

FUNDAÇÃO
LUSO-AMERICANA

ESTRATÉGIA E SEGURANÇA NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL



Manuela Franco
COORDENADORA

Lisboa, Julho de 2007

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ESTRATÉGIA E SEGURANÇA NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL

Manuela Franco

Coordenadora da Conferência

Os problemas políticos e de segurança em África voltaram a ter uma relevância estratégica na política internacional. Uma parte importante das situações de tensão com risco de guerra encontra-se em África. Há numerosos Estados em situação de fragilidade ou colapso institucional. A combinação de guerras com toda a série de carências, sobretudo de sistemas capazes de servir ou proteger as populações, a produção de deslocados, refugiados e massas migratórias é a manifestação de uma situação complexa que justifica uma crescente preocupação sobre a futura segurança do continente.

A África Austral, desde o fim da Guerra Fria, consolidou uma posição autónoma como uma região estratégica, onde os equilíbrios e as relações de segurança se definem, por um lado, pela interacção entre os Estados regionais – a África do Sul, Namíbia, Angola, Zimbabué, Botswana, Tanzânia e Moçambique – e, por outro lado, por uma crescente intervenção das grandes

STRATEGY AND SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Manuela Franco

Conference Coordinator

African political and security problems reacquired strategic relevance in international politics. Africa is home to the highest count of tense, volatile, war-risk situations. A number of states find themselves in a situation of institutional fragility or collapse. The combination of such factors as tension, serious shortages and abundance of systems unable to serve or protect the populations generate people's displacement, refugees and mass migration. These manifestations of a complex situation give cause to rather pessimistic analyses of the continent's future.

Southern Africa has, since the end of the Cold War, consolidated an autonomous position as a strategic region where equilibriums and security relations are defined, on the one hand, by the interaction between regional states – South Africa, Namibia, Angola, DRC, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique – and, on the other hand, by a growing Great

potências internacionais, nomeadamente os Estados Unidos e a China.

Uma vez terminado um longo ciclo de guerras civis e a transição post-apartheid, estão agora em causa o jogo dos equilíbrios entre os Estados regionais que determinam as condições de estabilidade política e estratégica na África Austral, bem como o peso relativo das potências externas, cuja competição regional é em parte motivada pela necessidade de garantir o controlo de recursos energéticos escassos.

A competição externa em África envolve, designadamente, os Estados Unidos, as antigas potências coloniais europeias e as novas grandes potências, como a China e a Índia. A pluralidade e a rivalidade entre as potências externas tende a ser vista por muitos países africanos como benéfica. A China, nomeadamente, pode configurar-se como um protector alternativo, sobretudo no caso dos regimes autoritários africanos que se sentem mais ameaçados pelas estratégias ocidentais de democratização. Por contraposição ao “Consenso de Washington”, nota-se uma crescente popularidade do “Consenso de Pequim”, que traduz uma proposta de aliança política assente na regra de não interferência nos respectivos assuntos internos dos

Power involvement, namely, the USA and China.

Once past the long cycle of civil wars and the post-apartheid transition, what is now at stake is how balancing amongst Southern African states will impact the region’s political and strategic stability, as well as the relative weight of the external powers whose regional competition is largely determined by the need to secure control of scarce energy resources.

External competition in Africa engages the USA, the former European colonial powers and mainly China and India as the great powers-to-be. Such plurality and perceived rivalries amongst powers tend to be viewed as beneficial by many African countries. China, in particular, may be pictured as an alternative protector, above all by authoritarian African regimes feeling most threatened by Western strategies of democratization. Countering “the Washington Consensus” we now hear of the growing popularity of the so-called “Beijing Consensus” which translates into a proposal of political alliance seemingly built on the observance of the rule of non-interference in internal affairs of States, including despotic ones.

With the growing instability in the Middle East, the US have been reviewing

Estados soberanos, incluindo os regimes despóticos. Paralelamente, com o aumento da instabilidade no Médio Oriente, os Estados Unidos mostram um interesse maior por África, que não se limita ao controlo dos recursos energéticos e pode incluir a procura de alianças estáveis em regiões cruciais, como a África Austral. Por sua vez, as antigas potências coloniais tendem a transferir uma parte das suas preocupações para o âmbito assistencial da ajuda humanitária promovida pela União Europeia e têm limitado a capacidade da acção política europeia em África. No entanto, os países europeus e os Estados Unidos partilham uma visão de longo prazo sobre interesses mútuos e comuns na resposta aos desafios da estabilidade em África.

Portugal tem defendido que a OTAN e a UE são parceiros indissociáveis para a projecção de segurança indispensável para a estabilidade dos Estados democráticos, bem como na formação das parcerias de combate às organizações terroristas internacionais, ao narcotráfico, à criminalidade organizada, à modernização das Forças Armadas, e à promoção de uma verdadeira cultura de prevenção dos conflitos, incluindo esforços para a consolidação de capacidades militares regionais de resposta

and stepping up its interests in Africa. These interests are being ever more clearly expressed as going beyond the need for control of strategic resources and may include the search for stable alliances in crucial regions, such as Southern Africa. On their side of the equation, the former European colonial powers tend to transfer part of their African concerns to the assistential field of ODA and humanitarian aid promoted by the EU, thus limiting Europe's capacity for dynamic political action in Africa.

However, the European countries and the USA do share a long-term vision on their mutual and common interests and on their efforts to handle the stability challenges in Africa.

Portugal has maintained that NATO and the EU are natural partners for the projection of security and a favorable atmosphere for both the stability and existence of plural and credible democratic states, and for bringing into being partnerships to fight drug-trafficking and organized crime, as well as the process of modernizing the Armed Forces and the promotion of a true culture of conflict prevention, including committed efforts towards strengthening the regional military capabilities and preparedness of both the AU and the SADC.

às crises armadas por parte da União Africana e da SADC. A paz, a estabilidade, a segurança e o desenvolvimento em África são factores estruturantes que definem novas prioridades para a segurança europeia e ocidental.

Assim, este livro traz a debate a actual competição estratégica global, analisa a forma como afecta e se repercute na África Austral e, ainda, explora as possibilidades de aprofundar a colaboração e articular esforços entre os aliados transatlânticos e os parceiros africanos.

Deste modo, a FLAD e o IPRI-UNL prosseguem o objectivo de consolidar um quadro estável de análise permanente das relações entre Portugal, os EUA e a África Austral.

The question of peace, stability, security and development in Africa is a structuring factor, one that defines new priorities for European and Western security.

Thus the contributions gathered in this book consider how global strategic competition is playing out in Southern Africa, the diverse ways in which it has an impact on African states, and the possibilities for deepening cooperation and link/tying efforts among transatlantic allies and African partners.

In this way, FLAD and IPRI-UNL pursue the objective they set themselves of building a stable framework of permanent analysis of relations between Portugal, the USA and Southern Africa.

A POLÍTICA EXTERNA DE PORTUGAL PARA ÁFRICA

Manuel Lobo Antunes

Secretário de Estado Adjunto e dos Assuntos Europeus

Devo começar por dizer também que é com muita alegria que, de alguma forma, regresso aos temas africanos, tendo eu próprio aqui há uns anos, sendo Director dos Serviços de Apoio (no Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros), estado muito ligado, às questões africanas. É um retorno a esta temática, o que muito me alegra. Também devo dizer-vos que, no âmbito europeu, Portugal não deixa, como aqui referirei, de suscitar de uma forma permanente e consistente as questões africanas.

Gostaria de partilhar convosco algumas reflexões sobre o que é actualmente a política externa de Portugal para África e quais são os seus pontos centrais.

Eu diria que o primeiro de todos é uma aproximação efectiva à União Africana. Como sabem nomeámos há cerca de dois, três anos, um Embaixador em Addis Abeba, naturalmente para cobrir a parte bilateral com a Etiópia mas também com a União Africana. Essa nomeação teve exactamente como significado o nosso desejo de estabelecermos relações mais eficazes, permanentes e estreitas com a organização continental que representa toda a África. Mas não só com a União Africana. Também com as organizações sub-regionais em África com quem procuramos naturalmente o intercâmbio de informação e o estabelecimento de projectos de cooperação e de parceria, designadamente de parceria para o desenvolvimento. E dentro dessas organizações sub-regionais cabe naturalmente destacar a SADC (Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral) e a CEDEAO (Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Austral). Com a CEDEAO, que ocupa neste momento um lugar privilegiado no âmbito das orga-

nizações regionais na nossa política externa, temos uma relação quase nova, visto que até há poucos anos não mantínhamos relações muito estreitas. Mas agora, tendo em conta os nossos interesses na África Ocidental, entendemos que temos de ter uma relação mais eficaz e mais estreita. Vamos nomear um oficial de ligação que estará em permanente contacto, assegurando a relação entre o Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros português e a CEDEAO. Queremos naturalmente desenvolver relações particulares e aprofundadas com as organizações regionais e sub-regionais africanas, designadamente a União Africana (UE), a SADC e a CEDEAO. Temos também, no âmbito da União Europeia, como é do conhecimento de todos, desenvolvido uma actividade consistente e permanente, e suponho que isso é indesmentível – e as pessoas que aqui estão e seguem as questões africanas são testemunhas – no sentido de reforçar o diálogo euro-africano como prioridade no topo da agenda externa. Fomos nós, recordar-se-ão, o motor e incentivador da primeira cimeira UE/África – e de resto temos entre nós o Embaixador António Monteiro, que foi também um dos grandes inspiradores dessa iniciativa, e com quem na altura colaborámos todos intensamente, na equipa do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros que promoveu e organizou esta cimeira.

Do meu ponto de vista, esta cimeira marcou definitivamente as relações entre a União Europeia e África. A consolidação desta parceria também conheceu, nos últimos anos, um reforço particular pela adopção de uma estratégia da União Europeia para África, e sobretudo pela histórica decisão tomada pelos africanos e pelos europeus de trabalhar em comum, numa estratégia conjunta. Este documento basilar da parceria euro-africana para a próxima década, cujo processo avança a um bom ritmo, num clima de cooperação entre a União Europeia e África, deverá ser adoptado, assim o esperamos, ao mais alto nível, na Segunda Cimeira UE/África, que, como sabem, está prevista, se assim for

possível, para a Presidência Portuguesa do Conselho da UE, no segundo semestre de 2007. Mas se não for possível organizar esta cimeira UE/África durante a Presidência Portuguesa, podemos no entanto ter a certeza que nos empenharemos na adopção, durante esse período, da estratégia conjunta União Europeia/África. E portanto, em qualquer circunstância, e uma vez mais, pretendemos que a Presidência Portuguesa fique assinalada por um progresso efectivo, real, nas relações entre a União Europeia e África.

Esta estratégia conjunta assenta em quatro grandes áreas, os chamados *clusters*, que reflectem as nossas preocupações e prioridades comuns. Gostaria de destacar um desses *clusters* em particular, o *cluster* relativo à Paz e à Segurança. Sob a liderança da União Africana, os países africanos têm cada vez mais assumido com inegável coragem a sua responsabilidade fundamental na manutenção da paz e da segurança no continente africano. A criação do Conselho da União Africana para a Paz e Segurança é o sinal mais evidente dessa determinação, que a comunidade internacional, do nosso ponto de vista, não pode ignorar. Esta *African Ownership* envolve o estabelecimento de mecanismos de prevenção e alerta, a formação e treino de forças de paz, o apetrechamento de centros logísticos, a disponibilização de meios, em suma, um conjunto de instrumentos que só se poderão tornar efectivos e operacionais se tiverem um sólido apoio e solidariedade internacional, e se forem implementados numa base de verdadeira parceria internacional. E a União Europeia naturalmente quer ser um dos parceiros estratégicos na consolidação deste mecanismo. Neste sentido progridem os trabalhos da estratégia conjunta entre a União Europeia e África. Saberão porventura que ontem, se não me falha a memória, em Brazzaville, teve lugar uma reunião de alto nível entre a Troika da UE e África, onde a estratégia conjunta foi debatida, esperando-se progressos concretos na elaboração dessa estratégia conjunta.

A UE está naturalmente também internamente a proceder à revisão do seu sistema de assistência e ajuda para o reforço das capacidades africanas na área da prevenção e gestão de conflitos e na manutenção da paz. Eu queria aqui partilhar convosco também um testemunho pessoal e que marca igualmente uma diferença na forma como a União Europeia encara as questões de segurança e da paz em África. Não até aqui há muito tempo, a União Europeia tinha uma visão exclusivamente civil do que seria, ou deveria ser, a cooperação com África. A cooperação na área da saúde, educação, infraestruturas, ou ainda na administração. Tudo o que de alguma forma implicasse segurança ou tivesse um qualquer, digamos, indício de conotação militar ou paramilitar era quase impossível de ser abordado ou de ser discutido, era rejeitado. Naturalmente também com a noção que a Comunidade Económica Europeia não tinha competência nessa área, sendo essencialmente uma organização que na parte de cooperação tinha sobretudo uma vocação civil. Hoje em dia, a doutrina mudou, e nisso alguns Estados Membros, julgamos que nós próprios, têm alguma responsabilidade. Hoje é absolutamente claro em todo o pensamento da União Europeia na área da cooperação para o desenvolvimento e na área da ajuda a África que sem segurança não há desenvolvimento. E portanto, hoje em dia não há nenhum pensamento, ou não há nenhuma iniciativa de cooperação para África oriunda ou nascida na UE que não tenha ou não possa ter já essa dimensão de segurança. Há aqui uma evolução doutrinária, que nos parece importante, e mais do que importante nos parece indispensável, que vai indiscutivelmente fazendo o seu caminho.

Gostaria também de vos dizer que sendo naturalmente a União Africana o principal e o primeiro interlocutor da União Europeia no processo da cooperação para a paz e para a segurança em África, não é naturalmente também o único parceiro. O trabalho desenvolvido nos últimos anos pela recente União

Africana assenta nas experiências concretas e nos esforços desenvolvidos e nos mecanismos criados por diversas organizações regionais africanas. A África Austral é certamente a região pioneira neste esforço de integração, e a SADC continua a ser uma organização regional de referência não obstante as limitações que tem conhecido nos últimos anos. A África Austral, por razões que são por demais conhecidas, é em África a região com a qual Portugal mantém, e quer continuar a manter, um diálogo político mais forte, uma parceria económica mais bem sucedida, e uma cooperação mais diversificada. Naturalmente, esta opção tem por base laços históricos, culturais, linguísticos, mas também económicos, que não devem ser ignorados. Não é só no plano do relacionamento bilateral com os países da região mas também no âmbito da União Europeia que Portugal está empenhado no reforço do diálogo com a África Austral e com a SADC. Dada esta proximidade e interesse pela região, Portugal não ignora algum desencanto, para não dizer se calhar mais do que isso, por parte dos parceiros da SADC, pelo que julgam ser um decréscimo do interesse da União Europeia neste diálogo regional. Pelo contrário, nós achamos que esse desinteresse não existe, as reuniões com as regiões africanas são percebidas como importantes pelos parceiros europeus para a construção de uma relação mais forte entre a União Europeia e a África em primeiro lugar, para uma mais justa integração das regiões africanas no processo de globalização em segundo lugar e finalmente para a criação de parcerias de verdadeira igualdade, nas áreas de paz e segurança, na governação, comércio e desenvolvimento, com impacto não apenas no plano regional ou africano mas também à escala mundial. Vale a pena sublinhar não apenas as imensas possibilidades da potência dos recursos da África Austral, mas também as realizações de grande parte dos países da região em termos de transição e de consolidação democrática da verdade política, boa governação e crescente respeito pelos direitos huma-

nos. Temos também todavia de reconhecer que a situação no Zimbabué tem sido uma questão contenciosa e limitativa no diálogo regional entre a União Europeia e a SADC, como tem sido de resto no diálogo mais amplo entre a União Europeia e a África, no contexto da futura Segunda Cimeira UE/África. Temo-nos no entanto esforçado, para dizer o menos, no sentido de tentar ultrapassar essas dificuldades, naturalmente em diálogo com o conjunto dos países africanos e também com os nossos parceiros. Do nosso ponto de vista, este impasse que se suscitou e que se mantém, é um impasse que se tem mantido por demasiado tempo e urge ultrapassá-lo.

Gostaria de terminar apenas com uma pequena nota de informação. Como sabem estamos neste momento em plena preparação do programa conjunto das presidências da União Europeia, Alemanha, Portugal e Eslovénia. É um programa conjunto que se iniciará em Janeiro de 2007 e se prolongará até Julho de 2008, com a Presidência final da Eslovénia, e naturalmente que parte importante desse programa são as relações externas da União Europeia, durante esses dezoito meses. A União Europeia obviamente é, e quer ser, um parceiro e um actor global no mundo. E nesse contexto, o programa, na parte das relações externas da União Europeia abrange, ou refere-se a todas as regiões do mundo – a América Latina, as relações transatlânticas, a situação no Médio Oriente, naturalmente as relações com a Ásia, isso é óbvio, mas também tem referências importantes a África. E naturalmente aí se fala quer desta estratégia conjunta, que estamos a elaborar com África e que gostaríamos de ver aprovada na presidência portuguesa, quer dos esforços que as três presidências farão para que seja possível a realização da cimeira UE/África. E devo-vos dizer que tenho encontrado da parte dos nossos parceiros de presidência um efectivo interesse e empenhamento em que as relações com África se desenvolvam e se reforcem. Há uma sensação, eu suponho

que justa, de que, apesar de tudo, por circunstâncias várias, a acção externa da União Europeia se tem dirigido preferencialmente para outras áreas mundiais. E designadamente para algumas áreas do nosso próprio continente, a chamada vizinhança próxima, a Ucrânia, países da Ásia Central, e também naturalmente a região do Mediterrâneo e Médio Oriente. E há a nítida sensação de que é necessário um novo olhar, um olhar mais reforçado para África e para os problemas que enfrenta e que de alguma forma são agravados pelo contexto actual da globalização. E a noção da perda da Agenda da Globalização, ou do ritmo, do processo da globalização da parte africana, é, e deve ser, motivo de atenção. Os nossos parceiros alemães estão francamente empenhados em que, connosco e com os eslovenos, possamos dar um impulso importante nessas relações. Está à vista de todos que efectivamente uma África pobre, uma África com dificuldades, uma África que não oferece perspectivas de vida, de progresso e de bem estar aos seus cidadãos só pode naturalmente ser motivo de situações que põem também pressão sobre a própria União Europeia, como de resto está à vista de toda a gente. E a esse propósito, também vos gostaria de dizer que, naturalmente o tema da imigração ilegal, designadamente da imigração que vem do continente africano, também ocupa uma parte importante no nosso programa. Nós temos sempre frisado como um aspecto muito importante, não apenas naturalmente as questões que têm a ver com as fronteiras, com a sua vigilância, mas também, obviamente, com as questões da cooperação para o desenvolvimento. Isto é, do nosso ponto de vista, não há forma de diminuir, se não eliminar, com sucesso, os fenómenos de imigração ilegal, de pessoas que naturalmente partem legitimamente à procura de melhores condições de vida, se efectivamente não criarmos nesses países as condições para que as pessoas fiquem e possam, naturalmente, estabelecer-se, trabalhar e viver nos seus países de origem como é natural e é

absolutamente legítimo. Como também não podemos nunca esquecer a outra dimensão, que é a dimensão de acolhimento humanitário, na base dos princípios humanitários. Esse aspecto para nós também é fundamental e queremos vê-lo reflectido no nosso programa conjunto. Finalmente queria dizer-vos que na Europa, naturalmente, os interesses, as visões que temos sobre as diferentes partes do mundo não são exactamente as mesmas. Isto para vos dizer que naturalmente nós queremos, com os nossos parceiros alemães e eslovenos, claramente, organizar a cimeira UE/África. Faremos tudo para que seja possível, mas também precisamos da colaboração e do empenho de todos os nossos parceiros europeus e africanos. Tem que se ter aqui uma vontade política, uma vontade política colectiva que seja forte. Portugal está absolutamente convencido que, com essa vontade política forte de ambos os lados, essa Cimeira será possível, para benefício quer de África quer da União Europeia.

STRANGERS AT THE GATE:
AFRICA, THE CHALLENGE OF CHINA
AND THE ECLIPSE OF THE WEST

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There have always been strangers at the gate. As Roland Oliver reminds us in his book, *The African Experience*, the product of forty years of reflection, long before the 19th century, Egypt and Africa had suffered conquest and colonisation by a long list of interlopers beginning with the Assyrians, the Phoenicians, the Persians and Romans, the Visigoths, the Byzantines and the Arabs. A second phase of colonisation began with the first European eruptions by the Portuguese and Spanish at the end of the 15th century. What made the third and most recent intervention by the Europeans – what is often known as the partition of Africa, qualitatively different, was that it was global; it was far more devastating in its impact; and above all it was geopolitical in motivation. The British called the partition of Africa a race; the French a steeplechase; the Germans a Torschluss-panik, a panic to get through the door before history closed. The metaphors are instructive. They tell us that geopolitics is not just about strategic advantage or access to strategic minerals or oil. It also tells a story. In the case of the late 19th century and Africa it was the struggle for mastery of the world in which the continent was classed as important but not crucial to the future of the different players. Today the geopolitical focus has changed again as have the stakes, to which must be added a new player, China. Even the narratives are new. Africa's fate however is unlikely to be very different. It will continue to remain a bit player, strategically upgraded from time to time to a greater role.

In the 19th century the continent became locked for the first time into a global economy. Indeed the Congress of Berlin which portioned out the continent met appropriately in 1884, the year that saw the first moves towards international agreement on the meridian, time zones and the beginning of the global day. This move towards global existence, the result of the conquest of space through the railroad, the telegraph and then the telephone and radio, has continued to intensify in our day. How far it may go is the subject of conjecture.

It is useful to remember that the partition of Africa is a phrase that has meaning only in relation to the actions of outsiders in response to others of their kind. Seen from the inside, from the deeper perspective of African history, the picture is very different. The intervention of the Europeans was so traumatic because it was a ruthless act of political amalgamation in which some 10,000 political units were reduced to a mere 40. Many of the ethnic, tribal and in some cases religious tensions which flowed from this act of political re-engineering are with us today in countries such as Somalia.

My theme here is the geopolitical challenge of the early 21st century from which Africa may suffer as much as it did in the last century when it was seen as a battleground for conflicting world visions. For the Soviet Union, for example, Southern Africa presented a chance to create a new political dispensation, a Marxist-Leninist order. The 1970s even saw the first appearance of the Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party, a political invention of Soviet academics who hoped to forge 'authentic socialism' in the battle zones of Angola and Mozambique. South Africa's ability to put the Soviet Union on the defensive in the closing years of the Cold War, in turn, made it a useful Western proxy, at least for a time.

With the conclusion of the Cold War, Africa was strategically downgraded. As the world moved into a more knowledge-intensive economic cycle, even its mineral wealth seemed less geopolit-

ically important than it had before. More interestingly, perhaps, it did not even retain its central importance as a moral reference point. In the absence of any compelling single system of ethics and in an age of moral relativism in which arguments about essentials were the norm and deconstructive doubts about universal values commonplace, at least apartheid South Africa had the questionable merit of providing substantial agreement between East and West. With the collapse of apartheid, all this changed.

I particularly remember reading Hugh Tinker's *Race, Conflict and the International Order* in the year in which it came out a year, twelve months after the Soweto uprising, in which he argued that largely through the African experience, race had entered into what he called, "the total experience", the experience of everybody. By operationalising the powerful, diffused forces of resistance to racism, he added,

"African leaders had even shown how the powerless might disarm the powerful. In 17th century Europe, religion formed the total experience. Transcending everything – dynastic struggles, political debates, artistic and literary ferment, the rise of capitalism, the challenge of science and rationalism – was the confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism. Today, transcending everything (including even the neutral effect) there is the confrontation between the races."

How distant all this seems today. Race is no longer the transcending theme of international politics. And insofar as Africa appears on the mental radar it is for a series of themes – famine in Ethiopia, genocide in Rwanda, cultural revolution in Zimbabwe which has seen the displacement of more than 700,000 people. TV has created not so much a global village, as a global theme park. Alas, no sense of genuine moral responsibility or political engagement is likely to stem from that.

Insofar as there is a transcending theme, it is largely external to the continent – it is not race, it is religion. And when it is not religion, it is the impending eclipse of the West, or what has been called the end of the western moment in history. These two themes provide the geopolitical high ground in which Africa is once again likely to be catalogued, divided and sub-divided by the major players – or ‘partitioned’ once again, at least metaphorically.

The Geopolitical Imagination

The greatest geopolitical thinker of the modern era was Halford Mackinder, the former director of my own institution, the London School of Economics. At the turn of the 20th century he penned a seminal paper, ‘The Pivot of World History’. For him, the decisive event was the colonisation of the New World by Western Europe and Siberia by the Russians. Whereas the Europeans had moved west across the North American plains to the Pacific, the Russians had moved east across the Eurasian land mass. By 1904 both had reached the Pacific Ocean. The 20th century, he suggested, would be determined by the conflict between the two.

That is the point about geopolitics – it tells a story; it involves a grand theme. Mackinder, of course, got it wrong. The future of the world was not tested in the Pacific in the course of the 20th century, but in Europe. The pre-eminent geopolitical narrative, at least until 1991, was the recurring necessity to prevent the domination of Europe by any single power. Europe, not the Pacific, was the pivot of world history. It is no longer. This in itself is of central importance to Africa, which has always been part of Europe’s hinterland, hence the French concept of *Euroafrique*.

In the geopolitical imagination there is always an enemy. In 1914 it was Germany; after 1945 the USSR. The identity of the enemy is not important for the cogency of the theory which is always about conflict. This takes us to the second factor. Geopolitics assumes a permanent interest and a permanent policy solution. In the 20th century the permanent interest was the balance of power in Europe, and later the globe. The permanent solution was coalition politics. The political challenge for the United States, in particular, was to form a coalition of liberal societies against those societies who challenged the balance of power, such authoritarian states as Imperial Germany and the USSR.

Thirdly, there is always a major framework within which strategic thinking can cohere. For much of the 20th century that framework was the idea of a World Order. It is useful here to remind ourselves that the concept of the 'world' was a late 19th century invention. It was this century which saw the coining of such terms as 'world politics' (the first course of which was taught at the University of Wisconsin in 1894); 'world economy' (the international division of labour); 'world trade'; 'world power'; and finally and most recently 'world order'. Geopoliticians were concerned about the kind of world order that would emerge, and who would run it. Every American president from Woodrow Wilson to George Bush in 1991 promised to take their countries into a New World Order through war.

What is interesting about Bush's son, the first president of the 21st century, is that he has not promised his country a New World Order; instead, all he has promised is more successful management of the global disorder which prevails. In one sense, despite America's unipolar 'moment in history', or the emergence of what the French like to call the first 'hyperpower', America's geopolitical ambitions are much more modest than those of the past.

So what is the situation today, who is the enemy? There are two: radical Islam, or more correctly Islamism and China. What is the permanent interest? The maintenance of American primacy. And the solution? In the case of Islamic fundamentalism, the management of risk; in the case of China, the management of its rise.

