NEW WAVES: MIGRATION FROM EASTERN TO SOUTHERN EUROPE

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Lisbon, 2004
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  Luso-American Foundation

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PREFACE

*Charles A. Buchanan, Jr.*
Executive Director, Luso-American Foundation

The Luso-American Foundation is extremely pleased to publish this new volume concerning issues of recent migration which we consider of great relevance. Portugal faces its greatest social challenge in accommodating the entrance of unprecedented numbers of new arrivals. The authors of this book and workshop participants at the Annual Metropolis conference in Vienna are to be congratulated for their critical contributions to understanding the migration processes.

The Foundation first started funding migration policy research about eight years ago, joining with leading Portuguese researchers in the University of Coimbra, University of Lisbon and New University of Lisbon. First efforts were to adapt the concepts and program objectives of “Metropolis International”, an international program aimed at “comparative policy research and analysis” which was then led by researchers in the United States and Canada, but expanding rapidly in Europe.

The METROPOLIS PORTUGAL research network was formed in 1997 and today is the leading source of Portuguese migration research data, policy analysis, and conferencing with special attention given to involving young researchers in the programs and conferences. Thanks to leadership shown by Professors Lucinda Fonseca (CEG/University of Lisbon), Margarida Marques (SociNova, New University of Lisbon) and Maria Baganha (CES/University of Coimbra) has developed an active policy dialogue with the political levels, the government, ACIME (Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Minorias Étnicas) and stakeholders of civil society. These excellent results speak for themselves and are a source of great pride for this Foundation.
INTRODUCTION

This book is based on papers that were originally presented at the 8th International Metropolis Conference, held in Vienna between the 15th and the 19th September, 2003. The editors of this volume were also the organisers of a workshop entitled: “New waves: migration from Eastern Europe into Southern Europe”, in which all these papers were first presented. The aforementioned workshop was the first ever specific forum organised by a Portuguese research team that sought to present and debate, in a comparative manner, the new migration flow from the Eastern European countries into Southern Europe.

Ever since the gradual disappearance of the communist regimes in the former Eastern Bloc countries, and particularly during the last decade, Western European countries have witnessed a sharp increase in the immigration flows originating in this region. These flows have usually taken the direction of the neighbouring Western European countries: indeed, there is an abundant literature on East-West migration, especially in what regards countries such as Germany or Austria. However, migration from Eastern Europe into Southern Europe is a much more recent phenomenon and a scarcely investigated topic. Their current numerical significance supports the hypothesis of the existence of both formal and informal migratory networks active in both ends of the trajectory. However, these networks have given rise to quite disparate flows (e.g., most Ukrainian males migrate to Portugal whereas Ukrainian women largely do so to Italy), as well as to very different types of insertion. The other novel aspect associated with the new migration flows from Eastern Europe into Southern Europe is the rapid increase in the number of skilled migrants from these countries, despite their incorporation in low-skilled branches of activity.
Within this context, the aforementioned workshop brought together social scientists from a variety of backgrounds and disciplines, who addressed various aspects of Eastern European migration to Southern Europe.

Olena Malinovska, who analysed the changes in the dynamics of Ukrainian emigration after this country’s independence, was the only participant to address the issue from the point of view of a sending country. The comparison of 1994 and 2002 survey data on labour migration illustrates some of the main changes that have taken place as far as migratory processes, main destinations and the migrants’ social and economic profile are concerned.

The remaining papers focused on three destination countries: Portugal, Italy and Greece.

M. Baganha et al. provide a portrait of the Eastern European migrants that have settled in Portugal and discuss the mechanisms behind the dynamics of creation and structuring of this new migration wave. This research was based on a series of interviews carried out in Portugal and the Ukraine, as well as on a comprehensive questionnaire that was given out to a sample of Eastern European immigrants in various Portuguese regions.

The paper by Serge Weber describes the paths of Romanian, Ukrainian and Polish migrant workers in Italy. Based on a series of interviews with Eastern European migrant households, both in their place of origin and in their destination – in Rome and its surrounding region, Lazio –, the author finds some original forms of migrant settlement and circulation. Both network and individual aspects of migration influence the migrants’ professional and residential mobility and their relationship with their place of origin.

Gabriella Lazaridis then examines various forms and mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion involving Albanian migrants in Greece. Building on the results of a series of semi-structured
interviews, in both Athens and Corfu, with Albanian migrants, migrants’ associations, anti-racist organisations, NGOs, government officials, employers and other key informants, the paper looks at the set of circumstances and mechanisms through which Albanian migrants have become the most stigmatised migrant group in Greece and one that is persistently associated with various kinds of criminal activity.

In the final chapter, M. L. Fonseca et al. describe the social and demographic profile and the characteristics of the labour market incorporation of the Eastern European immigrants in Alentejo Central – a markedly rural region with a pronouncedly aged population that risks significant demographic decline. The analysis of this case study also sets the stage for a broader discussion of the impacts of these “new migrants” upon the development processes of the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions of Southern EU countries.

This collection of papers only covers three Southern European countries, and is not meant to address all the relevant issues of this migration wave. However, it will hopefully provide an important contribution to understanding a recent, complex and evolving phenomenon, from the point of view of both sending and receiving countries.

The editors wish to express their gratitude to all the authors of the various chapters, as well as to the Luso-American Foundation, and in particular to Dr. Charles Buchanan, for its unfailing support to the “Metropolis Portugal” project.

The editors
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION FROM THE UKRAINE: THE LAST TEN YEARS

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After independence, the character, intensity, composition and direction of migration flows from the Ukraine have changed dramatically. Migrants have faced entirely new geographical, legal, political and economic realities, brought about by the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the emergence of the independent post-Soviet states, market reform, democratisation of public life, and greater openness to the outside world.

It is widely acknowledged that the emigration toward the West was rapidly increasing during the last years of Soviet era. However, the effect of the “dam break” was short-lived. The alarmist projection of the early 1990s regarding the wave of emigration from former Soviet territories did not come to pass. If, on the eve of independence in 1990, over 90 thousand people had emigrated from the Ukraine to Israel, the United States of America (USA), Germany and other states belonging to the western world, these exit rates gradually decreased throughout next decade. In 2002, it amounted to only 27 thousand people.

Several causes for the subsiding migration flow toward the West can be cited. Among them, of course, are the western world’s restrictive entry policies. Many also hoped for a better life in their own countries following independence. Yet the most important cause is related to the opening of borders, which has allowed people to take short-term trips abroad, seeking employment or to participate in petty trade. Such trips created the possibility to achieve migration’s main objective – the improvement of one’s own economic situation – without
changing one’s permanent place of residence and breaking important social links.

The procedure for short-term trips abroad was already liberalised during the period of *perestroika*. Yet, while trips abroad for private purposes allowed for 43 thousand such trips to be taken from the Ukraine in 1986, in 1991 alone 2,327 million were taken – 54 times greater than the 1986 figure.

In January 1993, the Ukrainian government abolished the permission system for travelling abroad, according to which citizens had to obtain an exit visa from authorities for each trip. In February 1994, the right to freedom of movement across the border was guaranteed by the law on exiting and entering the Ukraine by citizens of the Ukraine. According to the law, citizens can receive passports valid for 10 years. The passport application may be declined only in special cases, for example, due to criminal offences. Furthermore, an article in the law regulating employment was amended to state that citizens have the right to employment or business activities while abroad.

The severe economic crisis of the 1990s, unemployment and underemployment, low incomes and delays in salary payments, following the introduction of free exit procedures, created a wide variety of reasons for international labour migration. Short-term trips abroad with the purpose of earning through seasonal, temporary employment or petty trade became widespread practice. They sometimes remain the main sources of income for many people.

Official statistics illustrate that the intensity of the international labour migration is growing. However, the data on registered labour migration hardly approximates the reality. In 2003, employment services placed only 36 thousand Ukrainians in jobs abroad. The overwhelming majority of labour migrants go abroad declaring tourism or personal reasons as the purpose of the trip. Therefore, the real number of international labour migrants from the Ukraine can only be estimated.
According to the results of the survey recently conducted by the State Committee of the Ukraine for Statistics, the total number of Ukrainian citizens working abroad is estimated to comprise at least one million people. These estimates were provided on the basis of interviews with eight thousand households in eight regions within the country and appear to be quite reliable. Nevertheless, this figure is probably less than it is in reality, given that, as a rule, people are not willing to speak about their sources of income, which are largely unknown to taxation authorities.

According to the national sociological monitoring’s data, members of 10.2% of Ukrainian families have had international labour migration experience. There are approximately 15 million families in the Ukraine, meaning that at least 1.5 million persons have gone abroad with the purpose of earning. In reality, this figure is even higher, as the family may have more than one member with migration experience.

Border crossing statistics also provide some idea of the migratory intensity. Every year, citizens of the Ukraine cross the border approximately 15 million times. The most popular destinations are Russia and Poland with 5.6 and 4.5 million respective exits in 2002. Data from border check point interviews of international passengers regarding the purpose of their trips allows an estimate that Ukrainian citizens take approximately 1.4 million labour trips and three million commercial trips abroad per year. As these trips are often undertaken repeatedly by the same people, the real number of citizens working abroad is less than the abovementioned figure.

According to Ukrainian embassies’ estimates, 300 thousand Ukrainian citizens work in Poland, 200 thousand work in both Italy and the Czech Republic, 150 thousand work in Portugal, 100 thousand work in Spain, 35 thousand work in Turkey, and 20 thousand work in the USA. The number of workers in the Russian Federation is estimated by the Ukrainian Embassy to comprise approximately one million people.
We also have other estimates that significantly exceed the abovementioned figures. Generally, they are made by politicians, who raise the number of Ukrainian labour migrants abroad to between five and nine million people. They are usually employed in order to criticise the existing political regime and do not seem to be based in reality.

Therefore, comparison and analyses of data from different sources allow for an estimate of the scale of labour migration from the Ukraine to hover somewhere between two and 2.5 million persons.

Despite the diversity of the abovementioned estimates, all of them illustrate that labour and commercial international migration have become widespread and have thus taken on special public importance.

Migration behaviour of Ukrainian citizens for the last decade has not been constant. When borders opened, the first Ukrainians trying to earn a living by travelling abroad sold cheap national goods to the neighbouring countries. From these countries, they would bring consumer goods in short supply in the Ukraine, turning a profit from selling them back home.

Such petty traders were called “shuttles”. Their trips abroad allowed for the survival of thousands of families in the most difficult period of reforms. They played a pivotal role in supplying the internal market with consumer goods. At the same time, those trips functioned as a good business school and a source of business experience.

However, cross-border trade gradually took on more organised and civilised forms. Some petty traders became professional businessmen and shop owners. Some of them were pushed out and left the field altogether.

At the same time, with the experience obtained during commercial trips and the contacts they made, some Ukrainians were able to find jobs and settle down abroad for longer periods. It was in this way that the “migration network” was established
and, later on, used as a springboard for labour migration, providing higher and more stable incomes.

The change in the characteristics of Ukrainian international migration can be illustrated by the results of two surveys of labour migrants’ households, conducted in 1994 and in 2002, respectively.

The first survey was a part of an international project conducted with the methodological and organisational support of the United Nations (UN) and the European Economic Commission and based on the ethno-survey methodology developed by D. Massey, which had positively proved itself during research on Mexico-U.S. migration. Its results were described in the book, *In-depth studies on migration in Central and Eastern Europe: the case of the Ukraine*, published by the UN in 1999.

The survey spanned three areas, selected so as to represent a large metropolis, a middle-sized town and a rural area, located in different parts of the country, namely the country’s capital, Kiev; the regional centre, Chernivzi; and the village, Prylbychi, located in the periphery of the Lviv region. (Map 1)
During the summer of 2002, the second survey of migrant households was conducted in the same settlements and based upon the same methodology employed in 1994 in order to follow up changes in labour migration. The questionnaires were filled out by 350 households (463 individuals) that had experienced international labour migration at least once.

First, the comparison of the two surveys’ results allows for a conclusion that the intensity of labour migration has increased. This is illustrated by both the average number of trips undertaken by migrants (today every migrant has taken an average of 8.6 trips) and the share of migrants that have undertaken more than 10 trips abroad (15%). The significant spread of international labour migration is now more visible in rural areas, where, in 1994, there were fewer migrants than in cities. Thanks to the growing intensity of labour migration among the rural population, there were approximately 1.3 migrants per household in 2002 in contrast with the 1994 rate of 1.1 migrants per household.

The list of destination countries for migrants has also expanded. It includes 26 countries in Europe, North America and the Middle East, while only 17 destination countries were listed in 1994. Romania and the former Yugoslavia have practically disappeared from this list. Migration to Turkey has also decreased significantly. At the same time, migration toward Germany, Portugal and Italy has livened up. However, the primary destination countries remain Poland and Russia, being neighbouring countries with non-visa border-crossing regimes.

Trips to Western destinations prevail (84% of migrants’ recent trips), while only 16% of all trips were made to Eastern destinations, such as Russia. Compared to 1994, the gap between the two destinations has noticeably increased. However, the ratio between the number of trips to the West and to the East
differs for different areas. In Kiev, it is 3:2; in Chernivzi, 10:1; and in Prylbychi, 41:1. Therefore, the closer to the Western border migrants are, the more clearly trips to the West prevail.

A comparison with the 1994 data shows the changes in international labour migration’s demographic structure. The share of male migrants prevails (66%, compared to 54% in 1994). The average age has also somewhat increased (35.7 years-old, while in 1994 the average was 33.6 years-old). The apparent ageing of migrants was induced by an increase in the engagement of women over 45 years of age in labour migration, working abroad in domestic services.

In terms of educational levels, the most numerous group among migrants includes those with a secondary education – 71.8%. Only one out of every four people had a higher education (25.6%). The share of respondents with levels of higher education, which was 52% in 1994 (over 60% in Chernivzi), decreased by half in the past nine years. This is because the reviving Ukrainian economy has begun to give them better chances to get a job and receive a good salary at home. By contrast, the share of migrants with a secondary education has increased (in 1994, it was 47.5%).

**Figure 1** Educational levels of active migrants
The distribution of active migrants by employment status is quite significant. Only 28.9% of respondents stated that they were employed and only 6% declared that they were employed formally. The majority of them declared that they were not working (39.2%) or used the term “unemployed” to describe themselves (8%).

**Figure 2** The main occupation of active migrants at home

In most cases the migrants stated that they did not work, were unemployed or employed formally, meaning that their main occupation is working outside of the Ukraine. In 1994, the situation was rather different. At that time, employed persons made up 70% of migrants, indicating that most of them combined trips abroad with work at home or were earning their living abroad, when factories were not working because of the economic crisis. Nevertheless, they did not break official labour relations, generally planning to return to their previous jobs after an economic recovery.

The important indicator for the international labour migration is the duration of stays abroad. Departures for a period of one to six months prevail among the most recent trips made by migrants (43.8%). At the same time, one out of every five trips
is longer, lasting an average of 1.5 years. Short-term migration (shorter than one month) comprised 35.9% of recent trips abroad.

Figure 3  Last trip made by active migrants, by duration

The abovementioned data differs significantly from the 1994 survey data, where most numerous were those lasting only for a few days (51.1%). Trips that lasted for over one month comprised only 16% of the active migrants’ recent trips. The average duration of those trips did not exceed three months.

The duration of migrants’ stay also differs for various countries of destination. In Turkey, they stay only for couple of days. In Russia, Poland and Germany, they stay between one and six months. In Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, migrants practically always stay for periods longer than six months.

The determining characteristic of migration from the Ukraine is migrants’ occupation in the destination country. The survey has showed that the most popular occupation among migrants is in the construction sector – (38.4%). Petty trade comes in at second place (15.1%). Domestic work (14%) comes in at third place, followed by the agricultural, industrial and service sectors.
This data differs significantly from the results of the survey in 1994, when 77% of the last trips abroad by migrants were undertaken with the goal of trade and only 10% with the aim of employment. Thus, a transformation of international migration from Ukraine from primarily “commercial” (associated with “shuttle” trade) to mainly labour migration (associated with employment abroad) emerges.

