judgments and attitudinal stances are clearly involved, as both the phrasing of the question and the type of value-loaded answers offered suggest. Unfortunately, published data do not allow us to discern a causal relationship the other way around, that is, whether a change in numerical perceptions results in a change in attitudes.

Yet, this is an important point. In general terms, countries with a lower proportion of immigrants tend to show a higher degree of acceptance of “others”, and a lower frequency of anti-immigrant feelings and xenophobia. It is often surmised that the explanation for the lower incidence of xenophobia lies in sheer numbers of foreigners. If this were true, an increase in the number of migrants would lead to a deterioration of attitudes
towards them. The little information available does not confirm this explanation. Indeed, on the one hand the above correlation does not always occur in Europe: Greece and Denmark have relatively low proportions of migrants in their population and yet exhibit a relatively high degree of rejection of migrants. On the other hand, in recent years, between 1994 and 1997, the percentage of people in Italy who find the presence of other disturbing has increased by five points, while the proportion of those who think that there are too many migrants was substantially lower in 1997 than in the period 1991-93. Finally, the overall correlation between the proportion of immigrants and frequency of anti-immigrant feelings – measured by a composite index of xenophobia – does not seem to be very strong.

Within all countries, anti-immigrant feelings are more prevalent “among people over the age of 55, with a low level of education, who are unsatisfied with the way democracy functions in their country, who are not strong media users, who are quite pessimistic about the future, are very proud of their national identity and who see themselves on the right of the left-right scale. The most tolerant on the other hand, exhibit opposite characteristics.” (Melich, 1995:10). However, sex, is not a determining factor.

As for the evolution of these attitudes, the general trend points to a marked deterioration between the mid-80s and early 90s, a slight improvement afterwards and a stabilization since 1994. This is clearly the case with the perception of the number of migrants. A similar evolution can be predicted of attitudes towards the acceptance of migrants and feelings of annoyance, except that variations are much smaller. A worrisome evolution took place between 1988 and 1992 concerning attitudes towards the rights of migrants: the percentage of those in favor of curtailing migrants’ rights doubled in four years – from 18% to 34% –, while the percentage of those in favor of reducing
migrants’ rights was halved – from 30% to 17%. Maybe because of such threatening trends or perhaps due to the fear of possible deleterious effects, the question has been discontinued in subsequent surveys.

A special survey carried out in the 15 EU countries in the spring of 1997, which was also the European Year Against Racism and Xenophobia shows even more frightening results, a worrying level of racism and xenophobia in member states, with nearly 33% of those interviewed openly describing themselves as “quite racist” or “very racist” (European Commission, 1997:5).

Factors associated with xenophobia are again dissatisfaction with life circumstances, fear of unemployment, insecurity about the future and low confidence in public authorities and the political establishment. Ethnic minorities are the foremost target of racist and xenophobic feelings. Their implantation has coincided with structural changes and globalization which are perceived by some groups as a threat to their income, job security and national identity (Castles 1994; Alt 1998).

The conclusion is that “racial prejudice, discrimination and racist attacks continue to present a constant problem to the European Union” (Eurobarometer 1997). Both the European Commission and the European Parliament have expressed serious concern about the persistence, if not the rise, of racism and xenophobia on a number of occasions. In 1993 the latter recommended that member states pass national legislation directed at combatting racism, xenophobia and anti-semitism in Europe.


Attitudes do matter, both directly and through their influence on policies. Some of these connections materialize in the game
of electoral politics. The development of an adverse social climate, when not directly hostile to immigrants in Europe has had a number of direct and indirect implications which affect policies or conditions the political context in which they are adopted.

It can be said that nothing determines more the position that ethnic minorities have in society than the combination of citizens' attitudes and government policies.

The most direct manifestation of such a hostile climate is racist violence, which has manifested itself in an ominous proliferation of violent incidents of a xenophobic nature in which immigrants have often been the victims. In some countries, these incidents number in the thousands every year (Witte, 1995).

Obviously, racism and anti-immigrant feelings result in various forms of exclusionary practices against ethnic minorities, in the labor market and elsewhere, that are too varied to be accounted for here. A well-known mechanism that has attracted increasing attention recently through which racism and anti-immigrant feelings perpetuate themselves in a self-fulfilling prophecy is the temptation of the scapegoat. As Stalker has put it, “immigrants are blamed for everything from stealing jobs, to criminality, to eating strange kinds of food, or swamping the streets with alien languages. Above all, they are seen as a threat to the integrity of the dominant host nation” (Stalker 1994:61).

As a result, there has been an increase of extreme-right, xenophobic parties in several European countries. The novelty of this is the fact that the rejection of immigration usually constitutes the first and foremost tenet and banner of these parties. That some of them manage to command a certain electoral following on the basis of such narrow, specialized platforms attests to the strength of anti-immigrant feelings in a segment of European society.

Often the influence of these parties goes well beyond the limits of the social segments in which they find electoral sup-
port, and influences the platforms of bigger mainstream parties, worried about losing electoral ground to extremist agitation. Very often the rationale of preventing the growth of extreme-right parties is used to justify a hardening of immigration policies. At times, electoral occasions give way to a sort of auction of restrictionist proposals among competing parties. As someone has put it bluntly, migrants are often hostages of the vote.

A restrictionist drive

This climate of opinion has been the context in which a strong restrictionist drive in immigration policies in Europe has taken place in recent years. If there is a common denominator in European immigration legislation in recent years, it is its “increasing restrictiveness” (Soysal 1994:121). This orientation clearly prevails in the realm of admission policies. Indeed, in recent years, policymakers have devoted the bulk of their attention to entry policies. A full arsenal of measures to further restrict entry or to enforce existing regulations more severely has been passed since 1990 both in individual countries and in the European Union as a whole. As Catherine Withol de Wenden has put it, “partout en Europe, le droit d’immigrer apparaît en retraite” (de Wenden, 1997).

Besides the well-known prohibition of economic migration - with the exceptions of European, highly-skilled and temporary workers - a good example, relevant on its own, of this restrictionist drive is the evolution undergone in recent years by legislation and practices concerning asylum seekers. The changes that are taking place in this realm are so substantial that some experts are beginning to speak of a ‘new asylum regime’ in Europe whose main traits are increasing restrictions to the granting of protection and a preference for non-integration. Besides
expeditious mechanisms for not accepting clearly unfounded demands and quick resolution of claims, a frequent, widespread result is the granting of statuses of temporary protection (i.e. three years) and limited rights, outside the scope established in the Geneva Convention. It is estimated that nine out of ten accepted asylum-seekers nowadays receive statuses which do not conform to the provisions of the Convention. Among other limitations, integration programs have been suppressed in some countries, and even schemes for non-integration have been set up (Joly et al, 1997).

The evolution of legislation and practices in the area of asylum has run parallel to that of immigration policies. The most salient feature of both is a clear preference for temporariness and limitation of rights. In fact, the distinction between asylum-seekers and migrants is increasingly fading away.

The restrictionist drive does confine itself to entry policies: it also extends to integration and affects those that are already in, in matters that have to do with the definition of family reunion, access to citizenship or permanent residence, access to welfare services, and recognition of voting rights, inter alia (de Wenden 1997). Moreover, integration policies are often made to appear as inseparable from stringent admission policies, giving the idea that they are a compensation, if not an alibi, for the latter.

This climate is also affecting the first steps of the development of a European-wide immigration policy. Immigration is slowly starting to emerge as an area of policy, mainly at the level of intergovernmental cooperation, in the European Union - in what is known as the “third pillar”. But a number of measures have been taken. The bulk of the resolutions, recommendations, conventions, joint positions or joint actions adopted by the European Union in matters of immigration have to do with border controls and harmonization of asylum policies, and they all reflect a restrictionist orientation. Measures to promote
harmonization or rights or that have to do with migrants’ integration command much less attention, despite the fact that the EU has often proposed that member states apply the same legislation to workers originating from non-EU countries to their nationals (Melich, 1995). Most initiatives taken so far at a European level emphasize control of immigrants and asylum-seekers whilst offering little in the way of immigrants’ rights or measures to combat racism or xenophobia (Geddes, 1995). Indeed, the fact that in the European Union Treaty approved in Amsterdam, immigration appears in the unseemly company of international crime, prostitution, traffic in stolen works of art and terrorism cannot be devoid of symbolic significance.

In fact, the European Union has become the world leader in the efforts to curb asylum applications and limit the corresponding rights. Yet, in all fairness it has to be said that other regions are following suit, either as a protective reflex or as a sign that they share that orientation.

**Historical and cultural underpinnings of the political culture toward immigration**

Neither anti-immigration feelings nor the prevalence of restrictive policy are particular to Europe. In all receiving regions there are clear signs in recent years that point in the same direction. No doubt, in some migration systems – such as the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf and a number of receiving countries in Asia – the rights given to migrants are much fewer than in Europe, and the treatment accorded to them far worse. This is generally true of receiving societies whose political regimes are not democratic.

Even in traditional overseas receiving societies, signs of increasing restriction and mounting concern are obvious, especially in
the US - less so in Australia and even less in Canada. In the US, popular attitudes traditionally sympathetic to migrants may be reversing in recent years as never before (Massey 1995). Nevertheless, in all three traditional countries of immigration restrictive measures coexist with others intended to attract immigrants; and a positive ideology of immigration still counteracts a negative one (Livi Bacci, 1993). Among democratic receiving societies, only Japan can be compared with Europe in terms of the restrictiveness of entry incorporation, policies, and prevalence of exclusionary orientations (Castles 1995).

The relatively short European experience with immigration has not followed in the steps of the classical model of integration set forth by the US, Canada, and Australia - and Argentina, Brazil or Uruguay in the past. In all these countries, the major concern in relation to immigration was that of securing a continuous supply of immigrants, which meant cheap labor. Both their arrival and their integration into society as permanent settlers were actively encouraged, with minor exceptions. Indeed migrants tended to integrate with the passage of time - in three generations, according to the classic theory of Park -, and became “Americanized”, or “Australianized”. At that point ethnicity got restricted to the realm of folklore, and a “twilight of ethnicity” took place (Massey 1995). Needless to say, these were land-intensive societies established on large territories, open to peoples of multiple origins. Immigration, which implied large economies of scale, was a founding mechanism.

This is hardly the case of Europe. The prevailing civic and political culture toward immigration rests on psycho-social underpinnings that were shaped by a past of labor surplus and by peculiar processes of nation-state formation, and which have been reinforced by its experience with immigration since WWII. Indeed, two structural features differentiate the European cultural background from that of overseas receiving societies. Europe
has a history of labor-intensive economies and of densely populated territories in which space and land have been fully occupied for a long time, to the point that even modest increases in population threatened to alter the delicate balances between resources and people. In addition, there has been a close association – be it real or illusory – between territory, ethnic group, language and national identity. In Europe “the feeling of belonging to a nation is closely connected to a feeling of imaginary ownership of the territory of the nation-state” (Cordeiro 1997:109). This ideal correspondence makes the acceptance of heterogeneity more difficult especially as far as the definition of the polity is concerned. In Europe, nationality is primarily an ethnic concept, while in North America or Australasia it is primarily a legal one. In this framework, immigration is bound to be seen as a threat, or at least a nuisance, to the ideal cohesion of the nation-state, rather than a contribution to its formation or enhancement. Citizenship is reserved to nationals; “others” are excluded from the polity, in different degrees. No doubt, these illusory links are not particular to Europe. But nowhere are they as strong and durable, except probably in Japan.