The War on Terror

“They will either succeed in changing our way of life, or we will succeed in changing theirs”, Donald Rumsfeld proclaimed in a speech shortly before the release of The Quadrennial Defense Review in February 2006. The United States goes into the war on terror as a country with a universal vision. It still dreams for the rest of us. If it were merely a civilisation, and not a country, it would not, since civilisations dream only for themselves. China has no wish to transform the world in its image, and nor for the most part do most Islamic terrorists. Indeed, few dream of reconstituting the Caliphate, the old Islamic empire which once straddled the world from Morocco to Indonesia. A recent poll conducted in Saudi Arabia found that only 4% of citizens ever gave the Caliphate a moment’s thought. Nevertheless, for good or ill, the United States is committed to fighting the war on terror for the duration. The ‘Long War’ as it is now called is going to be long indeed.

In many ways, the template for the war on terror is very similar to new thinking on crime in Western societies. What most societies in the West now aim at are modest improvements in crime prevention at the margin, as well as a better management of resources. The aim is a reduction in the likelihood of criminal acts, and these days better support for the victims. These are all ‘post heroic’ objectives. Few of us think

that crime can be reduced significantly. All this is very different from the philosophy of penology in the 19th century which first saw the rise of national police forces, regulated prison regimes, and the idea that criminals were not just to be punished but also rehabilitated, and if possible redeemed. Prison became a school of life; the hope was that the criminal would become a useful citizen. Indeed, once crime was seen as a product not so much of greed but of social deviancy, social rehabilitation had to become the norm.

Since the early 1990s all this has changed. Soaring crime rates, questionable results in rehabilitation, including stubbornly high rates of recidivism, as well as declining state budgets for policing have forced governments to adopt alternative strategies. No longer do we treat individual offenders: we manage criminal environments. We have 'zero tolerance' policies; we move potential criminals from the area where they pose a risk, that is, the areas that matter such as tourism or business. We prefer to quarantine criminals in urban environments where they can do little damage to the economy, such as the ghettos of North American cities, or the sink estates of the UK. We go in for criminal profiling, identifying potential groups, the better to manage them. We do not police the community so much as manage communities of risk. And we certainly do not seek to rehabilitate criminals. These days we tend to lock them up. Our prison populations are higher than ever, 2 million in the United States, or 1 prisoner for every 120 members of the population. 'Three strikes and you're out' is now the slogan. And when we do let prisoners out we often tag them electronically. We monitor their movements. Freedom is no longer unsupervised.

The United States addresses terrorism much the same way. Like the police force, its first aim is to preempt terrorist action; accordingly its policies are pro-active. It has much less interest in addressing the causes of terrorism than the terrorist threat itself.

It wishes to 'reshape environments' the better to minimise risks that come from them. But reshaping very rarely involves much investment of economic or political resources. In the words of Ulrich Beck, many developing societies have found they are now responsible for "autobiographical solutions to systemic contradictions", which is merely a German Professor's way of saying they find themselves on their own. As Africa has found even when there is a major commitment such as the HIV-AIDS programme, the discourse of economic development is cast increasingly in the language of security.

And the security dimension could be seen to encompass much more than just AIDS. Take malaria – well over a quarter of the US Marines sent into Liberia in 2004 went down with the disease. The lesson – apparently – if you are a terrorist is to hang out in a country with *plasmodium falciparum malaria*, and recruit locals who have immunity from the disease. Unlikely, but apparently effective.

There are three major ways in which the United States now manage the risk of terrorism. One is surveillance. We are all on camera every day; in my country, which has the highest number of CCTV cameras per head of population, every citizen is on camera 300 times in the course of their working hours. Corporations actively monitor consumer choice every time a credit card is swiped or the internet site is visited, or an Oyster card is used on the London Underground. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) constantly seek greater surveillance capacities. Trade and environmental regimes increasingly arrogate the right to inspect. Intrusive verification is at the centre of most arms control agreements, as Iraq found in the 1990s, and as the Iranians are finding today. Surveillance has become crucial in obtaining the information that determines the scale of risk and shapes risk management strategies.

Surveillance allows us to systematically gather information to monitor the behaviour of risk groups, pariah states or rogue states, or what the State Department more diplomatically prefers to call 'states of concern'. Two of them are Sudan and Somalia.

Then there is the Precautionary Principle which was introduced in international environment law after 1992: namely that if the international community waits too long for scientific evidence of for example, global warming, by the time the evidence is available it will be too late to act. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" as Donald Rumsfeld famously asserted in the run up to the 2003 Iraq war.

The United States may not have signed up to the Kyoto Agreement, but certainly wish to introduce something like the precautionary principle into international security law. 'Anticipatory self defence' was the official US legal justification for attacking Afghanistan in 2002. The War on Terror mandates – or is deemed to – the political redesign of certain societies as a safety measure or precaution.

So far, America's political re-engineering has been confined to the Middle East. And yet, Africa too is being forced to choose which side it wishes to align with. Some rulers (Quaddafi) have done well from the change; some have done badly. No-one, however, is free from America's reach. The US Sixth Fleet has expressed an interest in the Gulf of Guinea – 'Wherever there's 'evil' we will fight it', declared the deputy commander of CENTCOM in 2006 with reference to Nigerian pirates preying on western oil companies. It is not only the west coast, of course. The bombing of American embassies in East Africa in the late 1990s showed that the Middle East had become another 'front line'. The country that has been of most concern is Somalia which was seen by the Pentagon as offering a 'haven for terrorists'. It was claimed that the Union of Islamic Courts, a loose religious

coalition that had offered Somalia their only unifying principle other than their Somali-ness, was promoting terrorism. So the Pentagon began paying and some say supplying weapons to the most unpleasant gangsters of all; namely Mohammed Afrah Qanyere, Musa Sudi Yalahow and Omar Mohamoud, known as 'Finish'. These warlords were called somewhat euphemistically the 'Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism'. Their mission was to wipe out the Islamic Courts. They failed. It took the Ethiopian army to do the job, with what long-term results remains to be seen. Whether a Taliban government would have emerged from the country is debatable; most Somalis take orders from no one, least of all religious fanatics. The future will tell whether Somalia has been secured for the War on Terror or not, or whether the warlords who blighted the country's progress in the 1990s are due to return with a vengeance.

The Rise of China

The rise of China presents the United States with a second geostrategic challenge. As The Quadrennial Defense Review in February stated: China is at a strategic crossroads: it can either choose to work with the United States or against it. Probably it can do both. As Yogi Berra, the famous American baseball player famously commented: If you're at a crossroads, take it.

There are two arguments involved here. One is that China is still a power that is willing to come to terms with the American unipolar moment, rather than challenge it. The other is whether it challenges it or not in the future, it has one over-riding requirement: oil. It is oil that may bring it into collision with the United States in the Middle East (with its strategic partnership with Iran), in Latin America (with its strategic partnership with Chavez), and in Africa

where it is now associated with what Max Boot, the American conservative commentator calls “the dictatorship premium”.

No-one knows, of course, how long oil resources will last. Some geologists disagree, as is the wont with experts, on when oil production will peak. The optimists say 30 years; the pessimists say 5 or 10. For the United States this is as much a problem as it is for China in the long run. In the short run, however, China’s predicament is far worse because it is growing so fast. It has accounted for 40% of all recent growth in world oil consumption and is now the second largest consumer of oil after the United States itself. Its oil consumption is expected to increase by 10% per year. Beijing has inevitably focused on African nations as likely hydrocarbon acquisition targets. An estimated 25% of its total oil imports currently come from Africa and Beijing has placed a high priority on maintaining strong ties with its African energy suppliers through investment, high-level visits, and a strict policy of ‘non interference in internal affairs’ which dictators, African or not, find comforting.

The ‘dictatorship’ premium is worrying, not only for the United States, but also for Europe for it involves another geopolitical dimension which is new: the future of global governance. In order to ensure its supply, China has made some unpleasant bedfellows. One is Sudan which now accounts for 7% of its total oil imports. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the single largest shareholder in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company which controls Sudan’s oil fields. 4,000 Chinese security guards now guard its oil investment. Nearly 80% of Sudan’s oil revenue is used to purchase weapons to subdue the rebels in the southern part of the country. In March 2004 Beijing also extended a \$2 billion loan to Angola, another country whose regime is considered to be endemically corrupt and authoritarian. Zimbabwe also remains a major source of iron and has benefited from arms sales in recent years.

The problem is that the us State Department has labelled Sudan a 'state sponsor of terrorism'. Here the two geo-political chessboards intersect. For states such as New Jersey, Illinois, and Oregon have banned public pension funds from investing in companies active in the country. us investors have sold their holdings or suspended operations until the political situation improves, and Chinese companies have inevitably filled the vacuum. As the Nigerian energy minister commented after signing a deal with the Great Wall Company of Beijing, while the Americans insist that their trade partners sign up to the war on terror, and the Europeans insist that they tackle corruption, all the Chinese are interested in is trade.

Far from retreating on this score, the United States too is making 'good governance a requirement to qualify for the Millennium Challenge account. But the situation for the European Union is more serious still. The cosmopolitan states that constitute the world's first trans-national community, the EU, have established in turn the world's first trans-national network. It is a network distinguished not by the use of military power, but a new diplomatic style, cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan states, argues Beck, differ significantly from 'surveillance' states such as the United States which keep the world under scrutiny all the time. Cosmopolitan states, by contrast, *not only fight against terrorism but also against the causes of terrorism. Out of the solutions of global problems which appear insoluble at the level of the individual state, they regain and renew the power of the political to shape and convince.*

The word 'political' is important here. Robert Cooper, the British diplomat, sees the EU as a post-modern system which is more trans-national than supra-national – a community that lives in a post-modern system but embraces global governance as a way of amplifying its own power. The Europeans syndicate their values by exporting their model – a trans-national one

– in the hope that it will have broader appeal in the world at large.

Cooper is honest enough to call the system for what it largely is – an imperial one, grounded on a new principle, ‘security through transparency and transparency through interdependence’. It is the interdependence which is imperial – the ties with which it binds countries to itself with associative agreements such as the Lome conventions, many of which have been revised retrospectively to include human rights provisions. This is an empire of overlapping power networks which involve NGOs. These networks promote cosmopolitan democracy – the partnership between states, social advocacy groups and pressure groups involved either in direct action (environmental protestors such as Greenpeace) or the monitoring of human rights abuses (Watch Groups such as Transparency International, a Berlin based global anti-corruption organisation which publishes an annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in which Africa significantly figures ranking the extent of corruption in different states). It is these that are the building blocks of a “cosmopolitan democratic view”. It is that view which is now threatened by the rise of China.

Grand Narratives

Now none of this might matter but for the fact that geopolitics tells a story. What makes us afraid of new challenges is the trend to invest it with a certain degree of historical inevitability.

If the ‘pivotal year’ for Halford Mackinder was 1904, the pivotal year for many geopoliticians is 1979 which saw two turning points: Deng Xiaoping modernised the Chinese economy. Since then economic growth has been dramatic, and the Mullahs came to power in Iran. The Islamic republic of Iran

represents a challenge to the American version of modernity and has inspired fundamentalists across the world, many of whom look to Teheran for funding.

In terms of Islamism in general it is useful to turn to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 which the South Africans abstained from signing because they were unable to accept the notion of racial equality. In retrospect we can see this was a country, one issue (apartheid) debate which only ended in 1994. Looking back at that event, however, much more significant in the long-term is the abstention of Saudi Arabia which went largely unnoticed at the time because the overwhelming majority of UN members were Europeans or, like the Russians and Americans, were of European descent. Saudi Arabia abstained on religious grounds. The Universal Declaration endorses the freedom of religion (including Article 18 which gives one the right to change one's religion). According to the Saudis this was contrary to Islam which recognises conversion in only one direction: to Islam.

Whatever the merits of the case, the point I am making is that the 1948 Saudi abstention was considered to be an anomaly at the time as indeed was the Saudi kingdom itself. It was an anomaly because religion was not considered as important as the secular ideologies of the day. The Saudi abstention was seen as a rejection of the European Enlightenment which had produced the secular ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism, which in 1948 were contending for the world's soul.

Today, of course, we can recognise that the Saudi abstention retains a degree of symbolism as the clearest expression of the now growing insistence that the Western idea of what is required to be a fully functioning human being is not universally shared.

Thus we come to the second grand narrative: not the clash of civilisations, from which Africa is likely to be sealed, but

the challenge to the western 'moment' in history – that 500 year cycle in which western ideas and values were entrenched in the international system. That system which the West did so much to create may be coming to an end. Put very crudely, the international community and its laws and regulations are largely a creation of western governments. It is by no means certain that China will be interested in sustaining it indefinitely, or playing by the rules.

For China may be becoming, in continents such as Africa, a 'soft power' as well. Over the past 25 years the country has fashioned a successful, economic model for development and modernisation embedded in ancient traditions. It combines modern but authoritarian political leadership with state-guided capitalism. This is highly attractive in some parts of the developing world and threatens to reduce the influence of the competing western principles of liberalism, democracy and the free market. In other words, the 'post-Washington consensus', may be challenged by a Beijing consensus. While this is likely to be of most interest to other Asian states, Africans may be inspired too, to find a specifically African model.

The thinking of China is important too because it is dominated by traditional concepts of sovereignty and the nation state, concepts that do not encourage multi-lateralism and certainly not global governance. In this respect China paradoxically has more in common with the United States than it does with Europe, and this should be of concern to the Europeans most of all with their predilection for delegating sovereignty to supranational bodies, and their commitment to effective multi-lateralism and humanitarian intervention. Whatever happens, in the long run, the rise of China constitutes a challenge to the current international architecture based on western dominance under the leadership of the United States.

Conclusion

Whether this should be of concern to Africa or not is an open question. What the people of Africa share in common is the need to escape the crippling psychological and emotional dependence on the outside world. Too often, African states have been divided by the US and Europe as those deemed 'suitable' for aid and those deemed not. As a result some of the West's would-be helpers have found themselves rendered helpless. And since helpers are usually countries which pride themselves on their competence in helping, rather than admit their irrelevance they tend to label countries as unsuitable for aid, chronically corrupt or irredeemable, best rejected, rather than embraced.

Whilst the new geopolitical environment in which Africa finds itself offers perhaps some opportunities that Africans may choose to seize, yet one cannot conclude but on a word of caution. It is tempting to see that emancipated from a kind of cultural imperial outlook Africans may be able to forge ahead in the 21st century. After all, in the 1960s in the immediate aftermath of independence, they fell into the hands of socialist economists with unreliable and irrelevant models and 5-year plans. Later some countries fell under the influence of neo-liberal development economists and liberal human rights workers. China's rise may be a solution but it may also be a problem, encouraging dictatorships, and stifling what global governance projects have been successful. It certainly seems likely to set back what Roland Oliver hoped in the concluding page of the book would be Africa's future when he wrote with misplaced confidence that "the era of mass participation in the political process [is] about to begin". That was in 1991. Looking back from the vantage point of today his optimism seems wildly off key.

ESTRATÉGIA
E SEGURANÇA
NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL



A Evolução Estratégica da África Austral

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Strategy and Security in Southern Africa

FAILED STATES IN WESTERN AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

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In this paper, I will first discuss the collapse of the international regime of quasi-states in sub-Saharan Africa; and then consider how failed states threaten international security, and the way the European Union (EU) reacts to such a threat. I will look at Western Africa, a region which is home to a number of failed states. I focus specifically on the group of countries that go from Senegal, in the North, to Nigeria, in the South, including Mali and Niger, part of the Sahel. I start by defining failed, or fragile, states and to explain why they constitute a threat to international security. Then, in the second part, I discuss the problem of Western African failed states and how they threaten regional and international security, making a connection with the issue of terrorism and radical Islamism. Finally, I will analyse the EU reaction to state failure in Western Africa, particularly in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy and its Strategic Concept.

* The writer is expressing his personal views.

1. From Quasi-States to Failed States: the Failure of an International Regime

The notion of “quasi-states” is a good starting point to discuss the problem of failed states. After 1945, with the process of decolonization, the post-colonial states were internationally enfranchised with juridical statehood, thereby enjoying the same external rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states.

Yet, at the same time, many of these states disclosed “limited empirical statehood: their populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with independent statehood. Their governments [were] often deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and organized power to protect human rights or provide socioeconomic welfare”. Thus, ‘quasi-states’ are primarily juridical constructions: “They are still far from complete...and empirical statehood in large measure still remained to be built”.¹ In this regard, a defining characteristic of quasi-states “is the undertaking of contemporary international society to promote their development – or at least to compensate them for their current condition of underdevelopment rather like poor citizens in welfare states”.²

If the old colonial regime withheld independence from underdeveloped territories until they were considered ‘fit’ for self-government, the post-colonial regime recognized independent statehood as a matter of right in the expectation of subsequently being capable to assist them to develop their capacities of self-government and their ability to deliver civil, social, and economic goods to their populations. There was the general conviction that it would be necessary to build an international regime to compensate for the shortage of positive sovereignty of quasi-states. International aid, for instance, has been justified on the affirmative action grounds that political independence had been necessary but not sufficient to enable former colonies to become functioning sovereign states.

After independence, the new African states had to deal with the problem of survival in an international political system of sovereign states. On the domestic front, African rulers followed, in most cases, violent, if not brutal, strategies of survival.³ At the external level, the survival of African states depended on the quasi-states international regime. “Those who formed the government of an internationally recognised state were able to

¹ Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 21.

² Jackson, *Quasi-States*, pp. 21-2.

³ For a discussion of domestic strategies of survival, which led to the construction of ‘monopoly states’, see Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 44-74.

make alliances with other states, and to use their own domestic statehood as a bargaining counter with which to attract resources, such as weapons or development aid, which could enhance their ability to retain domestic control. They were also in some degree insulated against the danger of attack by their neighbours, and against the possibility that dissident groups within their own territories might gain international support” (Clapham, 19).

Such a supportive international context was based on four elements: first, international recognition of sovereign statehood; secondly, special relations with former colonial powers; thirdly, the strategic support of the superpowers during the Cold War; fourthly, economic aid. There are two points worth-mentioning which have been quite crucial to the African sovereign state. On the one hand, by promoting the spread of sovereign states with territories and borders inherited from European Empires, decolonization was ultimately the triumph of European colonialism. We can call this the ‘paradox of decolonization’.⁴ On the other hand, because of such a paradox, and of the structural weakness of African states, one of the premises of the international regime was that former colonial powers needed to have the power and the will to, in a certain way, ‘neo-colonize’, giving in fact origin to what some observers have called “the post-colonial relationship”.⁵

The international regime of quasi-states produced, during the 1960s, the 1970s and even the 1980s, a political illusion: the international community was helping Africans to build positive sovereignty, from quasi-states to autonomous sovereign states. It was not; the collapses after the 1980s demonstrated that African states, three decades after decolonization, were still quite fragile, and it was their rulers, and only them, that reinforced power. “The issue of survival...raises the question of whose survival: the state’s or the ruler’s? In the great majority of cases, rulers

⁴ See Jeffrey Herbst, “Responding to State Failure in Africa”, *International Security* (21, 3, 1996/97), pp. 120-144.

⁵ Clapham, *Africa*, pp. 77-105.

seek to assure their personal survival by seeking the survival and indeed strengthening of their states...[However] these strategies...impose a particular view of statehood, which associates it with the welfare and security of the ruler. Since the security of African rulers was often particularly at risk, they felt the need to make use of their control over states in distinctive ways, the most characteristic of which was the construction of the monopoly states” (Clapham, 4-5). ‘Economic development’, ‘nation-building’ and ‘construction of states’ have been used to justify the international regime of quasi-states; but in the end, for most cases, it ended up by reinforcing the power of the rulers. The effect of the international regime “was to enhance the power of those individuals who gained the right to represent states in the international community” (Clapham, 19).

The world in which quasi-states operate continues to change. “The extent to which the environment of African statehood depended on the existence of a particular balance of forces in the international system was revealed by the end of the Cold War” (Clapham, 24) – and so was, the strategic decline of former European colonial powers. The survival of the international system in the end did not depend on the will of former colonial powers, but on strategic realities that they could not control. The new question: “to what extent is their survival now threatened?” (Clapham)

One of the implications is that when international assistance and support diminishes or even ends, quasi-states risk become failed states. “The road to state failure is marked by several revealing signposts. On the economic side, living standards deteriorate rapidly as elites deliver financial rewards only to favoured families, clans, or small groups...Corruption flourishes as ruling cadres systematically skim the few resources available”, and many people, particularly young people, find themselves without jobs. On the political side, leaders and their allies “subvert prevailing

democratic norms, strangle judicial independence, block civil society and gain control over security and defence forces. In the last phase of failure, the state's legitimacy crumbles", and conflict and violence spreads throughout the country.

Failed states "cannot or will not safeguard minimal civil conditions for their populations: domestic peace, law and order, and good governance...Failed states are juridical shells that shroud an insecure and even a dangerous condition domestically, a state of nature. Such states have an international legal existence but very little domestic political existence...They exist because the outside world recognizes them and respects their sovereignty regardless of their domestic conditions. They have a juridical existence but little if any empirical existence".⁶

⁶ Jackson, *The Global Covenant*, p. 296.

In both classical and contemporary political theory, sovereign states are seen as places of security and not places of danger. We remember the lessons of the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, who taught us that the creation of sovereign authority was the condition for civil security. "Failed states turn Hobbes's political theory on its head", in the sense that sometimes "sovereignty can be dangerous".⁷

⁷ Jackson, *ibid*, p. 295.

According to a number of studies, failed states share four significant characteristics. Firstly, "the central government has effectively lost control and authority over the territory" and its borders. As a result, "the state has effectively lost its monopoly of the use of force"; in other words, "violence, warfare and security have become privatized" (Andersen, 2005, 7). Secondly, failed states are further weakened by the emergence of what the political analyst, William Reno, calls "warlord politics". In such form of political anarchy, violence is needed to control the distribution of wealth and the building of political alliances". In such a political context, state-leaders deal with the threat of warlord politics "by basically mimicking the warlords", and it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish between 'rebel groups' and

‘government forces’. Thirdly, as the logical culmination of the process of failed statehood, humanitarian tragedies occur inevitably. The “level of human suffering is appalling: extreme poverty and hunger become widespread, large-scale atrocities are committed, and basic human rights are grossly violated. In sum, failed states provoke huge humanitarian tragedies. Fourthly, “warring parties are financed by money coming from, on the one hand, foreign aid and humanitarian assistance and, on the other hand, from kidnapping, trafficking, prostitution, and smuggling...A clear distinction between ‘armed groups’ and ‘organized crime’ is very difficult to uphold...”. Therefore, a “war logic is...built into the economy”; which in turn gives origin to “powerful interests” opposing “national reconciliation and peace”. States that correspond to this definition have become a serious threat to international security.

2. Why Failed States are a Threat to International Security

Before September 11, failed states constituted both a humanitarian problem and a threat to regional security, particularly to its neighbours. Yet, it was not considered a crucial issue for international security. However, the perceptions regarding the failed states changed dramatically with September 11. “In the wake of September 11, the threat of terrorism has given the problem of failed nation-states an immediacy and importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimension.” Failed states “pose dangers not only to themselves and their neighbours but also to peoples around the globe. Preventing states from failing, and resuscitating those that do fail, are thus strategic and moral imperatives”.⁸ In other words, from a humanitarian and a regional issue, failed states became a global strategic threat. This new reality was immediately recognized by the Western allies.

⁸ Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror”, *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2002), p. 127.

Failed states are “incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty. This outcome is troubling to the world order, especially to an international system that demands – indeed, counts on – a state’s capacity to govern its space. Failed states have come to be feared as “breeding ground of instability, mass migration, and murder..., as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror. The existence of these kinds of countries, and the instability that they harbour, not only threatens the lives and livelihoods of their own peoples but endangers world peace”.⁹ According to British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, “when we allow governments to fail, warlords, criminals, drug barons, or terrorists fill the vacuum”. Thus, “failed states may provide terrorists with territory in which they can operate freely”. In other words, failed states can be safe heavens for terrorist groups. This was one of the terrible lessons of September 11.

⁹ Rotberg, “Failed States”, p. 128.

Given the impact of September 11, and the later terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, we sometimes tend to forget that the first large scale attacks by al-Qaeda took place in Africa, more specifically in East Africa, in 1998, when American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were bombed. In this light, a question arises: Does Africa threaten to become a hotspot of international terrorism? To answer this question, we need to return to the issue of failed states. As I have already indicated, failed states offer many advantages to terrorism. Firstly, unable to properly and efficiently impose authority in the totality of the territory and in its borders, fragile states allow terrorist groups to install and use parts of the country, normally remote from the capital, to train and to prepare attacks. Secondly, their war economies offer excellent opportunities to money laundering, to trafficking and to smuggling. Thirdly, ineffective state security apparatuses create a convenient environment for carrying out attacks. Fourthly, a despaired, alienated, largely young, and

often radicalized, population constitutes a large and easy field of recruitment for terrorist activities. Now, as we saw, Western Africa is home to a combination of failed, failing or fragile states. Moreover, “international terrorism requires two additional factors: a mobilising, unifying idea, such as that offered by Islamic fundamentalism; and appropriate agitators, who abuse this idea in order to organise a powerful terrorist force against a common external enemy”. Therefore, we need to address the issue of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa.

Lately, the region is witnessing a deep transformation from what has been called “African Islam” to Islamism in Africa, through the spread of Wahabism. In West Africa...spiritual leaders and traditional Islamic leaders have played, and continue to play, a central role in exercising political power and maintaining clientele systems. Even the long-standing practice of a moderate interpretation of Islam is subject to change. The social conflicts in the coastal states of West Africa are increasingly developing along a north-south divide that is largely congruent with the geographic division between Christians and Muslims. This is particularly noticeable in Nigeria, Ghana and the Côte d’Ivoire, but also in Guine, in Mali and in Liberia. Two trends are specially relevant: on the one hand, a radicalization of populations and domestic politics is occurring; and on the other hand, the awareness of the place of African Islamism in the Umma (the global Islamic community) is increasing.

Here, the example of Nigeria, home to 60 million Muslims, is quite revealing. A radicalization has taken place with the introduction of shariah in several Nigerian states...it appears that aggressive missionary work in the north by Saudi Wahabis has played a decisive role in escalating the conflict between Christians and Muslims. The country has even witnessed the emergence of the self-proclaimed “Nigerian talibans”. Although “it is unlikely that extremist Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa will

become an important and integral part of al-Qaeda's terrorist network", the possibility of "the development of a genuine African variant of terrorism cannot be ruled out entirely. The necessary ingredients...are virtually omnipresent in sub-Saharan Africa. All that is needed is a mobilising idea and agitators in order to direct the violence bred by these factors externally. Indications of this sort of process already exist". The Sahel region is considered to be the new frontier of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, the vast territories where there is no law may be used as safe heavens and training ground for terrorist groups.