There is an clear correlation between migrants’ occupation abroad and durations of stay. Trade trips usually last for less than one week. Construction workers typically stay abroad for between one to six months, correlating with the building season. Farmers also stay for the similar periods of time. Those involved in the industrial and service sectors and domestic work tend to stay longer.

Consequently, compared to the beginning of 1990s, the nature of international migration from the Ukraine and characteristics of international migrants from the Ukraine have changed. Trips with the goal of employment largely dominate,
while, during the previous period, the dominant strategy for earning abroad involved “shuttle” trips for trading goods. Instead of international mobility, which was characterised by regular but short-term trips abroad, we observe absences associated with rather long stays outside of the Ukraine.

The new nature of migration has influenced the structure of the migratory flow. The share of male professional workers or those with a secondary education has increased significantly. On the other hand, the share of people with a higher education, which comprised the majority of “shuttle” traders at the beginning of 1990s, has decreased. Earlier on, most international migrants preserved their labour contracts in the homeland. Today, most migrants do not have legal contracts in the Ukraine and choose employment abroad as the main occupation and source of income.

In comparing the 1994 and 2002 data, another important feature of recent labour migration from the Ukraine emerges: the development and functioning of informal networks among places of origin and places of destination of migrants. Job searches, house hunting, travel arrangements and receiving an invitation to come to a destination country are generally provided for by way of compatriots that had gone abroad earlier. Therefore, the migration network itself determines the direction of migration flows, the nature of occupations abroad, etc. Male migrants from rural areas mostly specialise in construction and agriculture in Poland, Russia and Portugal. Female workers 45 years and older from Chernivzi leave to perform domestic work in Italy and Greece. Migrants from Kiev mostly work in Russia in the construction and service sectors.
THE UNFORESEEN WAVE: MIGRATION FROM EASTERN EUROPE TO PORTUGAL

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Introduction

This paper presents the first results of a research project carried out during 2002 on migration from Eastern Europe to Portugal\(^1\). The results presented are based on a set of interviews carried out in the Ukraine and in Portugal, on a survey by questionnaire carried out in Portugal, and on other sources that complemented the information directly collected during the field work.

Portugal, like other Southern European countries, is an area of recent immigration. In fact, the number of foreign residents in the country, in 1981, was 54,414, this is 0.55% of the total population. And although, the growth of the immigrant population was sustained and noticeable through the 1980’s and 1990’s, by 2000 the number of legal foreign residents was only 208,198, which is approximately 2% of the country’s total population\(^2\).

Furthermore, at the turn of the Twenty First Century migration to Portugal from third countries was overwhelmingly (76% in 1999 and 77% in 2000) constituted of immigrants from lusophone team had the collaboration of Andriy Yakhnysyky who translated into Portuguese the results of the field survey and of the interviews carried out in the Ukrainian and in Russian. This research project was financed by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

\(^1\) The research team was constituted by the co-authors of this paper. During the launching of the field work it had the collaboration of the Ukrainian sociologist Victor Suzak, who translated into Ukrainian and Russian the questionnaire, who also carried out a set of exploratory interviews in the Ukraine and in Portugal and collaborated in the recruitment and training of the interviewers who applied the questionnaire. In the last phase of the project the research

countries, i.e. the former Portuguese colonies in Africa\(^3\) and Brazil. The rest was spread among more than one hundred different nationalities, none of which were in significant numbers (Sef, Estatística de 1999 and 2000).

Overall, the presence of immigrants in Portugal was, until 2000, relatively low and the main migratory movements occurring were clearly rooted in the country colonial past, its historical and cultural links, as well as its main economic connections.

This was not however the whole story. In fact, since 1996 when there was a general amnesty (special regularisation period) and Portugal entered the Schengen space, the number of illegal immigrants in the country had been growing. This was particularly so after 1998 when the possibility of obtaining a permit of residence for those with an illegal status in the country was introduced in a bill on immigration.

In fact, article 88 of Law 244/98 of August 8 established that:

\[\text{In cases of recognised exceptional national interest, or for humanitarian reasons, the Minister of Home Affairs}^4\text{ may grant permits of residence to foreign citizens who do not fulfil the conditions established in the present legal text.}\]

According to the Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF), at the end of 2000 there were 41,401 requests for permits of residence based on article 88 of Law 244/98. Thus there were at least 41,401 illegal immigrants in the country. As noted in official documents:

\[\text{A noticeable growth of the informal economy took place in the Construction and Building sector. This growth was associated with the growth of immigrants needed in this sector, that, given the legal framework in place, was being based on irregular}\]

\[\text{[24]}\]
contracts, illegal permanence in the country, and informal labour relations...(in, Relatório sobre a evolução do fenómeno migratório, March 1, 2002, ACIME, SEF, IGT)

In fact, the Construction and Building sector, the main entry gate to newly arrived immigrants, registered a phase of intense growth during this period. The number of requests for construction permits, registered at the Instituto do Mercado de Obras Públicas e Particulares, jumped from 3,677 in 1999 to 11,149 in 2000 and to 18,588 in 2001 (Relatório sobre a evolução do fenómeno migratório, March 1, 2002, ACIME, SEF, IGT).

The marked growth in demand caused by this boom in construction was however met in large part, not by the traditional supply sources, the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, but by entirely new supply sources, namely immigrants coming from Eastern European countries, and particularly from the Ukraine.

This was a most unexpected change in the Portuguese migratory patterns of the 1980’s and 1990’s. Particularly so because Portugal had not adopted any pro-active policy to recruit Eastern European workers nor had any privileged economic, historical or cultural links with that region that could explain the sudden and, as will see, massive inflow of immigrant workers.

Furthermore, the number of Eastern Europeans that established themselves in Portugal during the 1990’s was very small, reaching 2,373 persons in 1999 (SEF, Estatística de 1999), and, what is more relevant, there was no sizeable group from any specific nationality upon which a strong migratory network could be based to sustain a sudden and above all extremely intense migratory inflow.

The fact is that under the dispositions of article 55 of Law 4/2001 of January 10 the number of permits of stay⁵

⁵ Permits of stay (autorizações de permanência) are one year permits that can be renewed up to a maximum of five years. Article 55 establishes that permits of stay may be granted to illegal immigrants as long as they prove to be in the possession of a valid work contract, have no criminal record, have their social security situation regularized, and have entered Portugal prior to November 30 of 2001.
granted to illegal immigrant workers during 2001 was
126,901. More than half (56%) of these permits of stay
were given to Eastern European immigrants and 36% to
immigrant workers from a single Eastern European country,
the Ukraine. In just one year, the number of immigrants
residing legally in the country\textsuperscript{6} jumped from 208,198 in
2000 to 350,503 in 2001, i.e. in a single year, the immigrant
population in Portugal registered a growth of 68%. By 2002
the ranking of nationalities of the immigrant population
from third countries had drastically changed. The
immigrants from the Ukraine constituted the largest
immigrant group in the country. Table 1 and 2 show the
ranking of the first 10 nationalities from third countries
in 1999 and in 2002.

\textbf{Table 1} Resident Nationals from Third Countries in Portugal in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>43,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>20,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>17,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>14,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>4,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>3,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total from Third Countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>138,467</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total From EU</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,429</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Foreign Residents</strong></td>
<td><strong>190,896</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source: SEF, Estatística,1999}
Table 2 - Resident Nationals from Third Countries* in Portugal in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>62,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>60,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>59,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>32,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>23,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>12,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>10,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>9,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>8,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total from Third Countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>347,302</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total From EU</strong></td>
<td><strong>66,002</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Foreign Residents</strong></td>
<td><strong>238,746</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permits of Stay, 2001</strong></td>
<td><strong>126,901</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permits of Stay, 2002</strong></td>
<td><strong>47,657</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*includes holders of permits of residence plus holders of permits of stay for 2001 and 2002


It is this sudden and intense inflow from Eastern Europe and particularly from the Ukraine that we explain and describe in this paper. The fact that the main determinants usually referred to in the literature – post-colonial relations, direct recruitment, state sponsored migration, bilateral agreements, strong historical, cultural or economic links, existent migratory networks – are all absent in this case makes it particularly interesting.

In fact, we believe we have unveiled one of the most paradigmatic cases of “industry of migration” of the globalized world. A globalized world where sudden and massive migration, as that described in this paper, can occur because organizations
seeking profit can organise their operations based on instantaneous information and communication, directing the flows according to the most convenient destiny; supranational spaces, such as the Schengen space, do exist; and distance has lost its temporal meaning.

Why do they come?

Official documents attribute this sudden and massive inflow from Eastern Europe to Portugal to three main causes: the lack of control by other EU member states in the granting of short term visas; the speed and ease of movement within the Schengen space; and the trafficking of human beings, organised in Eastern Europe under the disguise of “travel agencies”.

Thus, for example the Relatório sobre a evolução do fenómeno migratório (March 1, 2002, ACIME, SEF, IGT) states:

In the case of Eastern Europe illegal migration operates in a massive form. In the German consulates of Kushmou (Moldavia), Kiev (Ukraine) or Moscow (Russia) thousands of citizens from these countries, . . . , request short term visas, sometimes through travel agencies connected to human trafficking, and these are largely granted.

Speedily transported by bus or by some other fast mean of transportation, they enter [the EU through] the German or Austrian borders and then travel directly to Portugal. Once in Portugal they are integrated into informal or clandestine labour networks, but remain under obligation to those that brought them to us. Some of them are under the control of clandestine migration networks ( . . . )

The reason their number grew so significantly is linked to the ease with which short term visas were granted ( . . . ) and
the speed with which they were able to cross the Schengen space.

(…)

It is this context that explains the qualitative change in the composition of the immigrant population in Portugal. Such a change is not the result of a national option, but the result of policies granting short term visas adopted by other EU member states.

(…)

[As for the modus operandi] of the criminal organizations based in Eastern Europe, everything is managed there, providing the usual necessities for traveling (i.e. documents, visas, transportation, and guides). This is generally done through “travel agencies” created for this specific purpose. The process is based on coercive methods, namely by establishing previous defined routes to the country of destiny.

(…)

On arrival in the country of destiny – in this case, Portugal – these criminal groups go on controlling the immigrants, if necessary by coercion, by keeping their passports, making threats to their families or by denouncing the immigrants to the authorities.

Everything has to be paid for (…) the “services” rendered by the “travel agencies”, the “tolls” established in the different countries crossed, where they have to keep paying to continue their journey, until they reach their destiny. Then they have to pay again to find a job in the informal or clandestine labour market.

These factors are undoubtedly important. A sudden, massive legal migratory flow can only occur if there are organized infrastructures for transportation and the legal documents for traveling can be obtained. Furthermore, the results of our field survey clearly confirm the relevance of these factors. Thus, for example, 96% of the respondents indicated that they had entered Portugal with a short term visa (30% with an uniform visa and
66% with a tourist visa) which had been issued by a non-
Portuguese consulate/embassy. 57% of these visas were issued
by a German embassy in an Eastern European country. More
than half of the respondents declared that they had entered
Portugal with the help of a travel agency and 86% had traveled
by coach or by mini bus. Furthermore, when directly asked if
he/she had experienced “difficult times “ due to Mafia or Recket
attacks an impressive 16% admitted to having suffered difficulties.

Relevant as they may be, these factors do not explain why
people decide to leave their countries nor why they decide to
come specifically to Portugal. The answers to these questions
are to be found elsewhere.

Using a classical pull/push model we may say that after the
fall of the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries entered a
period of transition to market economies and to democracy
that increased their propensity for migration abroad considerably.
Firstly because it became possible for a large number of persons
to emigrate, i.e. the restrictions to moving abroad were
progressively dismantled in all these countries. Secondly because
the huge differences in salaries and standard of living between
Eastern European countries and EU countries became known
to the general public. Notice, for example, that 65% of the
respondents to our survey indicated earning less than 100 euros
per month in their home countries. This is well bellow the
minimum wage in force in any EU country. And thirdly, because
there were regions where there was a strong migratory culture
that could be reactivated. We are thinking, for example, of
Western Ukraine from where more than 49% of the respondents
to our survey came from, and which has a long migratory
tradition (Satzewich, 2002).

These are root determinants that help to explain, at a macro
level, why people from Eastern Europe decide to work abroad.
Why some of them decided to come to Portugal can be attributed
to the following reasons. Firstly, it can be attributed to the marketing of Portugal done by Eastern European travel agencies, particularly in the Ukraine, that offered very attractive packages that included travel documents, transportation and job opportunities which were affordable to a large segment of the population. Secondly, the fact that salaries in Portugal were several times higher than in their home country. For example, the salary for the lowest non-skilled occupation in the construction sector\(^9\), as already mentioned being the main entry gate for newly arrived immigrants, was 458 euros in January of 2001 and 474 euros in January of 2002\(^{10}\). In fact, 61% of the respondents to our survey indicated earning between 300 and 600 euros per month. And finally the fact that there was a process of regularization of immigrant workers in force from January to November 2001, that offered a real alternative to an eventual illegal stay in any other EU country. The possibility to obtain a legal status of residence was indicated by 13% of the respondents to our survey, as the main determinant behind their choice of Portugal as country of destiny.

It is the combination of all these macro and micro level factors that explains the sudden and massive inflow from Eastern Europe to Portugal that essentially took place during the year 2001, as exemplified by the dates of entry in Portugal of the respondents to our survey.

Who are these immigrants?

In the rest of this paper we will characterize the immigrants from Eastern Europe based on the results of our field survey. This characterization will explore four domains: socio-demographic characteristics; economic insertion; adaptation to the receiving society; and future projects.

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\(^9\) General Labour (Servente da Construção Civil).

\(^{10}\) In, Inquérito aos salários por profissões na Construção Civil e Obras Públicas. Ministério da Segurança Social e do Trabalho. January of 2002.
But first a brief methodological note on the survey. The survey was carried out between June and December of 2002, 816 questionnaires were given to immigrants from Eastern Europe. Of these 735 where validated for future treatment. The data set is thus constituted by the answers to our questionnaire of these 735 immigrants from Eastern Europe. Although among these immigrants we have respondents from eleven different nationalities, the overwhelming majority (89 %) were from one single country, the Ukraine. Thus our results reflect essentially the characteristics, the economic situation, and perceptions of the Ukrainian immigrant population in Portugal.

Social and Demographic Characteristics
The gender composition of the immigrant population is extremely biased, in fact 71% of the respondents were male
and 29% were females. In terms of age, the youngest was 15 years of age and the oldest 63 years of age, the average age was 36 years of age. Thus we detected a male dominated flow entirely constituted of immigrants in active ages. This is the composition typical of a new labour flow.

The vast majority (75%) was married and had at least one child (77%). These characteristics suggest that in the following years we will assist either to an intense movement of return or to an intense movement of family reunification.

When compared to the Portuguese active population and to the immigrant population from Third Countries, these immigrants show an extremely high level of education. In fact 69% had completed high school or a professional/technical school. 10% had a bachelor or equivalent and 21% had graduate studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Level of education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read &amp; write without formal education</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional or handicraft school</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional or technical college</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University BA level</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Spec./MA level</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate school</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phd</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Qualification</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know / don’t answer</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey applied to a sample of immigrants from Eastern Europe, June/December 2002
When asked why they had decided to live abroad, the vast majority (80 %) gave, as it should be expected, economic reasons for their decision. Furthermore, 58% declared that this decision was well planned in advance. Before departure, 76% of the respondents were economically active and 19% unemployed. The two most frequent occupations before departure were craft and related works (29%) and intellectual and scientific occupations (32%). The earnings of the vast majority were extremely low, 65 % earning less than 100 euros per month.

**Economic Insertion**

At the moment of the survey only 80% were economically active, what is a relatively low percentage given the fact that they had to care for themselves and the fact that the Portuguese economy was generating plenty of job opportunities, particularly in sectors like construction and tourism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual and scientific occupations</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical occupations</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill agriculture and fishery workers</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related workers</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non qualified workers</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know / don’t answer</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Survey applied to a sample of immigrants from Eastern Europe, June/December 2002*
The way they found their first job in Portugal varied greatly. Thus, the majority, 42%, found their first job through the help of their own family or friends already in Portugal, 22% with the “help” of a work agent, 4% through a travel agency in their home country, and only 14% found their first job by themselves. In sum, more than a quarter of the immigrants declared to have paid to intermediaries to find a job.