Given this background, it is easy to understand that, when after WWII, several Northwestern European countries ceased to be labor-intensive and became capital-intensive and labor-scarce – a condition seen by them as exceptional and transitory –, they required the contribution of foreign workers, and invented the notion of the gastarbeiter, whose primary characteristic is its temporariness – together with a limited endowment of rights. As Soysal has put it, “the normative model of migration developed within this [guestworker] framework is essentially an ‘exclusionary’ one, supported by ideologies of nationhood and citizenship” (Soysal 1994:21). No doubt, other countries have resorted to similar models, in the past or in the present, such as the US with the Bracero Program in the 40s.
and 50s, the South Africa of apartheid with the homelands, or receiving countries in the Gulf region and Asia. Yet, in the first case, it was not more than a temporary scheme to circumvent inadequate legislation, and its failure was relatively inconsequential; and in the remaining cases its functioning is not hampered by the legal and moral requirements of democracy.

But in democratic Europe, guestworkers were not disposable. Those who decided to stay were able to do so. Even more, entitlements became the foremost avenue for the arrival of new migrants, including asylum-seekers. The commitment of European societies with human rights and democratic politics led governments to grant protection and stability to migrants, who by then were becoming permanent ethnic minorities, and to set forth policies of integration, despite the fact that the historical conditions that had led to guestworkers' recruitment were no longer there.

This notwithstanding, many European governments kept pretending that the guestworkers they were integrating continued to be temporary, and that they would eventually return home. Indeed, as has been repeated many times, there are receiving countries in Europe which persist in denying the condition of immigration countries, against all evidence, and clinging to the view of immigration as a temporary and reversible phenomenon (Bolaffi 1997).

Processes of integration and factors of exclusion

Whether or not governments pretend that immigration is a temporary phenomenon, the fact is that many migrants have become long-term or permanent settlers (Castles, 1994), having stayed in Europe for over 15 years on average (Soysal, 1994: 24). This cannot be ignored by democratic societies. In fact,
regardless of their official discoures, all of them have launched integration programs and policies. Indeed, in the last twenty years migrant integration has emerged as an important area of public policy.

Evaluating the success and shortcomings of integration policies is admittedly far from easy, and it is not my purpose to do so. Apart from the fact that policies are relatively recent, embracing the various and often changing experience of a dozen countries makes generalizing exceedingly risky. In addition the number of policy areas and social processes to be taken into account is staggering. Not only formal policies, but informal practices are relevant.

Starting with the former, the first indication of limited integration is that most migrants are permanent aliens, and they are bound to maintain that status for a very long time if naturalization rates continue to be as low as they presently are in Europe as a whole. Certainly, not all migrants want to adopt the nationality of the host country, either for sentimental reasons - many would like to have dual citizenship, but few countries allow it - or for practical considerations, that is, because it is doubtful that it implies a major change. In fact, nationality does not seem to be a decisive factor in gaining access to basic services (North, de Wenden and Taylor 1987).

Indeed, migrants in Europe have many rights. After surveying a dozen countries, mostly in Europe, Soysal concluded that "the scope and inventory of noncitizens' rights do not differ significantly from those of citizens, and that [they] are increasingly standardized across host polities" (Soysal 1994:120). This is particularly true, as Hammar remarked a long time ago, of those that have the status of permanent residents (Hammar 1985); and more so of social and economic rights than of political ones. An important and much-valued right that has often been upheld by the courts of justice is the right to family reunion.
Recognition of political rights remains scant. In some countries migrants who are legally permanent residents have the right to vote and be elected in local election. Yet, the importance of political rights should not be downplayed, both because of symbolic reasons and on account of instrumental ones. Political rights may mean influence, bargaining power, ability to extract concessions, especially in uninominal electoral systems. It may foster self-esteem and ethnic mobilization. This seems to have been the case, for instance, in the United Kingdom.

Another type of right of considerable symbolic significance which is not granted to migrants - not even to permanent ones - is the supranational one of free circulation within the European Union. This denial is revealing of the concept of migrants as foreigners who do not belong in the European polity that is in the making, in spite of the realization that this refusal hinders the construction of an internal borders-free Europe and the process towards European citizenship.

All in all, it can be said that, as far as migrant rights are concerned, the European sky exhibits both lights and shadows. Civil, social and economic rights are generally recognized, as is normal in democratic societies. But other rights are usually not granted, and governments often drag their feet in this recognition. In addition there seems to be a tendency to limit the number of those entitled to a large array of rights. The preference for short-term labor permits goes in this direction, as well as the trend to grant asylum-seekers temporary protection with limited rights. Temporary migrants often have limited social protection.

Yet, as far as integration is concerned, obstacles of a different nature often matter more than a limited endowment of rights. These obstacles have mainly to do with the social disadvantages that usually plague immigrants and with informal practices, including different forms of racism and discrimination.
For a substantial proportion of immigrants and their children, chances of effective integration are limited above all by low socioeconomic status, discrimination or disadvantages in the labor market, residential segregation, poor educational results, limited social mobility, low political and trade union participation, unemployment – especially youth unemployment – and racism. The last two are probably the most devastating ones, and both seem to be on the increase. As Alain Touraine has recently said, “l’entrée dans la société d’accueil se fait par l’adoption d’un genre de vie qui suppose une qualification et un revenu que les immigrés ne possèdent pas” (Touraine 1997:236).

In short, the majority of migrants are part of society, with different degrees of integration, often in low status and disadvantaged positions, and suffering from different forms of exclusion. And they are generally not a full-fledged part of the polity and the nation.

In fact, two of the prevailing models of incorporation – the so-called “exclusionary” and the “pluralist” or “multiculturalist” one – do not aim at the full incorporation of migrants in the polity. And the one that did aim at that, the “assimilationist” model, is in deep crisis and in the process of being abandoned everywhere in exchange for other models or for hybrid formulae. Unfortunately, there is no space here for a full discussion of incorporation models and their effective working.

Concluding remarks

As far as immigration is concerned, European societies are caught between Scylla and Charybdis: between the Scylla of moral and political obligations stemming from their democratic nature and, commitment to human rights and labor needs, and the Charybdis of exclusionary definitions of the nation and of citizenship and
the prevalence of widespread anti-immigrant feelings. On the one hand, they have to come to terms with the fact that migrants have become permanent members of society, and, even more, that new ones will come to fill labor needs; and they have to be loyal to their fundamental principles as democratic societies, and therefore grant protection and rights to these minorities. On the other hand, they do so reluctantly, not fully accepting the condition of immigrant societies, restricting access to citizenship and political rights, and limiting the number of those entitled to rights.

The degree of integration of migrants in host societies results therefore from the operation of two impulses that pull in opposite directions. The fulfillment of democratic requirements and commitment to human rights and labor market participation lead to a certain degree of integration – of a certain proportion. Anti-immigrant predispositions, including racism, and an exclusionary concept of the polity and the nation lead to varying degrees of exclusion – political exclusion for most, social exclusion, in addition, for some. The end result is that most migrants are incorporated into society, although suffering from varying degrees of social exclusion; but most of them are not a full-fledged part of the polity. They are permanent aliens.

Such a balance can hardly be seen as a satisfactory one for the ethnic communities that live in European societies. And the question can be asked as to whether it can be seen as a satisfactory one for the receiving societies themselves, especially bearing in mind that immigration is here to stay and that the stock of migrants is being constantly renewed through new, albeit limited, entries.

At least one author has recently taken a relatively optimistic view of this state of things. Yasemin Soysal has presented the new dualism that characterizes European receiving societies as a blueprint for the future, an emerging form of post-national membership that signals the twilight of national citi-
zenship: “a new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the post-war era, one whose organizing and legitimizing principles are based on universal personhood rather than on national belonging” (Soysal 1994:1).

The point is whether this can be a satisfactory membership, both for the migrants themselves and for the receiving society. So far, there are many reasons to doubt it. The first one lies in the fact that such a postnational membership is not usually the result of a voluntary choice, but a subordinated status devoid of participation conferred upon migrants through exclusionary practices. The second is the fact that such a postnational condition very often coincides with membership in the lower ranks of society, perpetuated by limited amounts of intergenerational mobility.

Will this emerging model of postnational membership evolve toward an acceptable mode of incorporation? The answer will probably be given by the typical indicators of immigrant integration: migrants' satisfaction with their lives, degree of equality achieved, avoidance of discrimination, participation in social and political life, and the like. From the viewpoint of society, the test will also be a classic one: the ability to recognize and accommodate minorities. Without it, the quality of democracy will be impaired. As Tomas Hammar wrote years ago, “representative government cannot properly function without the political participation of a large active segment of its constituents represented by permanent immigrants without citizenship” (Hammar, 1985:438). One of the major challenges that European societies face in the coming years is the capacity to accept and organize a certain level of heterogeneity, as George Simmel wrote several decades ago. In the absence of a strong political will to adapt the concept of society to a reality that is different from that of the past, a large degree of skepticism is warranted.
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PORTUGAL AND MIGRATION IN GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

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Introduction

Many rapid, difficult to grasp, and seemingly unrelated changes in societies, economies, and international relations are refracted through transnational migration. We see and interpret such changes in particular ways in the presence of migration. The numbers and diversity of migrants seem to be growing, so, in consequence, we attribute many of the changes in our world to their presence. Their status and intentions are often difficult to pin down, so feelings of uncertainty, and sometimes even insecurity, linger in our minds.

Both host societies and countries of origin appear dependent on the migration relationship – the former for cheap and complaisant labor, the latter because it eases the burdens on overloaded labor markets and the capacities of political institutions, and because migrants’ remittances provide welcome infusions of hard currency. And, yet, both host and sending countries show increasing anxiety, and often resentment, about that relationship.

Migration-related developments are now seen as posing problems for publics, policymakers, social scientists and legal analysts, and, not least, for the migrants themselves. Such problems are vexing in many parts of the world; but it is mostly in Western and Central Europe and in North America that they have generated acute scholarly and public concern. But the concerns to which recent forms and magnitudes of transnational...
migration give rise may be due as much or more to social and economic changes in various parts of the world and to transformations of the international system as to the movement of people across borders.

Some of these factors emanate from “globalization.” They include the movement of capital and goods, marketing efforts, and expressions of culture across borders; easy, fast and relatively affordable long-distance travel; and electronic means of communication, including, of course, the rapid spread of access to the internet. Globalization is also associated by many observers with the progressive permeation of the borders of the nation-state, until now often deemed “sovereign territory,” by ideas and values of human rights, religious practices and notions of equality and democracy. And globalization also connotes the movements of people that, in the past few decades, have grown in magnitude and have affected more parts of the world than ever before in our memory.

But, as many scholars and journalistic commentators have observed, globalization is accompanied — perhaps even stimulated — by “localization,” the emergence of regional, sub-societal and other particularisms (see, for instance, Rosenau, 1983 and 1997; Sassen, 1998; Friedman, 1999). Current levels and forms of transnational migration may owe much to global forces, but their impacts are generally felt more at the local level than at the level of states or world regions. This is not a new observation, of course: an old adage in migration studies holds that, while migration may reflect international dynamics influences and national migration policies, its main impacts are experienced locally. Migrants live and work in the locality. That is where they come into contact with the host society and its institutions and culture; and that is where the relationships and attitudes that will determine the experience for both migrants and locals matter the most.

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How can that experience be shaped, to reflect the concerns of host societies, sending countries and migrants themselves? How might the connections between global, regional and national forces and policies be brought into harmony with the facts and human concerns in the communities where people live and work? Answers to such questions, even the most modest first steps toward grappling with them, cannot be found at the global or general level. They must be sought in the particular histories, institutions, circumstances and values of specific places and peoples. To date, most of my work on transnational migration has considered the broad patterns and general forces, at least as regards western European receiving countries. Here I move toward translating that experience into a set of contextualizing ideas that may be useful in the study of one country's circumstances. But, while I shall allude to Portugal's situation in this regard, by no means will I pretend to be knowledgeable about its situation. Rather, to reiterate, my aim is to identify ways in which large-scale processes might be linked to specific experiences.