3. What Can the European Union Do?

As I observed above, the European Security Strategy identifies failed states as a "key threat" to international security. More recently, the Document published by the Council, "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership", establishes "the strengthening of fragile states" as a central goal of the Euro-African partnership (December 2005). The European concern with fragile and failed states is reinforced by the creation, in the Cairo Africa-Europe Summit, held in 2000, of a "global partnership between Africa and Europe for the Twenty-First Century". From an analysis of key documents such as the European Security Strategy (ESS), the Council Common Position (CCP) concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, from January 2004, the "Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa", of November 2004, and "the EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership", of December 2005, we can identify five principles in the EU doctrine towards African failed states.

Firstly, the EU recognises that "the primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with African themselves" (CCP, 2004). In

this regard, the EU is willing to cooperate with the African Union and other African regional organizations in the “prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” in the region (CCP, 2004). Likewise, the EU supports “the enhancement of African peace support operations capabilities...as well as the capacity of the African states to contribute to regional, peace, security and development” (CCP, 2004). Secondly, the EU also acknowledges the “primary responsibility” of the UN Security Council “for the maintenance of international peace and security” (CCP, 2004, see also the ESS, 14). Thirdly, the EU explicitly links conflicts in Africa to state failure and to terrorism (ESS, 8-9). Thus, “conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives” are a “necessary precondition...for African States to build and sustain capacity to deal effectively with terrorism” (CCP, 2004).

Fourthly, the EU establishes a “link” between conflict prevention, peace-building and the fight against terrorism and “democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance” (CCP, 2004). As such, in the context of a “coherent and systematic approach to post-war situations in Africa, the EU shall stand ready to support security sector reform within the framework of democratic principles, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, in particular in countries in transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace” (CCP, 2004, see also ESS, 16).¹⁰ Fifthly, in more serious crises, the EU admits the use of military force in Africa, “including potential deployment of EU battlegroups” (The EU and Africa, Dec. 2005, see also ESS, 11-2, and 17).

Failed statehood represents a substantial challenge to the European states and to the European Union, in a double way. On the one hand, most of the instruments available to the international community depend on the existence of an effective state. However, by definition effective state authorities are absent in a condition of state failure. For instance, it is quite

¹⁰ Here, the relevant examples are British intervention in Sierra Leone, in 2002-2001, the French intervention in Ivory Coast, in 2002, and the EU humanitarian intervention in Congo, in 2003.

difficult to find political groups and leaders able to negotiate and to work with in order to establish an institutional and peaceful political order. On the other hand, the security situation in failed and collapsed states makes it highly unlikely for the international community to intervene without recurring to military force, which not only may aggravate the conditions but involves considerable risks for the troops engaged. The main terrorist threat in Africa arises from the incapability of African states to control their territory and to protect potential targets of terrorist assaults. Africa cannot win the fight against terrorism without determined investments in state capacity building, especially in the security sector, by its American and European partners.

4. Problems with the dominant international consensus (the institutional consensus).

Is the sovereign state model applicable to sub-Saharan Africa? If not, the attempt to insist on it is doomed to fail. In a way, it seems that there is a failed strategy to deal with failed states. There is a lack of alternatives that may be more efficient to organise political power and societies in sub-Saharan Africa. The persistence of a “failed paradigm”, the “New York consensus” built on sovereign statehood, and promotion of democracy, demand a deep, committed and long-term involvement of the international community. However, there are two historical problems that render such involvement very difficult. Firstly, there is a strong African opposition, which is of course linked to the heritage of colonialism. Secondly, and related to the same memories, both European governments and public opinions are also deeply reluctant to be heavily involved. We then face two options.

The first option would be a radical change of paradigm, based on the ideas of trusteeship or protectorates, shared sovereignty in some key political and economic areas, institution building rather than promotion of democracy, and the establishment of federal or confederal structures to deal with ethnic realities. The second option is to continue to muddle through, or to have more of the same: multilateral external efforts, such as peacekeeping operations and political and economic help in state-building, which produce few results. In addition, European states and the United States will try hard to protect the production of oil, the security of European nationals, to avoid terrorist activities that may threaten Europe, and to drip control refugees and illegal immigrants in camps at the borders of Europe.

I suspect that if, say in 2010, we attend a conference on security in sub-Saharan Africa, we will be basically where we are now. With decolonization, a historical option was made. Sovereign statehood would be built by Africans without a colonial or an imperial presence. The humanitarian costs of this option have been very heavy and will continue to be for the foreseeable future.

ESTADO E SEGURANÇA NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL

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O fim do *Apartheid*, em 27 de Abril de 1994, simbolizou o término de mais de trinta anos de elevado nível de violência política na África Austral, associada às lutas de libertação nacional na África do Sul, Angola, Moçambique, Namíbia e Zimbabué e às agressões rodesianas e sul-africanas aos países vizinhos. A outra fonte de violência foram os movimentos rebeldes que actuavam em Angola e Moçambique, a UNITA e a Renamo, respectivamente.

Ao longo dessa época histórica, as partes em conflito estavam claramente definidas, sendo, por um lado, o colonialismo, o Apartheid e o regime ilegal de Ian Smith e, por outro lado, os povos da região, que aspiravam à independência.

Mesmo antes da independência de Moçambique, o Presidente Julius Nyerere costumava ter encontros regulares com os seus colegas da Zâmbia, do Botswana e do Lesotho, respectivamente Kenneth Kaunda, Sir Seretse Khama e Leabua Jonathan, para troca de ideias sobre a situação política regional e o desenvolvimento das lutas de libertação nacional.

Nesses encontros, líderes dos Movimentos de Libertação eram convidados para informarem sobre a evolução das suas lutas de libertação nacional.

Com a independência de Angola e Moçambique o grupo alargou-se, com a inclusão dos líderes dos jovens Estados. Os encontros tornaram-se mais frequentes e sempre com o objectivo principal de coordenar esforços para se acelerar o processo de libertação da região. Este agrupamento informal, sem órgãos,

sede ou secretariado, passou a ser conhecido por Países da Linha da Frente, a partir de 1977.

Devido à sua vulnerabilidade à acção belicosa do regime do *Apartheid*, a Suazilândia e o Malawi não foram convidados a integrar este agrupamento político informal. Contudo, foram incluídos numa iniciativa regional mais ampla, destinada a opor-se à criação da “Constelação de Estados da África Austral”, plano político-económico de John Vorster, então Primeiro-Ministro da África do Sul. Essa iniciativa tinha como objectivo coordenar os esforços dos países da região para o seu desenvolvimento comum e levou à criação da Conferência de Coordenação para o Desenvolvimento da África Austral, SADCC, em 1980.

Doze anos mais tarde, a SADCC transformou-se na SADC, Comunidade para o Desenvolvimento da África Austral, em consequência da decisão de uma cimeira regional que teve lugar em Windhoek, Namíbia, a 17 de Agosto de 1992.

Entretanto, o número de membros dos Países da Linha da Frente foi crescendo, à medida que os países da região iam ficando independentes, nomeadamente, o Zimbabué (1980) e a Namíbia (1990).

Até ao fim do *Apartheid*, coube à Linha da Frente a coordenação da luta pela libertação política da região, nas frentes política, diplomática e militar.

A nova realidade geopolítica que se estabelece a partir de 1994 exige um repensar da região, com uma caracterização actualizada dessa nova realidade, bem como o estabelecimento de novos objectivos a atingir e instrumentos para o seu alcance. Assim, os países da África Austral deliberam que, com o fim do *Apartheid*, o esforço regional deveria ser direccionado para o desenvolvimento político, económico e social de cada um dos países individualmente e da região como um todo, contando-se com o poderio económico da nova África do Sul, que passou a integrar a SADC.

Na frente político-militar, tinham cessado os conflitos interestatais e, a partir de então, as atenções da região deveriam estar

focalizadas na modernização política dos Estados, sobretudo no que respeita à promoção da democracia, boa governação, reforço do estado de direito e respeito pelos direitos humanos. Outra área não menos importante é a adopção de medidas de cooperação entre os países membros da SADC para evitar conflitos entre si.

Estes desenvolvimentos ocorrem no contexto internacional do fim da guerra fria que simbolicamente aconteceu no dia 25 de Dezembro de 1991, com o colapso da União Soviética. Outro marco importante deste período é o caminhar para o fim do século xx, momento de balanço da vida dos países e das organizações internacionais e a projecção de objectivos a atingir no novo milénio que se avizinhava.

Sob o ponto de vista da segurança, a região da África Austral é confrontada, naquela altura, com os seguintes desafios:

- Conflitos intra-estatais em Angola, Lesotho, e República Democrática do Congo;

- Crime transfronteiriço, que inclui tráfico de armas, drogas e viaturas;

- Crime organizado;

- Crime cibernético emergente;

- Influxo de refugiados provenientes da Região dos Grandes Lagos;

- Presença de grandes quantidades de minas terrestres em alguns estados-membros;

- Acção terrorista na Tanzânia, com o risco de repetição noutros países.

Neste contexto de balanço regional, constata-se que os objectivos que levaram à criação da Linha da Frente, com a composição que tinha e a adoptar o método de trabalho que adoptou, haviam sido plenamente alcançados. Todos os países da região eram já independentes e o *Apartheid* terminara, embora a guerra

em Angola ainda continuasse. Assim, foi decidida a criação do Órgão de Cooperação Política, de Defesa e Segurança, em 28 de Junho de 1996, em Gaborone, instituição sucessora da Linha da Frente. Em 2001, foi adoptado o protocolo sobre a cooperação nas áreas da política, defesa e segurança, que cria o quadro legal em que o Órgão existe e opera.

Esta nova instituição da SADC foi criada com o objectivo geral de promover a paz e a segurança da região. Os seus objectivos específicos incluem a protecção dos povos e a salvaguarda do desenvolvimento da região contra a instabilidade resultante da ausência do estado de direito e de conflitos; a promoção da cooperação política e o desenvolvimento de valores políticos e instituições comuns, a promoção da cooperação nas áreas de defesa e segurança, bem como a prevenção e resolução por meios pacíficos de conflitos intra-estatais e inter-estatais. Para além do seu presidente, o Órgão integra uma troika, um Comité ministerial, um Comité Inter-estatal de Política e Diplomacia e um Comité Inter-estatal de Defesa e Segurança.

Na prática, o Órgão é um fórum da SADC, onde todos os estados-membros, sem excepção, participam no debate e na decisão sobre questões políticas, de defesa e segurança.

Ainda no quadro da implementação do Protocolo, em 2003 foi adoptado o Pacto de Defesa Mútua e, no ano seguinte, o Plano Estratégico Indicativo do Órgão.

O Pacto de Defesa Mútua tem como objectivo a união de esforços para a auto-defesa colectiva e a preservação da paz e estabilidade. Afirma que um ataque armado contra um Estado Parte será considerado como uma ameaça à paz e segurança regionais e respondido com uma acção colectiva imediata por todos. O princípio de não ingerência nos assuntos internos de cada Estado é limitado pela possibilidade de intervenção, decidida pela cimeira da organização, em caso de graves violações dos direitos humanos.

O Plano Estratégico Indicativo do Órgão busca a operacionalização dos objectivos do Protocolo, nas áreas da política, da defesa, da segurança do estado e da segurança pública. É um plano de médio e longo prazo, que indica os objectivos a atingir (que são os do próprio protocolo), a estratégia de implementação e o quadro institucional das actividades do Órgão. A parceria internacional é estimulada para apoiar os esforços regionais de apoio à paz, assistência humanitária, gestão de desastres naturais e combate ao crime organizado. O Plano Estratégico está em harmonia com as grandes linhas da União Africana, sobretudo no que respeita aos valores políticos a promover (tais como a democracia, respeito pelos direitos humanos e boa governação) e a criação de “força em estado de alerta” (*standby force*).

Em conclusão, pode-se dizer que a SADC tem sabido ajustar as suas instituições de defesa e segurança às realidades históricas da região. Os resultados alcançados são também positivos.

A Linha da Frente teve um papel vital na coordenação dos esforços da luta contra o *Apartheid*, principalmente na frente político-diplomática.

A região participou com sucesso na busca da paz em Angola, Moçambique, Lesotho e na República Democrática do Congo. No Zimbabué, a sua actuação muito provavelmente ajudou a evitar um conflito que poderia ter tido graves repercussões regionais e internacionais.

Hoje a região consolida a paz social, os valores e a prática democrática e o estado de direito. A região dá passos mais acelerados rumo à integração regional, que trará mais desenvolvimento para os povos da zona. Esta concentração de esforços no desenvolvimento político, económico e social só poderá produzir resultados duradouros se a paz prevalecer e se consolidar, bem como os valores próprios dos estados modernos, da democracia, estado de direito e de respeito pelos direitos dos cidadãos.

Na promoção destes valores, é importante que se compreenda que a África Austral não é constituída por estados com o mesmo grau de desenvolvimento dos valores e instituições políticas. Mas, todos eles, ao subscrever, voluntária e conscientemente, os princípios políticos consagrados nos tratados e protocolos da SADC, expressam a sua vontade de pautar a conduta dos seus estados em conformidade com os princípios político-legais estabelecidos. Contudo, as realidades históricas de cada país ditam diferentes graus de dificuldade no processo de alcance das metas comuns. Assim, os estados com maiores dificuldades em realizar as reformas necessárias precisam mais de apoio multiforme e encorajamento para ultrapassar os escolhos do percurso, em vez de pressões e condenações, que só criam confrontações desnecessárias e atitudes defensivas e atrasam ainda mais o desenvolvimento político que se pretende alcançar.

Na área da segurança, os estados da região necessitam de apoios para a modernização dos seus sistemas judiciais, incluindo uma reforma legal e o apetrechamento técnico e tecnológico das suas instituições, de modo a que possam estar à altura dos desafios que hoje se lhes colocam. Uma África Austral de paz e segurança é do interesse de todos, pois significa uma importante contribuição para a paz mundial.

Para além conferir poder das instituições da administração da justiça, a paz e a segurança na África Austral só poderão ser asseguradas através da redução substancial e contínua dos níveis de pobreza nos povos da região, o que passa pelo desenvolvimento do seu sector privado.

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

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Introduction

The elections held on 8 July 2006 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) marked the beginning of an end to a period of war, civil strife, confrontation and instability that have characterized most of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region over the last four decades. Although there is still a need for a second round to determine the first democratically elected government of the Democratic Republic of Congo since its independence in 1962, there are high hopes that elections will bring peace and the normalization of relations with its southern neighbour Angola and its eastern neighbours Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

Peace and the democratic elections in the DRC do not mean that the region has attained security. Long periods of war in the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and the existence of apartheid in South Africa for nearly half of a century, left serious legacies that continue to challenge the security of the region. Examples of these include well known problems of economic deprivation, poor economic and social infrastructure, small arms and land mines, organized crime, acute poverty exacerbated by cyclical droughts and floods and epidemics such as HIV/AIDS and malaria that affect the productive sectors of societies and service delivery.

Security in the region also continues to be affected by factors related to the dynamics of the international system that continue to breed as inequality among states of power, influence military capabilities of challenges to state-building and state-consolidation, unfavorable trade relations which add to the vulnerabilities of the region and challenge its security.

This paper examines some of the present security challenges faced by the Southern African region. It argues that for the region to attain security, SADC needs to develop an institutional and operational capacity to deal effectively with sources of insecurity such as threats to peace, trafficking of small arms, organized crime poverty and disease, as well as responding to the systemic challenges that exacerbate inequalities that affect state-building and state-consolidation, trade relations, the growing inequality among and within states which stimulates more competition and relations of subordination than an effective cooperation to deal with common problems faced by humanity.

The need to develop an operational and institutional capacity to deal with sources of insecurity as well as tackling the systemic problem impinging on the security of the region is expressed in the SADC treaty signed in Windhoek in 1992, that established the Organ for Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in 1996¹. The establishment of OPDSC signaled that the region was moving towards establishing a more stable security architecture. For example, Article 5 of the SADC treaty stipulates that one of the objectives of SADC member states is to promote and defend peace and security, while article 21 opens up a space for the member states to cooperate in the area of peace and security. The ratification of the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation by SADC member states subsequently, left little doubts that there is a will of the region to embrace a concept of security which was not state-centred but people-centred and which recognized the need to tackle both, operational and systemic challenges.

¹ See SADC
Communique,
Issued at the
End of the SADC
Summit in 28
June 1996.

I. The Present Security System and Its Origins

As argued elsewhere, long wars of liberation in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia, the civil strife that followed in the first three countries, the reigning of apartheid regime in South Africa for more than four decades and the ensuing struggle to end it, left the region with serious legacies that constitute daunting challenges to its security. Among these are landmines, the existence of easily available light and conventional weapons, pervasive poverty and disease and little capacity to deal with cross-border organized crime including money laundering cartels, drug trafficking cartels and corruption.

The wars in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have left large chunks of territory covered by land mines. Although it is very difficult to put an accurate figure of the existing mines in these territories, the 1993 UN conference on landmines held in Nairobi estimated that between 80 and 120 million land mines had been laid throughout the world and that Angola and Mozambique were the most mined territories in the world. Statistics published in 1996, estimated that Angola had between 8 to 20 million landmines in its territory while Mozambique was estimated to have 1 million. A decade later after the publication of the statistics, landmines continue to pose a serious threat to the population and their livelihoods. This is exacerbated by the current climatic changes, which bring frequent floods, and droughts imposing forced migration on populations.

Landmines continue to kill and mutilate human beings, limit the free circulation of goods and people, the free use of agricultural land and destroy the environment and render large chunks of the country unproductive. They impede communities to utilize their full potential into recovery and development. Meanwhile, mine awareness and risk education, minefields sur-

vey, marking and clearance, victim assistance including rehabilitation and reintegration and advocacy to support de-mining need large quantities of resources, which are not available. As a result, de-mining has shown sluggish progress in the region and continue to add to the insecurity of the region. However, Gareth Elliot and his colleagues observe, that the real challenge remains to move beyond de-mining and tackle all capacity building and socio-economic implications to development².

² See Gareth Elliot (ed) *Beyond De-mining : capacity Building and Socio-Economic consequences*, South African Institute for International Affairs Publications, 2000.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

In addition to challenges posed by landmines the region continues to face threats of the circulation of illicit weapons which fuel conflict and organized crime. Light weapons, apart from exacerbating the social conflict and inculcating fear, place an additional strain to the state's capacity to maintain public order and cater for other sources of stability and security, especially those in social and economic sectors³. Light weapons used in the Angolan civil wars have helped to fuel civil strife in the Democratic Republic of Congo, while the war in DRC has been fuelled by weapons coming from Uganda and Rwanda. Mercenary and apartheid sponsored para-militaries and mercenaries operated in Namibia and Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, facilitating gun running and other illicit operations. There is sufficient evidence in the region to show that light weapons acquired during the Mozambique civil war found their way to foment criminal activities ranging from armed robberies, organized cross-border crime and drug trafficking in Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and Malawi.

³ See, João Honwana and Guy Lamb, *Small Arms Proliferation and Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa*, Conceptual Paper, Staff Paper Series, Centre for Conflict Resolution of the University of Cape Town, February 1998.

Light weapons have thus become an important source of instability and insecurity in the region, destabilizing and terrorizing communities, fuelling civil strife, facilitating the operations

of gang running cartels, drug trafficking cartels and fomenting widespread corruption in police officers and in customs.

Recognizing the dangers posed by small arms, the United Nations organized a conference on *Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*⁴ in Kenya in 2001 to seek international consensus for a sustained global effort to stop the transfer and re-circulation of small weapons. The Kenya conference agreed on a set of measures ranging from the destruction of stock-piles of small arms, addressing the loopholes facilitating the trafficking, such as the existence of lax legislation and weak law enforcement and develop crossborder cooperation tailored to the needs of the region. The conference recognized that in countries torn apart by civil strife it was important to stop legal and illegal transfers of light weapons while in others efforts were to be directed at impeding the use of small weapons to violate human rights⁵. There was also recognition that practical measures were insufficient in the absence of norms and standards requiring global application by both producing and recipient countries.

However, driven by the will to maximize profit and rent-seeking activities, small arms traffickers, facilitated by the existence of porous borders, corrupt officials in the armies police forces and customs, still find loopholes to transfer and re-circulate light weapons. The existence of poor surveillance and control equipment of air-traffic, vessels such as radar systems, telecommunications equipment and the lack of qualified human resources in most of the subcontinent adds to the problem, making it easier for the cartels and gangs to operate more freely.

To deal with the issue of small weapons, SADC has signed a protocol on the Control of Fire Arms and Other Related Materials which commits the member states to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of small weapons, ammunition and other related materials and their excessive

⁴ See the United Nations Secretary General Report, S/ 2001.

⁵ See for example Elizabeth Clegg et al. on regional Initiatives and UN 2001 Conference: Building Mutual Support and Complementarity "biting the Bullet, British American Security Information Council, <http://www.basicint.org/wt/smallarms/UN2001BTB2/htm>.

destabilizing accumulation, trafficking, possession and use of fire arms in the region. The protocol also commits member states to facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and experiences that will help the region to achieve the above mentioned objectives⁶.

⁶ See Article 3 of the Protocol on Control of Fire Arms, Ammunition and Other related Materials, <http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal/protocols/firearms.php>.

⁷ Ibid, Articles 5-6.

The Protocol details initiatives that will be undertaken to effect cooperation, such as affiliating to international organizations and adhering to international conventions and initiatives aimed at curbing the illicit trafficking accumulation and use of small arms, enacting legislation where it does not exist, mutual legal assistance, public education and awareness programmes and co-operation among law enforcement agencies to promote the implementation of this Protocol⁷.

The signing and ratification of the Protocol on Fire Arms and Ammunition is by and large a good step towards curbing the illicit trafficking of small arms and to reduce their destructive impact in the region, however serious challenges still face its implementation. Chief among these is the poor institutional capacity in each member state to ensure that the Protocol does not remain a document left in the drawers or shelves of Ministries of defense, police and security. The establishment of bodies such as the OPDSC and their subordinate bodies such as the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organizations (SARPCCO) and other mechanisms to facilitate cooperation among Police and Intelligence Chiefs have helped to remind member states on their responsibilities to implement the Protocol, but there are more challenges associated with the speed of the ratification of the Protocols, enacting the necessary legislation that will facilitate the implementation of protocol and capacity in ministries, in the intelligence agencies, uniformed forces to implement the Protocol, monitor the state of implementation and keep track of the loopholes exploited by the operatives.

Pervasive Poverty and Its Implications

The Global Poverty Summit held in Okinawa in July 2000 recognized; "...poor are not only deprived of income and resources, but of opportunities. Markets and jobs are often difficult to access, because of low capabilities, geographical and social exclusions. Limited access to education affects the ability to get jobs and obtain information that could improve the quality of their lives. Poor health due to inadequate nutrition, hygiene and health services further limits their prospects for work and from realizing their mental and physical potential. This fragile position is exacerbated by insecurity."⁸ The report also noted that Sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the highest incidence of poverty in the world with some shocking indicators in infant mortality, school enrolment, income inequality. The report also indicates that 47% of the population lives below the poverty line⁹. Although this figure lowered to 44.6 % in 2001 it rose again to 46.5%¹⁰ in 2004.

The causes of poverty in Africa have long been identified as the lack of inadequate infrastructures, high illiteracy rates, high population growth rates, frequent natural disasters, low levels of production and productivity, poor production technology especially in the agriculture sector which provides most of the employment and the largest share in the continent's GDP. Despite its importance, the agriculture sector continues to be the sector where Governments spend less than 10% of their budgetary resources¹¹. This gloomy picture led critics to predict at the turning of the Millennium that Africa was the only continent where poverty levels were likely to continue to increase in the 21 century¹².

Sadly, the existing evidence shows that the prediction made 6 years ago was right. Poverty continues to increase in Africa and adding to the insecurity of the continent. The African

⁸ See the Global Poverty Report, Sponsored by African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for reconstruction and Development, Inter-American Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, p. 1, July 2000.

⁹ Ibid, p. 4.

¹⁰ See African Common Position on the Review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals, African Union, Addis Ababa, May 2006, p. 5.

¹¹ The Conference of Ministers of Agriculture facilitated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recommended African states to spend 10% of their budget resources as their commitment to NEPAD.

¹² See the Global Poverty Report 2000, p. 5.

Union Report on African Common Position on the Review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals reached the sad conclusion that not only poverty has increased, but also hunger and that if the present trends continue Africa will fail to reach the targets set to halve poverty levels and hunger by 2015. Among the reasons hindering poverty reduction in the continent, the report points to weak economic performance, political turmoil and civil strife, the vagaries of weather and highly skewed income distribution¹³. However, it will not be incorrect to add to this list, poor policies and the capacity to acquire and use new technologies that lead to further marginalisation of the African continent.

¹³ Ibid, pp. 6-8.

Poverty levels are also high in the Southern African region and statistics speak for themselves. About 30% of the population in the SADC region live with less than US\$1 per/day; while the average shortfall of poor below the poverty line is 27%. Under 5 mortality rate is 165 per 1000 live births while the average adult illiteracy rate is 29% with some countries reaching over 60%. Even South Africa, with a GDP per capita of around \$4000 in 2000, about half of its population lives in poverty and about one quarter of the households are trapped in chronic poverty¹⁴. Although some low income countries, including Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique have shown steady economic growth since the turn of the Millennium, like other countries in the region, they also risk not to meet the Millennium Development Goals targets by 2015.

¹⁴ See the Chronic Poverty Report 2004-2005, Chronic Poverty research Centre, Institute for development Policy and Management University of Manchester, p. 68, 2005.

The majority of the poor live in rural areas, although in recent times many countries have increasingly shown a significant number of urban poor¹⁵. The levels of poverty, especially chronic poverty in Southern Africa are exacerbated by the HIV/AIDS incidence which is among the highest in the world. The pandemic has left many households to be headed by children, the elderly and vulnerable females who have limited options to escape from the poverty trap, especially chronic poverty.

¹⁵ See the Chronic Poverty Report 2004-2005, Chronic Poverty research Centre, Institute for development Policy and Management University of Manchester.

If one takes the view of Amartya Sen, who sees poverty as a deprivation of capabilities¹⁶, the logical conclusion is that poverty is a source of insecurity in the region, perhaps the number one source today. First, because it affects large numbers people, since more than half of the population of the region live in poverty, and second, because it is in the core of people's existence. As explained by Sen, viewing poverty as capability deprivation does not deny low income as the major source of poverty.

Low-income people and nations find it difficult to feed themselves, their families and their populations. Because people cannot feed themselves adequately they will be malnourished and physically inapt to secure employment to increase their income base. People with low income will also find it difficult to pay for their health care or education that could be the basis for them to expand their choices. It is clear that for people living with less than US\$1 per day their security is clearly more threatened by poverty rather than by the prospects of an inter-state or intra-state conflict.

This fact should not take one to conclude that the threat of civil or inter-state conflict is less important than poverty. The point being made is that security is a concept that cannot be defined outside the context and in the absence of a referral object. In the context of Southern Africa today it would not make a lot of sense to talk about security without placing poverty in the equation and the relationship between security and poverty is well-known. Poverty creates inequalities among society members, inequalities can lead to social exclusion and alienation. Social exclusions affects the nation's cohesiveness and can lead to rivalries, organized crime and resort to violence to resolve social differences or perceived social injustice that can ignite conflict and civil strife. Therefore, tackling poverty becomes an important security priority in young nations such as those of Southern Africa.