Of the immigrants economically active at the moment of the survey, 62.1% had an unskilled occupation. The second most frequent set of occupations was craft and related workers.

In terms of earnings, 3% of the respondents that had a paid job declared earning less than 300 euros per month, 28% between 300 and 450 euros (notice that the minimum wage in Portugal was 348 euros per month in 2002), 33% earned between 450 and 600 euros, and 5% earned more than 900 euros per month.

Table 5  Actual salaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary level (euro)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 150</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151 – 300</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301 – 450</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>451 – 600</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601 – 750</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>751 – 900</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 900</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know / don’t answer</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey applied to a sample of immigrants from Eastern Europe, June/December 2002
Of the respondents that worked at the moment of the survey, 76% had a written contract and 24% had no written contract. Of these contracts, 35% were permanent, 63% temporary, and 2% had other type of contracts (e.g. self employed).

The number of hours worked by week was 42 hours or less for 41% of the respondents that were working and more than 42 hours for 59%.

*Adaptation to the receiving society*

We have collected some indicators on the adaptation of these immigrants to the Portuguese society.

The first of these indicators was on prejudice at work. The majority of the respondents, 63%, declared that they have not experienced prejudiced attitudes at work, against 27% that declared that they have suffered prejudiced attitudes at work.

The second indicator was on language fluency. It is highly surprising that after just a few months in Portugal the vast majority of the respondents declared to have at least some proficiency in Portuguese. In fact, only 9% indicated that they did not speak at all Portuguese (Figure 5), 29% declared that they could not write (Figure 6) and 14% that they could not read (Figure 7).

*Figure 5*  Level of ability to speak Portuguese (percentage)

Source: Survey applied to a sample of immigrants from Eastern Europe, June/December 2002
Figure 6  Level of ability to write in Portuguese (percentage)

Source: Survey applied to a sample of immigrants from Eastern Europe, June/December 2002

Figure 7  Level of ability to read Portuguese (percentage)

Source: Survey applied to a sample of immigrants from Eastern Europe, June/December 2002

The third indicator was on how they rated their experience in Portugal. 52% rated their experience as positive or very positive, and only 7% thought it was very negative.

Future plans
The majority, 51%, of the respondents to our survey plans to return home in the near future and only 16% have plans to remain in Portugal. 4% pretends to migrate to another country.
Conclusion

As said, migration from Eastern Europe to Portugal was a sudden and massive movement that occurred essentially during the year 2001.

The movement has since decreased significantly. Furthermore, given the country current economic recession, it seems reasonable to presume that it will continue to decrease in the coming year.

As our brief description of the characteristics of the immigrants indicates, migration from Eastern Europe may be typified as a temporary labour movement rooted in the economic disparities existent between the two regions. The movement occurred because organization for profit in the home countries, particularly in the Ukraine, promoted migration to Portugal, because during 2001 there was an on going process of regularization in Portugal that offered the possibility to obtain a legal status of permanence, and because the economy was generating plenty of job opportunities.

Still, even without new entries and even with some departures, the fact is that after this unforeseen wave, immigration in Portugal changed drastically and remarkably.

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THE UNFORESEEN WAVE: MIGRATION FROM EASTERN EUROPE TO PORTUGAL

EXPLORING SOME EAST-WEST MIGRANT NETWORKS AND THEIR DISTANT LOCAL DYNAMICS. UKRAINIAN, POLISH AND ROMANIAN MIGRANTS IN ROME

Serge Weber
CNRS UMR GéographieCités, Ecole Française de Rome

Introduction

An observer of migrations in Europe can choose between two points of view. The first one is the ‘institutional’ one, a top-down approach, and the second one, a bottom-up perspective, which could be named a ‘small-scale’ approach. The institutional perspective stresses the flux, stock, or legal frame aspects in order to measure the impact of migratory politics or labour market changes on social phenomena like migration. Decisions like ‘integration politics’, welfare laws for migrants or, on the opposite side, fighting ‘clandestine’ migration and moonlighting, are supposed to arrange social facts in a descending order. Society results settled in good order and ‘disorder’ zones claim for observation, study and intervention. Governance is seen as the most efficient philosophy.

The bottom-up point of view is situated at the actor’s level. What does the migrant (or any kind of social actor) do, what are his/her strategies, opportunities, hindrances, choices, decision making processes, expectations? How does he/she develop inventiveness in a given context? The individual level can be broaden up to the inter-individual level, dealing with social networks, (dis-)embedded links, solidarity/competition relationships, common values, community dynamics, symbolic and material belongings. Individuals and small groups of actors
adapt themselves to the institutional and practical context, using opportunities, obeying or infringing rules depending on whether they seem fair or unfair. Social order is the result of innumerable and infinitely various operations of negotiation. *Adjustment* would better sum up this second philosophy. Governance and adjustment seem contradictory, but they are the two only existing ways of connecting actors and institutions at various levels.

The inter-European migratory pattern is quite peculiar from this very point of view. It is one of the most institutionalised social phenomena and yet one of the most individualized ones. The Schengen countries and the EU in general seek to build a satisfying governance of boundaries, circulation, migration, traffic, clandestineness, welfare and bilateral cooperation. They aim to be the architects, in association with the applicant countries for enlargement, of what we could name the spatial order of a European social order\(^1\). On the other hand, some citizens of the ex-communist European countries take in hand their own destiny and decide to look for opportunities outside the state boundaries. They choose a path full of obstacles and adapt, when and where it is possible, to numerous constraints. Both partners – individuals and institutions – manage to find opportunities in this unpredictable process.

We chose to describe the paths of Romanian, Ukrainian and Polish migrants who work in Italy, taking both governance and adjustment dynamics into account, as well as their contradictory effects. The following findings sum up some conclusions of our field research among Romanian, Polish and Ukrainian migrant households, in their place of origin and in their place of settlement, in Rome or its region, Lazio\(^2\).
Abroad and stranger, two ambivalent notions in the changing European architecture. The Italian point of view

Europe is a moving reality. The main change is that as and when EU widens, the space of abroad shrinks, and its inhabitants become less and less strangers. Poland, Romania and Ukraine are at three distinct steps of this undifferentiating process. The choice of these countries precisely aims to observe which are the consequences of institutional changes on individual mobility (and vice versa, the impact of migratory movements on institutional initiative) in three different juridical situations.

Poland obtained the visa abolition quickly after the fall of the iron curtain: polish citizens were very early able to enter and circulate inside the EU (Schengen) with the only stamp the customs’ agents put on the passport which used to limit the staying duration to 90 days for a tourist trip. The Romanian had to wait till the 1st of January, 2002 to obtain this facility, and the Ukrainian have (till now) no hope of gaining such a ‘right’: they will have to pay and wait for administrative terms, even to pay in certain cases intermediary dealers for the voucher and the visa. They remain more strangers than the others. On which basis, this is difficult to know. Second level: the EU enlargement. Poland has become a EU member from the 1st of May 2004. Romania is sure to become a member after few years, hoping in the 2007 schedule. Ukraine, despite strong motivations and justifications, will probably not enter the EU, at least not before Russia, if Russia ever does. For the Pole, who are less strangers than the other because part of a European civil society (in Italian, from “extracomunitari”, a very common word to define migrant workers, they turned into “comunitari”), motivations for emigrating towards West will diminish although circulation is certainly going to maintain high levels. The juridical conditions for circulation freedom and for being recognized as
a European are West-East graduated. The “in-between Europe” is moving towards East.

Since the early 80s, Italy progressively became an immigration country although it was little time before (and even continued to be for certain people) one of the main sending countries in Europe. This is a consequence of the closing of the frontiers of the Western countries like France, Germany or the UK during the early 70s. Nevertheless it is also a consequence of a very rapid socio-economical change in Italy: the growth of the 50s, 60s and 70s, called “Italian miracle”, have had an impact on the changing labour market. Qualification, social and economical development, consuming and ways of life changed. Italy progressively needed new labourers because of the relative labour shortage in certain sectors and regions for certain types of positions (more than for the only demographical gap) (Pallidda and Reyneri, 1995; Ambrosini, 2001). Italy also became more and more capable of accepting strangers inside its social system (welfare and citizenship). The difference between EU and the non-EU strangers shows that the perception of the stranger is ambivalent. A series of legal initiatives progressively built a juridical system to include strangers inside the society over the past twenty years. Acts and decrees were successively adopted in 1986, 1990 (Martelli Act), 1996 (Dini Decree), 1998 (Turco-Napolitano outline law) and 2002 (Bossi-Fini act). Before these legislative changes, the (few) strangers were ruled by obsolete texts adopted during the Mussolini dictatorship. The most important act is the 1998 outline law, that tries to include all the aspects and functions of immigration from abroad in Italy, achieving the governance of migration with the coordination of all levels of actors in this field (Weber and Schmoll, 2004).

The 2002 Bossi-Fini act is an amendment of the previous one, with a clear orientation towards enforcement of clandestine
migration and labour, and criminalizing of undocumented workers (Miele and Carbone, 2002; ISMU, 2003). It has been a very important public issue during the 2002 year. The debate was hot both in the media and among the public opinion or inside the Parliament, but even in the core of the governmental majority. Its primary aim was to limit immigration to the maximum. The various bills that preceded it expressed very extreme ideas, like the “staying contract” (contratto di soggiorno) strictly linked to the labour contract, the cancellation of unemployment benefits and job seeking periods for strangers, maximum penalization of migrants. The most popular idea was the (utopian) proposition of cancelling ‘illegal’ (undocumented) immigration. Therefore the long debate opted for the legalization of migrants already working in Italy who could prove it. But it also introduced biometric measures, like the fingerprints of any extracomunitario citizen applying for a staying permit (permesso di soggiorno), including American or Japanese investors. After many political difficulties, employed workers and especially domestic workers obtained the right to apply for the legalization of their presence in Italy. They needed to have already a job, attested by the voucher of the employer, which guaranteed that the activity was uninterrupted since June 2002 until the moment of the application, November 2002). The employer had to declare to the INPS (National Institute of Social Providence) his/her illegal worker(-s). The fee he had to pay (around 300 €, depending on the type of work) used to stand for legal proceeding against him/her. This fee is typical of the “sanatoria” tradition in Italy, literally aiming to “making healthier” an illegal practice. The main objective is to fight moonlighting rather than undocumented migration, and this type of fight is a well accepted habit in the country (although a part of public opinion, more left handed, considers the sanatoria and condono system a little advanced way of governance3). One of

3 See the debate in the daily newspaper Il Manifesto about the current “sanatoria” of illegal building, which incitate people not to respect the juridical limitation to individual appetites. The “condono” is the cancelling of fee or process, replaced by a simple tax, for people who used to infringe the law and are simply “forgiven".
the troubles of this law is that the fee was actually paid by the migrant worker instead of the employer, enacting the most cynical idea of ‘migration tax’.

Nevertheless such a liberal politics led to the outstanding legalization of 634,000 non-EU workers at the end of the process (February 2004), on a total of 702,000 applications registered between the 10th of September and the 11th of November 2002. But the debate complicated the classical management of migration issues. The decree that has been fixing every year the quotas of entries since the Turco-Napolitano law, called “decreto flussi”, has been delayed of almost one year, disturbing the coherence of the migration governance. Besides the quota was exaggeratedly low, not more than 10,000 non-seasonal workers. The seasonal workers quota follows a separate procedure and concerns specifically the North-East (Trentino-Alto Adige for example). The quotas fix the country of origin of the workers, their professional specialisation and the region of destination, as an endeavour of managing globally the migration.

The new law put an end to the “sponsorizzazione” procedure (instituted by the 1998 law as well), which used to make possible for an employer to call a worker directly in his country of origin through the medium of the Italian diplomatic representation. The “sponsor”, a guarantor who could be either Italian or legally staying in Italy, could call someone he knew provided that he certified a series of conditions. Despite some mismanagement, this procedure was a good way of making institutions fit to the effectiveness of spontaneous social behaviours. Migratory chains as well as any social network dynamics used to have in a way a possibility of being officialized.

As a result of the legalization process many problems come into sight. In fact only domestic worker (baby minders, cleaners, nurses for elderly people, for invalid or sick persons), workmen and operatives or any industrial and agricultural labourer obtained
their legalization. Qualifications were undervalued. In case of the loss of a job (which often occurs especially for nurses at the death of the elderly people), the duration of the authorized job seeking (unemployment) period is reduced to four months, beyond which the staying permit is not more valid thus not renewable at the end of the year. Renewing the staying permit the year after can be risky when the worker changed job and didn’t obtain a new regular contract for example. Then he/she can turn undocumented again. In a word such a procedure creates a class of second category workers, limited to the subordinate work and threatened by the probability of falling easily into ‘illegality’ again. Such a sector-oriented choice explains why the need of migrant subordinate labour is not in contradiction with a high unemployment level in Italy. The work demand is specialized and doesn’t fit with a sufficient supply at a local – or even regional – level. The status of such jobs isn’t secure enough to motivate an interregional migration inside the country.

The origins of the migrants are very varied, without any sending country over-represented in the statistics. In 2002, Morocco was followed by Albania, Romania, Philippines and China for the most important. But the secondarily important origins are very numerous. Romania, Poland and Ukraine have a special place in this statistic hierarchy. They are the three main countries of origin inside the central and eastern European countries, although Ukraine is extremely under-represented in the statistics because it is a more recent and still highly undocumented migration. The chronological order of appearance of these three migratory fields follows exactly their rhythms of development and growth. Poland was first in the panel. In the early 80s, the first Poles came to Italy as asylum seekers, after the declaration of the state of war in 1981. Most of them obtained in Rome a visa to the United States and went off after

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6 Even if the recent regularisation and the rapidly increasing number of applications for residence registration show how important the undervaluation is.
Map 1  Localisation map: relevant places and neighborhoods for a migrant space structuration
Municipality of Rome (155 quarters)
few months or few years. They were accommodated in the refugee camps of Capua (Campania) and Latina (Lazio, south of Rome) and in Ladispoli (north of Rome), as well (see map). After the fall of the iron curtain, the asylum status attribution ceased to be facilitated as it used to be for the communist countries during the cold war. The Italian government did his best to prevent these asylum seekers to stay in Italy. But once interrupted the massive visa delivery to the United States, they became simple migrants and constituted one of the first important group of immigrants in Italy, as were Philippines, Cabo Verde, or Ethiopia. The first wave of Poles was made of highly skilled political refugees. Then after the fall of the iron curtain, the second wave became socially much more diversified and geographically more and more specialized on the Southern region of Krakow-Katowice-Wroclaw. The ‘poor’ migrants became the majority, and it had an impact on the ways of insertion on the labour and residence markets. Their community organization has been facilitated by the creation of some associations or solidarity committees. Furthermore the S. Stanislas church received the status of national polish parish thank to the action of Vatican. The Polish social space became relatively structured and recognized (Romaniszyn, 2000; Weber, 1998).

The Romanian migration began later, after 1991. The main pioneers arrived in 1992. They were leaving a much poorer country than Poland at the same time and built their migration out of nothing, without a previous pioneer wave. Their statistical visibility, always out-of-date, became significant in 1999, and the 2002-2003 regularization showed the migration from Romania has been the most active during these years: they occupy the first rank of the origin countries, with more than 130,000 legalized in 2003, they are more than 210,000 persons in 2003. Their repartition on the Italian territory is as various as the Polish one is concentrated on Rome. The industrial mobility traditions may have "prepared" as showed Dana Diminescu, Rose-Marie Lagrave, “Faire une saison. Pour une anthropologie des migrations roumaines en France, le cas du pays d’Oas”, Migration Etudes, 91, 1999.
districts of the Po valley (Veneto) are an important destination area as well. Small towns and rural areas are also significantly represented. The regions of origin are mainly concentrated in the Romanian Moldavia area, around cities like Focsani, Piatra Neamț, Bacau, Roman, Suceava. A certain religious visibility is growing, as show the numerous orthodox or Greco-catholic church creations (Weber in Diminescu, 2003).