**Changing Patterns and Assumptions of Migration in Modern Democracies**

Over time, Portugal's experiences with migration have reflected most of the major patterns displayed by both sending and receiving countries. For several centuries, it was almost exclusively a country of emigration; but recently it has also experienced immigration — albeit, on a relatively modest level, when compared with many other western countries or with the number of its own nationals living and working abroad. What is critically important, but sometimes overlooked, is that earlier emigration (at least until the 1960s or 1970s) took place under
conditions, assumptions and expectations that differed profoundly from those associated with immigration. In the second half of the twentieth century, transnational migration began to diverge in fundamental ways from the models of immigration that still reside in the backs of the minds of many scholars, policymakers and publics. Most of those models were based on a set of assumptions about migration that ranged between the notion of immigration and transience. Immigrants were expected to settle. The expectation was that they would adapt to, assimilate in, the society they entered, and adjust their behavior to its formal and social institutions. They, or at least their children – the “second generation” – were also expected to transfer their loyalty and, in some form and degree, their identity or sense of self as well. Such expectations did not attach to transients; but, consequently, the latter were held more or less apart from the host society. Some of the laws to which they were subject differed from those that applied to citizens and most prospective settlers; or at least some laws were applied to them differently. Short-term cross-border or seasonal workers, students, and some categories of refugees could be placed at some intermediate point on this continuum. But the clear import of the assumptions prevalent in most societies from early modern times until recently was that most migrants were either provisional candidates for assimilation or visitors whose status was in some degree tenuous. While expectations for the adaptability of the first generation, the immigrants, were relatively modest, their children, the second generation, was supposed to be fully malleable. In short, this assimilation model of migration assumed one-way and permanent or stable relocation.

Assimilation was not simply imposed. The model assumed that immigrants were willing, if not eager, to adapt and acculturate – or at least that they recognized that their alternatives were very limited. The prevailing norms of the host society
militated in favor of adaptation; and even the children of immi-
grants were enlisted in conveying those norms to their parents. 
Whether the assimilation model was ever fully operative any-
where is less important than that people and institutions acted 
as though it was. Consequently, the common presumption was 
that those who came were either apprentice members of the 
host society or strangers passing through. They were outsiders, 
who could expect to be treated only as such, protected by rudi-
mentary international, and occasionally bilateral, agreements. 
The fate of a few countries' emigrés was followed by non-govern-
mental (often church-based) and, less commonly, diplomatic 
attention.

These assumptions are no longer tenable for Western Europe 
and North America, the parts of the world of concern here. 
Expectations of assimilation have yielded to imprecise formu-
lations of integration, and even vaguer notions of "insertion," 
into the host society (see, e.g., Schnapper, 1991). Most, though 
not all, migrants now have portable standing on the basis of 
treaty law or human rights conventions (Jacobson, 1996; Sassen, 
1996). They can, and commonly do, avail themselves of inex-
pensive and convenient travel back and forth between the coun-
tries of residence and their origin. Cheap, readily accessible 
(indeed, vigorously marketed) cultural links – television, video 
tapes, printed materials – permit the retention, and even cul-
tivation, of their native cultures. Education and other services 
in the host society are often extended in their native language. 
A distinctly new pattern of semi-settlement has emerged for large 
numbers of people living outside the countries of their origin 
on a long-term or open-ended basis (Heisler and Heisler, 1986a;
1990).

Such back-and-forth migration is not new, to be sure. One 
of the earliest patterns of this sort, entailing movement back 
and forth across the Atlantic, was established by Portuguese
(see, e.g., Serrao, 1974; Brettell, 1986). Whether as fishermen who worked off the New England coast or workers and planters who spent appreciable periods in Brazil, Africa, South Asia and elsewhere, they migrated but often returned home — either on a more or less regular schedule or after an extended period of working abroad.

Semi-settlement is more prevalent now; and, from the point of view of governance, it is much more problematic. In the past, most transnational migration — except for seasonal and cross-border work — was, in economists' terms, a "lumpy good." It entailed major dislocations, great costs in money, time, and cultural adjustment. Undertaking it was, therefore, not done casually; and, while the idea of return ("the myth of return," in the language of migration studies) was common, actual return and especially recurring coming and going between the countries of origin and destination was infrequent and dislocating, as well as costly. Improved and more accessible transportation and communication have changed those conditions and, consequently, the perspectives of migrants. This has led to the emergence of transnational communities, where migrants regularly shift between the sending and receiving countries, often leaving families behind, sending money back home ("remittances") and, in general, establishing a bi-societal way of life (see, e.g., Kearney, 1995a; 1995b). Families and other social institutions in the countries of origin also adapt to such patterns, making them relatively stable and long-term (Brettell, 1986).

The notion of immigration, as noted, is unlike that of migration or the semi-settled condition associated with transnational communities because it leads to the expectation that people will assimilate, if not in the first generation, then certainly in the second or third. Thus, immigrants are expected to act like candidates for membership in their new societal home. This is akin to a probationary status. It implies openness to learning
and adjusting to the new society's culture and demonstrating progressive identification with and loyalty to it. The adaptation is to be done entirely or almost entirely by the immigrant; the host society need not change in fundamental ways - at least not consciously and purposefully. The expectation of many people in most host societies is that newcomers will "earn" their way into their new home. This expectation is important for understanding current attitudes of the cultural majorities in many host societies and the consequent circumstances of many migrants in western Europe.

Not only is assimilation no longer expected, but, in most western democracies, it is considered an archaic and normatively undesirable practice of the past. Concern for the cultural integrity and "identitive rights" of minorities, including those of migrant populations, has replaced the past assumption that migrants would either assimilate or remain outside the host society in important respects. This change reinforces the more prevalent tendencies toward semi-settlement or transnational life, since it puts minimal pressures on migrants to adapt in cultural and social, as well as legal, terms. (Adherence by migrants to the laws of the host society remains a universal expectation, however.)

This is another very significant factor that accounts for the institutionalization of the semi-settled condition: the negative or critical attitudes of greater or lesser portions of the members of host societies. Resistance to foreigners who are seen as potential settlers is common in most contemporary societies. However, it is far from overwhelming and, perhaps more important, it confronts larger, more vocal and effective opposition from organized advocates of migrants' rights and in general public opinion. It is necessary, therefore, to understand some of the underlying historical and ideational sources of these sentiments.
Migrants and Host Societies

European societies did not integrate quickly or harmoniously. Virtually all of today’s European democracies had appreciable economic, regional and ethnic minorities at the beginning of the twentieth century. It took several generations and virtually always entailed confrontation and, not uncommonly, violent conflict, to achieve identitive coherence and social solidarity. The right to vote, to organize for collective bargaining and other “entitlements” now taken for granted are, thus, viewed as having been earned. Even those who grew to adulthood too late to have to fight for such rights and inclusion directly have strong historical memories (whether imagined, constructed or “real”) and sense of connection to the struggles through which such rights were earned by their ancestors. This history or collective memory was an important underpinning of the vaunted “social contract” and constructive labor-capital relationships that prevailed for several decades after the Second World War; and, more generally, it accounted for relatively peaceful relationships across socioeconomic classes during that period, especially in continental Western and Central Europe.

With a partial exception, migrants who in the 1960s or later do not share that history, directly or through descent; and they do not partake – nor are they seen by most of their hosts as partaking – of such foundations of solidarity. Foreign workers recruited in the late 1950s and early 1960s, particularly by German, French and Belgian firms, came to be seen by many nationals of those countries as important contributors to their economies’ sustained economic growth, and, therefore, earned a place in the economy and society, if not invariably, in the polity. Similarly, those immigrants to the metropolis from former colonies who were identified with colonial rule were often seen as having earned a place in the colonial center. Newer arrivals
and those with no historic association have been much more likely to bear the heaviest burdens of resistance and discrimination in the host society.

Answers to three sets of questions are most likely to be telling for the way in which migrants will relate to the host society—not simply the police or other agents of the state. First, are migrants from another European Union (EU) member-state or from outside? As a corollary, along the lines just noted, are they from a former colony and identified with the interests of the mother country? Second, are they middle class professionals or skilled workers; or are they working or lower class—unskilled and un- or under-educated? Third, are they willing and able to make an effort to integrate—not necessarily to assimilate—into the host society, by, for instance, learning its language, seeking mainstream employment, and, eventually, moving at least in part beyond the social institutions and perhaps also the housing patterns of their immigrant enclave?

By far the most important difference, especially in the wake of the provisions of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties and the Schengen accords, has come between people from other member-states of the EU. As the Portuguese came to realize when the country entered the EU, in 1986, membership has its privileges. For citizens of member-states, in addition to free and unlimited movement and the right of (professional and business) establishment, there are now opportunities for full participation in the political life of the locality in which one lives, regardless of one's national citizenship. Consequently, neither Portuguese nationals living elsewhere in the EU nor citizens of other member-states in Portugal present problems conventionally associated with immigration.

Second, considerations of class—socioeconomic class, in its classic European sense—are crucial, even if few advocacy researchers are inclined to acknowledge their importance. Prejudice
on the part of members of the host society is often based on class distinctions. Historical class biases reinforce attitudes toward outsiders. Those migrants who occupy lower rungs on the economic, social and educational status ladders often appear to confirm those biases and attitudes. There are few studies of the integration of middle class or skilled or professional migrants in Europe, but there is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that class matters greatly.

Class distinctions also extend (in the experiences of any particular cohort, it may appear that they perpetuate) inequality, exclusion and limitations on life chances through educational differentials. Historically, the children of working class or lower class parents were very unlikely to receive more than a primary school education. Their entry into even vocational, much less higher educational, institutions was very slow, across two or more generations, and gradual.

Third, religion, or, rather, the mode of religious practice, can make a significant difference in migrants' adaptation to the host society and the manner in which their hosts perceive and treat them. It is possible to integrate into today's democratic societies in the western world while retaining one's religion. One can be French or German or Portuguese and a Muslim at the same time. What is problematic, however, is the retention of a more comprehensive cultural distinctiveness - life-styles, social institutions, and practices that are markedly different from, if not opposed by, the dominant cultural majority. This distinction and problem is succinctly and clearly put by William Pfaff, writing about France. "Even though Islam is now the second religion in France," he writes, "religiously observant Muslims remain conspicuously exceptional in a country that today is firmly secular and rationalist, and historically is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic (Pfaff, 1997)." In this view, the tensions emanate more from the distinction between the secu-
lar and the strongly, perhaps militantly, observant or orthodox than from that between Christians and Muslims.

This secular-orthodox distinction is not special to the relationship between western host societies and immigrants from distinct cultures, of course. It is at least as problematic in societies that are nominally homogeneous in terms of religion - such as Turkey and Algeria, and within religious majorities in such nominally secular states Israel and India. Thus, it is not different religions, per se, that affect migrant-host society relations, but, rather, how religious beliefs are presented in everyday life.

Conclusions: Problems to be Addressed in the Near Future

Normative frameworks have changed drastically in the past half century, perhaps nowhere more evidently than in Western Europe. In addition to the lessons drawn from the Holocaust and other horrors associated with World War II, including the forced migrations or ethnic cleansing that followed it, the opportunities to implant declarations of values into the myriad institutions created in Europe in the aftermath of the war seemed irresistible. Thus, in addition to being in or near the forefront in the development of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 50 years ago, Europeans used the establishment of the Council of Europe and, subsequently, the EU and other regional institutions to articulate not only principles of human rights but more specific expectations regarding political freedom and democracy. While the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) was quite comprehensive, the myriad of more specific conventions and judicial bodies and procedures that followed, is enormous. There are, significantly, specific declarations, conventions and adjudicatory
machinery addressing the circumstances of migrant workers and “Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which they live” (Wallace, 1997: ch. 8). Thus, perhaps we need to be less concerned with formal, political rights and the status of migrants in those terms and more with economic, social and cultural issues. Many of these relate to socioeconomic class.