¹⁶ See Amartya Sen, *Development As Freedom*, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 87-94.

Recognizing that poverty is of particular importance to the security of the region, SADC member states have put together a comprehensive plan to respond to the challenges of poverty. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) articulates the priorities by sector, both economic and social and the capacity development needs in areas such as disaster management, humanitarian assistance and others¹⁷. The RISDP has attempted to combine NEPAD objectives and assigns top priority to poverty reduction and sees RISDP as vehicle through which the region can achieve MDG's. The plan is to implement RISDP at national level with SADC Secretariat playing a facilitative role.

¹⁷ See the regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, March 2004.

The Regional Framework for Security

As argued elsewhere, there can be no doubts that in post-Cold War era SADC has been moving away from a traditional state-centred concept of security to a people-centred security and its approach is to tackle both operational issues, from legal framework to institutional capacity and issues emanating from the international system. In the search for its security SADC has chosen a path of, on the one hand, consolidating its regional cooperation and identity while tackling the institutional framework and capacity issues necessary to curb insecurity, in clear recognition that they mutually reinforce each other. In other words, addressing common concerns reinforces regional identity and the development of a common institutional framework facilitates the cooperation and the resolution of common concerns.

Thus, since its creation in 1990 SADC has signed or ratified protocols that aim at creating common values, standards and principles and norms such as the Principles Governing Democratic Elections, Protocol against Corruption, the Protocol

granting the free movement of peoples and goods and cooperation among parliamentarians. SADC states have also signed and ratified protocols that seek to strengthen cooperation on operational issues such as curbing the organized crime, as evidenced by the Protocol on Cooperation to curb organized crime, Mutual Assistance on Legal Affairs and the protocol on the firearms. The third category of Protocols signed are those that seek to reinforce cooperation in sectors such as energy, tourism, wild life, transport and communications. All these protocols have in one way or the other a direct bearing on the security of the region.

The framework for cooperation in the specific area of security is, however, set by the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation signed by SADC member states in 2001. This protocol gave a new life to the Organ as it stipulates that member states will cooperate in normative, standards setting and operational issues, undertaking activities aimed at promoting, defending and consolidating democracy, peace and security and stability. The protocol objectives include the following:

- To protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from breakdown of law and order, intrastate conflict, and aggression,
- Promote political cooperation among state parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
- Promote regional coordination and cooperation on matters related to security and defense and establish mechanisms to this end;
- Prevent, contain, and resolve inter and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;
- Promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of the state parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the charters and conventions of the Organization of African Unity and United Nations respectively;

- Consider a development of collective security capacity and conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external military threats;
- Develop a close cooperation between the police and state security to address crossborder crime and promote a community-based approach to domestic security;
- Observe and encourage state parties to implement United Nations, African Union and Other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states;
- Enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance;
- Develop a peacekeeping capacity of national defense force and coordinate the participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations.

Following the ratification of the Protocol, SADC has developed a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) that was approved in August 2004. The SIPO provides general guidelines that spell out specific activities for the realization of the Organ objectives including the Protocol on Politics Defense and Security Cooperation and the Mutual Defense Pact approved by the member states in 2002.

While SIPO recognizes that member states demonstrate the political will to cooperate in political, defence and security matters and this has created an enabling environment for peace and security, and stability in the region, the region continues to face potential and actual military threats stemming from unfinished demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration in some member states and activities of former military personnel, terrorism and land mines. Thus SADC sees it essential to avert political conflict, external aggression and promote peaceful relations among its members and citizens¹⁸.

¹⁸ See the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, 2004, p. 10.

The SIPO commits member states to cooperate in the political sector, by promoting political pluralism, encouraging political consultations using informal and informal networks to usher in peace and create an enabling environment for development; promote the development of democratic institutions and practices including the observance of human rights. The agenda also includes the creation of common electoral standards and the code of conduct, good governance, including the creation of conditions for political parties to accept the elections results and creation of regional commissions for human rights¹⁹.

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 14-20.

Through SIPO, SADC member states have also outlined activities that will strengthen their defence by signing a defence pact which, among other things, seeks to protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, harmonize their defence policies, consider the development of a collective security capacity including peacekeeping capacities including a standby arrangement to enhance regional capacity to deal with humanitarian disasters and coordination of humanitarian assistance.

The Indicative Plan also seeks to enhance state sector security and public sector security by dealing with threats to subvert constitutional order and diminish national sovereignty and manouvres to undermine the economic interest of member states or the region. Cooperation in this sector also envisages promoting regional coordination on matters related to security and defence and the establishment of an appropriate mechanism to effect this cooperation. Exchanging information on criminal activities, criminals and the conduct of joint operation, collaborative efforts by the police forces and intelligence are also envisaged activities.

As indicated, the established framework, legal and institutional, since the creation of the OPDSC seeks to respond to both

operational institutional and capacity challenges to the enhancement of security in the region and is a logical follow up to the debate that has taken place in SADC since the waning of the Cold War. However, the real challenge is on the capacity to implement what the member states have agreed on and to monitor the state of implementation. This will be determined, apart from the political will, by the quality of human resources in each of the member states, the training and experience of implementing agencies. While some of these challenges can be fully resolved in a relatively short period of time others, such as the availability of financial resources and prioritization, or technological requirements, are more serious and can take a long time.

Systemic Issues Affecting the Southern African Security System

In the present text, the term 'systemic issues' refers to the issues resulting from the interaction of Southern African security system(s) with the larger international system. The concept of system of security is borrowed from Hedley Bull's conception of system of states. Bull depicts that a system of states is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them and have sufficient impact on one another's decision to cause them to behave at least in some measure as parts of the whole²⁰. Working with the same conception Barry Buzan calls it security complex and refers to distinct patterns of security relations within regions of a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed apart from one another²¹.

SADC member states are a result of the expansion of the international system and bound by a complex web of relations with

²⁰ See Hedley Bull, *Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London: MacMillan, 1985, pp. 16-17.

²¹ See Barry Buzan, *The European Security Order Recast*, London: Pinter, 1990, p. 13.

the rest of the world. However, their security is mostly affected by relations with powerful members of the international system in Europe and the United States of America, where one finds patterns of dependence and interdependence.

Classic writings by Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight and others have attested to the existence of hierarchy of states in the international system which are important in defining norms and setting standards²². One factor determining this hierarchy is power that can be defined as aggregate capabilities across several sectors, that is military, economic, societal and political²³. Being a powerful nation in this case would mean the ability to concentrate and control national assets, economic, military, technological and ideological and turn their influence outward to achieve the nation's interest.

The evidence shows that Southern African states are no exception. Power relations are at play. The fact that these states are the junior members of the international system has made them look for support and guidance from the powerful members for their policies and technical endeavors. They have applied norms and standards set by the powerful members and taken their recommendations and advice into consideration. Andrew Hurrell observes that less powerful states are more than in the past becoming "role takers."²⁴ Thus, their policies and actions including their security decisions are also influenced by the relationships they have with powerful members of the international system. However, acquiescing to this external influence has at times resulted in tension requiring a balancing act between the pursuit of their security interests dictated by the realities at home and preserving their interests in the global international system.

One practical example illustrating the tensions between domestic realities and international standards is the need for the Southern African states to catch up with norms, principles and

²² See for example Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* and Martin Wight, *Power Politics*.

²³ See for example Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, reading Mass, Addison Wesley, pp. 131, 192.

²⁴ See Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods "Introduction" in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods *Inequality, Globalisation and World Politics*, Oxford University press, 1999, p. 1.

agreed rules guiding the functioning of modern statehood such as good governance and respect for and protection of human rights. Having been created much earlier than their counterparts in Southern Africa, Western states master these concepts and have them fully streamlined in their policies when compared to their counterparts in the South. They have also a well-trained, equipped and experienced civil service that does not find difficult to work with these concepts and apply the required rules. However, for their Southern counterparts applying these norms and standards has been a challenge due to, for example, the lack of a well-trained civil service, resources or the existence of cultural realities that do not permit quick transformation of societies. Thus the interaction between SADC and powerful members of the international system on normative issues has generated tensions that cannot be ignored in security analyses.

Another practical example is shown by the need to hold regular multiparty elections as an internationally accepted standard to measure whether or not a given country is democratic. The experience is that in many Southern African countries, elections continue to be a dividing factor. Elections have led to skirmishes in Zanzibar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho and Zambia and have led to divisions in Zimbabwe and Malawi. Participating political parties have tended to see each other not as groupings seeking to contribute to their nation's advancement from different political and philosophical perspectives, but as rivals pursuing war through other means.

At times political parties see each other as competing for a post-election scramble of the country resources and opportunities and privileges coming with occupying a public office. They then find it difficult to see themselves as part of one nation but as parties in dispute and this partly explains the post-election violence. In this regard, the frequent post-election violence in the region is a quick reminder of how democracies in the

region are still fragile and able to generate a climate of instability and insecurity. Post-election violence is a quick reminder of the existing tensions between the need to apply internationally recognized standards and norms and realities on the ground, which need to be factored in the security needs.

State building and Consolidation as a Security Need

Ayoob has observed that we cannot comprehend the security predicament of the Third World states without understanding the process of state building currently underway in the Third World²⁵. States play a central role in security, not because, as noted by Max Weber, they possess monopoly over the means of violence and coercion which enables it to become the overarching source of order and authority at the domestic level but because they provide protection to its citizens against foreign aggression.

Tilly argues that states are central to security because their monopoly of means of violence enables them to carry out 4 different activities such as: i) war making to eliminate or neutralize their own rivals in territories in which they have clear and a continuous priority as wilders; ii) state-making, eliminating and neutralizing their own rivals inside those territories; iii) protection which includes eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients; and iv) extraction which means acquiring the means of carrying out the first three functions²⁶. Although Locke had already observed that the desire for men to put themselves under government is to defend their property, including lives liberties and estates²⁷, is it pertinent to ask whether all states are capable of guaranteeing security to their citizens?

Barry Buzan suggests that not all states are capable of providing security to their citizens and indeed some of them are sources of insecurity. He postulates that to be able to provide

²⁵ See Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, regional conflict and the International system* London Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 21.

²⁶ See Charles Tilly, *War Making and State making As Organized Crime* In Peter D. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda Skocpol (ed) *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) p. 181.

²⁷ See John Locke *Two Treatises of Government*, (edited by Peter Laslett), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 406-407.

²⁸ Barry Buzan,
People States and
Fear: *An Agenda
for Security
Studies in the Post
Cold War Era*
(London:
1991)

security states should have a well articulated idea of the state, that is what the states exist to do; a physical base which comprises assets, population, territory and authorities; and institutions that are capable of mediating societal interest and provide an environment to realize their aspirations²⁸. Buzan further argues that when the idea of the state and institutions is strong, the state will be in a better position to act as a coherent unit in the interest of its citizens.

One would certainly reach the conclusion that most Southern African states are still in the phase of gestation and unable to provide security for their citizens when one judges them through the criterion set by Buzan. They will also not qualify to perform all the four functions suggested by Tilly. They are still struggling to consolidate their statehood through a process of transformation from a colonial state conceived to exploit and subjugate their fellow citizens. The idea of the state or its purpose is still not widely held and in some cases is narrowly defined to coincide with particular interests of some citizens, yet in others it is still struggling to find expression. The institutions to promote and protect societal values are weak, while their physical base, particularly resources and assets cannot yet be leveraged to serve the interests of all citizens.

Inequalities within the states of development resources, opportunities and capabilities have produced economic and income distribution asymmetries undermining social cohesion and the national idea from which the concept of national security is derived. These inequalities are not only a result of domestic factors but of interactions with international system from financial and monetary institutions, relations of trade, structure of aid, military and political aid and the normative framework and systems of governance. Southern African states can no longer exist in isolation, become neutral or indifferent to the international system or their counterparts in the West or in other parts of the

world. They were created in a different context from the early European model of state building, whereby a strong alliance between racketeers and merchants and their mutual support conditioned the state consolidation, its expansion²⁹.

The context in which Southern African states need to consolidate themselves and attain their security is characterized by the existence of a well established international system dominated by some powerful member, which contains also powerful multilateral institutions that are important not only in setting norms and standards but also in expanding and eventually globalizing these sets of norms. The international system in which these African states are inhered continues to recognize the state as the basic unit of interaction with the rest of its members, powerful and weak. Members of this system of stems are not only required to be states but to also become good states that abide by a certain set of norms. In this regard, in the struggle for their security, southern African states will need to increasingly adhere to these norms consult and interact with their counterparts outside Southern Africa. This interaction makes their security decisions to be also aware to some measure, that they are part of the whole. Consolidating state building could help the consolidation of Southern Africa's security system.

²⁹ See Charles Tilly, *War Making and State Making*, op. cit. p. 181.

Resources and Technology

The third way in which the international system impinges on the security of Southern African states is through their dependence on economic, military, technological and financial aid. Among all these technological and financial aid are more important. During the Cold War the big brother syndrome played an important role in the security of the Third world states and not least of Southern African states, providing them weapons, equipment

and technology. The result was the well-known polarization of the world into pro-Soviet and pro-West. Even those who professed non-alignment have been forced to search for greater power patrons from whom they derived military, economic, technological and financial aid.

In the present context, the big brother has disappeared, but the need to have a big power or group of countries on which they can lean on continues to be important. Some commentators could argue that this is more pressing now given that technological advancements have marginalized the continent even more. Business opportunities, strategic resources including mineral and energy have proved to be important to forge such relations. But, like in yester years powerful states have used their influence, technology and resources to leverage their interest and to shape the international system in protection of their values and interests. Therefore, the acceptance of these values has been used as a trade off by rich countries to provide more resources, technical support including the transfer of technology. Another factor that has counted for the attraction of more resources and other types of assistance is the perceived role or position of a given country in the fight against terrorism or other strategic issues.

Southern African states have embarked on the other systemic problem affecting the regional security system in Southern Africa, the dependence on resources. Resources are needed for basic social services, for food and health, for economic recovery, for training in peacekeeping and for joint operations and for technology transfers. SADC member states finance the current cost of the secretariat, while operational costs are funded by the donor community.

The likelihood that security activities to attract donor funding in the absence of perceived immediate threats is remote. Funding security related activities is likely to remain a problem for a very long time.

As Southern Africa continues to interact with the rest of the world and willing to adopt international best practices, new norms values and standards tensions resulting from slow adaptability to change, and chock between the old and the new are likely to rise and affect the way the regional security system functions.

Conclusion

The thrust of this paper is that Southern Africa has made significant advances both in operationalizing a new concept of security, one which is people-centred and encompassing many spheres of human interaction, that is, military, economic, political and social. The advances include the development of institutional and legal frameworks in dealing with issues. Although the region has some reasons to celebrate, it still has reasons to be worried about such as landmines, small arms, organized mines, poverty, the vagaries of the weather and issues resulting from the dynamics of the international system which has created inequalities within and between states and brought more vulnerabilities to weaker states. While the region should continue its efforts to consolidate state-building and deal with operational issues, it should also pay particular attention to issues such as technological development and transfer and expanding its resource base and managing issues that will enable it to maximize benefits from the international system. These seem to be essential for its security.

FROM HEGEMON TO CHAMPION: SOUTH AFRICA AND STRATEGIC BALANCE

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During the 30 years leading up to the end of the Cold War and shortly after the dismantling of the apartheid state in South Africa, southern Africa had been characterised by a tense balance between an aggressive hegemon and its restless neighbours. The region was simultaneously engaged in forging cooperation and pulling itself apart. South Africa's economy not only dwarfed all others but also anchored, shaped and/or distorted them. Men from across the region were sucked into the migrant labour system feeding South Africa's mining industry. Railways, ports and power grids were developed to serve South Africa's needs. As Chester Crocker notes,

The weight and influence of South Africa could be felt throughout the region, parts of which functioned as dependent offshoots of the South African mining, transport, and communications systems. Banks, corporations, managers, and technicians were often South African-based. South African-style Roman-Dutch law and common commercial standards spread to a number of neighbouring lands. South African import-export traffic, electricity demand and tourism shaped the economy of southern Mozambique¹.

No national army or guerrilla force could seriously threaten the apartheid state at home, and only Angola's military, with the strong backing of Cuban troops, mounted a viable opposition to the South African Defence Forces deployed north of the

¹ Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1992, p. 20.

Limpopo River. In its rolling campaign to thwart advancing liberation movements, some of which were Marxist and all of which were hostile to Pretoria, and stem the retreat of white minority dominance in the region, South Africa waged dirty tricks campaigns and wars of destabilisation in almost all of its immediate neighbouring states. It fuelled prolonged and vicious civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, launched raids against states that harboured exiled South African struggle movements, and fought alongside Rhodesian forces against Zimbabwean guerrillas.

Three main regional blocs emerged in response to South Africa's economic and military dominance. The region's three smallest states, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, were joined with South Africa and South African-controlled South West Africa in a customs union. In 1975 six regional states – Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe – grouped together as the Frontline States to provide assistance and safe haven to the liberation movements of South Africa and South West Africa. Four years later, in May 1979, those states joined together with three others – Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland – to form the South African Development Co-ordination Conference. The SADCC had four main objectives: to reduce economic dependence on South Africa; identify, design and implement a regional development strategy; pool resources and build self-reliance; and garner international support against apartheid and for the emerging post-colonial states. As P J Liebenow observed in the early 1980s, the SADCC, which at the time of its inception created at least the idea of a combined market of 60 million people, reflected an attempt to solve two regional conditions: first, 'the independent states acting separately have been no match for South Africa'; and second, 'the acquiescence of independent African states in forging economic links with South Africa has impeded the liberation efforts of Africans in Namibia and the Republic of South Africa.'²

² P J Liebenow, Abstract from 'SADCC: Challenging the 'South Africa Connection' http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12338432&dopt=Abstract

In Africa the rains bring change. The two great political developments that transformed the region – Namibia's independence in 1990 and the unbanning of South African liberation movements and release of political prisoners such as Nelson Mandela the same year – did not result in an immediate shift in the prevailing regional strategic balance. It took a change in the weather to unlock the potential for new dynamics based on integrating rather than opposing the regional hegemon. A severe drought gripped southern Africa in 1992, and SADCC became the instrument for a coordinated regional response. In August that year, SADCC was formally reconfigured as the South African Development Community, which espoused the principles of economic integration, sovereign equality of member states, common peace and security, and democracy. Importantly, the newly transformed SADC embraced South Africa's participation and ultimate membership.

In the 15 years since, the SADC has developed an impressive edifice of common protocols, agreed best practices, and committees on peace and security, elections and so on. These have had little tangible influence, however, on the behaviour of and between member states, and among the nine regional economic communities in Africa the SADC is one of the least effective. The former regional strategic balance between apartheid South Africa and its neighbours has been replaced by a muddle of agreed ideals and conflicting national self-interests. SADC member states have engaged in intra-regional wars and resource pillaging. They have shown a disinclination to hold each other accountable to accepted standards and pledges. The organ on peace and security has been disrupted repeatedly by power rivalries. Importantly, the implosion of Zimbabwe has made the shared goal of economic integration unrealisable. And while the strategic seam between South Africa and the rest of the region has been stitched together, the same essential imbalances and attending

suspensions abide. South Africa remains the greatest economic and military power in Africa, a reluctant hegemon still eyed cautiously by neighbouring states despite its vigorous pursuit of pan-African interests on and off the continent. The old economic and military rivalries have gone, but an odour of distrust lingers.

This chapter attempts to assess regional strategic rebalancing in contemporary southern Africa. Three points of departure must be indicated at the outset. First, in the context of the brief history given above, regional strategic rebalancing suggests a process through which two or more intra-regional rivals – whether individual states or blocs – seek to correct new economic or military imbalances resulting from the region's significant political transformation. It is the position of this paper that no such process is indicated or underway. Second, this is not an assessment of regional economic integration or peace and security-building. That work is left to the many fine studies that have been done and will be done on the effectiveness and evolution of the SADC. Third, while it can rightly be argued that strategic rebalancing in southern African involves an Eastward shift in economic relations, the burden of assessing that trend has fallen to other chapters in this volume.

The opportunity thus arises to move in a different direction. The single most formative development in Africa since the Berlin Conference of 1878 was the demise of the apartheid in 1994. The advent of majority rule in South Africa initiated the final integration of a continent of free and independent states, a process that would include the total transformation of Africa's diplomatic norms and architecture. Pretoria has become the continent's chief builder of peace and catalyst for change. Almost from the outset of its democratic rule, however, South Africa has set its sights on grander ambitions. Under President Thabo Mbeki, particularly, South Africa has increasingly tied the transformation of its region and continent to the rebalancing of the global economic and power equation – a project it

is pursuing as much in the UN Security Council and World Trade Organisation as in the polling stations of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Based on statements and positions taken by South African officials in international fora, this paper argues that understanding regional strategic rebalancing requires a shift in the definition of the region involved from southern Africa to, in its broadest terms, the entire non-Western world. The hegemon of southern Africa has become the self-appointed champion of an emergent South, a development that is already reshaping international dynamics in critical global issues.

Indicators and Technicalities

A 1996 government 'white paper' on South African foreign policy observed: 'South Africa, as a small to medium-sized economic power with an open economy which is dependent on international trade, will have to play a role in the constructive advancement of the new "economic" world order towards a more equitable set of practices.'³ Two actions by South Africa in different arenas of the United Nations during the past year give substance to that aspiration.

On February 4, 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency voted 27-3-1 to refer Iran to the UN Security Council, paving the way for possible punitive actions against Tehran for failing to halt its nuclear activity (limited sanctions were imposed in December of that year). South Africa cast the lone abstention. In explaining his country's position, Amb. Abdul Samad Minty, South Africa's representative on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said:

This resolution seeks to initiate a process whereby the Security Council will become more substantially involved in

³ 'South African Foreign Policy,' Discussion Document June 1996, Department of Foreign Affairs. This white paper can be found on the website www.dfa.gov.za

the Agency's verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a diminishing and possibly subservient and even marginal role for the Board. ... South Africa places a great importance on the role, authority, impartiality and integrity of the Agency and we would not wish to do anything that would reduce or undermine its solemn responsibilities⁴.

⁴ Statement by Mr. Abdul Samad Minty, Governor of the Republic of South Africa at the Special Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Related Board Resolutions, Vienna, Austria, 4 February 2006. This document may be found on the website www.dfa.gov.za

That motivation – a technicality, in essence, of forum and jurisdiction – would reappear almost exactly one year later in another controversial vote. In one of its first actions after assuming a nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council in January 2007, South Africa voted against a resolution calling on Myanmar's government to cease military attacks against civilians in ethnic minority regions and begin earnest political negotiations with opposition parties on a transition to democracy. Explaining South Africa's vote against the resolution, for which the government sustained domestic and international criticism, Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad stated that 'this resolution deals with issues that would be best left to the Human Rights Council. The Non-Aligned Countries and the G77 and China consistently voiced concern at the tendency of the Security Council to encroach on the mandate of other United Nations entities.'⁵

⁵ Op. cit.

⁶ 'Declaration: Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World – The Need for New Agenda,' 9 June 1998. This document may be found on the website www.info.gov.za/speeches/1998/98612_0x0289810312.htm

In one sense, the Iran and Myanmar votes appear to be thoroughly inconsistent with two abiding principles of South African foreign policy: non-proliferation and protection of human rights. As the only country to unilaterally disarm its nuclear weapons, South Africa enjoys broadly recognised moral authority as an opponent of such programmes. In 1998 South Africa joined a host of other nations in signing a joint declaration entitled 'Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World – The Need for a New Agenda' pursuing 'the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons.'⁶ The Declaration recalled the statement by the com-

missioners of the Canberra Commission that 'the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used – accidentally or by decision – defies credibility.'⁷ Seven years later, in a statement at the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Minty reiterated South Africa's position that 'the only real guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be produced again.'⁸

The country's position on human rights is equally unequivocal. The South African Bill of Rights, referred to as the 'cornerstone of democracy' in a national constitution shaped by the memory of one of the more repressive systems the world has ever known, 'enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.' The 1996 White Paper on foreign policy, similarly states that '[t]he advancement of human rights and the promotion of democracy are pillars on which South African foreign policy rests.' Finally, a statement by the National Executive Committee of the ruling African National Congress explaining South Africa's approach to serving on the Security Council declared:

Our fortunes as a nation are intimately interconnected with the fortunes of our neighbours, our continent and indeed all of humanity. It is therefore on this basis both of moral responsibility and collective self-interest that we continue to be actively engaged in the effort to build a better Africa and world. SA needs to use this important position in the Security Council to advance the cause of Africa in international affairs, in particular, and confirm that Africans occupy the front ranks in the world struggle for peace, security and stability⁹.

⁷ Op. Cit.

⁸ 'Statement by the Republic of South Africa during the general debate of the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, delivered by Mr. Abdul Samad Minty, Deputy Director-General: Department of Foreign Affairs, Chairperson of the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and South Africa's Governor on the Board of the IAEA, New York.' This document may be found on the website www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05050410151001.htm

⁹ Cited by Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad in 'Notes following Briefing by Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad, Media Centre Amphitheatre, Union Buildings, Pretoria, Wednesday, 17 January 2007.' This document may be found on the website www.dfa.gov.za

In both the Iran and Myanmar votes, South African officials were quick to point out their longstanding commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and human rights. Both votes, however, have drawn sustained criticism. On the specific issue of Iran's nuclear programme, South Africa is certainly protecting its own interests. One senior foreign policy official, speaking in an interview in his office in Pretoria, defended the abstention in the IAEA vote on Iran this way: 'It is them today and us tomorrow.'¹⁰ South Africa maintains the position that as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has the right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology. Pretoria, meanwhile, has publicly indicated the possibility of resuming enrichment of uranium as part of a revitalised domestic commercial nuclear sector. The ruling African National Congress remains wary of 'bullying' by Western governments against smaller, non-aligned states, and asserting the rights of the latter forms part of its own defence against the same. Another South African official also referred to the need to protect 'economic relations between Iran and Africa.'¹¹ South Africa obtains 40 % of its oil from Iran.

¹⁰ Interview, Pretoria, 23 June 2006.

¹¹ Interview, Pretoria, 20 November 2006.

A survey of statements by key South African foreign policymakers and positions the country has taken on international issues since 1994, however, shows that both votes followed a consistent thread. Two points emerge: first, although still an emerging middle power, South Africa is engaging in international debates from increasingly influential offices and at the head of increasingly powerful groupings of non-aligned states; and second, that Pretoria, both on its own and through these blocs, is pursuing a rebalancing of global economic power and diplomatic influence.