The Ukrainian migration is one of the most recent ones, contemporarily with the one from the Republic of Moldova. It began around 1996, because the system changed much slower than in Romania or in Poland, the abolition of the emigration limitation came later, and because the effective poorness was stronger. The cost of migration to west was too high in the first years, this explains why it remained for a long time mainly oriented towards ex-communist countries (mainly Russia) for commercial circulation. It became massive from 1998-1999 and the statistical visibility occurred five years behind the main arrivals. It is the 2003 legalization that showed how important and dynamic this migration was, and how difficult it was for them to manage to get out from the informal labour and from the undocumented status. The first regions of origin were the Western Ukraine, around L'viv, Ternopil, Tchernivtsi. But now the whole territory is concern with migration towards Italy.

These three categories of migrants, Poles, Romanians and Ukrainians, differ from each other not because their ways of building a migratory destiny are different, but because their respective countries of origin and personal status are highly differentiated in the European architecture. Ukraine is more abroad, Ukrainians are more strangers. Circulating, feeling free to choose a way and place of living or another is much more difficult than for Romanians, who are free to circulate and less perceived as strangers, or even more for Poles, who are to become European citizens of a European territory (even with the
temporary limitation to their right to work abroad). Such a graduation can be noticed in the chronology of migration and transition, as well as on the durability of precariousness.

Mobility adjustments in a trans-European living space

Differences in the juridical status of migrant individuals affect the mobility capacity but mobility is as important as settlement, it can even be the most important point of this inter-European migration, as shows D. Diminescu (2002 and 2003\(^8\)). Poles easily circulate with the customs stamp on their passport. Valid three months, the stay in Italy for tourism reasons is a convenient way of sharing one’s life upon two places of living. Distance is reasonable, time and cost are quite easy to manage. This rhythm of daily life fits with some seasonal works, like fruit picking or any agricultural gathering, like building sites, summer tourism jobs (hotels, restaurants, and shops). And there is no surprise to notice that almost all of the seasonal workers of Trentino-Alto Adige for apple gathering are Poles. Such frequency of there and back journeys is also available for some turnover activities like minders, nurses and other domestic worker. So that in many cases, more than one member of a family or a social network divide with other people one common space of living: cousins, or brother and sister take it in turns to sit up the elderly person in Italy and to keep children at home, to watch a small farm in Poland and to take over from each other on a job on a site in Rome. Students can find in summer jobs in Italy important complementary resources. On the other hand, the easy circulation between both countries allow migrants who live in Italy to keep together their scattered families, when children study in Poland and partners work in a third country like Germany or Belgium.

\(^8\) For further informations, see the previous findings of Dana Diminescu. She demonstrated that settling into mobility can replace settling in a destination country.
Poles, more than other, circulate with personal car, an habit that began around ten years ago much before the other central European migrants. This type of circulation more and more indicates the permeability between tourism and circular migration: more and more Poles drive their own cars to Italy for tourism and no longer for supplying the transnational household in commodities and consumer goods, nor for precarious turnovers. There is a continuity between two different types of mobility that accompany progressive integration into EU. Other means of transportation grew: Pullmans from any place in Italy to Poland, especially southern Poland. From Naples, Palermo, Syracuse, Reggio-Calabria, and in Rome, from the Tiburtina station (see map 1), many buses leave once, twice a week or every day. Several companies extended their activities, like Panaceum, Itapol, Contribus, Eurolines, and others. But low cost flights take very long to appear, and this is a peculiarity of the Polish situation. Anyway, it is easy to circulate from Italy to Poland and people don’t need specific acquaintances to organize their trip: there is an undifferentiated panel of travelling possibilities. The major part of the Polish bus companies use the regular bus stations like Tiburtina in Rome, like any other regular European line.

The Romanian circulation throughout Europe had a second boom in January 2002. And the panel of travelling opportunities grew in a spectacular way. The microbus network is very important and many of them are specifically connected with one origin region, the Vrancea district, around the city of Focsani, including other areas of the Romanian Moldavia, East of the country. The microbus have a specific bus station, where also normal buses stop. As a connecting place, the subway terminal and parking of Anagnina is a very interesting example of informal and temporary centralities. During the week, this place is a huge parking full of cars: people who live in the south-

9 Both practices may coexist because of local difficulties to succeed in the economical transformation, for instance in the south-eastern rural municipalities of Poland.
eastern periphery of the metropolis leave their car to take the metro. The main density is the area of Castelli Romani, a densely inhabited countryside-like urban area. Further the motorway leads to the Ciociaria and the Frosinone Province. Urban buses and regional routes both stop at the bus station at the ground floor. The B metro line stops at the underground level. Access roads lead to the G.R.A. (Gran Raccordo Anulare, Circular motorway at around 15 km far from the center) which is very close to Anagnina. Anyway, this place is an interconnecting synapse of the metropolitan system. The long distance regular bus lines are from Sibiu, in the western part of Romania, but they stop in various places of the country. But the main regular line is the well known Atlassib, one of the most important Sibiu companies, which stops at the Tiburtina Station. The Eurolines company, which is quite efficient for the trips to Poland, is not well represented, due to problems with the Romanian partner Ognivia: they stopped for a long while the Romania-Italy circulation. Atlassib developed in an impressive way, linking numerous cities of Italy, from South to North, to numerous cities in Romania. The company opened offices, like the one of Stazione Tiburtina. After 2002, the Romanian number plates became gradually more and more numerous, even if less than the Polish ones: the Romanian “settling into mobility” (D. Diminescu) is more and more alike the Polish one.

The Ukrainian circulation infrastructure still depends on the microbus individual lines. There are few Ukrainian transportation companies even though the Polish companies opened recently their destinations to Kiev and western Ukraine, especially to Lviv. Anyway it is easy to begin a journey towards Kiev from the Tiburtina Station. But the very interesting place is the informal terminal of microbuses called Garbatella. Unlike Anagnina, Garbatella is situated in a quasi central area of the city. The very location of this place facilitates the pedestrian
access more than any other one. The metro station Garbatella of line B, the south-west urban buses, the railway station Ostiense, which is a stop of the circular railway line, the metro Piramide, and the Porta San Paolo terminal of the Ostia railway line show how well connected this place is inside the public transportation network. The main difference with Anagnina or with the Polish circulation system is that migrants who come in Garbatella have very few cars: this is one of the possible sign of maturing succeeding the migratory process. Being younger, the Ukrainian migration isn’t as mature as the other ones yet and consequently, the use of public space is different. In Garbatella, a huge activity of postal service takes place: migrants send packings, luggage, presents, money, letters etc. to their families.

Suburban and rural-urban local systems: causes and effects of migration in both departure and destination regions.

Migration is deeply rooted in local processes inside the departure regions. In fact, all places of the sending countries are not homogeneously involved in emigration and/or circulation. On the contrary, these examples show once again how selective spatial mobility is. The main sending regions of these three countries are their piedmont of the Carpathian mountains. They are continuous from Craiova till Suceava in Romania, with a special importance of the Moldavian Romania, around Roman, Bacau, and most of all Focsani. In the Northern Romania, Bucovina and Maramures, till Baia Mare and Satu Mare, began later (around 1998) to establish migratory processes in Italy. Transylvania and the rest of the country are not very much involved in the Italian migration (more towards Germany for instance).
In Ukraine, Bucovina, Galicia, and Volynia are the most dynamic migratory regions. The main one is the area of Lviv, in the western Ukraine, which is very specific. Indeed Lviv is the source land of Ukrainian nationalism, which used to claim for independence during the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, sharply opposing against the Russian influence, Russian language and orthodox religion. This area is the place where was born the Uniat Church, also named Greco-Catholic church, created in 1596 with the support of Rome to face the extension of Reformed religions. The Greco-Catholic Church authorized to conserve the Orthodox ritual but recognizing the authority of the Vatican. Its existence is problematic for the orthodox Patriarchy and is a subject of tensions between Kiev and moreover Moscow orthodox hierarchies and the Vatican. Besides the Galicia used to be a region of the Habsbourg Empire (the German name for the city is Lemberg), populated with numerous Poles (who named the City Lwow), an inheritage which explains a strong feeling of difference among the majority of its inhabitants. Lviv has been looking towards West for centuries. But this is not the only reason for its strong migratory dynamics. In fact the West of Ukraine is much poorer and less densely populated than other parts of the country. Its economic and electoral weight is little compared with the Donbass and the Eastern Ukraine in general, which is much more Russian-speaking and industrial. Poverty is one of the migratory factors in the region. It is thus the first place to have initiated the labour migration rush towards Italy, followed by the areas of Ternopil, Ivano-Frankovsk, Lutsk and Tchernivsti. After 2000, many other places of Ukraine got involved in the Italian migration, but with an minor impact on local systems.

Regarding the Polish situation, the spatial selection of international mobility towards Italy is as clear as in the other countries: only the South of Poland led to well-structured
emigration systems, from Wroclaw to Rzeszow. The Krakow and Katowice industrial basin are particularly involved. As one could expect, the main macro-economic reasons are the industrial unemployment, rural crisis in this small individual private farming area, collective trauma of the collapse of industrial conglomerates. But one shouldn't forget other types of factors, inside the family configuration, which only can explain why comparable households did or did not migrate.

As a whole, it is interesting to notice that the emigration zones form a crescent-shaped area bordering the external piedmont of the Carpathian mountains. Such a assertion could lead to many possible large-scale explanations of the actual migratory phenomena. For example, the little collectivised small farming, the in-between position, the linguistic and ethnic mix, the heritage of western European dominations and belongings.

But the most efficient explanation, inside this panel of general migratory factors, can be found in another finding: the migratory networks were born in the small villages and towns not far from metropolises like Wroclaw, Krakow, Lublin, Przemysl, L’viv, Tchernivtsi, Focsani or Brasov. Not the remote rural areas, nor specifically the main municipalities. Migration decision making is localised at the fringe of rural and metropolitan worlds, inside poorer and peripheral regions. In these villages, the “transition” challenge is not only one (a strictly rural and agricultural problem of private property, distribution and input system in a young capitalist economy, or a strictly urban problem in large cities, linked to industrial unemployment, inflation of housing prices and selective consuming goods market) but is a double challenge, depending on the two dimensions of the transition: a external response to the pauperisation due to the system change is necessary. International labour migration is one of them. The international suitcase trading is the other one, although nowadays
less dynamic, turned into a more classical commercial attitude. This local/transnational way of life, distorting the familiar world in dispatched places, rapidly extended to the suburbs of the main cities. The diffusion of migratory strategies went in the opposite direction regarding the diffusion of capitalist standards of consumption and ways of living.

This is the reason why the impact of a transnational space of life for many households is sharper in the suburban and periurban zones, including neighbouring villages. The geography of constructed areas is changing. It is possible to observe, outside large and medium-sized cities, outside towns or villages, new neighbourhoods emerging from nothing. New villa-like houses are built, as a result of migration or commercial mobility savings. Their localization can be explained in two manners: on the one hand sales of land by lots allow to some developer or group of purchasers (the richer) to create *ex nihilo* a new neighbourhood in a peripheral zone of a city; on the other hand landlords of a farm or a rural house and a piece of land can build on their very perimeter near the old house, or on a distant parcel. The distant parcel has a peculiar status in the ex-communist countries: when the regime collapsed, and the decollectivisation produced free parcels, many state workers were given a piece of land as a compensation for having lost their job or not been paid for months. These pieces of land are often the beginning of a new building strategy which couldn’t be possible without international migration or commercial mobility. The houses are often made of two or three semi-independent apartments: they are meant for children or parents of the migrant household. Migration savings are a new basis for spatial rooting of a family community and for a new social status.

It could be added that such a modification of rural zones around cities and villages has another important consequence: the building of churches. One can observe a coincidence between
the real estate market dynamism and the multiplication of churches in peripheral areas. Mainly orthodox in Romania and Ukraine, they often are Greco-catholic in Romanian Moldavia (around Roman and Bacau), in Galicia (around L’viv), and of course, Roman Catholic churches in Poland (around Rzeszow and Lublin for instance). In many areas, each village has its new peripheral church. This is part of the vast process of religious reconquista after years of limited religious freedom, and this process is particularly vivid in orthodox lands.

In a whole, the changing of the geography of such regions seems to accelerate the peri-urbanisation process that had been delayed during the communist era. Nevertheless it presents a contradiction: there is a waste of housing possibilities. Unoccupied flats during the migration period, rural habitation units with one nuclear family instead of two or three… this availability of housing doesn’t hinder the rapid increasing of real estate prices in the cities and their suburbs. Such a paradox is the sign of a mentality change about housing and residence geography\(^\text{10}\).

In the destination area, the metropolitan area of Rome, we have been struck to notice that comparable processes are appearing. The main observers described migrants’ settlement in central zones. Since few years, a very specific peripheral dynamic can be observed.

The inner-city geography of immigration has to be differentiated in two ways (see map 1): residence and public space. The public space aspect concerns the gathering places for migrants. Some of these places are visited only by migrants from the same country of origin, others are mixed. Most of them are linked to a religious function. Squares or streets in front of national churches are well represented in Rome, where almost every Christian national Church has a representative church. The Monti neighbourhood (Viminale) welcomes for

\(^{10}\) About the cultural changes in housing practice before and after the fall of the communist regime, see Mihailescu et al., 1995.
example a Filipino church, a Russian Catholic and a Greco-
catholic Ukrainian church, and the squares in front of them
are gathering point on Sundays or for the breaks during the
working days. The centro storico, ancient core of the city, welcomes
the Polish parish S. Stanislao, another Filipino church, four
Romanian churches (Greco-Catholic and Adventist), and the
North of Esquilino welcomes a Russian Orthodox church and
a Moldavian Greco-Catholic chapel. These are only examples
of the huge panel of Christian diversity. Mosques are much
underrepresented, but the great Mosque of Parioli (Northern
outer-inner Ring) is an important gathering point for Muslims
in Rome. Other “ethnic” differentiated public spaces are linked
to the circulation logistics we described supra. Finally the open
air commercial places are mostly frequented by migrants on
Sundays, mainly by Romanians, Poles and Ukrainians. Porta
Portese is the great flea market in the central area of Trastevere,
it is the only place and the only moment for migrants who
have full days of labour all the week long to buy cloths, shoes,
any kind of consumer good. Sellers are Chinese, Moroccan,
Bangladeshis, and few Italians. The success of such a commercial
place explains the creation, in the early 90s, of a second flea
market, Porta Portese 2, in a peripheral area, at the edge of the
agglomeration, in the Prenestino zone. Both markets are well
connected to the public transportation network and satisfy the
demand of thousands of eastern European migrants in consumer
goods.

This is only a part of the geographical aspects of migration
in Rome. The study of residential space reveals other perspectives.
The space of residence is no longer an inner city issue. There
is no ghetto for immigrants in Rome. Only one area has a
particular status with regard to immigration: Esquilino. The
hill of Esquilino runs between the central Station and the ancient
core. Around the Piazza Vittorio Emmanuele, migrants settled
Map 2  Foreigners among the resident population, Lazio, 2000 (%)
at the beginning of the 80s. Chinese, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, but also some Africans. The shops were progressively occupied by Chinese garment wholesale business. But the foreign residents in the neighbourhood are a minority, even if their number and proportion are more important than in other zones. If it is possible to say that Esquilino is an ethnic quarter in terms of public space and activity, it is not possible to say it is a ghetto. On the contrary it is a centrality for migrants who contributed in a way to “gentrify” this ex-bad reputation prostitution area. The studies of P. Mudu about this area show how exceptional is the destiny of the neighbourhood. Other significant forms of concentration of migrant resident are not visible inside the inner city (Mudu, 2000 and 2002). This area is close to the main central place of the city, Termini railway station, which is continuously a migrant centrality for varied activities and transits.