As regards class, education is critical. Since most foreign workers, and, indeed, most migrants entering European states have been working class or unskilled, they and their offspring have educational deficits. In good times, especially during the 25 years of rapid and sustained economic growth, education — including entry into higher educational institutions for technical or academic training — served as the most important ladder for upward mobility and integration into what became essentially middle class societies. However, that took several generations — i.e., for working class families’ children or grandchildren to enter the middle class and become fully integrated into the society (not just the economy), just as it took several generations of struggle for working class people in Europe to gain a political voice and a foothold in the economy through collective bargaining.

But expectations have changed here, too. Waiting two or three generations is not palatable for most — including the champions of migrants in the host societies. Further, neither the public economies in general nor the educational systems of host societies are sufficiently robust to provide ample resources for rapid adjustment, “affirmative action” designed to include migrants in the mainstream more rapidly, or, for that matter, to cope with unemployment among the native population.

The policies and programs that affect migrants in the host society also apply, for the most part, to citizens and permanent residents. Thus, education, health care, registration for employment (or for unemployment benefits), housing and housing
assistance, and the like tend to be mandated by central governments in Europe. Until very recently – i.e., the mid- and late 1990s – the programs, levels of benefits, and modes of administration were essentially identical for citizens and aliens alike, although sometimes discrimination in the ways programs were administered for the latter was discernible. The responsibility for administering social policies usually falls on local authorities; and, in many countries, these have considerable latitude in how they implement the centrally delineated programs and policies. In Germany, for instance, for more than 75 years, the idea as well as the institution of the Sozialkommune has been central to both the administration of public policies and the linkage of people to the local – and through the hierarchical federal structure, the central – state. In most other Western European countries, the local level of administration has been similarly crucial, not only in terms of policy implementation but also as the closest level of government and most direct connection with the social state.

I shall close with a very difficult conundrum facing local or municipal institutions with regard to establishing sound, normatively acceptable, sustainable relations between migrants and the receiving country. It is one which I believe is particularly acute in some European countries, including Portugal: housing. I have in mind not simply finding adequate housing for those in need but, rather, the manner in which issues surrounding residential concentration or dispersion of culturally distinctive migrant populations are treated.

The difficulty stems from our own normative and theoretical uncertainties. On the one hand, segregation by place or origin or culture or formal (citizenship) status is clearly contrary to the normative templates — and often the laws and policies — of the host society. On the other hand, dispersing migrant populations, to minimize concentration, may serve to weaken

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or even render ineffective the social institutions they have formed or brought with them. Since such social institutions are often the most useful for their daily lives, work, and adaptation to the host country, disrupting them may well carry unwanted consequences.

I know of no clear or easy solution to this problem. Perhaps the most heartening insight I gleaned during my brief visit to Portugal and FLAD is that there is great awareness of this and associated problems, and they are being confronted by thoughtful, caring and skilled people. It may be the most we can hope to achieve in the short term.
References


PFAFF, W. 1997, “Immigrants and the mainstream,” Baltimore Sun, March 10, p. 9A.


CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS: A SITUATION IN FLUX BETWEEN TENSION AND INTEGRATION

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Socinova-FCSH/New University of Lisboa

Although in general terms foreigners represent a relatively small percentage of the total population (about 2%), they are heavily concentrated in two areas which are highly visible to the rest of the country: the region of the capital, and the Algarve (vd. Fonseca 1996; Cordeiro 1997; Machado 1997). In these regions, the relative weight of foreigners increases two - and nearly threefold, respectively.

Considering the geography of immigration and the rate of growth already shown in previous publications, as well as the integration dynamics of African immigrants and their descendants observed in several case studies (Marques, Santos, Santos e Nóbrega 1999; Marques & Santos 1997; Justino et al. 1998; Marques et al. 1998b), one might expect a growing differentiation and complexification of the situations leading to increased inequalities, which in turn might bestow (or reinforce) centrifugal tendencies, potentially deviant, particularly among some segments of the youth (vd. Justino et al. 1998).

When we see the news in the media on immigration and ethnic populations, one can see that youth problems are indeed an important topic making press headlines. Although there is, as yet, no systematic analysis available, it would not be going too far to say that these youths are frequently all lumped together by the media under the heading of anomie and its correlates - violence, crime, gang formation, unemployment, lack of school attendance...
This is the topic we intend to address in this presentation: considering the sizeable contingent of young people born abroad or born in Portugal but having at least one foreign born parent, can we speak of a second generation? If the answer is affirmative, how is the second generation achieving its integration into Portuguese society? Are the media overemphasising local and circumscribed instances of social exclusion, turning them into a racial or immigration problem? How are the youths of foreign descent getting along with the opportunity structures in the host society, and how are the institutional actors dealing with the emergence of this new social category?

Of course first things should come first, and it is important to define what we mean by second generation, and try to establish the relative weight – demographic as well as social – of this group. There has been some debate on this, particularly considering the fact that the bulk of immigration has been recent (after the mid-eighties), but also the fact that a sizeable portion of these young people were born in Portugal and cannot simply be labelled as immigrant (e.g. Machado 1994). But there is no consensus on a single definition. Although theoretical rigour supporting analytic decisions is a sound scientific procedure, the nature of available data leads us to follow a rather biased path here. To be more specific, since some of the children of foreign born parents have Portuguese nationality and others do not, even within the same family, depending mostly on whether they were born before or after the change on naturalisation law after de-colonisation (see Marques et al. 1998a), the demographic analysis will simply focus on a cohort of foreigners defined by age limits. The age criterion will also be used to look at opinions and try to assess whether there is an overlap or, on the contrary, a discontinuity between generations’ values orientations. However, it should be noted that available data on personal and family characteristics gathered through
direct observation allow for the creation of the variable ethnic belonging, that reaches far beyond the plain administrative attribute of nationality.

Regarding the institutional framework, decisions on immigration and ethnic minorities are nowadays heavily dependent on normative guidelines issued at the European Community level and broader institutional frameworks. Notwithstanding, the national institutional matrix still plays an important role in moulding the opportunity structures - both for nationals, and foreigners (as shown in Soysal 1994). In this context, one might wonder what results will be obtained or can be expected from the adoption, in Portugal, of institutional forms (apparently) similar to those in use in other countries having long immigration experience (e.g., the municipal councils for immigration and ethnic minorities issues). There are grosso modo two typical orientations on this issue in Portugal: the “corporatist” (socialist) position, which favours collective forms of representation and participation of immigrant and ethnic populations; and the “liberal” position, more prone to favour individual merits when confronted with the school system and the labour market test. While the Portuguese central government presently endorses the first view, in tune with the claims made by some national associations, religious organisations and other institutions; the elected officials in the city hall of Oeiras, the municipality where we have been doing empirical research for the past two years, prefer the second one.

The possibility of working simultaneously with data collected at the central government and data at the municipal levels enables us to go beyond the formal dimension, and circumvent the paucity and inaccuracy of official data. We shall, therefore, (1) focus on the demographic analysis of immigration in Portugal, in the Lisbon metropolitan area and Oeiras municipality, in order to estimate the relative weight of the
second generation, and show that, in demographic terms, the situation in Portugal is far from being stabilised; (2) we shall then move to an analysis of the institutional framework in order to describe the character, organisation and functioning of the opportunity structures available, with the aim of unveiling normative orientations and priority setting by the Portuguese decision makers; (3) then we shall present some selected indicators in order to assess the importance of anomie behaviour in the second generation and try to make some sense out of it – is there really an adversarial culture gaining roots among the children of foreign born parents, or not? Afterwards, we shall present some of the data we collected at the municipal level, which, it should be kept in mind, belongs to the Lisbon metropolitan area and has the second biggest African born and African descent population\(^1\). It is, therefore, the analysis of a typical situation which, although not statistically significant, is the only relevant alternative. Using our survey and the results of intensive observation, (4) we shall begin by showing that there is no such thing as an adversarial culture, although some segments of the second generation may adopt that outlook; (5) then, we shall look at interviews made with some public and semi-public officials, and with the leaders of particular collective interests having local or national scope, in order to understand how they are facing the issues concerning second generation integration, if they believe that there is indeed a second generation problem, and how they coordinate with one other in order to deal with these issues. In general terms, we intend to demonstrate that it is not only in demographic terms that the situation is far from being stabilised. The same thing can be said about the institutional framework, which is still unable to routinise practices in handling everyday situations – in school, in municipal housing, in job training, etc.

\(^1\) See the results of the census of African born and African descent populations in the LMA made by CEPAC (AAVV 1995).
1. Settlement patterns and demographic evolution

The latest data\textsuperscript{2} provided by Customs and Immigration Service\textsuperscript{3}, concerning 1997, show there were 175,263 foreigners residing in Portugal, 39,789 (22.7\%) of which were of Capeverdian nationality, indeed the biggest of all foreign populations.

When one considers the proportion of Capeverdians in relation to all immigrants from Africa, the percentage climbs to 46.6\%. Angolans (9.3\%), Guineans (7.3\%), Mozambicans (2.5\%) and Santomese (2.5\%) are the most significant nationalities which add to Capeverdians. The heavy presence of foreigners coming from the former colonies is thus the fundamental trait that characterises immigrants holding residence permits in Portugal.

Among the 81,717 African nationals living in Portugal, 82.5\% are settled in the Lisbon and Setúbal districts\textsuperscript{4}. The polarising effect of the capital on both those districts is clear; and if we look at only the metropolitan areas of these districts, the relative weight would certainly be even greater.

Another trait characterising the presence of African communities in the Lisbon metropolitan area concerns its settlement in slums and rundown areas. One can estimate that, in 1997, nearly half the African immigrants lived in these sorts of quarters.

Finally, one of the most impressive traits characterising African immigrants in Portugal, especially in the Lisbon metropolitan area, concerns the still increasing weight of the youngest age groups.

Using the African community living in Oeiras municipality, as point of reference, among 2,949 already re-housed individuals in municipal projects, the population under 25 years of age represents 54\% of the total, while those of the same age group born in Portugal and having Portuguese nationality are only 41\%\textsuperscript{5}.

\textsuperscript{2} Ministério da Administração Interna, Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras, Divisão de Planeamento. Relatório Estatístico, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{3} An official organ of the Department of the Interior, also in charge of producing statistical data on foreigners.

\textsuperscript{4} An administrative unit encompassing several municipalities, but smaller than a region.

\textsuperscript{5} Data provided by the Oeiras municipal Housing Department, concerning the latest information update on families living in municipal housing (May 1998).
Analysis of the age structures of the two groups reveals the two migrant generations present: the youngest, having an average age around 15 years; and the other, having an average age of 43 years.

Far from being a stabilised phenomenon, this rejuvenation of the African immigrant community seems to be amplifying due to three major factors:

1. A high fertility rate, associated with cultural patterns of the old country and the rising incidence of adolescent pregnancy, higher among African families living in slums
and rundown quarters. The average family size is a good indicator of demographic differences between immigrant and Portuguese descent populations: among the re-housed families observed in SOCINOA's survey in the Oeiras City Council housing, we counted 4.5 inhabitants per house, for the first category, and 3.6 inhabitants per house for the second.

2. A rejuvenation of the latest migrant fluxes coming from African countries associated, among other things, with the re-composition of families. Among African immigrants who arrived in Portugal in 1997, 66% were under 25 years old - both males and females.

3. The present demographic structure of the countries where the major fluxes originate, all with an important relative weight of the youth segment.

In fact, demographic data (UN estimates for 1998) concerning the major sending countries to Portugal confirms that internal pressures to emigrate are increasing. The population under 15 years old in Angola represents 48%, and the total fertility rate is 6.69, whereas the values for Cape Verde are 40% and 3.56, respectively.

**Table 1** Demographic estimates for Portugal and Portuguese speaking African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>S. Tomé &amp; Príncipe</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent under 15 years old</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility rates</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Furthermore, it should be emphasised that all these major sending countries are part of the sub-Saharan zone of Africa, which presents the highest percentage of population aged 25 and under.

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6 We prefer this term to the more commonly used "family reunification" because of the highly diversified situations observed, which entail more than just the gathering of formerly scattered members of a same unit (a family as we would conceive of it in European middle class terms), and includes the making of new households.