In the 'outcome document' of the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2005, the heads of state and government

‘reaffirm[ed] our commitment to work towards a security consensus based on the recognition that many threats are interlinked, that development, peace, security and human rights are mutually reinforcing, that no State can best protect itself by acting entirely alone and that all States need an effective and efficient collective security system, pursuant to the purposes and principles of the Charter.’¹²

At the closing of that session, which failed amid strong US objections to achieve consensus on the broad-based reform agenda set forward by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, South African President Thabo Mbeki used that passage as the basis of his strong critique against what he regarded as the prevailing ‘imbalance of power’ and its consequences. He stated:

‘We have not achieved that “security consensus” because of the widely disparate conditions of existence and interests among the Member States of the UN as well as the gross imbalance of power that define the relationship among these Member States. It is the poor of the world whose interests are best served by real and genuine respect for the fundamental proposition that we need the “security consensus” identified by the Outcome Document. The actions of the rich and powerful strongly suggest that these are not in the least convinced that this “security consensus” would serve their interests. Thus they use their power to perpetuate the power imbalance in the ordering of global affairs. As a consequence of this, we have not made the progress of the reform of the UN that we should have.’¹³

This is a familiar and well-established theme in South African foreign policy. As a strong proponent of UN reform and a staunch critic of the US-led war in Iraq, South Africa has consistently voiced its preference for the General Assembly over the Security

¹² United Nations, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome,’ A/Res/60/1, UN General Assembly, New York, Distr. 24 October 2005. This document may be found on the website <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement>

¹³ Thabo Mbeki, ‘Speech to the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly,’ New York, 15 September 2005. This document may be found on the website www.thepresidency.co.za

Council as the most democratic forum in which to define and pursue the international security and development agenda. In his address to the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2006, Mbeki, speaking as the current chair of the G77 and China, noted that

¹⁴ Thabo Mbeki, 'Address of the President of South Africa and the current Chairperson of the G77 and China, Thabo Mbeki, at the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly,' 19 September 2006, New York. This document may be found on the website www.thepresidency.co.za

'[i]f the wishes of the majority of the world could turn into reality, this would be a century free of wars, free of internecine conflicts, free of hunger, free of preventable disease, free of want, free of environmental degradation and free of greed and corruption. ...[S]ome of the developed nations have consistently refused to implement the outcomes and agreements of this world body that would help to alleviate the wretchedness of the poor'¹⁴.

Against this backdrop, the 'technicality motivation' in the South African votes on Iran and Myanmar – the argument that those issues were more appropriately handled in UN fora other than the UN Security Council – takes on new light. It is not merely a question of jurisdiction, but of the balance of influence. As Thenjiwe Mtintso, South African ambassador to Cuba, argued in an op-ed following the Myanmar vote: 'The government is part of a fierce struggle for the transformation of the UN and its institutions in content, form, composition, rules, processes and procedures.... The Myanmar question is an example of the selectivity on the part some of the most powerful countries.'¹⁵ South Africa's vote, she concluded, was part of her government's desire to 'reassert the centrality of the General Assembly'.¹⁶

This coincides with an Eastward or Southward strategic shift in South Africa's economic and security alignment both inside the UN and in other international fora such as the World Trade Organisation to redress what South African Foreign Minister

¹⁵ Thenjiwe Mtintso, 'Myanmar vote critics missing SA's aim at UN,' Sunday Independent, 4 February 2007.

¹⁶ From 'Joint Communiqué of the 9th Joint Bilateral Commission between the Republic of South Africa and the Islamic Republic of Iran held in Pretoria on 21 and 22 August 2006'. This document may be found on the website www.dfa.gov.za

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma has called 'the continued marginalisation of developing countries.'¹⁷ Importantly, in both the Myanmar and Iran votes, South Africa strongly positioned itself in the same camp as China and Russia – the two permanent Security Council members most inclined to use their veto against resolutions reflecting the positions of the Western powers.

New Constellations

During the Cold War the global balance of power was defined by a contest between two blocs with more or less fixed ideologically defined identities anchored by two superpowers. Almost two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new global bifurcation is emerging between 'the West and the Rest' or the North and the South. Those terms are hardly helpful, however, in large part because the new division is less defined by geography than they would suggest. Nor is the world settling into two new blocs to replace those of the previous era. Rather, while it remains possible to talk about the West as a more or less coherent entity, the 'South' has multiple new poles and sub-groupings. Put differently, the non-aligned world is coalescing into an ever expanding system of overlapping new constellations, none of them fixed or mutually exclusive and all of them anchored by more than one emerging power. The latter include China, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa, while others, including Venezuela, Pakistan and Iran, aspire to join the club.

Since emerging from isolation in 1994, South Africa has sought energetically to reinvigorate existing blocs such as the Non-Aligned Movement and has been a key architect in the building of new ones. Some of these, like the G22+, which brought the Cancun round of the WTO talks to a grinding halt in August 2004 in protest against farm subsidies in wealthy

¹⁷ Taken from the 'Statement by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of South Africa H. E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, Chair of the Group of 77 on the Occasion of the Handing Over Ceremony of the Chairmanship of the Group of 77, New York, 10 January 2007'. This document may be found on the website www.dfa.gov.za

states, emerged almost spontaneously as the need arose. Others, such as IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa), have formed slowly. In many cases there is notable overlap in the membership of these groupings. It is hard, however, to miss what all have in common: an aspiration to rebalance global power by spreading or democratising the control of global resources, trade and the security agenda.

This point is reflected in a joint communiqué between two emerging powers following a state visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to South Africa in February 2007 stated:

The two sides observed that the world is undergoing profound and complicated changes. ... The two sides decided to maintain communication and collaboration in the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation and other international organisations, and fully coordinate each other's positions on major issues such as development and poverty reduction, regional conflicts, South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue and formulation of multilateral trade rules in an effort to uphold the common rights and interests of the developing world¹⁸.

What are the immediate effects of this 'Southern' push for rebalance?

One is a likely end to isolation as an effective punitive measure. For decades Western countries, and in particular Britain and the United States, have attempted to ring-fence 'rogue' states – states that allegedly sponsor terrorism or engage in actions deemed to be offensive or threatening to Western security interests – through sanctions regimes or other measures in an attempt to coerce those states into changing their behaviour. Libya, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria and, during the final years of apartheid, South Africa have

¹⁸ Joint
Communiqué
Between the
Republic of
South Africa
and the People's
Republic of
China, Pretoria,
6 February 2007.
This document
may be found on
the website
www.dfa.gov.za

all fallen into this category at one time or another. Isolation, however, requires consensus, and that has become increasingly elusive. The ANC, for one, refuses to go along. Having enjoyed support during its liberation struggle from countries shunned by the West, it has adamantly insisted on maintaining those friendships despite Western pressure not to do so. That stubbornness is further informed by South Africa's cultural affinities, its instinct to share its own successful model of conflict resolution, and its resistance to Western external coercion against fellow non-aligned states. While the Bush Administration labelled Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an 'axis of evil,' South Africa has maintained relations with all three – not least due to its belief that its engagement can help to break longstanding impasses involving such states.

While China and Russia have consistently wielded their vetoes to cut against the Western grain in the UN Security Council, South Africa and other emerging middle powers now provide additional resistance – not only from the vantage point of non-permanent seats, but also, as has been noted, by attempting to shift sensitive issues out from under the Security Council altogether. This has and will undoubtedly make it more difficult to apply pressure on a state such as Iran to comply with international demands regarding its nuclear programme – note how difficult it was to reach a consensus on even limited sanctions in the Security Council – but it may also force to open new space for creative new approaches to longstanding disputes. Notably, the US and Britain have moved – albeit grudgingly – toward dialogue-based solutions with both North Korea and Iran.

A related likely effect is that controlling the development and spread of nuclear technology and materials will be increasingly difficult. South Africa and Brazil have acknowledged aspirations to enter the commercial nuclear sector both at home and

abroad. That is certainly one factor explaining South Africa's resistance to Iran's referral to the Security Council. At issue is who will control the burgeoning commercial marketplace as demand for nuclear power accelerates in an age dominated by concerns about climate change and rising oil costs. South Africa's pebble bed modular reactor marks an important technological innovation. Will it be allowed to develop and export this product? Will the West use security justifications to attempt to dominate the sector and prevent non-Western states from developing their own capacities and networks? Pretoria fears it will, but growing South-South linkages will also increasingly complicate such efforts.

The growing influence of non-aligned powers and blocs, in addition to creating new competition for natural resources, will also create new competition in the resolution of longstanding international disputes. As the United States struggles to maintain – or regain – its credibility in the Middle East in the wake of its invasion of Iraq, for example, states such as South Africa and Russia are providing alternative voices. That is partly motivated by self-interest – in their need for energy security, China and Russia have not burdened their relationships with Iran and Sudan with political or human rights concerns – but it is also driven by realism, altruism, ideological kinship, or some combination of these. South Africa, for example, finds compelling similarities between the plight of the Palestinians and its own struggle for liberation and continues to present itself as an uncompromised alternative voice in the pursuit of a resolution to the Israel-Palestine issue. However salutary that development might be, it also carries an implicit warning: The balance is shifting increasingly against us and Israeli exceptionalism. New actors and new approaches are needed. While the US remains an indispensable player, others are clamouring for the ball.

Back to the New World Order

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the first President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev could look ahead and envision a 'New World Order' in which the great powers cooperated with each other in realising a safer, more stable world. The 15 years that followed produced little evidence that such a paradigm was materialising. In what may go down as the single most important acknowledgment of Realpolitik so far in the new century, however, the second President George Bush in 2005 signed a historic agreement on civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. While the deal binds India to closer compliance with the IAEA and obligates Delhi to work more vigorously to safeguard its nuclear arsenal and curb the spread of enrichment and related technologies, it lifts a longstanding US ban on nuclear trade with India and, most significantly, acknowledges India as a nuclear power.

In effect, President George W. Bush signalled through the India nuclear deal that the United States were entering an era when they would have to work with new powers rather than attempt only to contain them. That is precisely the turn that South Africa, particularly under Mbeki, seeks. Pretoria has engaged itself as a self-appointed champion of the emerging South. It is prepared to straddle divides – advocating the rights of Palestinians while at the same time forging relations with Israel, simultaneously creating bilateral commissions with India and Pakistan, trading vigorously with the West while joining new non-aligned blocs in a battle for fairer terms of trade. It seeks radical reform in the UN, but in the absence of that is prepared to use its positions and prestige within the organisation's various fora to circumvent the West's disproportionate diplomatic influence. It poses discomfiting questions on the behalf of others.

Why India but not Pakistan? If Israel is allowed to have the bomb, why can't Iran?

Fifteen years after South Africa's integration into the old SADCC, integration has replaced strategic balancing as the region's overarching project. Together, the 14 member states of SADC make up a market of 240 million¹⁹. Southern Africa is richly endowed with natural resources, including oil, diamonds, platinum and titanium. But it is also characterised by a preponderance of poor socio-economic indicators. Eight of the countries fall in the World Bank's bottom tier as 'low-income,' and five are listed as 'heavily indebted poor countries.' The regional average unemployment (among the seven countries for which statistics are available) is 17%, with Namibia and South Africa reaching official rates of 31.1% and 28.4% respectively. HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are the highest in the world, approaching 25% of the adult population in Botswana, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. None of the countries is projected to achieve the targets of the 15 Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

South Africa's critics might suggest that it seek the reasons for such failure closer to home – in the well-chronicled corruption of Mozambique and South Africa, for instance, or more urgently in the implosion of Zimbabwe under the ruinous rein of President Robert Mugabe. Pretoria, however, has found a larger villain. As Mbeki has argued, 'the use of power is the reinforcement of the might of the powerful, and therefore the perpetuation of the disempowerment of the powerless.'²⁰ The votes on Iran and Myanmar were shots across the bow, signalling South Africa's intention to compel a rebalancing of the global control of economic resources, the discourse on security, and the terms of international diplomacy. As an emerging power, Pretoria seems to saying: What the West won't yield, the rest are increasingly prepared to force.

¹⁹ Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The population figure is a rounded aggregate based on 2004 estimates by the World Bank.

²⁰ Thabo Mbeki, 'Speech to the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly,' New York, 15 September 2005. This document may be found on www.thepresidency.co.za

ÁFRICA AUSTRAL: ELEIÇÕES E SEGURANÇA

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I. O colapso da União Soviética, marcando o final da “Guerra Fria”, abriu ao mundo uma nova era política. Muitos viram mesmo nela a oportunidade de instauração de uma nova ordem a nível global, fundada nos chamados “valores ocidentais” que apareciam como vencedores do confronto da “guerra de nervos” (como também lhe chamara o Presidente Truman) que se instalara entre os dois blocos depois da IIª Guerra Mundial.

África foi talvez o continente onde as mudanças “pós-queda do muro” na Europa mais se impuseram fora dela. Desde logo, porque a nível regional, a morte anunciada do *apartheid* se consumou, quase em simultâneo, de imediato com a independência da Namíbia e, escassos anos depois, com a transição pacífica da África do Sul para um verdadeiro Estado de Direito.

Por todo o continente, estava aberta a via para a transformação dos regimes autoritários de partido único então prevalecentes, que já não podiam escudar-se na necessidade de privilegiarem a “unidade nacional” face à ameaça externa do *apartheid* e do colonialismo. Na África Austral, nomeadamente, realizaram-se até meados da década de 90 eleições multipartidárias em todos os países da região (SADCC) com excepção da Suazilândia e do Zaire (hoje RDC). Essa abertura ao pluralismo político foi particularmente saudada numa área onde, ao reconhecimento do enorme potencial do desenvolvimento, se aliava a insegurança resultante de guerras civis prolongadas. A estabilidade de toda a região parecia concretizável à medida que negociações e acordos de paz foram substituindo a luta armada pela livre escolha nas urnas.

O papel das Nações Unidas ganhou, neste contexto, novo relevo. A Carta impõe o princípio da autodeterminação e define a defesa dos Direitos do Homem como um dos objectivos da Organização. Por isso, historicamente, as Nações Unidas estiveram sempre ligadas à assistência eleitoral, sobretudo pelo apoio dado aos Governos autónomos saídos da descolonização na organização de actos eleitorais. Mas foi o fim da “Guerra Fria” que marcou os termos do novo envolvimento da ONU na procura da paz e nos consequentes processos eleitorais democráticos. O Conselho de Segurança, em conformidade com o seu papel de principal garante da paz e da segurança internacionais, aprovou o lançamento de sucessivas operações de paz para pôr cobro a conflitos internos. E a Assembleia Geral, por sua vez, respondendo a um imperativo imposto pela realidade no terreno, concordou, em 1991, na necessidade de criar um grupo de assistência eleitoral que, entretanto, já recebeu mais de 140 pedidos de apoio por parte de Estados-membros. A Organização entrou, portanto, num novo ciclo da sua existência, promovendo activamente princípios democráticos e direitos políticos. Os dois Secretários Gerais desta nova era, Boutros Ghali e, ainda mais fortemente, Kofi Annan, não hesitaram em proclamar a Democracia como um dos objectivos principais das actividades operacionais das Nações Unidas (do mesmo modo que advogaram o valor da empresa privada e do investimento estrangeiro). E, no entanto, como nota Edward Luck (“Mixed Messages”), a ONU não foi concebida como uma organização de democracias. Alguns dos seus membros fundadores, a começar pela União Soviética – membro permanente – não o teriam sido se fosse esse o critério. Aos próprios novos membros exige-se apenas que sejam “amantes da paz” (*peace-loving*), mas não necessariamente “democráticos”, um termo que a Carta nunca usa...

O caminho percorrido pela Organização neste campo, em paralelo aliás com a progressiva afirmação da sua universalidade,

está bem patente nos objectivos que norteiam a acção da Divisão de Assistência Eleitoral:

- a) Assistir os Estados-membros nos seus esforços de realização de eleições credíveis, legítimas e democráticas, de acordo com critérios internacionalmente reconhecidos e previstos nos instrumentos de direitos universais ou regionais; e
- b) Contribuir para o estabelecimento de capacidades institucionais dos países com vista à organização periódica de eleições democráticas.

Ao mesmo tempo que enveredam pela afirmação do primado da democracia, as Nações Unidas reconhecem, prudentemente, que não existe um sistema ou método universal, aplicável a todas as Nações. Embora as experiências comparativas e os exemplos forneçam informações úteis para a criação de instituições democráticas, as estratégias de assistência devem adaptar-se às necessidades específicas do país visado. E devem ser aplicadas em conformidade com o princípio de igualdade soberana dos Estados, no respeito da sua integridade territorial e da sua independência política.

II. A “vaga do multipartidarismo” que a África conheceu a partir do final da década de 80 foi o factor crucial de abertura democrática no continente. Não podiam realizar-se eleições genuínas sem a existência de partidos políticos que pudessem livremente exprimir-se e corporizar as diferentes aspirações dos eleitorados locais. Mas em países sujeitos a autoritarismos monopartidários e, em geral com o poder centralizado na figura do Presidente, tornou-se evidente a dificuldade em garantir à chamada “sociedade civil” o exercício da plenitude dos seus direitos democráticos. Mais difícil ainda foi a aparição de partidos políticos capazes de competir em pé de igualdade com os detentores do

poder, que só cosmeticamente deixava de ser absoluto. A aceitação das eleições acabou por ser, em muitos casos, um estratagemma para a legitimação do poder já existente, só na aparência dando voz aos diferentes grupos ou a minorias étnicas e não permitindo uma mais justa partilha dos recursos económicos. As tentativas de minorar estas distorções democráticas através da imposição de “estatutos da oposição” também não resultaram, a não ser nos poucos países em que a liberalização política correspondeu, na realidade, a uma conversão aos princípios do Estado de Direito.

À regra “um homem, um voto” poder-se-ia acrescentar “sempre no mesmo”, o que obviamente desiludiu os que acreditavam numa efectiva alternância democrática. Mesmo países que haviam ganho a independência em simultâneo com a organização de eleições multipartidárias não resistiram à imposição progressiva e cada vez mais violenta do poder pessoal, como se a escolha inicialmente feita justificasse a perpetuação de uma governação que, sem contas a prestar, se foi deteriorando (Zimbabué).

Caso diferente foi o dos países que conheceram longos períodos de luta armada ou de guerra civil. A África Austral foi um dos principais beneficiários das negociações de acordos de paz que permitiram a países como a Namíbia, Angola e Moçambique iniciarem novos ciclos da sua história. Os “movimentos de libertação” ou “rebeldes” transformaram-se em partidos políticos e a luta deslocou-se para o campo eleitoral. O papel das Nações Unidas foi determinante, como já referi, aliando às tarefas de manutenção da paz o objectivo de apoiar a criação de condições para a realização de eleições livres, justas e internacionalmente reconhecidas. O insucesso pós-eleitoral registado em alguns casos, nomeadamente em Angola – onde a guerra recomeçou em condições ainda mais duras e dramáticas do que anteriormente – não invalida o intenso trabalho interno e o esforço internacional que culminaram nas eleições de Setembro de 92.

O anti-clímax que sucedeu ao relativo optimismo inspirado pela esmagadora participação eleitoral e pela forma pacífica como a votação decorreu em quase todo o território não destruiu as esperanças de liberalização política fundada na paz. Uma vez esta alcançada, o país prepara-se para retomar o caminho então interrompido. Mas o caso angolano, infelizmente como outros em África e fora dela, mostra bem os cuidados, limites e precauções que devem orientar a busca da segurança individual e colectiva em situações de pós-conflito através da livre escolha popular.

III. A minha própria experiência de participação ou observação em casos de abertura africana a valores democráticos e ao multipartidarismo deu-me consciência da fragilidade desses processos. Desde logo, porque se trata de conceitos importados do ocidente, entendidos por elites escassas e com pouca tradução prática para a maioria das populações. Em muitos casos, a própria vitória eleitoral é encarada como uma forma de acesso privilegiado às benesses do poder e não como uma responsabilidade acrescida de resposta aos anseios de liberdade, desenvolvimento e bem-estar social das respectivas populações. Cada vez menos acredito na imposição de ideias e mais na obrigação de promover a convicção da justeza de um determinado caminho. Uma democratização forçada do exterior tem sempre um carácter postíço e provisório.

Os actos eleitorais não devem por isso ser entendidos como um fim em si mesmo, mas constituir o instrumento da consagração de valores democráticos já amplamente aceites e reconhecidos pelas sociedades em causa. Não basta à validade de uma eleição o facto de o voto corresponder tecnicamente ao exigido pelas normas internacionais. A aceitação dos seus resultados e a forma como o poder vai ser exercido e partilhado depende do grau de convicção da sua legitimidade por parte da maioria da população.

Ou seja, de que ele traduziu a opção livre por um conjunto de propostas apresentadas em igualdade de circunstâncias com as que consigo concorreram.

Como conciliar essa legitimidade com o facto de se estar perante “valores importados”, como acima referi? Creio que o primeiro aspecto a ter em mente é a primazia de uma boa preparação eleitoral em detrimento da urgência da concretização do voto. É certo que, sobretudo em situações de pós-conflito, se não pode descurar o respeito de datas estabelecidas em acordos, a obrigação das autoridades locais responsáveis realizarem de boa-fé e de forma expedita o que lhes é legalmente pedido, nem a necessidade de acautelar recursos internacionais cada vez mais disputados pela multiplicidade de situações de crise ou de catástrofe humanitária. Mas não se pode pretender que o acto eleitoral, só por se realizar, garanta a democratização do tecido político, económico e social de um país. Como noutros sectores da vida das Nações, o factor educação é decisivo.

Daí a importância que adquire a promoção e a construção, como parte integrante de processos de consolidação do Estado de Direito, da “Diplomacia Cidadã” (expressão feliz que retiro da colectânea organizada pelos brasileiros Clóvis Brigagao e Valerie de Campos Mello sobre prevenção/resolução/gestão de conflitos internacionais). É evidente, como nota outro especialista brasileiro (Marco Carmignani), que “onde os direitos à participação não são respeitados, incluindo o do voto democrático para escolher um governo de uma forma livre e justa, a opressão se transforma em norma...”

Há que garantir a abertura efectiva da sociedade civil, a transparência nas diversas fases dos trâmites que conduzem ao voto, a liberdade de expressão e de circulação e a certeza de que os partidos políticos envolvidos na contenda compreendem e aceitam as regras do jogo democrático. Nos casos de conflito, há também que assegurar a desmilitarização das forças em pre-

sença, por forma a evitar-se um factor de coação inibidor da livre escolha ou a ameaça latente de um regresso à violência em função dos resultados obtidos. Tudo isto só pode ser feito com pleno conhecimento das particularidades de cada país e com a chancela da imparcialidade que deriva da presença – antes, durante e depois – de técnicos e observadores internacionais nos actos eleitorais.

No âmbito das operações de paz, a responsabilidade das Nações Unidas na assistência, fiscalização ou mesmo condução dos processos eleitorais, tem de ir de par com os meios postos à sua disposição, a começar por uma clara definição do seu mandato. É preciso ter em vista que, na grande maioria dos casos, os representantes da Organização têm de lidar com Comissões Eleitorais mais ou menos independentes e de ter em conta que estas são instituídas segundo as leis locais ou os acordos subscritos pelos responsáveis políticos dos países em causa. Esta realidade impõe muitas vezes controvérsias ligadas ao conceito de soberania, que são exploradas geralmente em detrimento do genuíno interesse nacional e da imagem política da própria ONU.

Por isso se afigura essencial o reforço das capacidades da própria Divisão da Assistência Eleitoral, integrada no Departamento de Assuntos Políticos, bem como a clarificação do seu interface com o Departamento das Operações de Paz. À progressão da via democrática na cena internacional deve necessariamente corresponder o reconhecimento do papel relevante e essencial daquela Divisão na preparação, orientação e credibilização dos actos eleitorais. Mesmo no caso do envolvimento directo e primordial de organizações regionais nesses processos não se deve perder de vista o valor acrescentado que é a chancela de uma organização de carácter universal e aberto como é a ONU. Será essencial também aproveitar as potencialidades e expectativas criadas pelo recente estabelecimento da Comissão de Construção da Paz.

Nos casos em que as eleições representam uma quota parte da solução de conflitos internos que sejam objecto de operações de paz, a acção do Conselho de Segurança é indispensável. Não só os mandatos dessas operações devem ser precisos, abrangentes e, tanto quanto possível, inequívocos, como o Conselho deve dispor sempre da flexibilidade e da autoridade necessárias à prevenção e repressão de tentativas desestabilizadoras dos objectivos por ele próprio fixados. É igualmente importante o entendimento entre os cinco membros detentores do direito de veto. A inoperacionalidade da ONU registada em muitos casos em que está em causa a liberalização política de países ou territórios tem a ver com diferentes pontos de vista quanto aos padrões estabelecidos pelo próprio Conselho. Basta referir as divergências de interpretação no que respeita ao conceito de “boa governação” entre europeus, chineses, russos e americanos. De onde decorre a necessidade de, numa reforma do Conselho de Segurança, se ir além de um mero alargamento: representatividade, consistência de princípios e novos métodos de trabalho e funcionamento serão decisivos para o acatamento das decisões obrigatórias que só ao Conselho competem.

A capacidade de levar a cabo eleições credíveis, genuínas, reconhecidas pela comunidade internacional e aceites pela maioria das populações, é essencial para colmatar ou amparar à partida a questão da debilidade do Estado que tanto afecta os países africanos.

Um notável dirigente do Continente, o Primeiro-Ministro de Cabo Verde, José Maria das Neves, afirmou neste mesmo local no ano passado que o maior desafio em África é o da construção do Estado em sociedades pluri-étnicas. E que, por isso, “é necessário e inadiável erguer e consolidar Estados que obedeçam às regras do jogo democrático...”. Claro que tal passa por eleições inclusivas e honestas. Promovê-las é também olhar para África com um novo optimismo. As enormes deficiências e os graves-

simos problemas que subsistem devem constituir um incentivo para a comunidade internacional em geral e para a Europa em particular. Porque, como Nicolas Kristof recentemente conclui num artigo publicado no “Herald Tribune” (4.10.06) a partir da Guiné Equatorial: “... a liderança [em África] está a melhorar, as oportunidades vão aparecendo e há algo de novo no ar: reforma e esperança”. Reforma que obriga os dirigentes africanos a uma visão introspectiva e desassombrada, reconhecendo os erros e promovendo um projecto nacional responsável, baseado na mais ampla participação cívica e numa gestão adequada e inclusiva de recursos. E esperança no aprofundamento e expansão dos sinais positivos provenientes de África que lhe permitirão, se prosseguirem, assegurar um lugar relevante e activo na agenda da globalização.

ESTRATÉGIA
E SEGURANÇA
NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL



Energia e Segurança na África Austral

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Energy and Strategic Resources in Southern Africa

ENERGY AND SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Despite some progress with the development of a shared electricity transmission network, the Southern African region faces a short to medium term electricity shortfall – although the potential for clean hydroelectric power from the giant Inga scheme could offset the rising demand at some point in the future. The absence of an integrated regional supply system to allow the region to benefit from the oil production in Angola and shortly Madagascar presents a more serious strategic challenge and in this sense the demand for oil from the US and China obviates against the adoption of a regional supply and demand system that could enhance strategic self-sufficiency.

Introduction

Energy security has become a growth industry across the world in the wake of the wars in Kuwait and Iraq. In Africa, largely isolated from many global developments, the growing competition for Africa's energy resources between the US and China has sparked a more belated debate.