In the outer-inner ring, areas like Torpignattara, Casilino, Centocelle, Torre Angela and Borghesiana in the South-Eastern part of the city (between via Prenestina and via Casilina, the two most densely areas of the metropolis), and Labaro, Tomba di Nerone, and La Storta along the via Cassia in the North show some corridors of the migrant residential space. Besides another one is emerging West around via Boccea, like the Val Cannuta zone for instance (see map 2). But the most important phenomena are outside the municipality, in rural-urban fringes, where the numbers of foreigner residents increased more rapidly. And this phenomenon is mainly due to one specific migration, the Romanian one. Small municipalities are in fact the level that fits to endogenous mechanisms of sociability, activity, networking and settlement. In these zones which are midway between urban and rural, the local level is very efficient for the success of inter-individual networks. Building one’s life is easier when both social network and local opportunity are close to
individual sphere. The bottom-up process we referred to at the beginning of this paper is here easily observable. There is no housing politics, no social housing institution that is open to migrants, and there is no available cheap abandoned area that could lead to a real “ethnic” quarter. The lack of a social housing politics is a problem, but it is also a paradoxical advantage: there is no segregation top-down dynamics, but very little social help for housing, indeed not at all. This is why Rome offers such a remarkable example of dispersion of the migrants’ residence. This is also why the concentration processes we can observe in spite of all correspond only to specific social networks dynamics.

Many immigrants live in the Castelli Romani municipalities at around 15-30 km south-east of the agglomeration on the via Appia (Velletri, Frascati; Albano, Grottaferrata, Pavona, Genzano di Roma… see map 2). Such municipalities offer optimal conditions for an easy insertion: residence opportunities like available apartments due to the high density of built surface, real estate prices less prohibitive than in the commune of Rome. On the other hand, the labour opportunities are mainly represented by three overlapping sectors: numerous building site and rehabilitation project, innumerable apartment renewing opportunities, need in nurses for elderly people living at home or in specialized institutions, old people’s homes, clinics, hospitals, cure homes and hotels who also employ maintenance and cleaning staff. Secondarily migrants can find jobs in the agricultural activity: stock breeding, olive trees, fruit and vegetables. And among the immigrants who live in the Castelli, a great deal come from Romania. They are flatmates in collective apartments welcoming more than one family (from 2 to 15 individuals a flat). The roman real estate market is so much blocked that this way of housing is the only possible one. Constituting such composite households means following
multiple and specific sociological ways (see the researches of Ionela Vlase). The resources can be divided between the local labour market and the near roman labour market.

Another local concentration dynamics is made of a small group of municipalities, between via Flaminia and via Cassia, north of Rome. Sacrofano, Campagnano di Roma, till Civita Castellana, welcome numerous Romanian residents. Inside a comparable distance, the Tivoli-Guidonia-Montecelio-Monterotondo cluster, with a high density of inhabitants, plays an important role in the migrant geography of the region. Further areas of Latina, Aprilia, Frosinone towards south, Ladispoli and Civitavecchia towards north also attract migrant residents. They are part of the metropolitan system of the city, based on commuting, complementary local and metropolitan labour and real estate markets, social and spatial proximity, local peculiarities (like fruit agriculture in the Pontine plain, ceramic industry in Civita Castellana, mechanic industry in Aprilia, olive trees in Sacrofano etc.) The maximum distance of this mixed local/metropolitan system is around 100 km (for example towns like Alatri or Viterbo).

Gender aspects of a larger social change

Examining the balance between men and women inside this spatial distribution of migrants is possible. Among the migratory networks, some of them have a major proportion of women, others are mainly constituted of men. This gender structure of networks has a direct impact on spatial configuration in the geography of residence. The intricacy of different factors like local society demand, local economic context, housing opportunity, juridical constraints, individual migratory project and inter-individual configurations design differentiated possible
paths for settlement. And some paths lead to gender specialized networks. Such contrasts have deep consequences on representation, collective auto-perception and social interaction. The very sharp unbalanced sex ratios are usually typical of recent, quantitatively limited and little structured migrations. Two examples can illustrate this assertion: the Ukrainian migration is almost totally feminine: 74.2% in 2001 of the Ukrainian registered in the Lazio region (staying permits). Between 1999 and 2002, the Ukrainian residents in Rome (municipality) grew up because of women's arrival: they increased of 755% and men only of 214%. Such numbers show easily that Ukrainian migration is structuring now, becoming statistically visible thanks to the women's action. It is also sure that this migration will be less and less contrasted: the results of the recent legalization prove it. The second example is the Chinese migration: a chronologically mature, very equilibrated and based on family migration. But the correlation between age of migration and gender balance is denied by some other observations: the Bangladeshi migration is an aged migration, absolutely structured, but undoubtedly dominated by males: they represent 84% of the staying permits in Lazio. On the contrary, the Romanian population of Lazio is constituted for 45% of women, i.e. a quite balanced structure, even if it is a rather recent arrival. When observing the polish migration, it is interesting to notice that it began with a balanced structure (women around 55% in the early 90s) and progressively specialized in a feminine network: 66% in 2001. There are two different series of factors: one structural and the other relating to economic climate and one should not mistake one for the other. The niches inside the labour market as well as the gender relationships in the origin country are the two main factors. The Filipino migration is one of the most well-known examples of this elaborated configuration.
The gender relationship depends on the strength of the community belongings, which is very unequal among migrants. When community belonging is strong, migration intensifies patriarchy and women submission to men in traditional communities of origin. When the majority of migrants are from Ukraine, Moldova, Peru, Philippines and Poland, their departure is justified by men because their sacrifice for the community is honoured and because, being away, they send the money necessary for the men and children who remained home to maintain their standard of living, their social status and to go on the social competition that validates conformism and community cohesion; movers and stayers are linked to each other inside the same system (see the methodological and theoretical point of Rosental, 1999). The labour market of the domestic workers, highly feminine, is seen like a secure niche because the lack of freedom of women who live where they work and without being ever left alone guarantees the distant social control of women by men. The studies of Liane Mozère (2002) remind us that the dangers of the world domestic labour market exist everywhere. On the contrary when mostly men emigrate (Egyptian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Albanian), they keep women in their submitted passive condition. Women are obliged to perpetuate the roles and status they were attributed by men, their economical dependence is sharpened, and they are obliged to be grateful. The Ukrainian feminine migration is ambivalent: in the interviews, women described very difficult situations with regard to gender relationships, validating the model of women’s sacrifice. But a further look to the interviews destroy this assertion. In fact, the women who are no longer really young (more than 25 or 30 years old) are mostly divorced. Their family situations are distorted, and constrained them to an innovative trajectory in which gender identity is particularly problematic. Their declarations during the interviews demonstrate
how difficult it is for households to maintain gender roles and status when the social and economical status of men and women collapsed with the socialist system. The affective and personal dimension of the socio-economic crisis deeply affect the innovation capacity of individuals. When women migrate and provide the household with resources, the status of men is deeply weakened.

In other cases, migration reinforces the recourse to community links because distance endangers their solidity. This is why in many cases, their legitimacy is accentuated. Among these controlled links, one is more sensible: loyalty of women to men: men succeed in pointing that the community cohesion depends on migrant (or non migrant) women.

“Migrating together” isn’t in every case the sign of an emancipated behaviour. It is a typical case of the community migration, like a great part of the rural Romanian migration from Vrancea or from Neamț. Wives and husbands migrate together with children, brothers and sisters, kinship and marriage witnesses, inside perfect migratory chains. The traditional social and neighbourhood structure of the village is exported in Italy, mainly in another rural area, this is why villages around Rome have such a success. Apparently equilibrated sex ratios mask a strongly traditional social control.

On the contrary, where the community belonging is weaker than a rather undifferentiated societal belonging, which can be true for numerous migrants who have in common an emancipation trajectory, the hierarchic gender domination is less significant. Migration means in these case also individualisation (see Singly, 2003 for a review of the individualisation problematics). It is illustrated by graduated individuals, who are able to elaborate the contrasted spheres of their heterogeneous worlds. We found cases from the three countries, but the common point of all these individuals is the
level of formation, information and the social status certitude that only qualifications and diplomas are able to guarantee.

Conclusions

Differentiation among migrants and among settlement or circulation strategies thus not only depends on local specificities, nor on institutional opportunities but above all it depends on social status. And the eastern European societies are particularly deeply concerned with this problem. They suddenly and abruptly discovered the rapid social inequality that the collapsed regime could no longer pretend to contain. The competition for money, standard of living and social status explain migration strategy, instead of the strictly economic factor of absolute poverty. These gendered inequalities also explain specific migratory strategies.

This is why it is possible to assert that the migration settlement process in Rome depends on individual decision making inside their close social worlds. The difficult renegotiation of social status in the post-communist societies is the strongest motivation to a stay abroad of which nobody can tell the duration. Many migrants for instance stopped projecting a long term settlement and rather chose an intermittent circulation. Other ones opted for settlement and progressively lost contacts with home.

Migrants adapt to the juridical obstacles or facilitations: they benefit of them when and where it is possible, they circumvent the difficulty in a way or another. Migration governance has to take into account this adjustment-based social practice. The spatial order of the European social order can not ignore the complex realities of local dynamics involved in migration.
References

EXPLORING SOME EAST-WEST MIGRANT NETWORKS AND THEIR DISTANT LOCAL DYNAMICS. UKRAINIAN, POLISH AND ROMANIAN MIGRANTS IN ROME


ALBANIAN MIGRATION INTO GREECE: VARIOUS FORMS, DEGREES AND MECHANISMS OF (IN)EXCLUSION

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Introduction

Ever since the gradual disappearance of the communist regimes in the former 'Eastern Bloc' countries, western European countries have witnessed a sharp increase in immigration flows originating from this region. The Albanian case represents allegedly the most spectacular instance of East-West migration after the dismantling of the Iron Curtain which left us with images of thousands of Albanians crammed onto rusty, creaking buses arriving in the Greek towns of Epirus or swimming over to the Greek coastal areas. Ever since, the Albanian has been the main migrant group in Greece in terms of numbers.

My aim in this paper is twofold:

First, to examine the ways in which Albanians have been able to access employment and housing in Greece and to what extent they are excluded from some types of houses and jobs and confined to others; to what extent does access to housing confine them to ‘periphractic spaces’ (Psimmenos 2000), located within degraded, rejected parts of Athens and Corfu. I will thus analyse the processes through which the social, spatial and economic exclusion of Albanians in the host country takes place.

Second, to look at how Albanian migrants came to be stereotyped and constructed as a ‘classe dangereuse’, which is used to legitimise discriminatory behaviour against the ‘other’. Thus I will try to uncover a set of circumstances and mechanisms
through which Albanian migrants became the most stigmatised migrant group in Greece, persistently associated with criminal activities of many kinds ranging from violent murders, Mafia gangs and drug-smuggling to prostitution and petty theft. And I will show how even within the ‘Albanian migrants group’ a ‘hierarchy of whiteness’ has emerged, with some Albanians (those with Greek ancestral ties) being less racialised than others. In doing so, the paper takes a distance from the logic that Albanian migrants in Greece comprise a homogeneous entity, but also tries to avoid falling into the trap of dichotomic approaches.

Methods

The paper is based on preliminary analysis of findings of a study of Albanian migration into Southern Europe funded by the Leverhulme Trust\(^1\). During a two year period (2001-2003) 71 semi-structured interviews broadly employing a life-history approach were conducted in Greece with Albanian migrants (41 in Athens 19 with women and 22 with men, and 30 in Corfu 20 with men and 10 with women); in addition 69 interviews were conducted with migrants’ associations, anti-racist organizations, Non-Governamental Organization’s (NGO), government officials, employers and other key informants. Given the high level of suspicion amongst Albanian migrants interviewees, the snow balling technique was employed to approach them; here intermediaries were critical. Although the migrant population surveyed was unknown and hence not subjectable to a rigorous sampling frame, we tried to achieve an intuitive representativeness by interviewing people across age groups and socio-occupational backgrounds and keeping the male/female ratio in Corfu to approximately 2:1 ratio to

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\(^1\) The author would like to acknowledge the financial contribution of the Leverhulme Trust on this project (grant no. F/00230/D) and to thank the valuable contribution of Maria Koumandraki who worked as research assistant on this project.
reflect the gender balance of Albanian population in the island. Acknowledging the ability of Albanians to quickly learn Greek, the interviews were conducted in Greek.

(In)exclusion in the Greek labour market\textsuperscript{2} and housing sector

The concept of social exclusion is being increasingly applied in the study of social inequalities and disadvantage. Whereas the concept’s origins are found in the French social discourse, from the 1970s onwards the term has been popularised because of its use in EU social policies and programmes. There is no agreement on what social exclusion is. In the French Republican rhetoric, social exclusion is the ‘rupture of the social bond between the individual and society, referred to as social solidarity’ (Silver 1994:66). There are many bonds tying individuals to society (Yepez de Castillio 1994:615). In the French tradition, for some these ties refer to employment and its integrating capacity (ibid.), whereas others point to the rope of social and family relationships and welfare provision (Paugam 1991 cited in Martin 1996:386). According to Martin (1996:382) the “risk of social exclusion” results from two phenomena which combine and reinforce each other: first, the risk of being kept out of the labour market and of employment, and second, the risk of seeing one’s network of social relations and primary integration broken up because basic social links, of which the family is the most important, disintegrate’. In this section, following Martin’s definition of social exclusion, I will show how employment and access to a network of social relationships are the two important ties whose breaking increases the risk of exclusion. Having not access to an informal network of relationships can be proved a real handicap for Albanian migrants, as such network can provide the migrant with information which could facilitate access to employment

\textsuperscript{2} The employment section heavily draws on material from the paper ‘Albanian migration to Greece: (in)exclusion in the labour market’ co-authored with Maria Koumandraki which is forthcoming in the journal ‘European Societies’.
or housing, protection, support and mutual help. Three groups of migrants will be identified: those who have no contact with any networks of support, are unable to find a job and are in need of help; those who are at risk, fragile in economic terms, without access to social provisions or benefits; and those who after the regularisation have a relatively stable job, and access to social provision and benefits.

**(In)exclusion in the labour market**

The employment opportunities available to Albanians in Greece are largely shaped by existing socio-economic structures and especially the large informal economy where opportunities for participation of migrants in informal activities are found. Albanians are largely confined to the underground economy where working conditions and wages are well below the accepted national and European thresholds, despite the majority of them being skilled with some kind of technical or other qualifications. We find them employed in five main segments of the Greek labour market such as construction industry, agriculture, tourism and catering sectors, quasi-self-employment and in particular service sector including plumbing, decorating etc. We also find them in petty-trade, street-hawking, domestic work, and prostitution, and finally, miscellaneous casual services such as assistants to various technicians, security guards, petrol pump assistants, assistants in transportation and removal services etc. Most find employment via social and village networks with already established migrants.

There is a tendency for Albanians to accept lower rates of remuneration than other migrants because of the alleged ‘risk’ of employing an Albanian as opposed to a Pole or a Russian. This access to a skilled, flexible and relatively inexpensive labour
force enables marginal firms in Greece to survive. It seems that the ‘winners’ from Albanian migration into Greece are owners of capital and the losers the legal unskilled Greek workers who cannot afford to accept the low wages available due to the abundant supply of labour hands by needy migrants who attach more importance to earnings than to considerations of job status and prestige, and who are prepared to move and take up any job, irrespective of their qualifications and skills, as long as it pays.

The analysis of the work histories of the migrants interviewed, illustrate three areas of (in)exclusion in the housing and labour markets of Athens and Corfu:

- a) a high exclusion/high risk area;
- b) an area of relative exclusion/relative risk;
- c) an inclusion area.

These areas are not sealed tight spaces of (in)exclusion; migrants move in or out, especially in the high risk and relative risk areas. The line between high and relative risk areas is very thin and some people go in and out between the two areas. For example, many workers in the tourist industry may experience spells of employment without social insurance and benefits coverage.