7 MAI, SEF, Relatório...
Sending countries are not only confronting a serious demographic and economic situation; they also face increasing social instability, sometimes associated with internal conflicts - even civil war.

In a recent World Bank report on the Capeverdian economy and society, it is estimated that about 30% of total population lives in poverty, and about 14% in absolute poverty. Unemployment rate estimates point to 25%. Yet, the Capeverdian situation is probably one of the less serious among the countries where the biggest immigrant fluxes to Portugal originate. Angola and Guinea-Bissau are facing civil wars, Mozambique has just left behind a similar situation.

All these indicators point to an increasing pressure of the factors that have fed the migratory fluxes in the last two decades. This allows us to conclude that, in demographic terms, the situation is far from being stabilised; it is rather what we might term a situation in flux.

How does the institutional framework respond to these new situations?

2. Institutional framework - foreigners and state policies

Despite the fact that the Portuguese Constitution and all the other normative arrangements grant equality of rights and tre-
treatment to both nationals and foreigners, as long as the former are legally living here, one cannot actually say that in Portugal at the present time there is a rather different treatment between nationals and foreigners depending on their legal status. Even the categories of non-citizens that fall outside the formally guaranteed ones – namely all those who are illegal immigrants –, as we intend to show, can legitimately access public benefits: municipal housing, in order to eradicate the urban slums; public health care, in order to achieve acceptable levels of public sanitation; job training, in order to prevent social marginality, etc.

We also want to emphasise that immigration is a rather recent issue on the Portuguese government agenda. The institutional framework is far from being stabilised. As a matter of fact it was only seven years after Portugal joined EEC (in 1986) but as its direct consequence that those questions started to arise in political speech, in spite of illegal massive presence of foreigner workers and their degrading living conditions in slums in the greater Lisbon.

It was during the liberal (PSD) governments (1986-1994) that some legislation strictly related to immigration started to appear. 1991 stands as the year when the first decisions were taken to promote social integration of ethnic communities with the creation of a multicultural education board\(^9\) especially conceived for monitoring immigrants' schooling issues, and a special job training project. The government was the sole responsible for the first one; the other being the result of deliberation of the state and the social partners' joint decision council (CPCS\(^{10}\)).

Before that, the traditional police department in charge of controlling foreigners in Portugal (Customs and Immigration Service\(^{11}\)) was restructured in 1986 (it still monopolised the responsibility for that control). In 1993, a second restructuring


\(^{10}\) Conselho Permanente de Concertação Social.

\(^{11}\) Serviço de Estrangeiros until 1986, and Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras from then on (Decree-Law 440 of December 31 1986).
took place\textsuperscript{12}, and the responsibility was divided: administrative control would remain with the SEF; and the Ministry of Employment and Social Security would be in charge of co-ordinating actions aimed at promoting immigrants’ social integration and monitoring its evolution\textsuperscript{13}.

In the succeeding years, major state policies aimed at simultaneously solving some of those community problems and above all implementing Schengen Treaty resolutions. A “special legalisation” process took place in 1993, followed by the approval of a cabinet resolution (also in 1993) aimed at countering immigrants’ social exclusion. This resolution covered, as priority areas, housing, education, job training and other social welfare\textsuperscript{14}. As a direct result two laws were passed, one concerning job training and employment\textsuperscript{15} and another one creating a special public re-housing program\textsuperscript{16} to be implemented by municipalities in metropolitan areas.

These liberal governments’ orientations on immigrants issues were suddenly changed after general elections took place in 1995 and socialists were elected, bringing another orientation to public initiatives. The measures already implemented, however, survived (Special Re-housing Program (PER), Special Job Training and Entreculturas). As the fulfilment of an electoral promise, a High Commissioner for Immigration an Ethnic Minorities\textsuperscript{17} was created, which made public concerns over Portugals’ new role as an immigrant country more visible, and created a forum which represents immigrants and ethnic communities interests within government, and where they can represent themselves as they become recognised as legitimate interlocutors.

In the last few years we have seen the approval of several laws that established equality of rights between nationals and foreigners in all the following different areas: work and job training, housing, healthcare, schooling and social welfare.
Work and job training
Portuguese legislation on foreign labour has been changing according to economic and political trends but is nowadays strongly influenced by the European Social Charter impositions.

In the earlier post-revolutionary period some discretionary legislation related to foreign labour was approved creating limited quotas for the number of foreigners allowed to work as wage earners in the same enterprise, thus counteracting a series of other regulations. This ambiguous condition prevailed until this year (1998), when a law was approved revoking the first one. This new law assures the same treatment to foreigners and nationals in compliance with international treaties signed by the Portuguese State and gives inspection authority to the official inspection organism of the Ministry of Employment, thus replacing the Ministry of the Interior.

Concerning job training, there have been some initiatives targeted at particular excluded groups, among which immigrant communities and especially their youngsters are considered priority recipients. Prime examples are the Cabinet Resolution of 1993, which created the institutional framework making such initiatives possible, and the political agreement on job training celebrated in 1991 within the CPCS that gave way, two years later, to a Cabinet Regulation regulating “special job training”, establishing immigrants and ethnic minorities as some of its primary targets.

Housing
Foreigners’ access to public housing was also recently changed. Restrictions imposed by a 1976 law (which reserved it only for national citizens) are omitted in the 1996 Special Re-housing Program aiming at total eradication of slums in metropolitan areas by the year 2000 and the re-housing of “all” populations.

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19 Namely the Portuguese Constitution, the International Labour Organisation Convention signed in 1978, the International Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination approved in 1982 and the European Social Charter approved by the Portuguese Parliament in August 1991, as well as the Cabinet Resolution 38/93, which obliged the Portuguese State to assure equal treatment on employment issues between nationals and legalised foreigners.
21 Cabinet Regulation 140 of July 2, 1993.
22 Decree-Law 797 of November 6, 1976.
Healthcare
Although the Portuguese Constitution (Article 64) and all the international agreements signed by Portugal establish equality of access to public healthcare for all individuals regardless of race and nationality, a 1990 law23 makes it dependent on reciprocity agreements. Yet, recently, a non governmental association (SANITAE) negotiated an agreement with the Lisbon Regional Health Administration24 on free healthcare for illegal immigrants.

Schooling
As already mentioned, Education Ministry created in 1991 a multicultural education board, which is conducting a systematic inquiry into and monitoring of the various ethnic groups' school performance. Furthermore, the support for immigrants' children in school is even a Constitutional right (Article 74).

Social Welfare
All Portuguese legislation enables foreigners to access social welfare, and a special law approved in 199625 even assumes that immigrants are priority recipients for a minimum state guaranteed income26.

Voting in local elections
Since 1997, non European Community citizens have been allowed to vote in local elections27 as long as reciprocity exists - which restricts this participation, among the significant immigrant populations in Portugal, to Capeverdians and Brazilians. It should be stressed that more than 9,000 Capeverdians are registered as voters for local elections in Portugal, but only around 5,000 are registered in the Capeverdian Embassy and Consulates to vote in Capeverdian elections28.

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24 Comissão Regional de Saúde de Lisboa e Vale do Tejo.
26 Rendimento mínimo garantido.
27 Law 50 of September 4, 1996.
28 We thank the Capeverdian MP for the immigrants' constituency in Portugal for this valuable information on registrations for Capeverdian elections. Data concerning registration for local elections in Portugal was obtained from STAPE (the national public office for technical electoral matters).
Cultural Mediators
Finally, one should call attention to the creation of cultural mediators, in 1996, aimed at facilitating ethnic minority youngsters’ integration in the schools.29

In sum, one might say that the past ten years’ institutional experience shows there has been a clear and deliberate intention on the part of the Portuguese government not to discriminate against foreigners and, considering the past experience from traditional immigration countries, to prevent exclusion. Immigrant and ethnic youth, in particular, have benefited from the same programs created to promote success in schools and easy labour market integration of the youngsters through job training.

How then can we explain the pervasive public image, echoed and amplified by the media, of dominant anomic behaviour among young Africans?

Two indicators can give some clues.

3. Anomic behaviour

3.1. Criminality
Starting by quantifying the proportion of the immigrant population somehow related to crime between 1994 and 1996, we can see that there is a major gap between percentage of foreigners in the population (1.6% in 1994 and 1.7% in 1996) and the foreigners arrested (9.6% in 1994 and 12% in 1996)30. If one considers specifically the Africans, the gap is even wider: their weight in the total population was 0.7% in 1994 increasing to 0.8% in 1996. The figures for the arrested Africans are alarming: 5.9% in 1994 (eight times more then their national weight) and 7.9% in 1996 (nine and a half times more).

As we will see, according to quantitative (as well as qualitative) information, youngsters are responsible for a large part of criminal behaviour.


30 These figures include the population arrested for unlawful stay, which nonetheless represents a very small percentage of the total. In fact, considering the relation between the number of expulsions that took place between 1995 and 1997, and the total number of legalisation requests presented in 1996, one can estimate the probability of being expelled as an illegal immigrant in Portugal to be less than 1% (see Seabra 1999).

31 The Home Security Reports (until now only those from 1991 to 1996 have been published – see references).
Concentrating the analysis on the two youth groups (from 16 to 18 years old, and from 19 to 24 years old), we can see that the younger group one represents a very small part of the total arrested population (1.4% in 1994 and 1.6% in 1996). A different scenario emerges with the second group, which shows an increase from 17.4% in 1994 to almost 20% of the total in 1996.

Specifically with regard to the African arrested population, these data show a somewhat erratic evolution. Arrests in the younger group (16-19 years) dropped from 6.4% of the total arrested population in that age group in 1994 to 5.8% in 1996 – which still represents a very high rate when compared with the group’s weight in the Portuguese population. The second group (19 to 24 years old) reveals a different trend but the same alarming scenario. Again the Africans represent, by far, the largest portion of non-Portuguese arrested people. From 1994 to 1996 this has increased from 6.3% of the total arrested population, and in that specific age group, to 8.3%. Once more these figures reveal, besides this group’s being disproportionately represented in the prison population, it increased by two percentage points in just two years.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prisoners</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>16-18 years (%)</td>
<td>19-24 years (%)</td>
<td>Total (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of prisoners</td>
<td>10 311</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National prisoners</td>
<td>9 320</td>
<td>90.39</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>90.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign prisoners</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>9.61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Americans</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Next, we shall look at the distribution by nationality among these African prisoners, and how it has evolved.

Table 4 Existing African prisoners in December 31, by age group and selected nationalities (1994/1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>16-18 years (%)</td>
<td>19-24 years (%)</td>
<td>Total (%)</td>
<td>16-18 years (%)</td>
<td>19-24 years (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>18.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>21.64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44.44</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>49.83</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Tomé</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8.03</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Due to the small absolute figures that are present in the first age group, we shall not analyse those figures.

Three major considerations, related to the second age group, should be highlighted:

i) First, the evolution of two percentage points during this period (from 18.5% in 1994 to 20.7% in 1996), at a higher rate than the overall evolution (at 17.4% and 19.6% respectively). These figures, once more, reveal a high incidence of criminal behaviour among this group;

ii) Another salient fact revealed by these figures is the inversion of positions among Angolans and Capeverdians. In 1994 the Angolans represented 31% of the total foreign prisoners in this age group, while the highest rank was occupied by Capeverdians, with 40.7%. One year later, these are inverted, with 40.5% and 32.2% respectively.
in 1996\textsuperscript{33}. Logically, a longer series would be necessary in order to confirm this tendency;

iii) Last but not least, we should highlight the marked increase observed among the Guineans (by about 120% between 1994 and 1995, and by 100% between 1995 and 1996). This group, although small in terms of actual numbers, nevertheless shows an impressive worsening of the situation.

The second indicator concerns schooling.