Energy production and consumption patterns in the SADC region are dominated by a number of key characteristics. The first is probably the well-known oil exports from Angola and potentially Madagascar – a situation where the region cannot meet its demands for refined oil despite its substantial oil blessings. The second is the massive electricity production

and consumption of South Africa, most of it produced from coal and possibly in future also from increased nuclear energy. A third characteristic is the potential of hydroelectric power from the Grand Inga project in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The SADC region should not suffer from energy shortages. Oil, hydroelectric power, thermal (coal) and even nuclear fuel abounds in Southern Africa. The challenges that the region faces are in the patterns of production and distribution as well as that of capital investment. In the case of oil, domestic production is linked to the consumption patterns of the USA and China, not that of the region itself. In terms of electricity the pollution-heavy energy from coal production of South Africa's Eskom is being fed into a regional grid that could, with the necessary investment, switch to hydroelectric power.

Electricity

Numerous inter-connections facilitate the bulk sourcing of electricity from one part of the southern African region for utilisation in elsewhere through the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP), creating an interdependent and interconnected network. Politically the most well-known linkage is the completion of the Matimba-Insukamini inter-connector in 1995 that linked South Africa's Eskom with the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA).

At the same time the region is characterized by extreme disparities in the availability of electricity to the vast majority of its citizens. For example, more than 80% of SADC's population rely on wood fuel – a practice that contributes substantially to deforestation and environmental degradation. A similar 80% of

the population in the region lives in the rural and peri-urban areas with no access to electricity.

In theory the SADC region does not suffer from a long-term electricity deficit although demand will appear to outrun supply in the near future. Hence urgent decisions need to be made, evident by the current electricity shortages that South Africa is beginning to experience¹. In response the region is embarking on various projects such as the rehabilitation of some generators and associated transmissions, which will be completed by 2010². Poor planning by Eskom compounded by the buoyancy of the South African economy appears to have played an important role in these anticipated shortfalls – pointing to a worrying lack of capacity in the region's largest provider of electricity.

Regionally, demand for power had been increasing by an average of 3% per year and the region's demand for power increased from 41 036 MW in 2004 to 41 682 MW last year. South Africa consumes more electricity than any other country in the region using 34 807 MW in 2005, compared to 34 195 MW the previous year – accounting for 90% of SADC's demand. Botswana also increased from last year's 402 MW to 473 MW. Of the region's 49.8 GW generating capacity, 41.3 GW is produced by South Africa's Eskom. Indeed, Eskom supplies more than 60% of Africa's electricity³.

More than ninety per cent of the electricity produced by Eskom is coal fired which used 91,9 million tons of coal for this purpose in 2005 (out of a global total of 2,9 billion tons). South Africa is the world's sixth largest coal producer and, being the world's third largest coal exporter (in 2002), the country has the world's largest coal export facility (the Richards Bay Coal Terminal)⁴. Indeed, while a few other countries in the region also have coal reserves, they are negligible compared to that of South Africa of about 54.6 billion tons

¹ *Power shortage threatens SADC*, Mapitsi Phukubje, Posted Thu, 14 Sep 2006. The Intergovernmental Agreement creating SAPP signed in 1995 serves to expand the region's trade in electricity, reduce the costs associated with the supply of electricity as well as to enhance the supply capacity of the region's electricity utilities.

² Mapitsi Phukubje, *Power shortage threatens SADC*, posted 14 September 2006, on www.businessinafrica.net. Together with Ghana and Zambia, South Africa is one of the top three net exporters of power in Africa.

³ Figures derived from the following report: "Nuclear Power in South Africa", Briefing Paper # 88, August 2006: www.uic.com.au/nip88.htm.

⁴ For detailed figures, see "Country Analysis Briefs" focusing on South Africa: www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/safrica.html. Neels Blom, Now gas guzzlers can grow their own, in *The Weekender*, Business, 7-8 October 2007.

– an endowment that constitutes more than 90% of Africa's proven coal reserves⁵.

Although far less important in proportion to coal in the generation of Southern Africa's electricity, nuclear power is also a contributor to the region's pool of electricity. Currently it accounts for about 6% of South Africa's total electricity supply. In the Southern African region, Namibia and South Africa are the countries with major deposits of uranium, although it is mainly exploited for export purposes, rather than for generating nuclear power. While nuclear power is not a serious consideration for other countries in the region, the South African government has indicated that it was considering "building between four and six new nuclear reactors. This would mean that it would add an additional 5 000 MW of nuclear-generated power to its supply mix by 2030"⁶.

More serious are the projections that South Africa's excess electricity capacity will likely be exhausted in the next few years if the country's economic growth accelerates beyond its current levels⁷. Given the dominant role of South Africa in the generation of regional electricity, potential power shortages in the country portend power shortages for some parts of the Southern African region.

Yet on paper SADC does not face a power shortage in the longer term if the Grand Inga hydroelectric project can be made. Some fifty years after the idea was first mooted, stability in the DR Congo may now allow this long-delayed project to proceed. In fact many analysts have speculated that the potential contribution of the DR Congo to electricity and water in the region was the real reason why South Africa pushed so hard to get it to join SADC. Building peace in the Congo is a long process within which peaceful elections are necessary but insufficient milestones. And even then many obstacles will have to be overcome if the region is to benefit from its hydroelectric potential

⁵ Botswana has 17 billion tons, Mozambique 9 billion tons, Swaziland 5 billion tons, Zimbabwe 2 billion tons, Tanzania 2 billion tons and Zambia 0.3 billion tons Southern African Development Community, Energy Sector Report, 1999-2000.

⁶ Terence Creamer, "Enrichment but one of the uranium-beneficiation options studied – Erwin", Creamer Media, 8 August 2006: www.engineeringnews.co.za/components/print.asp?id=92683.

⁷ "Country Analysis Briefs" focusing on South Africa: www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/safrica.html. "Nuclear Power in South Africa", Briefing Paper # 88, August 2006: www.uic.com.au/nip88.htm.

as the ghost of the Cahora Bassa project hangs like an angry cloud over long-term infrastructural projects.

The potential is massive. When completed, the Grand Inga project will generate as much electric power as does South Africa, and produce more than twice the electricity generated by China's Three Gorges dam project.

By way of comparison South Africa's Eskom can produce 42 000 MW from 19 power stations. The overall generating capacity produced at Inga will be more than 43 000 MW and it will therefore be able to satisfy the electricity requirements of the entire African continent – but the eventual will be substantial.

Various feasibility studies are currently being conducted for the Grand Inga project and a smaller Inga 3 – a major focus of NEPAD. With the help of World Bank loans, the Inga 1 and 2 power stations, which were commissioned in 1972 and 1982, are being rehabilitated to allow them to operate at full capacity. Once completed they would supply a further 750 MW above their current capacity of 1 000 MW. The real leap will come with Inga 3 with a potential contribution of between 3 500 MW to 4 000 MW to the Southern African power pool, expected to be completed by 2011.

Oil

Africa owns about eight percent of the world's known oil reserves, with Nigeria, Libya and Equatorial Guinea as the region's leading oil producers. Seventy percent of Africa's oil production is concentrated in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea, which stretches from the Ivory Coast to Angola. The low sulphur content of West African crude makes it of further strategic importance. However, the region is also vulnerable to onshore instabilities evident by developments in the Niger Delta.

Only three countries produce oil in the SADC region: Angola, DRC and South Africa and although they produce a massive surplus of unrefined oil, little of this finds itself to the largest consumer, South Africa. Angola accounts for about 96% of the region's estimated reserves and produces 1.5 million bbl/d – expected to reach 2 million barrels per day by 2008. Angola also has major offshore sources of gas. The oil and gas industries, both considered highly promising, have attracted over \$20 billion in foreign direct investment since 2003. The Angolan economy is highly dependent on its oil sector, which accounts for over 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and almost 90 percent of the government's revenues. As a largest oil producer in the region, Angola plans to increase its refinery capacity. Currently, the country refines only 39 000 bbl/d and, by 2007, it plans to have a 200 000 bbl/d new refinery facility running⁸.

⁸ "African Energy", Angola: www.africa-energy.com/html/public

⁹ "Country Analysis Briefs", focusing on South Africa, January 2005 and the Southern African Development Community, also January 2005: www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/safrika.html and www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sadc.html

¹⁰ Neels Blom, Now gas guzzlers can grow their own, in *The Weekender, Business*, 7-8 October 2007.

South Africa, the second largest oil producer in the SADC region, produces only about 50 000 bbl/d⁹ – around 10% of its domestic needs which stood at 529 000 barrels per day in 2005 (as part of a global consumption of 82 million barrels per day). It imports the rest from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, Kuwait and Russia, therefore being dependent upon disruptions in the associated shipping routes¹⁰. South Africa has far and away the largest oil refinery capacity in the SADC region (second only to Egypt in Africa), with a capacity of 519 547 bbl/d.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the third largest oil producer in the region – with a paltry 25 000 bbl/d production in 2005. Without domestic refining capacity and reflective of its extremely low level of industrialization, the DRC is a net oil exporter.

Other SADC countries with some refinery capacity include Tanzania (14 900 bbl/d), Zambia (23 750 bbl/d) and Madagascar (15 000 bbl/d).

Madagascar is becoming the next staging post of Africa's energy boom as oil conglomerates descend on the poverty

stricken island to contend for a share of the recent discovery. At current prices, industry estimates are that the oil could translate into an annual revenue of one billion dollars. Initial projections were that Madagascar could produce 60,000 barrels per day in three to four years. Official estimates put offshore reserves as high as five billion barrels of oil, but the exact size remains unknown. This will quickly make the oil industry the main contributor to the country's gross domestic product (GDP). In 2003 Madagascar's GDP was \$5.5 billion dollars, or \$240 per person annually.

The region has and continues to engage in exploratory efforts. Countries that had not produced oil in the region are now hoping to make new finds on their shores. For example, Madagascar announced new licenses in 2004 for the exploration of the Madagascar Basin located off the western coast, which is considered to be an untapped oil reserve. On its part, Namibia's National Corporation signed a memorandum of cooperation with EnerGulf Resources to "jointly explore and develop offshore Block 1171, located along the maritime border with Angola"¹¹. Furthermore, South Africa's petrochemical company, Sasol, and the Mozambican Hydrocarbon Company also signed an agreement for gas exploitation on block 16 and 19¹². A number of exploratory activities are also under way in Angola and South Africa.

With regard to gas, the SADC region accounts for 1.9% of the Africa's natural gas: Mozambique has 4.5 Tcf, Angola 1.6 Tcf, the DRC 35 Bcf; South Africa 1 Bcf and Tanzania 800 Bcf¹³.

Conclusion

Considerable progress has been achieved in developing a regional policy framework for common approaches to energy in the

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Note that this agreement also involves the Mozambican government.

¹³ Country Analysis Briefs, Southern African Development Community, Op. cit.

SADC region, particularly through the regional power transmission infrastructure and the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) that bring together the electricity utilities in the region into a common network. This progress cannot hide the challenges that the region faces in terms of its short to medium term electricity demand and the fact that it does not have a commensurate system to refine and internally share oil and gas instead of importing its requirements from elsewhere. The giant oil sucking sound from China and the USA will probably drown out any appeals for regional solidarity from other countries in the region who will not be able to compete with soft loans and investment and under the current rising competition between the West and the East for Africa's oil. The most well-known of these is the \$2 bn soft loan that China recently provided to Angola, allowing that country to sidestep IMF requirements regarding good governance and transparency. Considerable leadership and financial sacrifice will be required if the region is to meet its oil needs from neighbouring suppliers instead of from further a field.

ENERGIA E RECURSOS ENERGÉTICOS

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Introdução

Nos últimos anos os recursos estratégicos em geral têm estado a ganhar uma proeminência sem precedentes na arena mundial, com o petróleo a desempenhar um papel muito especial. A sua utilização, tendo em conta a limitada disponibilidade deste recurso natural não renovável, está a criar uma nova dinâmica nas relações internacionais e a determinar uma reavaliação das estratégias tanto dos países produtores como dos consumidores.

O Plano de Energia Nacional dos Estados Unidos da América publicado em Maio de 2001 deixou clara a relevância de África para a segurança energética americana e a produção de energia a nível global. O documento recomendou um aumento do empenho americano na promoção de um clima de investimento favorável, no encorajamento da transparência, boa governação e uma utilização responsável das receitas provenientes dos recursos naturais para apoiar o desenvolvimento social e económico sustentáveis em África.

De acordo com o Departamento de Energia americano, África produz cerca de nove milhões de barris de crude por dia, sendo aproximadamente 4,7 milhões de barris provenientes da África Ocidental. A produção africana de petróleo já corresponde a cerca de 11% da oferta mundial. Os Estados Unidos importam 18% do seu crude de África, estando a Nigéria e Angola entre os seus 10 principais fornecedores mundiais. Esta dependência americana em relação ao crude africano poderá

aumentar no futuro com a entrada em produção de novos poços petrolíferos¹.

¹ Statement of John R. Brodman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of International Energy Policy, Office of Policy and International Affairs, US Department of Energy, before the Subcommittee on International Economic policy, Export and trade Promotion, Committee of Foreign Relations, US Senate, July 15, 2004.

² Ibid.

³ “China – Angola: Ties Between Angola and China to Strengthen over Medium Term”, Global Insight, Segunda-feira, 26 de Junho de 2006.

⁴ “Sub-Saharan Africa: The Changing Economic Landscape of Sub-Saharan Africa: Enter China”, Global Insight, Quarta-feira, 12 de Abril de 2006.

O Departamento de Energia americano considera ainda que a produção africana de crude poderia aumentar entre 4 e 6 milhões de barris por dia nos próximos 10 a 15 anos, tendo em conta a continuação de descobertas em águas profundas e ultra-profundas, a optimização do desenvolvimento e produção de recursos petrolíferos, suficientes níveis de investimento na exploração e desenvolvimento e a manutenção de produção nos campos já em fase de maturação. A Nigéria, Angola, Gabão, Congo-Brazzaville e a Guiné Equatorial poderiam ver a sua produção total subir de 2 a 3 milhões de barris por dia nos próximos 5 a 10 anos e de 3 a 5 milhões de barris por dia nos próximos 10 a 15 anos².

O petróleo ganhou tal importância na economia mundial que influencia a segurança dos estados e as relações de cooperação entre as nações. Por exemplo, em África assiste-se ultimamente a uma maior intervenção económica da China na procura de oportunidades de investimento nos países produtores de petróleo, particularmente no Golfo da Guiné³.

Com efeito, na sua condição de segundo maior importador de hidrocarbonetos no mundo, a China satisfaz cerca de 25% das suas importações a partir de África. Angola é um dos países onde a presença chinesa se faz sentir na indústria petrolífera, nomeadamente no Bloco 18, em parceria com a BP. Segundo alguma imprensa angolana, desde 2004 a China já teria concedido ao governo angolano cerca de 5 mil milhões de dólares em empréstimos garantidos pela produção petrolífera para financiar o programa de reconstrução nacional de Angola actualmente em curso⁴.

Em 2002, as importações americanas do crude de Angola estavam estimadas em cerca de 3,2 mil milhões de dólares, enquanto que as chinesas só totalizavam mil milhões. Em 2004, as importações chinesas já tinham aumentado para 4,7 mil milhões de dólares, quase o montante de 4,8 mil milhões de dólares das

importações americanas. Entre Janeiro e Junho deste ano, a China importou 13,4 milhões de toneladas de crude de Angola, ou seja, 18% do total das suas importações. Angola ultrapassou a Arábia Saudita como o principal fornecedor de crude da China⁵.

⁵ Ibid.

Emergência Estratégica do Golfo da Guiné

No sentido estrito do termo, o Golfo da Guiné cobre o espaço marítimo entre o Benin e a Guiné Equatorial. Porém, foi popularizado pelos *media* e a indústria petrolífera para incluir países produtores como Angola, Camarões, Gabão, Guiné Equatorial, Nigéria, República Democrática do Congo, República do Congo e São Tomé e Príncipe. O aumento da concorrência internacional na procura de hidrocarbonetos contribuiu para um renovado interesse no Golfo da Guiné como uma das principais zonas de produção petrolífera no mundo. Nigéria, Angola, Gabão, Guiné Equatorial – e São Tomé e Príncipe a seu tempo – já satisfazem 16% das necessidades de energia americanas, estatística que se espera vir a aumentar para 25% até 2015.

Actualmente o Golfo da Guiné está a viver um momento economicamente favorável devido à conjuntura internacional vigente, caracterizada pela instabilidade no Médio Oriente, o que contribui para o seu papel como alternativa de abastecimento de energia para os Estados Unidos. Até 2010, estima-se que a região venha a beneficiar de investimentos avaliados em 43 mil milhões de dólares.

Neste ambiente internacional em que a segurança energética constitui uma das maiores preocupações dos países desenvolvidos, o Golfo da Guiné apresenta vantagens crescentes devido a:

- diversidade e abundância dos seus recursos naturais, particularmente o petróleo e o gás;

- um oceano aberto e a sua relativa aproximação aos mercados internacionais, em especial à América do Norte e Europa Ocidental, o que torna os custos de transporte menos onerosos;
- ausência de pontos de trânsito susceptíveis de provocar atrasos na circulação ou de passagens marítimas como o Canal do Panamá, o Estreito de Ormuz ou o Canal do Suez, situação que evita a possibilidade de bloqueios, ataques ou acidentes;
- oportunidades económicas adicionais com o potencial da exploração de gás, cujos níveis de queima durante a extracção do crude são os mais elevados a nível mundial. Países como Angola estão a mudar este quadro. O governo angolano decretou que todas as novas explorações devem ser efectuadas sem a queima de gás, estando previsto para 2010 o fim de qualquer queima sistemática de gás. O gás do *off-shore* angolano vai ser aproveitado dentro de um projecto de exportação do Gás Natural Liquefeito de Angola (ALNG) que está a ser implementado no Soyo pela Sonangol em parceria com a Chevron, BP, Exxon e Total. O projecto, estimado entre 3 e 5 mil milhões de dólares, vai processar inicialmente um volume de 5,4 mil milhões de metros cúbicos por ano, produção que se destina ao mercado norte-americano⁶.

⁶ “ANGOLA: Desenvolvimento de uma Estratégia para a Energia”, Agência Internacional de Energia, Setembro 2006.

Porém, o Golfo da Guiné também apresenta desafios que não podemos ignorar, sob pena de comprometermos investimentos realizados e o desenvolvimento em curso na região. Por exemplo, os indicadores de boa governação estabelecidos pelo Banco Mundial mostram que os países do Golfo da Guiné estão abaixo da média internacional, particularmente no que concerne o estado de direito e o combate à corrupção, uma situação que requer a atenção e tratamento adequados de todas as partes interessadas.

Desafios e Perspectivas no Golfo da Guiné

Os países membros do Golfo da Guiné continuam a ter instituições democráticas fracas, governos confrontados com economias distorcidas que alimentam a pobreza, o desemprego, as doenças endémicas e a emigração de quadros necessários para o seu desenvolvimento. Por outro lado, à medida que a exploração petrolífera avança para as águas profundas e ultra profundas, estão a surgir disputas territoriais entre estes países, fruto de sobreposição de zonas económicas exclusivas e da indefinição de fronteiras. São os casos das disputas entre a Nigéria, os Camarões, a Guiné Equatorial, São Tomé e Príncipe e o Gabão.

Em Agosto, os estados membros da Comissão do Golfo da Guiné acordaram em Libreville, Gabão, as bases do funcionamento desta organização que terá a sua sede em Angola e será dirigida por São Tomé e Príncipe. Criada em 1999, a Comissão vai servir de árbitro regional nas disputas fronteiriças que afectam a região. Irá substituir o Tribunal Internacional de Justiça na resolução de conflitos regionais, sendo a disputa entre a Guiné Equatorial e o Gabão sobre a ilha de Mbanié o primeiro caso a merecer tratamento⁷.

Em Março, o Almirante Harry Ulrich da Marinha americana declarou que os Estados Unidos assegurariam a segurança do Golfo da Guiné, tendo em conta que a região era uma fonte crítica de energia que requeria uma presença naval mais concentrada para salvaguardar os interesses de Washington. Os Estados Unidos manifestam-se disponíveis para treinar os países da região para combater o terrorismo e na identificação de um número cada vez maior de barcos que navegam as águas do Golfo da Guiné para e a partir da Europa e da América⁸.

Assim, os Estados Unidos vão providenciar a São Tomé e Príncipe um sistema de radar avaliado em 18 milhões de dólares para assistir no controlo da actividade nas suas águas territoriais.

⁷ “Sub-Saharan Africa – Angola – Gabon: Gulf of Guinea Commission Summit in Gabon Brings Organisation to Life”, Global Insight, Segunda-feira, 28 de Agosto.

⁸ World Markets Analysis, 22 de Março de 2006.

Washington espera que esta medida venha a inspirar outros países na região a aceitarem ou a desenvolverem capacidades similares de controlo para melhorar a segurança regional e evitarem que o Oceano Atlântico possa servir de “paraíso seguro” para eventuais terroristas⁹.

⁹ “US Gives Radar System to Sao Tome and Principe”, Al Pessin, VOA, Pentágono, 5 de Outubro de 2006.

Porém, muitos analistas consideram que a instabilidade doméstica constitui uma maior ameaça para esta região cuja importância estratégica para o ocidente tende a aumentar com a volatilidade da situação no Médio Oriente.

A edição do jornal *Financial Times* de quarta-feira, 11 de Outubro, (2006), focava os desafios que a Nigéria enfrenta no delta do Níger, onde a situação de instabilidade provocada por militantes locais está a afectar a produção petrolífera e a forçar as companhias a reconsiderarem as suas operações. De acordo com este diário, “Disputas entre a população local e as companhias petrolíferas são frequentes no delta, alimentadas pela pobreza e o abandono das comunidades locais por parte dos governos estatais”¹⁰.

¹⁰ “Nigeria Military Focus on Defending Oil Hubs”, Dino Mahtani, *Financial Times*, 11 de Outubro de 2006.

BP Angola e o Golfo da Guiné

O Golfo da Guiné é uma das áreas de África que tem merecido acompanhamento e atenção cuidada por parte da BP, tendo em conta a sua presença em Angola, uma das principais áreas do seu crescimento internacional de exploração e produção petrolífera. Em 2008, Angola vai representar cerca de 6% da produção mundial da BP. Até ao momento já investimos mais de 5 mil milhões de dólares em quatro blocos no *offshore* angolano, dois dos quais como operador, no quadro de uma presença que já data desde 1974. A nossa estratégia assenta numa cooperação a longo prazo com as autoridades angolanas, dentro do nosso objectivo de criar uma empresa de energia local, onde os quadros nacionais desempenhem um importante papel de liderança em todas as áreas e níveis.

Reconhecemos os passos que estão a ser dados pelos países do Golfo da Guiné em termos de transparência, quer no seu apoio a programas internacionais como a Iniciativa de Transparência das Industrias Extractivas, a sua adesão à Convenção das Nações Unidas contra a Corrupção e a Convenção da União Africana para a Prevenção e Combate da Corrupção e a sua participação em conferências e *fora* em que a boa governação e estabilidade macroeconómica são abordadas como questões fundamentais para o crescimento e o desenvolvimento sustentáveis. Discussões abertas entre o governo e a sociedade civil sobre a gestão de receitas começam a ser mais frequentes, criando assim uma dinâmica nacional susceptível de criar um ambiente conducente a uma maior transparência e a um combate mais efectivo contra a corrupção.

Em Maio, o Ministério das Finanças de Angola e o Banco Mundial organizaram conjuntamente dois *workshops* sobre Gestão de Receitas Petrolíferas envolvendo membros do governo, empresas e representantes da sociedade civil. O objectivo foi analisar questões ligadas à gestão das receitas petrolíferas num país cuja economia permanece dependente deste recurso natural. A BP não só contribuiu para a preparação dos mesmos, mas também participou activamente nas discussões, partilhando a sua experiência de trabalho com outros governos, nomeadamente do Azerbaijão, sobre transparência e gestão de hidrocarbonetos.

Como apoiar a estabilidade e desenvolvimento no Golfo da Guiné?

1. No nosso entender, a gestão dos recursos estratégicos deve fomentar o desenvolvimento e garantir progresso e estabilidade para as gerações futuras. Revestem-se, assim, de grande importância, a criação de mecanismos como os “Fundos de Petróleo”,

a par de investimentos em infra-estruturas e no aumento da capacidade humana nacional.

Neste sentido, a BP Angola tem mantido encontros com a equipa económica angolana para partilhar a nossa experiência sobre a forma como outros países estão a gerir as suas receitas petrolíferas e a criar diferentes tipos de fundos para garantir o desenvolvimento e a estabilidade social das gerações futuras.

2. A diversificação da economia desempenha um papel crucial, sobretudo naqueles sectores susceptíveis de contribuir para a criação de postos de trabalho e a redução de pobreza.

A BP Angola está a apoiar os esforços do governo angolano para um aumento da produção agrícola, tendo criado um fundo de 1,5 milhões de dólares para a concessão de micro-crédito a camponeses nas províncias de Benguela e Huambo, em parceria com o Banco Sol e a organização não governamental ADRA. Espera-se que cerca de 66 mil famílias, na sua maioria de antigos combatentes, venham a beneficiar de micro-financiamentos para melhorarem as suas condições de vida.

3. O incremento do “Conteúdo Local”, ou seja a participação das empresas locais na economia quer na prestação de serviços, quer no fornecimento de produtos necessários para a actividade petrolífera contribuiu para uma maior distribuição dos benefícios do sector da energia à população. Este desiderato requer acções tanto das companhias petrolíferas como do governo para que todas as partes envolvidas vejam o conteúdo local como um contributo necessário para o desenvolvimento da economia e um aproveitamento adicional da força de trabalho nacional.

Em nome da indústria, a BP Angola está a liderar um programa para capacitar pequenas e médias empresas angolanas para participarem mais activamente no mercado petrolífero e na economia nacional. Com o apoio da Sonangol e o recurso a uma equipa de especialistas, o Centro de Apoio Empresarial já prestou assistência a mais de 130 empresas, estando neste

momento 12 contratos a serem negociados entre algumas destas e as companhias petrolíferas.

Por outro lado, BP Angola assinou com a Universidade Agostinho Neto um protocolo de cooperação para melhorar os programas das faculdades de Engenharia e Geociências e aumentar o número de quadros técnicos angolanos disponíveis para satisfazerem as necessidades do mercado. Nos próximos dez anos a BP Angola vai investir 14 milhões de dólares na implementação desta iniciativa.

4. Esforços para aumentar o sentido de responsabilização, eficiência e efectividade governamental, um quadro legal forte e claro, o respeito pelo estado de direito e o combate à corrupção são factores indispensáveis para o desenvolvimento sustentável.

Em Julho, a BP Angola e a Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Agostinho Neto acordaram o estabelecimento de um programa de pós-graduação em Direito de Petróleo e Gás com o fim de contribuir para a sensibilização geral sobre a importância e os benefícios da condução das actividades económicas, principalmente na indústria petrolífera, dentro dos princípios da ética e da jurisprudência internacionalmente aceites, criando assim um ambiente de maior transparência e boa governação em Angola.