(a) high exclusion/high risk area: workers in the informal economy

The high exclusion area is associated with high risk, vulnerability and lack of formal networks of support (eg: legal status, access to TU support or support from professional associations). Despite the fact that migrants in this group are not strictly speaking excluded from the Greek labour and housing markets, they are not ie: unemployed, or without a shelter, they are included in the parallel economy where there is a demand for cheap provision
of services and goods and as a result can afford cheap housing in the most run down areas of the greater Athens area. The main feature here is irregularity and informality, irrespective of one’s qualifications and skills. The absence of legal protection makes for a fierce exploitation of the migrant who is compelled to accept almost inhumane exploitative working conditions in order to survive. Highly vulnerable were the young and elderly migrants who with great difficulty find employment as gardeners or perform various chores, mostly on a part-time basis. Those between 18 and 50 are easily recruited in the domestic, agricultural and construction industries. In some cases they are employed to do one job, but are expected to perform a different one or harder tasks than their Greek counterparts. (eg: women hired as nurses find out that the work they are expected to do is housework).

Relationships with the employer vary. ‘it can be a little white, grey or black’ a man said. ‘it can be good, bad or just typical’, another added. The ‘just typical’ or ‘grey’ often includes cases of verbal assault at the workplace by employers and Greek colleagues, whereas the ‘bad’ or ‘black’ may entail refusal of payment of part of or the whole daily wage, or in the case of live-in domestic workers, refusal to return documents.

In addition sexual harassment by employers was reported. Another problem is dismissal without notice. As Abileka, a 56 years old Albanian living in Athens said:

‘I work for the first time repairing old machinery. It was a hard job, it was a job I knew little about. He kept me for three days and at the end of the third day he said ‘I will call you’, that is ‘I do not need you any longer’. He did not show me how to do the job properly. Then, I tried to assist a plumber, emptying a toiler, but he did not keep me either; he preferred to hire a younger person… Then in construction …This is how things are…’

[GABRIELLA LAZARIDIS]
People like Abileka are trapped in a cycle of disadvantage, a revolving door from unemployment to insecure work in the informal sector, back to unemployment.

(b) An area of relative exclusion/relative risk
This area encompasses unskilled jobs in the formal sector. After the first regularisation of 1997 (see Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky 1999), a large number of Albanians succeeded in getting more secure jobs with relatively good payment, and full or partial social insurance coverage. Spells of unemployment occur in this area too, especially in the agricultural and tourist sectors, where jobs are seasonal.

The majority of regularised migrants ask for same wages as their Greek counterparts, but so not always get them offered. In some cases the employer break the initial agreement and refuse to pay employers’ contributions towards social insurance or may refuse to pay the worker overtime for additional work performed. Some of the migrants we interviewed had become members of trade unions, but had no time to be actively involved.

In the area of relative risk we also find those migrants who engage in informal business activities. This can be seen as a survival strategy, a ‘poor person’s employment strategy’ to ensure inclusion in the host economy and relatively high earnings. These activities include people working as decorators, domestic workers, plumbers, gardeners, etc. The migrants offering these services may not be insured on a regular basis and some may rely on their spouse for insurance coverage. The case of Mirella, a 29 years old migrant woman living in Corfu, is a typical case in this category. She said:

“My husband works in the construction industry and I was hired as domestic worker by his employer, who was an old man. I cleaned the house thoroughly… I worked for him for 4 months,
for less than 7 Euro per day”. Then, the couple went to work for a subcontractor for 25 Euro per day. She explained:

I was carrying the bricks and the mud to the roof. Then she worked in a restaurant, in the kitchen. She explained that this was a luxury to her since her parents used to work in the fields in Albania. She was working 12 hours a day for 90,000 drs per month. In the winter months she worked as a baby sitter for 60,000 per month, then back to another restaurant as waitress this time because she spoke French. She explained how she then learnt English. Then she attended a seminar on computing. ‘In the mean time I learnt the word ‘ensima’ (meaning ‘insurance contributions stamps’) and started demanding those from the employer which meant that she was now entitled to claim unemployment benefits during the winter months. After a long break because of health problems of her son, she found work as a waitress in a hotel. As she explained the work there is 9 to 5 and the work conditions fine. ‘When I am there the boss leaves … I do everything, from cooking to serving the customers, to ordering supplies, to taking care of invoices; I speak fluently English now.

As this case demonstrates, migrants initially take on any job at any wage, but when alter on their opportunity cost increases they tend to become more selective. Some quickly learn new skills, the Greek language and move on to self-employment (see Lazaridis and Koumandraki 2003).

(c) An inclusion area
Jobs in this area are well paid, and include social insurance coverage and employees are entitled to fringe benefits. Migrant workers in this category are members of professional associations and trade unions; more often than not they receive the same payment as their Greek co-workers, are paid extra for extra hours of work and incidents of discrimination are rare. Most have qualifications and skills. They type of ’good’ jobs is mostly
found in Athens than in Corfu. There is a difference between ‘other’ Albanians and ‘ethnic-Greek-Albanians’ in that it is the latter in our sample who mainly found professional jobs as managers, doctors, dentists, journalists. Gianna, a 52 year old ethnic-Greek-Albanian who is a microbiologist, working in a private laboratory in Athens, said:

“As soon as I arrived [10 years ago] I found a job in my profession. I did not encounter any difficulties. I was lucky. I have all rights and benefits every worker in Greece is entitled to. I am very happy indeed, I respect everyone and they respect me.’

Some ‘other’ Albanians who were qualified dancers, teachers, writers, artists, did not attempt to find a job in par with their qualifications and experience, because, as they explained, they could earn more money by working in the relative risk area performing a less skilled job. They got ‘hooked’ in earning money, as they said.

Moreover, some ‘ethnic-Greek-Albanians’, after working as wage workers for some time, succeeded in setting up small businesses (coffee shops, food stores etc). This is the case of Petros, a 35 year old ‘ethnic-Greek-Albanian’ man who worked as a wage worker in the Corfiot tourist industry and now runs a tourist shop and boutique in a five star hotel.

In all there (in)exclusion areas, family and ethnic connections play a crucial role in organising the arrival of the new migrants, them finding jobs in the host country, the other alternative being clustering in public squares and waiting for prospective employers to stop by and recruit them.

_Spatial (In)Exclusion: Housing_

In both Athens and Chania there is not a spatial concentration of Albanians in one geographic area or district. Albanians are
scattered in different areas in both sites. In Athens, ‘other’ Albanians live mainly in inner-city areas with high criminality (Sepolia, Attikis square, Amerikis square, Kypseli, galatsi, Vironas, Filadelfia, Agios Nikolaos, Neos Kosmos); the west (such as Haidari, Aigaleo, Piraeus) and north-west of Athens (such as Agios Stefanos, Goidi, Ano Liosia, Nea Ionia). These areas are the most economic and affordable ones compared with the most expensive north, northeast and east. In Corfu, ‘other Albanians’ and ‘ethnic-Greek-Albanians’ reside in various areas in the town centre (such as Kofineta, Kambielo, Madouki, Spilia, Fifaretto) as well as outside the city in various agricultural and tourist areas such as Kassiopi, Kondokali, Potamos, Solari, etc. where they find seasonal employment. They tend to prefer to reside in areas where other co-ethnics live. Some live close to other relatives or friends, or other migrants but do not necessarily have close contact with them. ‘It is a case of just knowing that other foreigners live in the same neighbourhood or area’, an Albanian migrant in Corfu said.

When Albanians first arrived, they were renting rooms in hotels or stayed at the employers’ house. Living conditions in these hotels were bad. Some used to sleep in inner-city squares until they found accommodation. This residential pattern can be explained by the negative stereotypes attached to Albanians (see Iosifides 1997; Lazaridis and Romaniszyn 1998; Lazaridis and Wickens 1999; Lazaridis and Psimmenos 2000) and the reluctance of Greek property owners to let accommodation to them. As a landlord stated, ‘I fear that they won’t pay the bills’; another one added: ‘I won’t have in my house criminals’. Abileka, a 56 year old other Albanian man living in Athens said: ‘Well, I phoned up two or three times to make enquiries about a house I say in an ad. They asked me, ‘where are you from? Are you an Albanian? Sorry, but we do not rent our house to Albanians, we can’t.’ I may be a good tenant, maybe better than a Greek, but they don’t care’.
Rita a 38 year old Albanian woman living in Athens said: ‘although they were keen to rent, as soon as they heard I was Albanian they would say ‘call tomorrow’ and put the phone down’.

However, this image of the Albanian as the ‘the dangerous criminal’, ‘the polluter of the city’ has started gradually to change. As for example another interviewee, a 46 year old ‘ethnic-Greek Albanian’ man who lives in Corfu said: ‘Well, in the beginning people were afraid of the Albanians. But now, many Greek landlords are happy to have an Albanian tenant, because we pay the rent and other bills in time and look after the house too. My landlord comes to check the house once in a while and he is happy as I have decorated the house. I decorate the house once a year and I pay the rent on time. So everything is fine. But in the beginning, landlords were sceptical and scared of us’.

Basilis, a 48 year old ‘ethnic-Greek Albanian’ man explained why some landlords are still not keen to rent their property to Albanians, as follows: ‘Well the truth is … that some Albanians may rent a place but wouldn’t pay the rent. Some may be unemployed and cannot pay … some can vacate the property without paying rent for a few months and go back to Albania. Others did not pay the phone or water bills when they left. As a result, Greek landlords lost trust in them’.

However, some ‘ethnic-Greek Albanians found it easier to rent a place than the ‘other-Albanians’; Gianna a 52 year old ‘ethnic-Greek-Albanian’ who lives in Athens said: ‘we encountered difficulties; landlords were asking me ‘where do you come from?’ and when I replied ‘I am an ethnic-Greek-Albanian’, he would say ‘ooh, you are all Albanians; I am not renting the house to an Albanian; then, I asked the local priest to ring them; he told them ‘ do you know who she is? Her origins are Greek, she is one of us’. The landlord agreed to back off and let me have the flat’.

4 For an elaborate discussion of the differential treatment of ‘Ethnic Greek Albanians’ and ‘other Albanians’ see Lazaridis 1999.
So in order to bypass discrimination in the housing market, Albanians often rely on informal networks with Greeks or other relatives and friends to give a recommendation to the landlord or inform them of the availability of a house to rent in the area; some used a house rental office but only a small minority found a house by answering an advert. ‘I always rely on friend, thus the landlords know who I am and there were times when the friend who recommended me had to sign the contract on my behalf; for example, the house I live in at the moment belongs to my employers’ godmother’, said Lina a 27 year old ‘other Albanian’ woman.

Leonardo, a 26 year old ‘other Albanian’ who lives in Athens, added: ‘there is a general dislike of Albanians in Greece. It diminishes gradually though. Many Greeks have now bonds with Albanians since they work together. But there is a general negative attitude and racism. Till some years ago, none would rent us a place to live because we are Albanians. People were afraid … Things have changed gradually though’.

Ten years later after the initial influx of Albanians into Greece, the majority of Albanian interviewed rent old cheap accommodation, mostly basement or ground-floor flats shared between relatives, some with no central heating; Floretta a 27 year old ‘other Albanian woman who lives in Athens narrated: ‘I didn’t choose this house. We stayed in a one-bedroom flat, 6 people altogether in the beginning, we were staying together with my cousin’s family and we were sleeping on the floor. Our cousin moved out in another house and we stayed here. Our cousin introduced us to the landlord and guaranteed for us that we will look after the house and pay the rent on time’.

Only a few (8 cases) had purchased their dwelling. These were all ethnic-Greek Albanians. Differential legal status between ‘other Albanians’ and ‘ethnic-Greek-Albanians’ may explain this difference. ‘Ethnic-Greek-Albanians’ are granted a special
ID card which provides them with the same rights as Greek citizens regarding purchase of property. ‘Other Albanians’, unless regularised, have a migrant worker status which does not allow them to buy properties in their name. Also future migration plans often affect the decision to own a house or not. For example, ‘other Albanians’ who stated that they wish to return back to Albania one day, stated also that they save money to build a house in their country of origin. On the contrary, many ‘ethnic-Greek-Albanians’ are determined to live in Greece and have no plans to return; for them, the purchase of a dwelling in Greece is of paramount importance.

Racism/s as exclusionary mechanism/s

New racism is of particular importance in understanding the (in)exclusion of migrants in Greek labour market and housing sectors. New racism is ‘a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but “only” the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions’ (Balibar 1991:21). A main element of ‘new racism’ is the deracialisation of race ‘involving the displacement of an older racial vocabulary in public arenas, in which explicit references to race are now coded in the language of culture’ (Mac an Ghaill 1999:71). It employs not biological but cultural characteristics to justify and legitimise discrimination policies and exclusion of migrants. Recognising that ‘new racism’ is not new (Husband 1992:319; Brah, Hickman and Ghaill 1999; Rattansi 1994; Mason 1994; Balibar 1991; Wieviorka 1994), the term is useful here because it takes us beyond the black-white divide and can help us throw light into
the multi-dimensional character of the ‘cultural difference based’ non-colour racism experienced by white groups such as migrants from Albania in Greece and the problems they are faced with. Having said that, in the Albanian case one could also argue in favour of ‘Greek racisms’ in the sense that the dominant racist ideology affects differently different people and thus results in multiple outcomes. As shown below when looking at the subjective individual experiences of two groups within the Albanian migrants group, one can decipher the differentiated experiences of two sub-groups, ethnic-Greek-Albanians and ‘other Albanians’ within the Albanian ethnic minority community.

Irrespective of the area they live in or the area of exclusion one finds oneself in, our migrants had experienced racial harassment. Following Weviorka’s (1995) forms of racism, their ‘racist’ experiences refer to ‘prejudice’ and ‘discrimination’, and ‘violence’. Prejudice refers to a ‘reality more or less explicitly expressed in everyday speech or in the media and which is identifiable, if not quantifiable, with the aid of sampling and questionnaire techniques’ and discourse analysis (ibid:36-7). Prejudice in the Albanian case can be found in conversations and in the press. ‘Segregation’ ‘involves keeping the racialised group apart, setting aside designated spaces for it which it may only leave under certain conditions’. As shown in the section on housing above, although ‘periphractic spaces’ have started emerging, these are not the result of ‘ghettoisation’ of Albanian migrants. ‘Discrimination’ encompassed differential treatment of a group in various fields of social life … along lines which render it inferior’ (ibid). eg; differential treatment in the labour market. Also, ‘violent’ incidents were limited and mainly referred to police violence against illegal migrants during deportation. These forms are all apparent in the Albanian case, some more visible, more observable, more widespread, than others, and there is a great deal of overlapping between them.

[84]
A significant number of our respondents (27 out of 57 cases) did say that they experienced institutional and or everyday racisms. Furthermore, the vast majority of our interviewees stated that both themselves and members of their family and friends have not been victims of racist violence while staying in Greece. While incidents of overt and direct verbal abuse are nowadays rather rare, name-calling and everyday comments, especially discussions in public transport, seem to be the most common discriminatory experiences experienced by our interviewees.

Racialisation through the media seems to be having a major impact on constructing negative stereotypes of the Albanian migrant as being someone likely to cheat or steal, untrustworthy, rogue, thus being constructed as a source of trouble, a ‘classe dangereouse’ (Lazaridis and Wickens 1999:646; Lazaridis and Koumandraki 2001:288). Albanians are discriminated against on a number of grounds other than race, such as religion (most are Muslims), historico-political factors etc. Such images often have serious consequences in shaping racist attitudes and practices and in constructing racialised boundaries. ‘The demarcation line between belonging and not belonging can be described as a ‘muro di gomma’, a ‘rubber wall’ whose position is not static, but changes’ (Lazaridis and Koumandraki 2001:289) depending on the ‘interplay between different social divisions enacted within the context of historically produced economic, political and cultural relations’ (Anthias 1990:24).

**Institutional racism**

**Educational institutions**

Access to primary, secondary schools and universities is permitted to all Albanians irrespective of their parents’ legal status. The vast majority of our interviewees did not encounter any problems
in registering their children at schools, with the exception of one case where the necessary documents were not ready. Some cases of discrimination are recorded in schools such as differential treatment from teachers or students. A famous case here is the repeated incident of denying Albanian pupils who hold the best marks the right to hold the Greek flag in school parades during national historical war remembrance days as tradition beholds.