3.2. Schooling

To illustrate the situation among youth of ethnic minority groups concerning their participation in school, we shall use information gathered by Entreculturas\textsuperscript{34}.

Concerning school enrolment from 1992 to 1996, the actual number of Portuguese nationals enrolling at the beginning of the academic year declines each year from 1993 on. In the Setúbal district and in the municipality of Oeiras, however, there is a slight increase in the last years. The trend among non-Portuguese, on the other hand, is toward an overall increase, which reflects a different population age structure.

The dropout rate increased, both in the Portuguese and the non-Portuguese groups, from 1993 to 1995. However, between 1995 and 1997, the Portuguese dropout rate decreases, while the non-Portuguese rate continues to increase. In Oeiras, the Portuguese group shows an overall negative rate, whereas the opposite occurs in the last year for non-Portuguese.
Table 5  Enrolments from 1992/93 to 1996/97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (mainland)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>1,316,637</td>
<td>1,377,077</td>
<td>1,329,566</td>
<td>1,244,427</td>
<td>1,222,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N on Portuguese</td>
<td>91,735</td>
<td>75,058</td>
<td>93,668</td>
<td>97,972</td>
<td>91,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,408,372</td>
<td>1,452,135</td>
<td>1,423,234</td>
<td>1,342,399</td>
<td>1,314,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon (district)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>248,589</td>
<td>266,461</td>
<td>253,399</td>
<td>220,145 *</td>
<td>218,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N on Portuguese</td>
<td>28,644</td>
<td>20,998</td>
<td>25,251</td>
<td>29,826</td>
<td>29,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>277,233</td>
<td>287,459</td>
<td>278,650</td>
<td>249,971</td>
<td>247,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setúbal (district)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>109,326</td>
<td>113,071</td>
<td>106,994</td>
<td>95,821 *</td>
<td>96,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N on Portuguese</td>
<td>13,075</td>
<td>9,059</td>
<td>10,846</td>
<td>11,497</td>
<td>12,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>122,401</td>
<td>122,130</td>
<td>117,840</td>
<td>107,318</td>
<td>108,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oeiras (municipality)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>17,159</td>
<td>18,373</td>
<td>16,464</td>
<td>16,711 *</td>
<td>17,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N on Portuguese</td>
<td>3,487</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>3,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,646</td>
<td>20,837</td>
<td>19,356</td>
<td>20,038</td>
<td>20,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6  
Dropout rate from 1993/94-1994/95 to 1995/96-1996/97 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portugal (mainland)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N on Portuguese</td>
<td>-18.6</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lisbon (district)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N on Portuguese</td>
<td>-9.8</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Setúbal (district)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N on Portuguese</td>
<td>-49.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oeiras (municipality)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N on Portuguese</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The upper school levels, however, show a different evolution (within much higher retention the school system but, on a much reduced basis for students arriving at the post-mandatory school cycle).

So, concerning non-Portuguese participation in school in Oeiras municipality, their performance is worse than that one observed for the native youth. Furthermore, the evolution observed and the numbers involved may be a sign that the ethnic minority student population is expanding, possibly with direct entry into the school system of students coming from abroad.

In sum, when considering criminality and school performance, the official data do suggest symptoms of anomie among ethnic minority youth. However, is it possible to extrapolate from these two important, but simple indicators, to an adversarial culture? Their high visibility and effect on public opinion is a consequence of the sensitive areas at issue: criminality.
involving security concerns, and the acquisition of human capital entailing investments in the future.

In order to circumvent ideological and moral bias, we must under move to empirical observation of specific everyday situations, controlled ecological conditions, and try to make some sense of these loose pieces of information.

4. Is there an adversarial culture?  

Concerning the results obtained via the analysis of Entreculturas Oeiras data base, it should be kept in mind that it involves the entire municipal population, and that Portuguese students come from highly diversified ecological situations; whereas the ethnic population is over-represented in social exclusion areas. The empirical data gathered by our own survey will show that the influence of cultural factors on school performance should be clearly distinguished from the effects of socio-economic exclusion.

Let’s now move to a specific universe, the municipal re-housing projects, and try to see if, under the same ecological conditions, differences still exist. We shall focus on information gathered through a survey carried out in 1997 and 1998 by SOCINOVÁ in municipal re-housing projects in Oeiras municipality.

The survey allowed for the collection of data characterising every household member. We shall use this information to characterise the youth living in these neighbourhoods. Afterwards, for social representation analysis, we shall use only the information concerning the respondents.

Among ethnic minority youths, it is usual to distinguish between individuals whose primary socialisation has taken place in the host society and individuals whose primary soci-

---

35 We shall draw heavily on A Portes’ (1995; 1996) framework.

36 Data collection was funded by Urban, Renovação Urbana, and Praxis XXI (CSH/840/95) projects, and involved a survey of 881 randomly selected households in ten different municipal re-housing projects. Yet in only seven of these neighbourhoods, corresponding to 724 households, did we find a significant presence of immigrant and ethnic populations. For a thorough description of the universe and the characteristics of the survey see Marques et al. (1998b).

37 I.e. (i.e.,) resident population aged between 15 and 24 years old.

38 Also aged 15 to 24.

39 Here, we considered individuals born in Portugal and individuals born outside Portugal but who arrived at the age of 9 or younger.
alisation has taken place elsewhere\textsuperscript{40}. However, this second category in our survey data is really very small, making its use unadvisable in any statistical test. We shall therefore consider youth as one single group.

Concerning youth productive status one sees a wide variety of situations\textsuperscript{41}. Yet, in most neighbourhoods, the weight of students is greater among the ethnic minority segment.

Table 7 Ethnic minority and majority youth, by productive status, in the municipal re-housing context (\%)\textsuperscript{*}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inside the labour force</th>
<th>Outside the labour force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Works</td>
<td>Studies and works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic majority</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know/</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t answer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOCINOV\textsuperscript{A}.

* In order to deal with the survey as a whole (and not with the ten independent samples initially drawn by neighbourhood), the data presented in tables 8 to 13 have been standardised according to the weight of each neighbourhood in the total of all municipal re-housing projects surveyed.

Concerning educational level, one observes some (small) differences among student categories, the ethnic majority being slightly less concentrated at the end of the mandatory level. Yet no significant difference appears with regard to occupational structure, with unskilled workers being the largest group in both categories in almost all re-housing neighbourhoods.
Table 8  Large occupational groups*, in the municipal re-housing context (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic Majority</th>
<th>Ethnic Minority</th>
<th>Doesn't know/Doesn't answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White collar occupations</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual manufacture labourers</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't know / Doesn't answer</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOCINOVA.

Notes:
* The composition of occupational groups is the following: white collar occupations – shopkeepers, school teachers, intermediate level technicians, and administrative clerks; manual manufacture labourers – skilled and semi-skilled manual workers; unskilled workers – sales clerks, personal and domestic services, unskilled manual workers.
** Includes the most recent occupation of the unemployed.

Table 9  Educational level, in the municipal re-housing context (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic Majority</th>
<th>Ethnic Minority</th>
<th>Doesn't know/Doesn't answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st cycle</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cycle</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd cycle</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above high school</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't know / Doesn't answer</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOCINOVA.

Moving now towards social representations, in all the surveyed neighbourhoods most individuals think that individual merits can lead to social advancement. This is the general case among ethnic minority youngsters, whereas among the ethnic majority youth we find some variation in opinions from one neighbourhood to the other.

42 The total number of respondents aged 15 to 24 years old amounts to 242 in the total sample (ten re-housing neighbourhoods), and to 203 in the seven municipal estates where we found a heavy presence of immigrant and ethnic minority populations.
Table 10  Opinion about the possibilities of social advancement (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic majority</th>
<th>Ethnic minority</th>
<th>Doesn't know/Doesn't answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One can climb the social ladder on the grounds of individual merits</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural obstacles will always block the way</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know/Doesn’t answer</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOCINOVA.

If one focuses on the working youth alone, we see that, concerning the possibility of climbing the social ladder based on one’s work, most of ethnic majority young workers think that their work enables upward social mobility, whereas ethnic minority youth have a much more skeptical outlook.

Table 11  Opportunities to climb the social ladder through one’s work (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic majority</th>
<th>Ethnic minority</th>
<th>Doesn’t know/Doesn’t answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know/Doesn’t answer</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOCINOVA.

As for opinions about the importance of education to prepare for the future as opposed to enjoying the present, we see that the first alternative is clearly preferred to the second one, by ethnic majority as well as ethnic minority young people.
Table 12  Opinion about the importance of preparing for the future versus enjoying the present (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic majority</th>
<th>Ethnic minority</th>
<th>Doesn’t know/Doesn’t answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare for the future</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoy the present</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know/Doesn’t answer</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOCINOVA.

In sum, the survey carried out in Oeiras municipality shows that ethnic minority youngsters differ from the rest in the following aspects: their greater weight within the student population; and the dominant opinion expressed about the possibility of upward social mobility – greater than that observed among the youngsters of Portuguese descent, although work experience seem to diminish the general optimistic feelings.

As far as the descriptive analysis allows us to speculate, it seems as if the ethnic minority youth carry on their parents’ dream of upward social mobility, based on individual merits and effort, the same way that youth of Portuguese descent reproduce the mind-set of their underclass origins, emphasising distrust in the opportunity structures “blocked” by insurmountable structural obstacles.

In order to ascertain whether (and how) specific interactions occur which might shed some more light on this relationship, we resorted, first, to a factorial analysis of multiple correspondences, and, secondly, to a loglinear analysis, using six variables: two sociographic attributes (youth and non-youth) and ethnic belonging (also as a dummy: belonging to an ethnic minority or not). All built as dummies: beliefs in the possibility of upward mobility through work (only for workers); structural obstacles vs individual effort; vocational training in order to prepare for the future vs enjoying the present as long as you can.
The results for the total surveyed population\(^{46}\) show evidence supporting the idea of different value orientations of the two categories in the predicted direction (confidence of the ethnic minorities in the opportunity structures; mistrust among the others). Taking a closer look at factors one and two, we see that there are two distinct sets of attributes and opinions: (1) the ethnic minority category, which believes in meritocracy, values future preparation (rather than enjoying the present), and is oriented to the youngest age group (15-24 years); (2) the ethnic majority category, which thinks that there are always obstacles to social mobility, prefers to enjoy the present, and is oriented to the population aged 25 or more.

**Table 13** Factor analysis (total sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explained variance %</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cum. %</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loadings</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngsters</td>
<td>-20.8</td>
<td>-0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic majority</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>-10.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know/Doesn’t answer</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future/Present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare for the future</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoy the present</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>-15.3</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know/Doesn’t answer</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social advancement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By individual merits</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always structural obstacles</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know/Doesn’t answer</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOCINOVA.
The loglinear analysis shows there is in fact an interaction between age and ethnic belonging, which do not interact with expressed opinions. Then there is another independent interaction between ethnic belonging and the value placed on vocational training, another between age and beliefs on social mobility, and yet a fourth one between the value placed on vocational training and beliefs on social mobility.

Considering only the workers, and factors one and two (table 14 and chart 3\[47\]), the results further support the bipolar value orientation: (1) the first cluster comprises the sceptical position regarding the opportunity for upward social mobility explained by the first four factors amounts to 60.3%.

\[297\]
through one's work, the belief in the existence of structural obstacles to social mobility, and the emphasis on enjoyment of the present; (2) in the second cluster we find a faith in individual meritocratic values, the belief in the opportunity for climbing the social ladder through work, and the preference for preparing for the future rather than enjoying the present. This second group is close to the individuals belonging to ethnic minorities, thus supporting the hypothesised overlap between generations' orientations.