O programa vai facilitar um debate saudável e dinâmico nos círculos académicos e políticos sobre questões ligadas ao desenvolvimento estratégico dos recursos naturais, particularmente no que concerne a gestão das receitas do petróleo. A Faculdade de Direito tem sido uma incubadora de futuros dirigentes de Angola e desempenha um papel influente junto dos círculos políticos. A BP Angola vai disponibilizar 2,5 milhões de dólares para a realização deste programa.

5. O diálogo permanente com os diferentes *stakeholders* para melhorar o fluxo de informação e a transparência sobre o mercado petrolífero cria audiências mais conscientes

sobre estas questões, evitando assim possíveis movimentos especulativos.

A BP Angola e a Associação dos Economistas de Angola estão a organizar um seminário sob o tema “Análise Estatística da BP sobre a Energia Mundial” que vai ter lugar proximamente em Luanda. Esta análise, publicada pela BP há mais de 50 anos, oferece informação objectiva, consistente e global sobre os mercados energéticos, baseada em fontes governamentais e outras de reconhecida idoneidade. Em Angola será a primeira vez que economistas seniores do grupo BP vão animar tal debate sobre a energia no mundo para favorecer uma melhor compreensão e conhecimento dos mercados petrolíferos internacionais.

Conclusão

A continuação dos actuais níveis de investimento no Golfo da Guiné para a exploração dos seus recursos estratégicos, nomeadamente petrolíferos, vai depender da sua estabilidade política e económica, a existência de regimes legais transparentes e a continuação de termos fiscais atraentes capazes de mobilizar capitais internacionais num mercado global cada vez mais complexo e competitivo.

O aumento da transparência na gestão das receitas petrolíferas vai certamente determinar o desenvolvimento económico da região. Por outro lado, vai ser importante que os países membros melhorem os regimes jurídicos para conferirem maior estabilidade e respeito dos contratos existentes, de forma a poderem continuar a merecer a confiança das companhias petrolíferas internacionais e a beneficiarem dos actuais índices de crescimento por um longo prazo.

ESTRATÉGIA
E SEGURANÇA
NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL



A China e África

•

China and Africa

THE AFRICAN DIMENSION
IN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY


Evan S. Medeiros

Rand Corporation



***Chinese Foreign Policy:
The Africa Dimension***

***Presentation at the FLAD-IPRI Conference on
“Strategy and Security in Southern Africa”
Lisbon, Portugal
October 2006***



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Briefing Outline

➤ **China's Global Foreign Policy Objectives**

- **China's Africa Policy: Objectives and Actions**
- **Chinese Statecraft Toward Africa**
- **Future Trends and Challenges**



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China's Foreign Policy Approach

- **China looks at the world through three lenses:**
 - *Reclaim lost status* as an internationally respected great power
 - Focus on “rejuvenation” and “revitalization”
 - Strong and pervasive “entitlement mentality”
 - *Victimization* at the hands of western powers who violated China's sovereignty and territorial integrity
 - “Century of shame and humiliation” (百年國耻)
 - *Defensive security outlook*: China seeks to maximize its security and its independence/autonomy
 - China seeks freedom from external threats and limitations on its actions

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Perceptions of Its External Environment

- No major power conflict likely in the future, but there are growing tensions and contradictions among major powers – resulting from US policies
- Globalization pervasive and enduring: less zero-sum-ness, economic power important, high degree of interdependence, soft power
- US unipolar dominance likely to remain for next 20 years and “multi-polarity” developing far slower than China expected
- Rise of non-traditional security challenges
- Growing need and competition for resources and energy security
- “China’s rise” in global affairs: a new force for shaping rules, norms and global institutions

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Global Foreign Policy Objectives

1. Create a stable security environment for economic development
2. Seek opportunities for more trade and investment with China
3. Reassure regional nations that China’s rise doesn’t threaten them
4. Reduce the willingness and ability of regional nations to constrain China’s rise; reduce international support for “containment”
5. Secure and diversify access to natural resources, energy supplies
6. Reduce Taiwan’s “international space” and the ability of others to confer status and legitimacy on Taiwan

The degree to which China emphasizes these strategies varies among nations, regions, and over time

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Briefing Outline

- **China's Global Foreign Policy Objectives**

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China's Africa Objectives (I)

- **Moved beyond the days of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-hegemony as basis of China's Africa policy**
- **Despite rhetorical emphasis on ideology, Beijing always pursued its national interests in Africa: counter-Soviet influence and marginalize Taiwan**



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China's Africa Objectives (II)

- China's 2006 "Africa Policy" white paper:

"China seeks to establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, and cultural exchange."



- Vice Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong:

"Business is business. We try to separate politics from business...You [the West] have tried to impose a market economy and multiparty democracy on these [African] countries which are not ready for it. We are also against embargoes, which you have tried to use against us."

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China's Top 4 Africa Objectives

1. Securing and diversifying access of energy supplies and other strategic resources – for China's development
2. Expand access to African markets: back door to Western export markets
3. Reduce Taiwan's international space and recognition: long-standing objective
4. Coordinate foreign policy strategies in multilateral forums and build common vision of global affairs




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China's Energy Needs

- China is about 90% energy *self-sufficient*, due to abundant coal reserves
 - Oil provides 24% of national energy needs
- Oil is only fuel China imports in large quantities
 - World's 2nd largest oil *consumer* (>30% of US level)
 - World's 3rd largest oil *importer* (>25% of US level)
- Don't exaggerate Chinese oil demand!
 - China imports about 40% of total oil demand
- Thus, imported oil only accounts for less than 12% of total Chinese energy demand (US is <50%)
- Beijing's response has been to expand supply over demand moderation
 - Diversify sources and making "equity" oil investments to secure supply
 - By 2020, imported oil may meet 60%-80% of China's demand for oil – but still only 27% of overall demand




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Africa in China's Energy Equation

- Africa provides 31% of China's oil imports
 - Expected to grow as China diversified sources (growing at 1-2% per year)
- Both imports oil and makes equity investments
- Africa's top crude suppliers to China in 2005
 - Angola (14%), Sudan (5.2%), Congo (4.4%), Eq. Guinea (3.0%), Libya (1.8%), Nigeria (1.0%)
- Modest but growing oil investment in Africa
 - "Equity oil" is 15% of total Chinese oil imports
 - Sudan largest share of China's foreign equity production at 36% - but that's changing
 - Recent Chinese investments in Angola and Nigeria will expand its equity oil



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China's Crude Oil Imports in 2005

Country	Amount in 2005 (Millions of Tons)	Percentage Change (from 2004)	Percentage of Total Chinese Imports
1. Saudi Arabia	22.178	28.6%	18%
2. Angola	17.462	7.7%	14%
3. Iran	14.272	7.8%	13%
4. Russia	12.777	18.6%	10%
5. Oman	10.832	-33.7%	9%
6. Yemen	6.839	39.2%	5%
7. Sudan	6.619	14.7%	5%
8. Congo	5.534	15.9%	4%
9. Indonesia	4.087	19.2%	3%
10. Equatorial Guinea	3.707	6.3%	3%

Source: Chinese Customs data, 2005

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China's Oil Imports from Africa in 2005

Country (in rank order)	Exports to China in 2005 (million of tons)	Percentage Change (from 2004)	As a Percentage of Total Chinese Crude Oil Imports	Jan-July 2006 Exports (% change) [2006 Rank]
1. Angola	17.462	7.7%	14.0%	15.081 (46.3%) [1]
2. Sudan	6.619	14.7%	5.2%	.900 (-76.9%) [5]
3. Congo	5.534	15.9%	4.4%	3.480 (17.1%) [2]
4. Equatorial Guinea	3.707	6.3%	3.0%	3.095 (59.8%) [3]
5. Libya	2.258	68.7%	1.8%	2.340 (76.7%) [4]
6. Nigeria	1.310	-11.9%	1.0%	
7. Algeria	.821	21.5%	.65%	
8. Chad	.547	-34.1	.43%	.415 (53%) [8]
9. Egypt	.079	NA	.06%	
10. Gabon	NA	NA	NA	.530 (NA) [7]
11. Mauritania				.543 (NA) [6]

Now,
China's
No. 1
Supplier

Source: Chinese Customs data, 2005 and 2006

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Africa and China's Resource Needs

- China's demand for strategic resources growing
 - World's largest user of copper
 - Huge demand for iron ore and cement for construction projects
- China is purchasing strategic resources from several African nations, mainly in central and southern Africa
 - Via direct investment by Chinese state companies in mines, fisheries, precious woods
 - DRC: copper and cobalt mines
 - Zambia: copper mines
 - Liberia: iron ore




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
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Growing China-Africa Trade (I)

- China-Africa trade booming, in absolute and percentage terms
 - \$3 billion in 1995 to ~\$25 billion in 2005



Source: Chinese Customs data reported to UN COMTRADE database, excludes Hong Kong



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Growing China-Africa Trade (II)

- China has become Africa's third most important trading partner, after US and France – ahead of UK

Year	Total China-Africa Trade (US \$ millions)	% Increase in Overall Trade Year-on-Year	PRC Exports to Africa (US \$ millions)	% Increase in Exports Year-on-Year	PRC Imports from Africa (US \$ millions)	% Increase in PRC Imports from Africa
1995	2,078.1	--	1,749.6	--	328.5	--
2000	6,479.8	--	3,476.9	--	3,002.9	--
2001	6,236.7	(3.8)	4,306.1	23.85	1,930.6	(35.7)
2002	7,159.1	14.8	4,976.9	15.58	2,182.2	13.0
2003	11,550.7	61.3	7,463.0	49.95	4,087.7	87.3
2004	18,374.8	59.1	9,737.1	30.47	8,637.6	111.3
2005	24,882.7	35.4	13,255.8	36.14	11,626.9	34.6

Source: Chinese Customs data reported to UN COMTRADE database, excludes Hong Kong


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Growing China-Africa Trade (III)

- China's top five African trade partners in 2005

	1995	2000	2005
# 1	South Africa	Angola	Angola
# 2	Angola	South Africa	South Africa
# 3	Nigeria	Nigeria	Congo
# 4	Gabon	Benin	Nigeria
# 5	Togo	Congo	Equatorial Guinea



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Interpreting China-Africa Trade (I)

- Chinese imports from Africa driven by oil - mainly from Angola
 - In 2005, oil imports from Angola accounted for *more than 50% of all Chinese imports from sub-Saharan Africa*
 - 4 of China's top five trade partners are oil suppliers
- Trade growth characterized by much volatility, largely due to volatility in China's oil imports - due to world oil price volatility
- China's exports to Africa are consistently growing
- Many African nations run a trade deficit with China
 - Also the case for African trade with Western nations
- China's textile exports have hurt numerous nations: factories closed in Kenya, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, Kenya
 - China as “double whammy”: killing domestic and foreign markets
 - Chinese firms using Africa as a “back-door” to Western textile markets, via AGOA



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Interpreting China-Africa Trade (II)

- China's trade with Africa remains of limited importance to China's overall trade volume
- Majority of Chinese trade with Asia due to integrated regional production chain

Year	PRC Trade with Africa as a % of Total Chinese Trade
1995	0.2
2000	1.3
2001	0.8
2002	0.7
2003	1.0
2004	1.5
2005	1.8




Source: Phillip C. Saunders, *China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2006, p. 24.

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Reduce Taiwan's International Space

- Consistent goal in Chinese foreign policy since 1949
 - 5 of 24 nations that recognize Taiwan are in Africa
 - Burkina Faso, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tome-Principe, Swaziland
- 
- China uses large financial grants and related aid to persuade African nations to switch recognition to China from Taiwan
 - China scored 8 major successes in last 12 years:
 - Chad (2006), Senegal (2005), CAR (1998), Guinea Bissau (1998), Lesotho (1994), Liberia (2003), Niger (1996), South Africa (1997)
 - Several flip-flop: Chad (2x), CAR (3x), Lesotho (2x), Liberia (2x), Niger(2x), Senegal (2x)
 - Playing Beijing and Taipei off one another for financial gain

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Coordinate Foreign Policy Objectives

- China has a dual international identity: developing and developed nation: calls itself “the largest developing nation”
- China rhetorically promotes common vision with African nations
 - Principles of equality, sovereignty, “win-win” cooperation, economic development, and non-interference in internal affairs
- Presents a “soft-alternative” to US and Western policies to Africa
 - African nations are a welcome audience for Chinese principles guiding global affairs
- China uses African nations to implement its foreign policy goals
 - Powerful voting block in international organizations
 - Prevent UNHRC votes against China
 - Derailed Japan's bid for UNSC permanent membership
 - Reduce Japan's international influence with aid and investment

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Briefing Outline

- **China's Global Foreign Policy Objectives**
- **China's Africa Policy: Objectives and Actions**
- **Chinese Statecraft Toward Africa**
- **Future Trends and Challenges**

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China's Statecraft in Africa

- **Leadership diplomacy**
 - 2004: Hu Jintao and 3 PBSC members visited 12 African nations
 - 2005: Wen Jiabao and another PBSC member visited 8 African nations
 - 2006: Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao visited 11 nations, so far
 - Hu's visits focused on forging partnerships and concluding deals
 - 2004: Algeria, Egypt, Gabon (all energy related)
 - 2006: Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco (oil exploration related)
- **Strategic Partnerships: Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria – and Portugal**
 - China uses them to gain influence with key regional nations
- **Multilateral forums: China's "influence multipliers"**
 - China-Africa Cooperation Forum: established in 2000
 - Met in 2003 and will meet in November 2006
 - China-Africa Business Council formed in 2004

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China's Aid to Africa

- **Debt relief:** China agreed in 2003 to forgive \$1.27 billion (10.5 billion *Renminbi*) in debt to 31 African nations
- **Technical assistance:** training doctors and farmers; educating African students in China
- **Development assistance:** millions annually (estimates vary)
 - China doesn't publish complete foreign aid statistics
 - No strings attached: no human rights/governance standards
 - No conditionality: China as an alternative to IMF
 - Such aid provides China with preferential access to resources
- **China's prestige projects**
 - New foreign ministry buildings in Uganda and Djibouti
 - Stadiums in Mali, Djibouti and Central African Republic
 - Parliament buildings in Mozambique and Gabon
 - Direct civil service funding in CAR and Liberia

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More Diplomatic Tools

- **Military Assistance:** limited but consistent
 - Zimbabwe, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and others
 - 2001-2004: \$200 million in arms exports (from \$600)
 - 6.78% of Africa's arm deliveries (from 15.4%)
 - 7.41% of China's exports (from 20.7%)
- **Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa**
 - Liberia (600), DRC (218), Sierra Leone (39), Ethiopia/Eritrea (35) Côte d'Ivoire (8), Burundi (6), and previously Mozambique
- **Tourism:** China designated 16 African nations as approved tourist destinations
 - 110,000 Chinese tourists to African in 2005 – 100% increase from 2004
- **Cultural exchanges:** establishing "Confucius Institutes" to promote study of Chinese language, history, and culture
 - Over 200 African students studying in China in 2006



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Briefing Outline

- **China's Global Foreign Policy Objectives**
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China's Diplomatic Challenges in Africa

- **Growing voices that see China as a “neo-colonial power” and an “extractive economy”**
 - Chinese construction projects employ few local workers
 - Tens of thousands of migrant workers remit money back to China
 - Chinese exports of consumer goods are low quality
 - A few anti-China riots already in Zambia and Lesotho
- **Growing trade frictions with African nations**
 - Numerous countries run a trade deficit with China
 - Local merchants and manufacturers throughout Africa hurt by China
 - Guttled many textile factories in southern Africa
 - A replay of Africa's trade with Europe?
- **External costs of China's Africa policy**
 - Hurting China's international reputation: Sudan and Zimbabwe
 - Tensions with US and EU over aid and investment practices

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...Even More Challenges in Africa

- China has tied itself to unreliable leaders such as Mugabe in Zimbabwe
- African energy supplies rely on vulnerable sea transport: China needs land routes
- Are Chinese aid and investment practices sustainable over time; are Chinese state companies willing to continue paying bribes and taking losses?
- China learning that some African nations can not follow through on formal agreements due to weak governance
- China's Africa policy will get drawn in to its broader foreign policy interests: "being a responsible stakeholder"



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Key Chinese Trends to Watch

- Changing energy policy: developing a national energy plan
 - Focusing on demand moderation via conservation
 - Diversifying suppliers to reduce reliance on vulnerable sea lanes of communication (SLOCs): Central Asia and Russia
- Changing trade policy strategy
 - New target for foreign trade growth of 10% p/a from 2006-2010
 - down from 24% p/a
 - Exporters abandon the blind pursuit of "growth for growth's own sake" in favor of "quality growth"
 - Move from low-price competition to gaining competitive advantages through technical innovation
- Changing foreign policy identity
 - Shifting toward greater identification with developed nation interests
 - Focus on being a "responsible major power"

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CHINA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: OLD STORY, NEW STRATEGIES?

Steve Stead

Admiral, Deputy-Director, The Brenthurst Foundation

Introduction

There is a regular statistical media consommé on China and the impact of its economic growth: for example, China uses 25% of the world's steel and 40% of its concrete; if the People's Republic had to reach US car ownership levels it would consume more oil than the current daily production; and if the Chinese annually ate as much fish per capita as the Japanese, they would consume the entire world fish harvest.

China's trade with Africa has soared as its economy has continued its apparently inexorable growth path. The usual statistical superlatives illustrate this, if only to a degree: some 9% average annual GDP growth for two decades, US\$65 billion in annual investment inflows, and foreign reserves of around US\$700 billion. No wonder then that this growth pattern has led to a debate around the viability of the 'Beijing consensus' to developing countries elsewhere as an alternative to Western prescriptions of liberalisation.

Many African countries face a conundrum with regard to China's changing relationship with the continent. African domestic industries, in textiles and other areas, risk being swamped by cheaper Chinese products. China's (including Hong Kong) trade with Africa has increased from US\$900 million in 1990 to nearly US\$30 billion in 2004. South Africa's share is around US\$4.5 billion, of which the balance (US\$2.5 billion) is in favour of the People's Republic and mainly in manufactured (labour-intensive) goods.

Behind these impressive, if not increasingly routine, empirical flourishes lies a simple issue – the over nine percent annual Chinese economic growth over the past twenty years, and what this means for economic prosperity and development strategies as we know them. Certainly how to take advantage of China's burgeoning market without damaging your domestic economy are two questions which are – or should be – consuming the thoughts of policy-makers.

I would like, however, to limit my comments to three inter-related areas:

- The implications on commodity-based African economies, especially the oil producing nations, of increasing demand by both the us and China.
- The identification and development of strategies of co-operation necessary to support Africa's economic growth, good governance and movement towards greater democracy.
- The impact of China's increasing engagement with Africa, in both economic and political terms. Is China likely to change Africa more than Africa changes the nature of Chinese engagement?

Driven By Commodities, Complemented By African Imports

The conventional wisdom is that China presents Africa with major threats and opportunities. This has been alluded to in a recent article by the Foundation titled, "Arrival of Partners or Predators?" Interestingly, it elicited very little reaction – positive or negative.

In the latter category is the boom in extractive industries including oil and mining driven in part by Chinese (and Indian)


demand. In 2004, China's imports from Africa increased over 80% to just under US\$16 billion, driven mainly by oil imports. Indeed, Africa is a new, increasingly important energy frontier.

Currently the United States imports two-thirds of its oil needs, and 15% of this comes from Africa, with forecasts that this figure could increase to 25% by 2015. Africa produced 6.8 million barrels of oil per day in 1979; this increased to over 9.8 million bpd in 2005¹. China, the second-largest global energy importer behind the US, currently imports in the region of six million barrels of oil a day. The figure is expected to double in the next 15 years. Asia's oil production meanwhile has gone up by more than double, from 11 million barrels per day in 1979 to just under 24 million in 2004². During the same period, China's energy consumption increased by 243% – as opposed to her energy production which has increased by 194% – and the gap appears to be growing. There is no need to discuss or explain further the priority requirement for sources of energy to fuel an economy presently powered by manufacturing industries.

With only half of its energy needs now supplied from domestic sources, China is aggressively pursuing fresh oil interests in Africa notably in the Sudan (which makes up almost one-tenth of all Chinese oil imports) but also more recently in Angola, where China agreed to a US\$2 billion credit line in 2004. Today the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the largest investor in Sudan. CNPC's Heglig and Unity fields in Sudan now produce 350,000 barrels per day and a 41% share of a field in the Melut Basin, which is expected to produce as much as 300,000 barrels per day by the end of 2006. Another Chinese firm, Sinopec Corporation, is busy completing a pipeline from that complex to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, where China's Petroleum Engineering Construction Group is constructing a tanker terminal. China also made a US\$2.3 billion investment in the Nigerian oil fields in 2005.

¹ At http://www.investis.com/bp_acc_ia/stat_review_05/htdocs/reports/report_3.html.

² At http://www.investis.com/bp_acc_ia/stat_review_05/htdocs/reports/report_6.html.

Consumption by area | Million barrels daily


Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006

In Southern Africa, Angola is at the centre of the oil boom, with its output increasing from 722,000 barrels a day in 2001 to 930,000 in 2003. By 2020 it is expected to reach 3.3 million barrels a day. Nigeria's output is predicted to double to 4.4 million barrels a day by 2020. And today's minor oil producers – such as Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Sudan – could more than treble their output given the continuation of this demand. Today's dozen African producers could in the next few years include five more, primarily outside the “traditional oil regions”, namely Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique and Madagascar.

China is at the centre of interest in this and other commodity sectors, in addition to its investments in other areas of African economic activity: forestry in Equatorial Guinea, retailing in Sierra Leone, construction in Botswana, mobile phones in Zimbabwe, and pharmaceuticals in Ethiopia. Large flows of Chinese people are accompanying the money. In 2005, Angola's energy minister

reputedly told Reuters that as many as three million Chinese could move there during the next five years, a sizeable percentage of Angola's 14 million strong population. It is estimated that there are more than 100,000 Chinese nationals living in South Africa, many of them illegally. There are concerns about the longer-term impact of the arrival of large numbers of Chinese firms (notably recently in the construction sector) on local citizens in Africa. Is this a second colonisation and does it threaten to crowd out local business? Or will the effects be less deleterious and rather instil improved competitiveness and standards in African economies?

Production by area | Million barrels daily



Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006

Some threats to Africa

Commodity booms have historically proven to be a long-term threat to economic development for a number of reasons

including the threat of the so-called “Dutch-disease” of over-valued currencies and a related failure to diversify economically, along with the pernicious impact on governance structures. Oil booms have generally enriched African elites – not their populations. Yet the scale and future prospects of the oil sector in Africa mean, in the words of one executive, “that there is nothing in Africa that even comes close in terms of investor interest. There is a frenzy of appetite involving American, European and now Chinese and Indian players”. New, large-scale discoveries “could change Africa irrevocably given the numbers involved.”

There are a number of other threats posed by China’s growing involvement in Africa.

China is swamping Africa with cheap manufactured goods, at least cheaper than most African producers can make them. In 2004, China’s total exports to Africa touched US\$14 billion, up more than 35% over 2003. This is good for African consumers, but not for the balance of payments of African economies.

Also, China’s reach into third-party markets reduced further still the ability of Africa to develop its own alternatives, given both the scale and productivity advantages of their Chinese competitors. Furthermore, the termination of the AGOA and Multi-fibre Agreements (MFA) in January 2005 resulted in the closure of 10 factories and the loss of over 10 000 jobs in Lesotho – which may not, on the surface appear disproportionate, but put in the context of a small and poor country, is catastrophic. Even countries with larger economies like South Africa and Nigeria have seen their textile industries crippled with the former losing in the region of 85 000 jobs. Exports from China to South Africa rose by almost 40% during 2005 leading to protests from the South African Government and the present debate on placing import quotas on Chinese textiles.

Moreover, China has apparently traditionally operated with principal concern for its own needs and African governance

and democratisation second. This may be a more openly honest approach to those Western countries which traditionally offer lip service to such causes, but nonetheless it is debateable at best whether Chinese lines of credit outside of international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank will actually improve the African governance record on accountability and transparency. The issuing of a US\$2 billion credit line to the Angolan government and US\$4 billion's worth of Chinese investment in Sudan is moot – both necessary, apparently, to satiate China's increasing hunger for energy.

However, I am loath to say that China is going to weaken governance regimes established in Africa's oil producers. After all, the record of engagement by us and European oil producers has hardly been that encouraging in this regard. It is difficult to see how these regimes could actually be much worse.

Some Projections for Africa

There have been suggestions that African economies can compete with China in areas where their climates and conditions are better suited. Unfortunately this comparative advantage is not fixed, and will be affected by advances in technology, for example the development of new crops, seeds and farming techniques.

Just as it demands pro-activity and not policy passiveness, the path of African – and similarly, Latin American development for that matter – is not static. I believe that much will depend on what happens inside China itself. As China increasingly leverages technology and its people become more affluent, lower-wage countries might be able to compete better. This process may also be influenced by environmental pressures within the PRC demanding a more knowledge – rather than manufacturing – based economy. The continuous demand for higher-productiv-

ity and increasing mechanisation is already having an impact: One recent study shows that between 1995 and 2002 China, now regarded as the manufacturing capital of the world, lost 15% of its manufacturing jobs compared to 11% in the us, 16% in Japan and 20% in Brazil.

The Chinese leadership has also, at some point, to realise that it is in their long-term interest, that the global economy is not imbalanced in its favour – hence for example the pressure to revalue their currency. China also faces other constraints and pressures: If it is to maintain its ability to absorb new entrants into the labour market, Beijing will have to learn to free up stifling regulations on private enterprise, key to accelerating the pace of innovation. At the other end of the scale, by 2015, China will probably begin to feel the effects of its one-child policy – with a slowdown in the supply of cheap and youthful labour and the ‘greying’ of its society.

Essentially China is successful because of the (low) cost of its labour inputs. But what distinguishes it from other growth paths is, first, its sheer size and internal market opportunities; and second, the depth and breadth of its cultural values, combining an ancient civilisation with Confucian values.

Will China, paradoxically, be able to cope with its extraordinary internal diversity – between national groups and regions? Will it be able to extend the benefits of prosperity beyond the coastal regions to the generally poorer interior, and in so doing deal with widening wealth inequalities? What will be the impact of an increasingly male-dominated, spoilt ‘uni-child’ society, the result of the single-child policy adopted by Beijing to curb the population explosion? Will its international relations shift from today’s broad co-operation to resisting containment by others, especially given China’s now active participation in the race for oil and gas reserves worldwide?

Implicit in the answers to these questions, is an analysis of the trajectory of the Chinese economy. Here there are two

groups, essentially the Sino optimists and pessimists – although one can certainly argue for a number of alternatives somewhere on the spectrum between the two.

The ‘Sino optimists’ envisage a continuation of China’s remarkable economic performance for the foreseeable future, and a management of internal contradictions and potential external stumbling-blocks.

For this group, China and other states are in broad partnership rather than conflict, not least because the global economy is not a zero-sum game. China’s growth does not ultimately, according to this argument, come about at the expense of others, principally the United States. Instead China’s low-cost base passes on savings to the US economy. Moreover, the global economy is not a static but rather a growing pie.