State agencies
Negative experiences with Greek state agencies refer to state employees who do not pay much attention to migrants, or are unwilling to serve, that is ignore them, or insult them verbally (this includes name calling).

Discrimination ranged from incidents where state employees did not pay attention to them to being insulted and verbally abused. The majority of our interviewees encountered difficulties in dealing with various state agencies (e.g., social insurance funds, tax office, health centres, the police etc) they had to approach during the regularisation process in order to obtain the legal documents that were required. Access to welfare and health organisations is legal status contingent. They can have access to health services provided that they have social insurance coverage. Illegal migrants are accepted by Greek hospitals for emergency treatment.

Police
Some of our interviewees complained about police behaviour during checks of documents in the borders or in the streets and public transport. Police officers were not polite; there seems to be a differential treatment of Albanians in that ‘ethnic-Greek-Albanians’ receive better treatment than ‘other’ Albanians.
Police attitude is harsh against migrants; six of our interviewees reported that either themselves or a relative or friend has been a victim of physical violence by police officers at the Greek-Albanian borders while attempting an illegal entry into Greece or during the deportation process.

*Everyday racism*

Everyday racism refers to systematic, repetitive and familiar practices of racism (these encompass both state orchestrated ones and practices operating at the micro-level such as streets, buses, etc), which have been socialised in people’s attitudes and behaviour and could be generalised.

Essed (1990) argues that the dichotomy between individual and institutional racism is sterile and fails to provide an adequate and sufficient explanation on how racism is being produced and reproduced in a given society. Therefore, one should take into account both the impact of macro-structural and cultural and micro factors (daily experiences of the individuals under study- permeation of racism into the routine practices of everyday life) There is ‘mutual interdependence of macro and micro dimensions of racism. From a macro point of view, racism is a system of structural inequalities and a historical process, both created and recreated through routine practices. System means reproduced social relations between individuals and groups organised as regular social practices. From a micro-point of view, specific practices, whether their consequences are intentional or unintentional, can be evaluated in terms of racism only when they are consistent with (our knowledge of) existing macro-structures of racial inequality in the system. In other words, structures of racism do not exist external to agents- they are made by agents- but specific practices are by definition racist only
when they activate existing structural racial inequality in the system’ (Essed 1990: 39).

She introduces the concept of ‘everyday racism’; this refers to both structural forces of racism as well as routine situations in everyday life; the key features of everyday racism in the case of Albanian migrants are, as follows:

• racist practices against Albanians are embodied in daily routines, practices, such as informal conversation with colleagues, discussions with the employer, when using public transportation, going shopping, eating in a restaurant, etc;
• racist acts are often recurrent, having a cumulative effect;
• racist practices are often considered normal by the dominant group; for example, many Greek landlords considered it normal not to let dwelling to Albanian migrants;
• everyday racism is heterogeneous – is reflected in different types of experiences – but also unified because these practices are repetitive (Essed 1990: 288).

Conclusion

This paper highlighted differences (wherever possible and however subtle these may be) between the experiences of stigmatisation and social (in) exclusion of the ‘other’ Albanians as opposed to Ethnic-Greek-Albanians (that is those who come to Greece from Northern Epirus, a part of Albania once part of the Greek territory, and have Greek ancestral ties) in the Greek labour and housing markets. It shows the interdependence of various forms of exclusion, how these intersect and feed one another and their potential cumulative effect on individuals; for example exclusion from political rights deprive one from any chance to improve their legal status and
in turn their employment and housing conditions; stigmatisation and racialisation are important exclusionary processes; exclusion from employment may lead to exclusion from livelihood (poverty). It had a differential impact on the people we interviewed because it intersects with other social divisions such as ethnicity and gender. However, migrants must not be viewed as passive victims of exclusionary processes, but also, as dynamic actors who can fight and secure ‘spaces of control’.

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Introduction

The geography of the migratory flows to Portugal, in what regards both the immigrants' countries of origin and the geographic pattern of their settlement in the country, underwent some major changes in the late 1990s.

Alongside an increase in the diversity of the areas of origin, a significant migratory wave emerged originating in Eastern Europe, particularly in Russia, Romania, Moldova and the Ukraine.

A novel aspect that was brought forth by the new Eastern European immigration was an increase in the average educational levels and professional skills – these immigrants often have intermediate technical skills, and many have university degrees. Moreover, the patterns of both their territorial settlement and their incorporation in the labour market are substantially more diverse and complex than those of the African and Asian immigrants.

In what regards their areas of settlement, these immigrants can be found all over the country, following the employment opportunities available in each region, despite the fact that a considerable share has decided to settle in the Lisbon area.
It is worth stressing that even though the levels of education and training of these immigrants are relatively high, the truth is that, just like the Africans, most of them perform underpaid, low-status tasks, such as working in construction (men) or domestic cleaning and services (women). Nevertheless, a significant percentage works in agriculture, particularly in the Alentejo, Ribatejo and Oeste regions, and in some labour-intensive industrial activities, particularly in the Northern and Central Littoral regions (Fonseca and Malheiros, 2003).

The emergence of this new migratory wave from Eastern Europe has also represented a turning point with regard to the traditional migratory processes that were typical of Portuguese in-migration. Migratory strategies based on social networks of friends and relatives, which were characteristic of the migratory flows originating in the Portuguese-Speaking African Countries (PALOPs), have gradually been replaced by an organised system of illegal human trafficking networks.

All these changes have been a result of some very significant transformations in Portugal’s economic and political place in the world system, as well as of the demographic and economic performance of the various Portuguese regions. On the other hand, since these new migrants are typically characterised by high educational levels and professional skills, they may constitute a potential opportunity for the incorporation of new factors of economic growth which may well contribute to the demographic and economic revitalization of the destination areas, as long as they are put to good use (Fonseca and Malheiros, 2003, pp.164).

In this paper, we present the draft conclusions of the research carried out in Central Alentejo – an aged, pronouncedly rural region in which immigrants are gradually replacing the
autochthonous labour force, not only in construction and public works, but also in agriculture and, to a lesser extent, in the restaurants and hotels sector.

This paper is organised in three sections. In the first one, the main aspects of the recent changes in the geography of migratory inflows to Portugal are briefly presented, seeking to set the recent wave of Eastern European migration to the Évora region against its proper context. The second section presents the main findings of a survey that included 518 Eastern European citizens that have settled in this area, and which has sought both to identify the causes behind their decision to migrate and to characterise these immigrants in what regards their migratory process, legal status, demographic profile, educational levels, professional skills, incorporation in the local labour market, intentions for future mobility and relationship to the country of origin.

Finally, drawing on the findings of this case-study, we reflect upon the opportunities (and risks) for regional development resulting from this migratory wave.

The new geography of Portuguese immigration

The recent emergence of a new migratory wave from Eastern Europe marks the beginning of a new phase in Portugal’s short history as an immigration country. Table 1 provides a clear illustration of this change from a characteristically post-colonial cycle, in which PALOP citizens predominated (77,600 in late 1997, or 60.1% of the non-EU foreigners holding residence permits), to a situation in which these latter nationalities have been consistently decreasing in share (117,003 in late 2001, or 40.5% of the non-EU foreigners holding residence or permanence permits).
Table 1  Number of documented foreigners (main regions of origin), 1997-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>175,263</td>
<td>223,976</td>
<td>126,901</td>
<td>350,877</td>
<td>100.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>46,043</td>
<td>61,732</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>61,732</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU</td>
<td>29,220</td>
<td>162,244</td>
<td>126,901</td>
<td>289,145</td>
<td>123.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALOP countries</td>
<td>77,600</td>
<td>101,379</td>
<td>15,624</td>
<td>117,003</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>19,990</td>
<td>23,439</td>
<td>23,713</td>
<td>47,152</td>
<td>135.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>31,630</td>
<td>37,426</td>
<td>87,564</td>
<td>124,990</td>
<td>295.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INE – 2001 Demographic Statistics; Foreigners and Borders Office (calculations by the authors)

The distribution by nationalities of the permanence permits granted in 2001 and 2002 (under the extraordinary campaigns that aimed at the regularisation of the undocumented immigrants working in Portugal) illustrates the sheer size of the migratory inflows from Eastern Europe, particularly from the Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Russia: the citizens of these four countries accounted for 52% of all the permanence permits granted in 2001/2002 (see Figure 1).

Among the immigrants from Portuguese-speaking countries, there has been a very significant increase in the number of Brazilian labour migrants, so much so that this particular community ranked second in terms of the number of permanence permits granted by the Portuguese authorities in 2001 and 2002 (see Figure 1).

On the other hand, an increasingly diverse variety of countries is now being subject to the international recruitment of their labour force to come and work in Portugal, as is manifest in the growth of some Asian (China, India and Pakistan) and Northern African (especially Morocco) communities, which took place as migration to Spain became more and more difficult.
In what regards the patterns of regional settlement, the main novelty brought about by this recent migratory wave has consisted in their greater dispersal throughout the Portuguese territory, following the employment opportunities available in each region. Figure 2 – in which the stock of foreigners residing in Portugal in late 2001 (as represented by the number of individuals holding residence permits at that time) and the percentage of permanence permits granted in 2001, under Decree-Law no. 4/2001 of January 10th, 2001, are both mapped by districts – is in that sense quite telling. This Figure clearly shows a decrease in concentration in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area and a relative increase in the share of all the other districts, especially in the cases of the Oporto Metropolitan Area, Braga, Aveiro, Viseu, Coimbra, Leiria, Santarém and Évora. This pattern is closely associated with the employment opportunities that were created as a result both of large investments in the public works sector (Oporto – Cultural Capital of Europe 2001; construction of sports infrastructure for the 2004 European Football...
Championship; highways; the Alqueva Dam; etc.) and of the demand for workers in some labour-intensive industries, such as the textile, footwear and clothing industries, or even agriculture, in the case of some regions in which the autochthonous labour supply is clearly insufficient due to the level of ageing of the local population and to the displacement of the younger labour force to better-paid, higher-status jobs or to other regions in the country or abroad.

A more disaggregated analysis of the areas of origin and patterns of settlement in mainland Portugal of the non-EU foreigners holding valid work contracts in 2001 indicates that Eastern European immigrants are much less concentrated in the Lisbon Region than the Brazilians and, especially, the PALOP citizens (Table 2).

Table 2  Foreign citizens holding valid work contracts (eligible for permanence permits), by area of origin and region of settlement in mainland Portugal (NUT II), (31/12/2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region Resid.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Eastern Europe*</th>
<th>PALOP**</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Portugal</td>
<td>24005</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15016</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Portugal</td>
<td>19468</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13804</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon and Tagus Valley</td>
<td>71254</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>28434</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alentejo Region</td>
<td>8056</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4332</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algarve Region</td>
<td>18853</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12824</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>141 636</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>74 410</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Only includes the four most numerous nationalities: the Ukrainians, Moldovans, Romanians and Russians.
Notes: ** Only includes the three most numerous nationalities: Capeverdians, Angolans and Guineans.

With regard to their incorporation in the labour market, despite the fact that the majority works in the construction sector, the relatively high proportion of Eastern Europeans working in agriculture and in the manufacturing industry (two
sectors in which there are hardly any Brazilian or African workers) is especially worthy of mention (Table 3).

**Figure 2** Geographical distribution of the foreigners holding residence permits by December 31st, 2001 and of those to whom permanence permits were granted in 2001

Source: Foreigners and Borders Office (calculations by the authors).
### Table 3  Work contracts entered into with foreigners holding permanence permits, by activity sector and country of origin (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAE (activity sector)</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Cape Verde</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries and Agriculture</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extractive Industry</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Industry</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water, Gas and Electricity</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants &amp; Hotel</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As compared to the citizens of the PALOP countries, Eastern European immigrants are under-represented in the “services” and “restaurants and hotels” sectors, possibly due to these being sectors in which most jobs are performed by women and in which mastery of the Portuguese language is an essential skill. The lesser weight of the Eastern Europeans in the service sector has to do with the language barrier, as well as with the fact that Eastern European in-migration is a recent, predominantly male migratory inflow.

At the regional level, the distribution by activity sectors of the non-EU foreign citizens to whom permanence permits were granted in 2001 reflects the differences between the productive structures of the various regions. Thus, in Alentejo, over one-
fifth is employed in agriculture; in the Northern region, nearly 20% works in the textiles, footwear and clothing industries; in Central Portugal and the Algarve region, the restaurants and hotels sector stands out; and in the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region, alongside construction (the main activity sector in terms of immigrant employment in all the regions), the commerce, restaurants and hotels and cleaning sectors employ the largest number of non-EU foreign citizens (Table 4).

Table 4 Work contracts entered into with non-EU foreign citizens holding permanence permits, by activity sectors and NUT II, 2001 (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity Sector</th>
<th>Northern Portugal</th>
<th>Central Portugal</th>
<th>Lisbon &amp; Tagus Valley</th>
<th>Alentejo</th>
<th>Algarve</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgy</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants &amp; Hotels</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Cleaning</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other industries</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fonseca and Malheiros, 2003, pp. 177.

Alongside the recruitment of foreign workers by sectors (such as agriculture and manufacturing) that, until very recently, relied solely on regional labour markets, the dispersal of this new migratory wave throughout the country provides a clear indication of the growing internationalisation of the labour markets, even in the peripheral regions, as the processes of economic globalisation
increase in width and depth and as differential demographic ageing proceeds. Within the context of this new Eastern European migratory wave to Portugal, the Alentejo region has a number of unique characteristics (as indicated by the increase in the foreign labour supply in the region, especially in the Évora district, or by the percentage of foreign workers in agriculture) that call for a closer look at the conditions that gave rise to this phenomenon and to its effects upon the development of the region. Therefore, we have conducted a survey that has included 518 Eastern European citizens who resided in the Central Alentejo by March-April 2003. In the following section of this paper, we present the main findings of this survey.

Eastern European Migration to Central Alentejo: origins, migratory processes and incorporation in the local labour markets

Central Alentejo in the Portuguese context

Central Alentejo has an area of 7,228 Km² (7.8% of the total area of mainland Portugal) and comprises 14 municipalities, in which 173,446 inhabitants resided by 2001 (1.8% of the total population of mainland Portugal).

Between 1991 and 2001, the region’s resident population experienced a slight increase (0.2%), thereby reversing the demographic downward trend that had begun in the 1960s. However, this population growth was largely imputable to the city, and municipality, of Évora. According to the latest population census, 32.5% of the region’s inhabitants live in this municipality. All other municipalities, except for Vendas Novas (which may have to do with this latter municipality’s greater proximity to Lisbon) have experienced a population decrease.
The city of Évora has reaffirmed its position as a supply centre for goods and services to the surrounding areas and its employment catchment area has expanded, drawing numerous workers that reside in nearby municipalities each day³.

The economic and demographic performance of the city of Évora – based on the development of public and private services (particularly those associated with culture and leisure, tourism and the university), along with an attempt to make the city a member of European city networks and a consistent territorial marketing strategy – has had a positive impact upon the international qualification and reputation of the wider region, thus reinforcing the identity ties between the region and its inhabitants (Gaspar, 1993).

Nevertheless, as mentioned before in this paper, the rest of the region had not, up until the 1990s, shown any signs of reversing the long-run trend towards demographic ageing and population decline that had begun in the late 1950s, the exceptions being Vendas Novas and Montemor-o-Novo.

The level of demographic ageing, the low average educational levels and professional skills and the gap between Central Alentejo’s per capita gross regional product and the country’s average provide a clear indication of the region’s relative disadvantage within the national and European contexts.

Between 1991 and 2001, the population aged 65 and older increased by less than in the whole of mainland Portugal (21.9% and 26.9%, respectively), but the number of under-15s experienced a sharper decrease than the mainland average: -20% as opposed to -15.7%. With regard to the levels of literacy in the region, the rate of illiteracy in Central Alentejo was as high as 14.8% in 2001, as compared to a national average of 9.0%. Likewise, by the year 2000, per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in the region amounted to 9,500 Euros, or 84% of the figure for the country as a whole.