Table 14  Factor analysis (workers only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explained variance %</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cum. %</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loadings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngsters</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic belonging</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic majority</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>-11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>-16.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't know/Doesn't answer</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social mobility by one's work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-13.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future/Present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare for the future</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoy the present</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't know/Doesn't answer</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
<td>-17.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social advancement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By individual merits</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't know/Doesn't answer</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
<td>-19.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOCINova.
When considering factors one and three (chart 4), a clear contrast between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority emerges - which thus replicates the results found in table 13. The first group thinks their present work doesn't enable upward mobility, but believe that individual effort eventually brings about that result and considers vocational training of utmost importance. The latter group takes the opposite position, believing that their present work allows upward mobility, while admitting there are always obstacles to social advancement, and they value enjoyment of the present, rather than preparing for the future.
The loglinear analysis sheds some more light on this. In fact, besides the two first interactions already found in the total sample (between age and ethnic belonging, and between ethnic belonging and the value placed on vocational training), two other independent interactions are revealed, which are not influenced by them: (1) between the ethnic category, and opinions on the opportunity structures (the belief in the possibilities of upward social mobility through work, and the beliefs on social mobility); and (2) among the three attitudes towards the oppor-
tunity structures (the belief on the possibilities of upward social mobility through work, the value of training, and beliefs on social mobility).

In sum, these results show two things: (1) on the formal dimension, that there is indeed some congruence among the three indicators of attitudes toward the opportunity structures used; and (2) in substantial terms, a deep rift between ethnic minority and majority attitudes toward opportunity structures. Furthermore, they strongly suggest some continuity between ethnic minority youngsters and adults.

So, considering the adversarial culture hypothesis, these data allow us to come to some conclusions on two important issues: (1) first of all, attitudes expressed by ethnic minority youth about social mobility prospects are quite different from those evidenced by white underclass youth; (2) having the same average age, ethnic minority youngsters have higher rates of students than the white youth living in the same conditions. The first conclusion suggests that adopting American Black adversarial culture symbols does not necessarily imply adopting its weltanschauung; Oeiras ethnic minority youth surveyed reveal a great deal of confidence in what the future will bring, congruent with the social mobility prospects that led to immigration. However, when one concentrates on those youths who have already experienced the realm of work for wages, the perspectives seem much more gloomy. The second conclusion confirms this interpretation: if we control for ecological situations, ethnic minority youth are over-represented in the school system.

Of course, one should not rush to conclusions. What these results suggest is that cultural and socioeconomic factors should be correctly put in perspective, not that exclusion and anomic behaviour are absent from this universe. In fact, there are many serious problems arising among youth of immigrant descent. And they do represent a challenge to municipal institutions.
5. Local public policies and the second generation

In several interviews with public officials in Oeiras Municipality we were able to testify that, given the huge number of social exclusion situations among ethnic youngsters (child abuse, absent parents, low Portuguese proficiency... , see also França 1992 and Almeida 1991), and the lack of knowledge about the characteristics of these youth (cultural interests, cultural background, the typology of their families... ), officials often felt they needed some guidance in order to take the proper decisions, and do something not just because it has been done in other places48, but because it might prove interesting both to the local youth and the Town Hall. In fact, being constantly confronted with unfamiliar situations draws heavily on municipal resources and runs against the need for some degree of routinisation of procedures, which is indispensable for any institution to function.

Attitudes of pragmatism and trial and error are, therefore, predominant among Oeiras public officials dealing directly with immigrants, sometimes even running counter to the liberal municipal political stance. The elected officials of this municipality, congruent to their political views, assume that they only deal with individuals and not with communities as collectives, refusing any discretionary treatment on the basis that they are all municipal citizens. Meanwhile, anticipating that in the near future, and as a consequence of the much higher growth rate of ethnic communities, these youngsters’ mass presence in some local municipalities will be dominant, specific measures are being taken to specifically address youth of foreign descent. As examples of such sort of pragmatic practices stands the support given by the municipality to local, and even national associations, even when they assume an explicitly ethnic character. Pragmatism, once more, seems to be the only operative rule.

48 For instance, graffiti contests, supposedly aimed at involving those youngsters in activities, are repeated in the same way several times a year in very different places.
However, the main objectives of local policy may be completely undermined by lack of co-ordination between different levels of decision making, especially between municipal and central governments, but also between neighbouring municipalities. This occurs, among other things, as a consequence of the lack of a complete picture of all the consequences of an action (for instance, implementing a legalisation process for clandestine immigrants without consulting the municipalities where these people live, but relegating to them the responsibility for their integration), and as a result of the absence of a stabilised overall framework to support public intervention in this and related domains.

On the other hand, this non-stabilised formal context seems to constitute a congenial framework for nonofficial bodies like national associations, religious and other non governmental organisations dealing with migrants issues to thrive - both at the national and supra-national levels. As a matter of fact, representatives of these organizations are fully aware that now is the right moment to “place their bets”, capitalising on the situation to benefit the particular interests they represent, while at the same time promoting their own organization’s interests by molding the arena where public policy orientations are defined - in national as well as European fora. The existence of a second generation, although unequivocally recognised in informal terms, has as yet not been taken up as a major priority political issue. The existing youth problems (schooling, neighbourhood security, adolescent mothers, etc), thereby relegated to local intervention, are simply considered as the inevitable price to pay for the creation of better conditions for the generations to come.

Lisbon, September 1998

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IDENTITY, RIGHTS, AND CLAIMS-MAKING: CHANGING DYNAMICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN POSTWAR EUROPE

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University of Essex

The unfolding episodes of world politics in the 1990s have brought intensified attempts to redefine nation-state identities. This apparent revival of the nation and citizenship is clearly linked to a series of world-level developments: large-scale international migration, the political reconfigurations in the formerly socialist countries, and the emergence of regional and transnational political entities, most clearly observed in the case of the European Union. All these developments are closely associated with the reinvention and reassertion of national(ist) narratives throughout the world: fierce struggles for ethnic or national closures in former Yugoslavia, India, Rwanda, and Turkey; the aggressive vocalization of anti-immigrant groups throughout the United States and Europe; and an increasing concern with national sovereignties and borders, exemplified in the reactions of some European governments and societies vis-a-vis the advance of the European Union. In addition, the demise of the welfare state, in the United States but also in Europe, increases the stakes of citizenship, which further stirs up restrictionist sentiments and a general attack on immigrant rights.

Such developments have generated a burgeoning literature on the upsurge of exclusionary national identities and citizenships. However, although highly dramatic and explosive, these recent developments do not display the complete topography of citizenship in the postwar era. The exclusive focus on current nationalist tendencies, and the persistence in assign-
ing the nation-state a privileged position as a unit of analysis in much of our scholarship, render invisible the significant transformations that have occurred in the postwar era. The broader changes that underlie the contemporary institution and practice of citizenship are commonly overlooked. Alongside the growing emphasis on national identities in the 1990s, we are witnessing as well the emergence of new forms of membership and participation, which transgress the national order of citizenship.

In this paper, my goal is to address these new forms and the broader dynamics that occasion their emergence. I start by summarizing briefly the developments that contextualize the changes in the institution and practice of citizenship in the postwar Europe. Then, I elaborate the two paradoxes that I see as crucial in understanding the contemporary formations of citizenship, and exclusions and inclusions. The first paradox relates to the rights and identities (the two main components of citizenship), and their increasing decoupling. The second paradox regards the ways collective claims are made and mobilized: an increasing tendency toward particularistic and group-based claims and their legitimation through universalistic discourses of personhood and strategies. Finally, I suggest that these two paradoxes warrant a reconsideration of our dominant concepts of national citizenship and categories of exclusion and inclusion.

Postwar Changes in the European State System

Contrary to the predominant understandings and conceptualizations in sociology, my work suggests that contemporary citizenship is increasingly decoupled from national collectives and boundaries. My substantive argument is that, in the postwar
era, the practice of citizenship shows increasing localizing and transnationalizing trends, independent of belonging in the national collectivity. Regardless of their historical or cultural ties to the German nation, and even without a formal German nationality, Turkish immigrants in Berlin make claims on Berlin's authority structures and participate in Berlin's public institutions. When they make demands for the teaching of Islam in public schools, the Pakistani immigrants in Britain mobilize around a Muslim identity, but they appeal to a universalistic language of "human rights" to justify their claims. And, they not only mobilize to affect the local school authorities, but also pressure the national government, and take their case to the European Court of Human Rights. I argue that these examples undermine the predominant models of citizenship, which are normatively predicated upon the integrity of national communities and boundaries. I suggest that to provide a meaningful understanding of contemporary formations of citizenship, and exclusion and inclusion, we need to incorporate these broader changes in membership and patterns of participation into our analytical "tool-kit."

The background to the arguments I am advancing here are a series of interlocking legal, institutional, and ideological changes in the European state system in the postwar period. These changes have complicated the national order of citizenship and introduced new dynamics for membership and participation in the public sphere. I elaborated these changes elsewhere (Soysal 1994). Here I would like to cite briefly four developments that have significant implications for the institution of citizenship and the notions of identity and rights.

- First, the transformations in the existing national and ethnic composition of European countries, as a consequence of massive migratory flows not only from immediate European periphery but also from "distant lands."
• Second, the increasing intensification of transnational discourse and legal instruments that codify “human rights” or personhood as a world level principle. This elaboration of individual rights has laid the groundwork upon which more expansive claims and rights can be advanced, and led to the introduction of new forms of rights – for women, children, minorities, immigrants, and even for animals and plants.

• Third, the increasing legitimacy of the right to “one's own culture” and identity. These rights have been furthered by the massive decolonizations in the postwar period, as well as through the works of the international organizations such as the UN, UNESCO, and the Council of Europe. Collective identity has been redefined as a category of human rights. Codified as a right, identities have become important organizational and symbolic tools for creating new group solidarities and mobilizing resources (as in the case of women's movements, environmentalists, gays and lesbians, regional identities and interests, indigenous groups, and immigrants).

• Lastly, the diffusion of sovereignty and the emergence of multi-level polities, such as we observe with the gradual unfolding of the European Union (Marks and McAdam 1993, Schmitter 1992). The diffusion and sharing of sovereignty among local, national, and transnational political institutions, enables new actors, opens up an array of new organizational strategies, and facilitates competition over resources and definitions.

All these developments, the transformations in the population composition of the European states, the legitimation of rights at the transnational level, the codification of collective identities as rights, and the increasing diffusion of sovereignty, have paradoxical implications for national citizenship. They have paradoxical implications as regards the ways that rights and identities are defined and allocated; and also as regards the ways collective claims are made and mobilized.
Paradoxes of Citizenship

1. Decoupling of Rights and Identity

The first paradox I would like to discuss is the increasing decoupling of rights and identity – the two main components of citizenship. In the nation-state mode of political community, national belonging constitutes the source of rights and duties of individuals; and citizenship is delimited by national collectivity. The postwar era, however, has witnessed an increasing recasting of (national) citizenship rights as human (or personhood) rights (Soysal 1994). Rights that were once associated with belonging in a national community have become increasingly abstract, and legitimated at the transnational level.

The postwar reification of personhood and individual rights expands the boundaries of political community, by legitimating individuals' participation and claims beyond their membership status in a particular nation-state. With the breakdown of the link between the national community and rights, we observe multiple forms of citizenship that are no longer anchored in national collectives, and expand the sets of right-bearing members within and without the nation-state. These forms are exemplified in the membership of the long-term noncitizen immigrants, who hold various rights and privileges without a formal nationality status; in the increasing instances of dual citizenship in Europe and the United States; in the European Union citizenship; and in local citizenships in culturally autonomous regions of Europe.

As the source and legitimacy of rights shift to the transnational level, paradoxically, identities remain particularistic, and locally defined and organized. The same global rules and institutional frameworks which celebrate personhood and human rights, at the same time naturalize collective identities around national and ethno-religious particularisms.