³ On the subject of the expansion of Évora’s employment catchment area, see Alegria, 2002.
The Eastern European Migratory Wave to Central Alentejo

By late 1996, the number of foreign citizens holding Portuguese residence permits who resided in the Évora district was a mere 766, of which 416 were EU citizens, 201 PALOP citizens, 75 Brazilians and 13 citizens of non-EU European countries. Five years later, according to the Foreigners and Borders Office, the number of legal immigrants (holding either residence or permanence permits) who lived in the Évora district was 5.4 times as large: 4,160.

Table 5 Permanence permits granted to foreign citizens settled in the Évora district, 2001 and 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Permanence permits 2001</th>
<th>Permanence permits 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and former USSR</td>
<td>1,964</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Foreigners and Borders Office (calculations by the authors)*

Along with the substantial growth in the number of immigrants – which followed the general trend of the country – there have also been some significant changes in the geographical origins of these new flows. Out of 3,099 permanence permits granted in 2001 to foreign citizens residing in the Évora
district, 63.4% (1,964) were given to Eastern European and former-USSR citizens. In particular, 1,199 were granted to Ukrainian citizens. In 2002, the Eastern Europeans further reinforced their relative weight in the total number of permanence permit recipients: 66.1% (521 out of 788) of all the permanence permits granted to foreign workers living in the Évora district.

A closer look at the distribution of these immigrants by nationalities shows that, lagging behind the Ukrainians, the Moldovans, Romanians and Russians also have a significant presence (Table 5).

Legal status, demographic and socio-economic profile, migratory processes and reasons behind the decision to migrate

As mentioned before, with the aim of furthering our knowledge of the recent migratory inflow to the Évora region, we have conducted a survey that has included 518 immigrants, aged 16 and older, who lived in the Central Alentejo region by March-April 2003.

Following an analysis of the available statistical data (Foreigners and Borders Office and 2001 Population Census), a series of exploratory contacts were made with privileged local informants, which allowed us to get acquainted with a number of immigrants whose mastery of the Portuguese language would allow them to act as mediators in the survey process. Considering that it would be impossible to include in the survey, in representative fashion, all the Eastern European nationalities represented in the region, we have opted to deliberately privilege the three most numerous ones – the Ukrainians, the Romanians and the Moldovans –, while carrying out a number of questionnaires that would allow for comparative analyses of the various national groups (Table 6).
Table 6  Distribution of the questionnaire’s respondents by nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of valid questionnaires</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No nationality indicated</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall total</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of this survey indicate that this is a largely male population (66%), either married or joined in a *de facto* union (80%) and predominantly in the 25-49 age group (Figure 3).

Figure 3  Age structure of the survey sample

This is clearly a very recent migratory flow, as can be seen in the fact that only 6.6% entered the country before 2000 and just
over half arrived in Portugal in 2001. After that, possibly due to greater difficulties in obtaining permits and to scarcer employment opportunities, the flow of Eastern European workers to this region (and to the rest of the country) declined abruptly (Figure 4).

Most of these immigrants entered Portugal holding short-term visas, since 70% admitted to having immigrated illegally. As a consequence of that, even though many have taken advantage of the opportunity for regularisation created by Law no. 4/2001 of January 10th, only 79.8% of the survey sample fulfilled all legal requirements. A closer look at the results of this particular part of the questionnaire shows that the percentage of immigrants in an illegal situation is not unrelated to factors such as gender, nationality and the activity sector in which the person is employed.

**Figure 4** Distribution of the survey sample by year of arrival in Portugal

The relative frequency of undocumented women is much greater than that of the men (Figure 5). The Ukrainians and the Russians are the national groups in which the percentage of legal immigrants is the largest, reaching around 90%. In the case of the Moldovans

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4 75.1% indicated that they had regularised their legal status in the year 2001, even though only 56.4% claimed to have entered the country in that year.
and, especially, the Romanians, the percentage of undocumented workers is considerably higher: 20% and 40%, respectively. Finally, it is interesting to see that the cleaning services, construction and agriculture sectors employ the most illegal workers (between 18% and 22%), while the manufacturing industry employs the least (6.8%).

**Figure 5** Legal status by gender

![Legal status by gender](image)

Even though their average educational levels are much higher than those of the autochthonous population (17.8% are university graduates and 46.7% have at least finished high school), Eastern Europeans immigrants typically perform underpaid, low-status, low-skilled tasks (Figures 6 and 7). The construction sector employs the largest share of these immigrants: around 40% of all the workers interviewed. Agriculture employs nearly one quarter of the region’s Eastern European workers, despite it being an activity sector which rarely relied on foreign labour. Industrial and domestic cleaning accounts for 15.2% of the total and ranks first among the women included in the survey.
The wages that they earn in Portugal are quite low, even though 39.5% claim to work more than eight hours per day. More than
half earn monthly wages under 500 Euros and only 2% claim to earn more than 1,000 Euros per month. Still, the majority of the workers interviewed maintained that their wages back home would be much lower than the ones that they earn here in Portugal.

The precarious working conditions of these immigrants are also manifest in the fact that nearly 1/3 (31%) has no work contract and almost 1/4 do not have a social security registration number. Moreover, 37.8% argue that they are subject to discrimination by their employers and feel that they are treated worse than their fellow Portuguese workers that perform the same tasks. Allegedly, their wages are lower, they perform heavier and more dangerous tasks, work longer hours and have less rights than the Portuguese. Still, 66.3% say that they enjoy working in Portugal.

It is interesting to see that 86.6% of the survey sample came directly to Portugal and chose this particular destination due to there being good chances of finding work (46.1%) and to the likelihood of being paid good wages (12%). The pre-existence of friends and relatives was indicated as the main reason by 34.2%.

These findings clearly show the economic nature of these migratory flows, while at the same time highlighting the importance of interpersonal networks and family reunification processes upon the formation of migratory chains between a given origin and destination. However, we should stress that there are substantial differences between the early stages of this Eastern European migratory wave and those of the African migration in the past. 13.3% of the survey sample claim to have entered the country within especially organised groups and one out of five indicates that he/she has paid someone in order to obtain the necessary documents and permits. We are therefore in the presence of migratory flows that are organised by illegal networks dedicated to the international recruitment of labour, which ensure the supply of foreign workers to labour-intensive, low-wage, highly informal sectors and industries, whose needs are not fully met by the local and national labour markets.
Hence, as the process of economic globalisation continues to proceed apace, the immigration of foreign workers reaches deeper and deeper into the entire national territory, even into those peripheral, pronouncedly aged regions that are undergoing demographic decline, in which immigration acts as a substitute for the regional labour force.

Incorporation into the labour market being a *sine qua non* condition for the success of any migrant worker’s migration project, we have sought to identify the main difficulties faced by these immigrants when they tried to find a job. As might be expected, the “illegal” status and the lack of understanding of the Portuguese language were the factors that were more often indicated as the greatest barriers to labour market incorporation. Discrimination (due to being a foreigner) and difficulties in terms of skills recognition were also mentioned, albeit by a smaller number, as factors that have a negative effect upon the likelihood of finding a job (see Figure 8).

**Figure 8** Main barrier to finding a job in Portugal
As mentioned before, the migratory process of these Eastern European migrants is often associated with illegal networks that organise their coming to Portugal and, on occasions, even establish contacts with prospective employers. Therefore, it is not surprising that 30% of the immigrants interviewed claim that they did not receive any assistance whatsoever upon arriving in Portugal. However, as these communities grow in number, the informal solidarity networks made up of friends and relatives who migrated earlier on play an increasingly important role in the process of integration into the host society. Confirming this idea is the fact that among those who claim to have received some assistance, the indicated source of that assistance is virtually always the family (33%) or friends (63%).

Informal solidarity mechanisms are particularly important in rural settings and small cities, due to the high density of the social and neighbourhood relationships in these contexts – as opposed to the anonymity and interpersonal distance of the large urban areas.

With respect to this particular aspect, it is especially interesting to have a look at the way in which these Eastern European immigrants working in Central Alentejo came to choose their place of residence: 65.8% were helped by Portuguese or Eastern European friends and 23.5% by their boss. Of the remaining 11.2%, 4.1% relied on real estate agencies, 1% answered newspaper ads, 1.4% were helped by the Social Security office and 4.3% used some other means.

**Intentions for future mobility and relationship to country of origin**

To the question of whether they intended to remain in the country, most Eastern European immigrants interviewed (62%) claimed
that they intended to stay for less than 5 years. 9.5% are planning to stay for 10 years or more and only 16.5% are thinking of settling for the rest of their lives (see Figure 9). However, this latter option seems to depend, to a great extent, upon the economic environment in the country, their prospects of professional mobility (on to activities that are more suited to their educational and professional skills) and the possibility of family reunification (since this population is mainly made up of married men whose families remained in the country of origin).

Figure 9  Duration of intended stay in Portugal

The relationship with the country of origin and the intentions of family reunification are two other important indicators of the intention to settle in the country on a permanent basis. 79% of the immigrants interviewed regularly send home some of their income. Most claim that this money is intended to help their families with their daily expenses (food, education of their children,…), which provides a clear indication of the
economic hardship endured in their countries of origin. Only 5.4% indicated the accumulation of savings (4.6%) and investment in some business (0.8%) as the reasons for sending remittances to their country of origin. 12.6% of the immigrants interviewed claimed that they send remittances with the intention of buying their own house (see Figure 10).

Figure 10  Reasons for sending remittances

Even though only 16.5% consider the possibility of settling in Portugal on a permanent basis, 27% maintained that they would like their families to come and join them in this country. Moreover, many reported that they would not return to their homeland unless there was a significant improvement in the wages and living conditions there.

This apparent contradiction may indicate that some of those that are thinking of staying in Portugal for a relatively short
period of time may in fact be planning to move on to another country, instead of either staying in Portugal or returning to their country of origin.

Immigration and regional development: opportunities and risks

The effects of the international migration of workers upon the wage and unemployment levels and the rate of economic growth of the destination regions are hard to assess. Migration is much more than a simple mechanism for equalising growth differentials between sending and receiving regions, as neoclassical economic theory would suggest (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993; Holland, 1976; Polèse, 1994; Aydalot, 1985).

The available empirical evidence has shown that immigration is a positive contribution to growth, providing a solution to labour market bottlenecks during the process of economic growth and helping to create more jobs. Moreover, emigration being a selective process (emigrants being usually drawn from amongst the most dynamic, entrepreneurial and educated young members of society), the result for the host society is that the immigrated population usually has very high labour market participation rates and, consequently, lower social reproduction costs than is the case for the autochthonous population.

Immigrants also play a very important role in the process of internationalisation of the cities and regions in which they settle, by fostering the development of economic, social and cultural ties between the areas of origin and all the other territories in which people from the same ethnic or national background are present. Furthermore, they often create new business opportunities, promote international trade and tourism and contribute directly
and indirectly to the creation of jobs, by way of ethnic entrepreneurship and the expansion in aggregated demand\(^5\).

Nevertheless, the idea that immigration has a negative impact upon the employment and wage levels of the national workers has become strongly entrenched (Thalhammer \textit{et al.}, 2001; Lages and Policarpo, 2003). However, a recent report by the European Commission has shown that as a result of the segmentation of the regional labour markets, there is no significant correlation between immigration and unemployment: the various different segments of the supply side of the labour market do not compete amongst each other. Hence, immigrant workers are largely concentrated in underpaid, unsafe, low-status jobs and industries and in fact fill the positions left vacant by the upward social and professional mobility of the autochthonous workers. Even at times of rising unemployment, the expectations of social and professional mobility and the rise in the average educational levels of the European population result in the rejection of those professions in which wages and social status are lower (Ferreira; Rato, 2000)\(^6\).

Alongside its economic relevance, immigration into the European Union also has a very important demographic dimension to it, as the European population continues to experience very significant demographic ageing as a consequence of the increase in life expectancy at birth and of the drop in fertility to levels that are well below what it would take to ensure generational replacement.

The increasing awareness of the impact of demographic ageing upon the dependency rate and the risk of population decline has translated into renewed scientific and political interest in the concept of “replacement migration”.

In the year 2000, the United Nations published a report in which immigration was presented as a solution to demographic ageing and decline (United Nations, 2000). The expression

\(^5\) On the subject of the role played by the immigrants in the process of secondary internationalisation of the cities, see Malheiros (2001).

\(^6\) Wages play a very important role in this respect, effectively providing an explanation for the seemingly paradoxical persistent emigration of Portuguese workers to Germany, Switzerland, France, Germany, etc. to work in construction, hotels and restaurants, industrial and domestic cleaning and even agriculture, precisely as Portugal “imports” immigrants to work in those very sectors (Fonseca, 2001; Baganha and Peixoto, 1997).
“replacement migration” was thus coined, meaning the level of international in-migration that it would take for the total population and the population inside the working age to remain at their present levels and to curb demographic ageing.

In the Portuguese case, according to calculations by Abreu (2003), if the present birth and death rates persist at their current levels, in a zero-migration scenario, the country would have 970,000 less inhabitants in 2030 as compared to 2001, i.e., -16%.

These authors suggest that it is extremely unlikely that migratory flows of such magnitude will take place, which leads us to conclude that if the present fertility rates remain unchanged, the societies in which the dynamics of natural growth are either negative or very low will inevitably experience considerable demographic ageing.

Several authors argue that immigration is not a lasting solution to age structure problems, nor to its effects in terms of labour shortages and upon the sustainability of social security schemes (Coleman, 2002; Valente Rosa, 2003; Fonseca, 2003). Thus, even though immigration has an immediate impact upon the working-age population, it is not a long-term solution to demographic ageing, because immigrants grow old as well and need to be replaced. Moreover, despite an OECD report (Coppel; Dumont and Visco, 2001) that indicates that immigrant women give birth to more children than autochthonous ones, the fact of the matter is that these fertility rates tend to converge over time. To sum up, there is no single political solution that can solve this problem all by itself.

If we look at the history of migration in the Alentejo region, the direct relationship between periods of population in-flow and out-flow and times of economic boom and recession is clearly visible: that was the case during the cereal campaigns of the late 19th Century, as well as in the 1930s and 1940s.
Regrettably, the wealth created in times of economic boom was never adequately used to create the bases for sustainable regional development – built on a diversified regional economic base, skilled labour and the improvement of the livelihood of the region’s population. Consequently, agricultural crises have always translated into the exodus of the region’s younger, more dynamic and more ambitious inhabitants.

Under the light of past experience, Central Alentejo’s recent position as a destination area for international labour migration seems to announce a new period of economic expansion and wealth. But will they stay? Or will history repeat itself, by letting the region’s greatest wealth – its people – flee once again?

69.3% of the immigrants interviewed in our survey said that they had no intention of migrating to another country and, out of those who intended to stay, eight out of ten claimed that they intended to stay in the Alentejo. However, it is hardly surprising to anyone that their permanent settlement in the area will in the end depend upon their prospects of employment and upward professional mobility and upon their own entrepreneurial spirit. The possibility of family reunification and the way in which the local population and institutions welcome these immigrants will also play a decisive part in their decision to leave or stay.

A country that favours the integration and inclusion of its immigrants creates an environment that is conducive to the development of the regions in which they settle. Alongside the immediate advantages in terms of the demographic revitalisation of the region and the country, a series of potential economic benefits stand to be gained from migration, provided that adequate measures are taken in four key areas: the recognition of professional skills and educational levels; incentives to self-employment; incentives to start-up businesses; and incentives to permanent settlement, e.g. by way of promoting family...
reunification, particularly in the regions experiencing serious demographic decline.

Not only do these new residents create new economic and demographic opportunities for depressed regions, they also have the advantage of not requiring further investment in housing, infrastructure and other facilities, since the ones already in place are usually being under-used. However, one should bear in mind that illegal immigration can also render the economic restructuring of certain regions particularly difficult, by allowing the least competitive businesses to survive by exploiting the undocumented immigrants, thereby removing the incentives to changing the traditional economic structure. It is therefore essential to adopt flexible control instruments, in order to tackle human trafficking and the hiring and exploitation of illegal immigrants.

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NEW WAVES: MIGRATION FROM EASTERN TO SOUTHERN EUROPE

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Lisbon, 2004