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1 I use the term “human rights” in its broad, abstract sense, not necessarily referring to specific international conventions or instruments and their categorical contents.
This, as I already stated, has a lot to do with the works of the international organizations such as the UN, UNESCO, the Council of Europe and the like, (as well as the discipline of anthropology), through which the universal right to "one's own culture" has gained increasing legitimacy, and collective identity has been redefined as a category of human rights. What are considered particularistic characteristics of collectivities—culture, language, and standard ethnic traits—have become variants of the universal core of humanness or selfhood. This identity represents the "unchosen," and is naturalized through the language of kinship, homeland, nation, and territory.

Once institutionalized as natural, the discourse about identities creates ever increasing claims about national sovereignties and particularistic group rights. Ethic/national identities are enacted and improvised for mobilizing and making claims in national and world polities. Thus, while rights acquire a more universalistic form and are divorced from national belonging, (thus giving rise to more inclusionary forms of membership), at the same time, identities become expressively particularistic and the exclusionary practices (on the basis of identity) prevail. And this we observe in the increasingly restrictive immigration policies of Western European countries, the vocalization of minority and religious groups around group specific demands, and the citizenship practices of many of the former Soviet republics. So more inclusionary forms of rights clash with more exclusionary practices of identity.

II. Making Particularistic Claims through Universalistic Discourses of Personhood and Strategies

The second paradox to which I would like to draw attention has to do with collective claims-making and participation in public spheres, in other words the practice of citizenship by
individuals and groups. With the postwar reconfigurations in citizenship that I described in the previous section, the old categories that attach individuals to nationally defined status positions and distributory mechanisms become blurred. This inevitably changes the nature and locus of struggles for social equality and rights. New forms of mobilizing and advancing claims and participation emerge beyond the frame of national citizenship.

If we recall, our classical notions of citizenship assume the existence of actors whose rights and identities are grounded within the bounds of national collectives. And these collectives constitute the “authentic” sites for the realization of claims-making and an active citizenry. My research reveals two trends that diverge from this predominant prescription of citizenship. First, we see an increasing tendency to advance particularistic identities and demands; which are, at the same time, located in and legitimated by the universalistic discourses of human or personhood rights. Second, we see that the mobilization of claims take place independent of nationally delimited collectives and at different levels (local, national, and transnational). In other words, the social and political stages for claims-making proliferate.

I would like to elaborate these two trends by citing empirical evidence from Muslim immigrant communities and their participation and mobilization in European public spheres.4

a) The first trend concerns the nature of the claims and discourse. Islamic groups in Europe increasingly mobilize around claims for particularistic identities and highlight their group specificities. Their claims, however, are not simply grounded in the particularities of religious narratives. On the contrary, they appeal to the universalistic principles and dominant discourses of equality, emancipation, and individual

4 I do not want to imply that we can observe the emerging forms only in the case of Muslim immigrants. I think these are broader tendencies, but I focus on Muslim groups, since these communities are visibly the focus of contention.
rights. In their claims, particular and universal are not categorically opposed – the particular is interpreted by the universal.

Let's consider the following examples. In 1989, the issue of Islamic foulard erupted into a national crisis and debate in France, when three North African students were expelled from school for insisting on wearing their veils in class. The affair revived concerns about the “laicism principle” of the French state, the definition of the freedom of religion, and the integration of immigrant communities. During the debates, the head of the Great Mosque of Paris declared the rules preventing wearing scarfs in school to be discriminatory on the grounds of individual rights. His emphasis was on personal rights, rather than religious traditions or duties: “If a girl asks to have her hair covered, I believe it is her most basic right” (Washington Post, 23 October 1989). In this case, Muslim identity, as symbolized by the headscarf, was asserted and authenticizes by the very categories and language of the host society; that is through a discourse that accentuates individual rights.

In another episode (in Germany this time), on the 12th of November 1995, which corresponded to the birthday of Fatima (the daughter of the prophet Muhammad), the Shi'ite Ehlí bey mosque in Berlin invited “all Muslim women” to a celebration of the World's Women's Day. Speakers to the meeting included not only the (male) clergy of the mosque but “Muslim” women of different nationalities, Turks, Arabs, and Germans. The focal point of speeches delivered was to highlight women's emancipation, including demands to end discrimination against Muslim women in workplaces and public schools, especially on the basis of their wearing the Islamic headscarf. The issues raised encapsulated the very terms of the contemporary gender discourse. The keynote speaker, a young imam, traced the issue of the rights of women to the Qur'an. Making references to the Beijing
Conference on Women, he claimed the assertion, “women's rights are human rights,” as an original teaching of Islam and its culture. He declared indignantly: “In the Beijing conference, when someone said, 'women's rights are human rights,' thousands of women cheered and clapped. What were they cheering for? We already said that 1400 years ago! That is our word!” The meeting was an instance of linking Islamic moral realm to the contemporary concerns and discourses about women – speaking to and through them.

Similarly, when Islamic immigrant associations advocate the rights and the needs of Muslim children in schools, they employ a discourse that appropriates the rights of the individual as its central theme. During the 1987 national elections, the Islamic associations in Britain demanded Islamic instruction in public schools, by asserting the “natural” right of individuals to their own cultures to justify their demands. In their election program, they directly invoked the international instruments and conventions on Human Rights, to frame their position. As such, theirs is a claim for difference affirmed by universalistic and homogenizing ideologies of human rights. And by so doing, they participate in the host country public space and appropriate host country discourses as they amplify and practice difference.

Let me insert a caveat here: Muslim groups in European countries, obviously, do not speak in a uniform discursive framework. The examples that I just gave by no means exhaust the range of narratives employed by Islamic groups. Again, speaking for the Islamic veil, a Turkish imam in Nantua declared the practice as “God's law,” and pressured the Turkish families to withdraw their daughters from school. This led to serious divisions among the Turkish immigrant community – and to his eventual deportation from France (Kepel 1994:306). It is also possible to find Islamic positions which base their claims
on religiously codified family laws that sanction status disparity between genders. These proclamations obviously point to the alternative legitimating discourses and scripts. My point here is not to deny the existence of alternative, and often conflicting, discourses, but to delineate the prevalent universalistic forms of making claims by Muslim groups that are commonly overlooked, and to elucidate their implications for our theoretical vistas.

Yet another caveat is warranted here. Obviously, there is significant variation in the accommodation of the types of claims advanced. While some claims face organizational resistance, others are more readily accepted and incorporated into formal state structures. The educational authorities in Britain, for example, are more willing to accommodate the claims for Islamic dress codes, or even the teaching of immigrant languages in schools. On the other hand, religiously codified family laws (or polygamy, female circumcision) which create status disparity between genders are not viewed as legitimate demands. Here, the principle of gender equality contests the principle of religious equality, both of which are clearly embedded in European citizenships and transnational frameworks. In Europe, the treatment of women is codified in secular laws and institutions, thus the attempts to subject it to religious, private domain generates conflict. In my research, I attempt to untangle the contradictory dynamics among different legitimating discourses and principles, and explain how these dynamics lead to conflicting claims and empowerments in the public sphere.

To reiterate my main point, the Islamic organizations I study do not justify their demands by simply reaching back to religious teachings or traditions, but through a language of rights, thus, citizenship. By using the “rights” language they exercise civic projects and link themselves to the broader public spheres. The projects of citizenship in which they engage, however, are
not necessarily nationally bounded; they are both spatially and symbolically multireferential.

When Islamic associations make demands about veiling in schools, theirs is not a claim for belonging to an existing “French collectivity,” but to the educational system itself, which they behold as their most natural right. This, I argue, is not necessarily disengagement from the collective life but the collective is no longer bounded by a preordained national community. Indeed, they try to redefine the very nature of national community.

b) The second trend as regards collective claims-making is that the organizational strategies employed by individual and groups increasingly acquire a transnational and subnational character. The terms of their participation extend beyond the confines of the national, span multiple localities, connect (and simultaneously construct) transnational communities, thus, diversifying the “spaces for and of politics.”

In the case of immigrant groups, for example, we find political parties, mosque organizations, and community associations which operate at local levels but also assume transnational forms, and develop organizational fields between places of origin and destination. They carry back and forth institutional forms, bridging a diverse set of public spaces. For example, based on their experience in, and borrowing models from the German education system, some Muslim groups (to be more specific, Alevites), organized both in Turkey and Germany, have recently started to press for the recognition of denominational schools in Turkey, which do not have a legal standing in the current system. In a similar vein, during the 1995 local elections in Berlin, Turkish immigrant groups pushed for their local voting rights, while at the same time, put pressure on the Turkish government to facilitate their rights to vote in Turkish national elections.
In pursuing their claims, the mobilization of Muslim groups entails multiple states and political agencies, and they target trans- and subnational institutions. Again, for example, the Islamic foulard issue was not simply a matter confined to the discretion of a local school board, but has traversed the realms of local, national, transnational jurisdictions—from local educational authorities to the European Court of Human Rights. Similarly, in 1990, when the local authorities refused to permit the opening of another Islamic primary school, the Islamic Foundation in London took the issue to the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, more and more, Muslim associations elevate their operations to the European level, establishing umbrella organizations and forums to coordinate their activities and pursue a Europewide agenda (Soysal 1994, Kastoryano 1996).

So, while the claims and mobilization of Muslim groups aim to further particularistic identities and solidarities, paradoxically, they make appeals to the universalistic principles of human rights and connect themselves to a diverse set of public spheres. As such, their mobilization is not simply a reinvention of ethnic or religious particularisms (or isolationist community formation). Drawing upon universalistic repertoires of making claims, they, at the same time, participate in and contribute to the reification of host society and global discourses.6

Conclusion

The experience of organized Islam in Europe indicates a diversification from the classical forms of participating in the public sphere, mobilizing identities, and making claims. Much of the decolonization and civil rights movements of the 1960s and the early women's movements were attempts to redefine indi-
Individuals as part of the national collectivity. Similarly, labor movements were historically linked to the shaping of a national citizenship. It is no coincidence that the welfare state developed as part of the national project, attaching labor movements to nations (as in Bismarkian Germany). However, as I tried to delineate with my examples, the emerging formations of collective participation and claims-making in Europe are less and less nationally delimited citizenship projects. Individuals and collective groups set their agenda for realization of rights and enhancement of participation through particularistic identities, which are embedded in, and driven by, universalistic and homogenizing discourses of personhood and human rights. This shift in focus from national collectivity to particularistic identities does not necessarily implicate disengagement from participating in common public spheres or creation of disintegrated civic arenas. On the contrary, they are evidence for emerging participatory forms, and multiple arenas and levels that individuals enact and practice their citizenship.

As we approach the turn of the century, citizenship has come to the fore as a trying issue, both theoretically and politically, in the European polities. Our theories and policy prescriptions, however, have yet to respond to the changes in the institutions of citizenship, rights, and identity, and respond to the challenge posed by the emergent actors, border-crossings, and nonconventional mobilizations.

To capture the current dynamics of citizenship, we need to move beyond the traditional, and revisit our theoretical vistas and analytical frameworks. Drawing upon the arguments I developed in my paper, I would like to suggest three correctives to our current sociological thinking on citizenship:

• First, the much taken-for-granted dichotomy of particular versus universal no longer holds. We have to consider the mechanisms by which the universalistic rights discourse not
only reinforce particularistic identities and claims, but also concurrently reinterpret and normalize these very same identities.

• Second, there are no longer absolute and clear-cut patterns of exclusions and inclusions. Neither do these patterns simply coincide with the bounds of the national. We have to identify the multiple levels, contexts, and processes which give rise to simultaneous inclusions and exclusions as regards rights and identities.

• Third, we can no longer frame our analysis within the dichotomy of national and transnational, and the expected linear transition between these stages. Rather than treating the national and transnational as stages in progress, we need to organically incorporate them as variables that shape contemporary exclusions and inclusions, and consider them as synchronous analytical levels within which the current practices of citizenship and participation should be understood.

Only by proceeding along these lines, can we enhance our analytical agendas to capture the transformations in the modalities of citizenship, and inclusion and exclusion. And only then can citizenship serve as a meaningful analytical tool for our understandings (and enactments) of effective civic participation.

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