For the optimists, China will continue to be a good international player both because of its own internal growth needs and also because it has historically been a non-offensive great power, content to receive the tributes of others and where foreign military incursions – such as over Tibet and, in 1979, Vietnam – are the exception and not the rule.

And the optimists see huge potential in the complementarity between the Chinese and Indian economies, the former as ‘the factory of the world’ and the latter as ‘the office of the world’.

The pessimists prefer, however, to highlight the zero-sum nature of global interaction, with China gaining at others’ expense, especially the US given its widening balance of payments deficit. They see increasing tension across the Taiwan Strait as destabilising, and view China’s voracious appetite for hydrocarbon and other commodities as leading to an increasing conflict of interests with the US and EU.

But most importantly, it is questioned whether China can maintain social harmony in the face of wealth divides, recognis-

ing that an economic growth rate as high as 7% is required just for China to keep its head above the increase in the numbers seeking work. Is it possible that 'one little political bump' could cause an economic crisis?

The Overall Impact of China on Africa

To some extent the impact of China on Africa depends on whether the present engagement alters the traditional constraints on Africa's external engagements.

There is little doubt, in my book at least, that China's relations with Africa will likely broaden and deepen in parallel with the nature of China's own links with the global economy. But the extent to which China can transform African states relates to the nature of those states themselves. For reasons of geography and demography, and patterns of social organisation, these states have proven extremely resistant to enduring what Professor Christopher Clapham refers to as the 'grand projects of social and economic transformation' as the colonialists have found in the past³. This ability of China to positively influence Africa faces the same constraints as other large economies in terms of their relationship with the continent: in short, it is a deeply unequal partnership, with no African country (with the possible exception of South Africa) in a position to engage with China in the same way that China is engaging with Africa – rhetoric about developing world fraternalism aside⁴. For example, Africa still only accounts today for 3% of China's total overseas trade.

Whether Africa can cope with this inequality (at which they are manifestly well practised) and their elites can employ China for their own benefit is, however, another question. As Clapham has noted, 'One very important reason why China's involvement in Africa has been so widely welcomed and readily

³ Christopher Clapham, 'Fitting China In', Mimeo, July 2006, p.2. This section draws extensively from his excellent notes on the topic.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

accommodated, has been that it fits so neatly into the familiar patterns of rentier statehood and politics, with which Africa's rulers have been accustomed to maintain themselves.' China offers a rhetorical counter to African governance regimes (such as the Washington consensus), even though until now its role has been primarily to reinforce the extant models of African engagement with the global economy. Whether this might change, is moot, though there is little to suggest this is the case. Indeed, it remains to be seen how China – rather than Africa – will adapt to the volatility of the African investment environment in safeguarding its growing interests, a predicament that other actors have learnt to cope with, to some extent, in the 40-plus years since independence. This paradoxically contrasts with China's view on 'sovereignty' as a tenet of its international relations, one that has found common cause with many African states and leaders. And direct support for political regimes through client patronage or arms flows is not, as history indicates, a very reliable way of ensuring control since there is an acute difference between physical and social control, between control of the physical means of coercion and the creation of forms of authority to ensure compliance⁵.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

In the same way, China (and Chinese companies) cannot sidestep the basic premise of the need for governance as a means to safeguard interests, a conclusion that Western companies reached some time ago. Governance is, in simple terms, to quote Clapham again, 'an essential precondition for maintaining stable economic relationships'.

In terms of Africa's own development, one has to ask whether China's burgeoning engagement with the continent has led – or is likely to lead – to a change in profile of Africa's exports? To the contrary, it would appear to have reinforced past trends towards raw material rather than beneficiated exports, given China's appetite for these products and its own low-cost pro-

ducer basis. This structural divergence is widening rather than narrowing.

Finally, it is also unclear whether China's perceived sympathy and solidarity with certain African regimes and its concomitant ideological contrast with Western values and conditionalities, will serve it – or Africa – well in the long-term. China is perceived to represent an alternative to Western values. Yet it is these very values, including human rights, which African citizens seek to promote, since it is they who have suffered at the hands of brutal regimes. This is why Africa moved inexorably towards multipartyism in the 1990s and into the 21st century, in spite of many difficulties along the way. Close identification with any reversals in this process would do no favours for the external patron.

Summary

China came to Africa in the 50's as a trader; in the 60's as contract workers; during the Cold War as ideological competitors to the Soviet Union and today as marketers.

What are the basic motives for China's African initiative? It is a country of more than a billion people. Its rapidly growing industries require raw materials and energy. Exporters need markets and the country needs diplomatic support to advance Chinese national interests.

The value of trade between China and Africa has increased fourfold since the beginning of this century. China is now Africa's third largest commercial partner after the US and France. Although its interest is primarily in the energy sector, it has major interests in metals, food and timber. It is prepared to make investments in infrastructure and exports textiles and low-cost consumer goods. It is a significant supplier of military hardware,

contributes to peacekeeping operations, and provides aid, debt relief, scholarships, training and specialist assistance.

Its policy of non-interference in domestic affairs has removed many constraints faced by its competitors and provided the recipients with options they would not have enjoyed, for example the US\$2 billion soft loan to Angola (which certain informed sources believe will increase to US\$6 billion in the near future) has allowed that country to basically ignore the IMF's demand for accountability. It is in essence an alternative to working with the IMF.

It is this sort of approach that finds favour with a growing number of African regimes – not all of them leading examples of democratic values.

Ethiopia has been offered a loan to make good the shortfall following the suspension of EU aid due to human rights abuses. Equatorial Guinea is benefiting from specialist aid and military assistance leading to its president referring to China as his country's main development partner.

In the case of Zimbabwe, China is now the second largest trade partner after South Africa. It has supplied fighter aircraft, surveillance equipment and 3 commercial aircrafts to Air Zimbabwe – and is in turn increasing its influence in the tobacco industry and the extraction of minerals. It has stakes in electricity provision, mobile phones and transport. Reports indicate negotiations over a joint coal venture, a glass factory and beef production on land obtained through the re-distribution policy. President Mugabe was recently quoted as saying, 'Zimbabwe is returning to the days when our greatest friends were the Chinese. We look again to the East where the sun rises, and no longer to the West where the sun sets.'

Theoretically, China and Africa have complementary commercial and economic interests: Africa is short on capital, has a low manufacturing base, is import dependent, needs basic

infrastructure and exports commodities; China has abundant investment capital, has created an enormous manufacturing export base, needs to import commodities to fuel its manufacturing industries and is willing to invest in infrastructure. So theoretically, this could be “a marriage made in heaven.” Reality would seem to indicate something different.

Sub-Saharan Africa attracted an estimated US\$8,5 billion in new Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2003 – only 6.3% of total FDI to the world’s developing countries. Almost 50% of this went to new investment in the petroleum sector. Angola, Nigeria and Sudan together accounted for approximately 50% of FDI to sub-Saharan Africa. Chinese direct investment in Africa was estimated at US\$4,6 billion in 2005 – an increase of 112% over 2003 and 12,4% of total FDI. Incidentally why should sub-Saharan Africa have such a poor investment climate? This is open to debate but a combination of political instability, taxation systems, labour laws, excessive regulations, inadequate infrastructure, low productivity, corruption and HIV/AIDS will go some way to providing an answer and constitutes the environment in which China will have to do business.

According to US Department of Energy statistics for 2005, China accounted for 38.9% of the increase in oil demand from 2003 to 2004. For the same period the US accounted for 19.4%. This is obviously not directly comparable but gives an indication of the extent of growth in demand. In the same year China became the 2nd largest consumer of petroleum products after the US. 43% of its total requirement was imported and 28% of this requirement was supplied from sub-Saharan Africa.

In return China expects support for its “One China policy”; for its desire to be a major player on the world stage; for its stand in international organisations like the UN, the IMF and the WTO; and its approach to human rights. With South Africa set to take a seat on the UN Security Council in 2007, it may not

be a complete coincidence that both the Russian and Chinese heads of state visited the country during 2006.

China has gone to great lengths to convince the world of its “peaceful rise”. Its intentions are strictly commercial, minimally political and altogether peaceful with no military ambitions. However, its present policy towards Taiwan, a defence budget growing at 12% per annum and examples of military-heavy investments like the Sudan, are perhaps indications of the other side of the coin.

And finally, there are growing concerns in Africa over the potential for a “resource Cold War” developing, based on observations of China’s encroachment in countries like Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria – oil producers which have been developed primarily by us companies. To this can be added the possible emergence of a “new imperialism”. To quote Moeletsi Mbeki, brother of the South African President, ‘China represents both a tantalising opportunity and a terrifying threat. We sell them raw materials and they sell us back manufactured goods.’

Conclusion

There is no doubt that China’s emergence in the global economy and its changing relationship with Africa has probably been the most profound development on the continent since the end of the Cold War. But for the reasons above, China’s engagement with Africa is more likely to modify the African experience, than fundamentally change it.

THE GEOPOLITICS OF CHINESE OIL INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira

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Over the past decade, Chinese investment in Africa's oil sector, in tandem with Chinese involvement more generally, has grown from residual levels to a major presence with important, and still unforeseen, consequences for African domestic politics and the continent's relations with the rest of the world. The level of inquiry has, however, fallen far short of an accurate reading of this momentous process. Recent discussions of Chinese oil investment in Africa have lacked factual precision, analytical clarity, and even a measure of sobriety. Press coverage, particularly in the US, concentrates almost exclusively on the human rights and governance implications of China's so-called "lack of a moral agenda", to the detriment of other, equally significant and poorly understood dimensions. In turn, this alarmist rendition is countered by an unhelpful revisionist approach that sees China's demeanor in essentially positive terms and does not recognize the potential for negative results.

This presentation is a brief attempt at understanding this process. I will proceed in three steps. Firstly, I focus on China's oil industry and its dual mission of building world-class corporate players while keeping the fast-growing economy provisioned with energy resources mostly unavailable domestically. Secondly, I provide a summary of the present-day activities of Chinese oil firms in Africa, their business methods, and the challenges and opportunities they face. Thirdly, I discuss the likely implications of sustained, large-scale Chinese oil investment in the years to come.

1. Mirroring the centrality of oil provision for China's economic growth, oil companies are at the forefront of the Chinese government's attempts at constructing globally competitive companies. This emphasis owes to two factors. The first is the understanding that successful late industrializers have always developed world-class firms, particularly in the "commanding heights" sectors of the economy, and that China cannot secure its position in the world economy without them. The second factor is the overriding strategic importance of oil supplies and the concurrent desire of the Chinese government not to leave such a crucial task to the vagaries of the market and foreign intermediaries alone. Chinese "national champions" in the oil sector are, in this vision, tasked with finding, extracting, transporting, refining and domestically marketing the oil needed to fuel China's growth.

To that effect, Chinese industrial policy has sought to gear up its three main firms, CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC, all of which were established in the early 1980s and restructured in the late 1990s. By 2001, all three had had subsidiaries successfully floated in the New York and Hong-Kong stock exchanges. Despite the subsequent presence of commercially minded minority shareholders, and the Chinese leadership's ambition to turn these firms into global corporate giants that can compete with western oil majors, they remain principally the tools of Chinese government strategizing.

For all the portraits in the Western media of Chinese oil companies as ruthless competitors, the Chinese outlook on these matters is entirely different. Chinese decision-makers are painfully aware of the inferior prowess of their oil firms in the global stage. They possess neither the bountiful reserves of the national oil companies of oil-producing states nor the technical expertise and business savvy-ness of western firms. In her careful analysis of the challenges faced by China's oil

industry, Jin Zhang concludes that its technological capability is “relatively backward”. While the internationally listed subsidiaries of the three companies are more agile, broadly conform to western corporate governance principles, and are acquiring expertise at great speed, even they are no match for their western counterparts.

This perceived fragility of Chinese firms in the global economy is echoed by the government’s fear of dependency on foreign sources for keeping China provisioned. A net exporter until 1993, China’s appetite for foreign oil grew so fast that, by 2004, it had become the world’s second importer of oil. Chinese decision-makers are deeply fearful of this. They fear supply disruption in the context of conflict or deteriorating relations with the us. They have bad memories of dependence on Russian energy imports in the 1950s and early 1960s. They also understand well the political power of energy suppliers: as an oil exporter from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, China successfully used its own “oil weapon” to shape Japan’s regional policies. Yet for all the misgivings, the leadership has accepted this dependency as unavoidable.

A significant and multifaceted debate on how best to cope with its energy supply situation is happening in China, and the country is engaged in the simultaneous pursuit of a number of policies, many of which unambiguously market-based. That which is most relevant for its relations with Africa is a concerted effort by Chinese companies to venture into foreign markets and acquire equity oil. Through its companies, the Chinese government aims to “control” a significant percentage of its oil needs while shielding the Chinese economy from potential price hikes or supply disruptions. The main traits of this “mercantilist” approach to oil supply are: a) distrust of markets, especially in contexts of disruption or conflict; b) belief in ownership of oil resources through national oil companies as the best guarantee

of access; c) strong investment in affable bilateral relations with oil producers.

This attempt at “locking up” oil assets or, failing that, acquiring oil through fixed long-term contracts as opposed to the spot market, while only a segment of an otherwise mostly market-based Chinese approach to energy supplies, contrasts with current western visions of how a well-functioning international oil market works, even if it is historically unexceptional. (This was mostly how France conceived of energy security until the 1990s, for instance). The implicit role for Chinese companies, the subordination of commercial logic to the government’s political imperatives also contrast with the maximization of shareholder value that drives western firms. Yet far from opposing this impingement, Chinese oil companies are the most strident advocates for a global equity oil strategy. They see such immersion in the tough outside world as a much-needed technical and managerial crash course for their grooming as “global players”. Chinese oil companies also count on state assistance through soft loans and petro-diplomacy to more than compensate for the uncommercial element encompassed by “national interest” policies. In pursuit of this vision, Chinese companies have fanned out in pursuit of investment opportunities in Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

While certainly not an instance of global rivalry with the West, China’s equity oil strategy contains an ‘hedging’ element, a sort of insurance policy. Not wanting to “put all its eggs in one basket”, China believes that privileged access to oil and a dense political relationship with oil producers in the developing world will enhance its security and protect it from a deterioration of relations with the US in particular. Whether or not it is mistaken in its “strategic approach” especially in regard to the fungible nature of the international oil markets, where no

producer or consumer stands in isolation from others cannot be assessed here: the pursuit of this policy is itself consequential.

This is the political backdrop for much of China's policy towards Africa's oil resources.

2. The involvement of Chinese oil companies in Africa over the last decade has taken place amidst revolutionary change in the Continent's upstream, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea region that witnessed a major reassessment of the magnitude of its reserves. Technological breakthroughs in the form of ultra-deep water machinery and expertise have ushered in investment possibilities hitherto undreamed of. At the forefront of this process are major western firms such as Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, ENI, and Total, companies that have dominated oil production in the region since the 1950s. But scores of other firms of diverse sizes and origins are also taking part in this rush for business deals.

While Chinese companies have recently gained important footholds in Gulf of Guinea high-profile producers such as Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea, their first African stop (in 1996) was Sudan, a disreputable state mostly marginalized by the West in the 1990s. From the Chinese point of view, there was no intrinsic sympathy for Sudan's exclusion by the West. China's objective was rather to exploit the unique opportunity of putting down roots while the country was still in the international blacklist. In this, China was successful: not only is Sudan China's only major production site in Africa at the present time, but the end of the civil war in the south has rekindled international interest. China's willingness to engage with it at a troubled time means it is in an ideal position to benefit from peacetime investment opportunities.

The Sudan case is exemplary of Chinese business methods in the African oil industry in more ways than the mere willing-

ness to get involved in untapped markets, neglected regions, and rough spots, even if this is one of its hallmarks notice, for instance, CNOOC's recent arrival in the Niger Delta precisely when the insurgency there was expected to discourage new investors. More importantly, the Sudan experience shows China's capacity for providing "packaged deals" that promise aid, credit lines, and investment in infrastructure and other sectors that commercially-minded companies would never contemplate, and that western donors are not interested in. In Nigeria, CNOOC recently offered a \$2.7 billion development spending commitment on top of the \$2 billion-plus purchase of a 45 percent stake in a Niger Delta oil block. For its part, CNPC's acquisition of four drilling licenses came with its taking up of a controlling stake in the Kaduna refinery. Privatization had been decided on long ago but the refinery's poor condition and the virtual impossibility of making a legal profit in Nigeria's downstream had meant that no serious investors ever materialized. Moreover, and although these deals were not tied up together, China's simultaneous offer to invest \$1 billion in Nigeria's crumbling railway system (yet another sure money loser), cemented Nigerian good will.

The same applies to China's engagement in Angola, which has recently surpassed Saudi Arabia as China's number one source of oil imports. As elsewhere, China's apparent willingness to overpay for assets is coupled with a willingness to leverage oil sector participation with a number of non-oil sector perks. In addition to its upstream activities, Sinopec is participating in a joint venture with Sonangol to finance and manage a new refinery in Lobito. Familiar story: the Lobito refinery has been a pet project of the Angolan leadership for more than a decade. But despite the involvement of major foreign consulting firms, its dubious economics meant that it could not garner enough interest from western companies to see the light of day. Sinopec's enabling of the refinery is thus far more momentous than a simple business

deal. It is also a mere tip of the iceberg of Chinese involvement in Angola. By opening up three credit lines totaling almost \$5 billion in a mere two years, the Chinese have allowed the Angolan government to both pursue its postwar reconstruction strategy in the absence of a western donors' conference and keep its distance from the IMF's transparency prescriptions.

Finally, China's willingness to partner with African NOCs gives it an edge over other companies when it comes to licensing rounds and, through the sharing of technology and expertise, suggests the will to build relationships for the long haul.

In sum, while still lagging behind western companies in most areas, Chinese oil firms bring to the table the weight of the Chinese state, a willingness to pay for long-term engagements that would not be viable if perceived in the short-term, and cheap finance to secure deals. This strategy is strongly underpinned by an activist petro-diplomacy. While a discussion of China's Africa diplomacy falls outside the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that China has provided oil producers with either implicit political support (as in the case of Sudan which, in part because of China, has been able to avoid full international opprobrium over Darfur) or the means to override external criticism (in the case of Angola).

3. I will now briefly discuss the likely impact of Chinese oil investment in Africa from the viewpoint of China, the western companies and governments often described as budding rivals of the Chinese, and their African partners.

There is no doubting the stamina and competitiveness of Chinese oil companies. The leading oil consultancy Wood Mackenzie is right in stating that their presence is not a transient factor in Africa or elsewhere, and in heralding the arrival of "Big Eastern Oil" to the continent. For the time being, some actions by Chinese oil companies are clearly amateurish, but

they learn fast. Because they seem keen to emulate their western counterparts in so many ways (just check their English-language websites), might Chinese companies end up supporting human rights, good governance, transparency, etc? While rash observers assume that China simply does not care about being perceived as cavalier in this regard, in reality the Chinese government is extremely image-conscious. It makes consistent attempts at deploying “soft power” and wants to be liked. Note, for instance, the insistent disclaimers put out by Premier Wen Jiabao in his most recent trip to Africa to the effect that China was not pursuing a resource grab strategy in the continent, or the reference to the need for “respectable Chinese companies” to invest in Africa in the Africa policy document. There is certainly a nascent debating in some Chinese circles about corporate social responsibility.

To my mind, some minor convergence may take place in the near future. A measure of PR-driven rhetorical acceptance of the western-dominated discourse on how companies should behave will certainly occur. But this will not change the key operational features I described before, for four reasons. Firstly, Chinese companies simply do not face the scrutiny of activist shareholders or a concerned civil society back home. There is an emerging pluralist debate on this in China, but if the Norwegian progressives didn’t do it with their companies, why should Chinese critics get much further (or even that far?). Secondly, the fact that China tries to please does not mean it is trying to please a minority of activists in the West. While Chinese companies do not want to be the targets of a smear campaign, the true constituencies they are seeking to charm are: those of elites in the developing world countries they’re getting involved in; and those of regulatory bodies in the West. The SEC, not Human Rights Watch. Third point: while they seek to placate some criticism, Chinese companies will not want to become “stakeholders” in

western progressive agendas that would in practice erode the meager comparative advantage they possess. Finally, to expect major changes here is to misunderstand just how deep some of the Chinese assumptions run. Non-interference, mutual respect, the primacy of national sovereignty, etc, are not simply ploys to get ahead commercially, even if they do serve that purpose: they are coterminous with China's prevalent foreign policy values. Converging with something like the Western conditional approach to sovereignty would mark a sea change in Chinese policy that simply does not seem forthcoming.

The arrival of Chinese companies is welcomed by African elites both economically and politically. I do not discuss the perceptions of ordinary Africans for lack of time and because they seem not to be a make-or-break factor in the debate. Economically, more investment and a plurality of investors can only increase revenues and the negotiational leeway of power-holders. Politically, China's business-only approach is perceived as adding a degree of diversification to a landscape hitherto dominated by (at least theoretically intrusive) western prescriptions. African elites also appreciate China's understanding of, and assistance to, projects they feel are essential but that westerners tend to dismiss as "prestige" or "vanity" extravaganzas. African elites don't want western companies to go, of course, as they need their essential technical expertise. But they do hope that heightened competition will make westerners a bit more pragmatic and a bit less shrill about their "solutions".

The West will deal with the rise of Chinese oil firms in Africa in a contradictory way. NGOs and the media will often give it a bad press. But provided that the Chinese engagement with international oil markets is less equivocal, and that their presence does not detract from the business opportunities available to Western companies (which hasn't happened yet), governments in the West can only be happy at the Chinese willingness to pump

more oil. The same applies to western oil companies, which perceive their Chinese counterparts more as an opportunity than a threat, especially when compared with the national oil companies of oil producing countries. Most people don't know that western oil majors are strategic investors in the internationally listed subsidiaries of the three Chinese companies; they cooperate extensively in China and elsewhere, particularly but not only in the refinery sector; and will soon (once WTO criteria is implemented) be fully competitive within China itself.

The assumption that the Chinese role will of necessity be uniquely malignant presupposes a false reading of three things: the character of western actions in the African oil sector, the character of the oil economy itself (particularly its systemically corrupt character) and the potential for good governance of African incumbents. If we are true about these we realize that that far from disrupting a transparent, locally beneficial economy and creating something new, different, and nasty, the Chinese are actually inserting themselves in a much older political economy that is already illiberal, destructive, and hyper-exploitative. For decades this political economy of oil has been based on the exchange of political support and prosperity for local dictators against reliable provision of oil for consumer in industrial states. In effect, Chinese oil companies will be joining in a form of time-honored, if abysmally non-developmental, partnership long indulged in by African oil states, western importer states, and western IOCs. We used to know this, but what Michael Peel of the Financial Times calls the "oversold and underachieved" corporate social responsibility and transparency agendas have convinced many that there is a genuine difference, and that the West is trying to be nice. Now: the West does have a moral dimension to its present-day Africa policies, something China explicitly does not. But the oil sector has always been, and remains, largely absent from it.

Conclusion

How should one assess the likely impact of China's oil firms? It seems clear to me they are not much of a progressive force in Africa. This does not presuppose a blank judgment about the China "threat" to the continent. Rather, the Chinese impact as everyone else's will be sector-specific. There is doubtlessly great benign potential for Chinese investment in many sectors. But when it comes to oil, it would be surprising indeed if Chinese oil companies were willing and able to act in a manner that is qualitatively different and better from that of well-seasoned operators, and that their actions did not lead to the tragic governance standards that we have come to associate to oil production in Africa. Whether one thinks Chinese oil companies will be more of the same, or will actually be worse, it is difficult to claim that there will be significant benefits for the majority of Africans resulting from Chinese oil investment.

Of course, such negative, non-developmental consequences are not an inexorable outcome of oil economies, the activities of oil companies, or the presence of China, even if they all play a role. Although there are particular challenges to the proper management of oil monies, it is undeniable that the resources made available by the present oil boom (according to some sources, the greatest inflow of money into Africa in history) present the rulers of African oil-rich states with the opportunity to make consequential choices about the welfare of their citizens that are simply not available to the rulers of most of Africa's oil-poor, impoverished countries. The role of African leaderships, and what they do with this opportunity, is therefore vital here. That the wrong choices are often made, and that people suffer immeasurably from them, shows the extent to

which those in positions of power play a key role in fashioning the lives, and also the deaths, of their fellow Africans across the continent today.

ESTRATÉGIA
E SEGURANÇA
NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL



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The United States and Africa

THE AFRICAN DIMENSION IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-9/11 ERA

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The African continent has reemerged at the beginning of the 21st century as an arena of strategic importance and competition among the Great Powers. Especially in the case of the United States, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have led U.S. policymakers to characterize the African continent as an increasingly important “second front” in a global war on terrorism that has become the signature foreign policy theme of the Bush administration. Washington is especially focused on North and East Africa, inclusive of the Horn of Africa, due to the geographic, cultural, and religious proximity of these regions to the Middle East (the perceived epicenter of global terrorist activity that stretches from the Arabian peninsula to Pakistan) and the recognition that these regions constitute potential breeding grounds for further anti-American terrorist acts. Simply put, the Bush administration’s global war on terrorism has significant implications for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa¹.

The Policymaking Context

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 exerted a profound influence on the Bush administration’s approach to national security as the White House announced a global war on terrorism that harkened back to the initial stages of the cold war. Among the various domestic initiatives undertaken include enactment of the Patriot

¹ For an early assessment, see Stephen Ellis and David Killingray, “Africa After 11 September 2001,” *African Affairs*, vol. 101 (2002): 5-8. For a more comprehensive analysis, see Walter H. Kansteiner III and J. Stephen Morrison, eds., *Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa: Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S.-Africa Policy* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).

Act, which provided new, aggressive powers to law enforcement agencies; creation of a Department of Homeland Security to oversee borders and coordinate domestic counterterrorism activities; reorganization of the military's global command structure to add a Northern Command that would be responsible for military activities in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. (the first time a military officer had been appointed to such a post since World War II); and, after much pressure from the public and the Congress over the intelligence failures preceding the attacks of 9/11, creation of a new cabinet-level position, Director of National Intelligence, who would be responsible for coordinating the diverse intelligence activities of fifteen agencies.

The national security reforms enacted by the Bush administration nonetheless did little to alter the domestic constellation of forces that are involved in the making of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, which are best treated as a series of three concentric circles: the inner White House circle of the president and his principal foreign policy advisors, most notably the national security advisor; a second circle that comprises the national security bureaucracies of the executive branch; and an outer circle that includes Congress and the larger African affairs constituency². As concerns the inner White House circle, for example, the same factors that fostered presidential neglect during the cold war have largely remained constant during the post-9/11 era: a president's typical lack of knowledge and therefore the absence of a deep-felt interest in a region that historically enjoyed few enduring political links with the U.S. as compared with the former European colonial powers; a tendency to view Africa as the responsibility of those same European colonial powers, especially France; and the necessity of balancing domestic and foreign priorities, especially during a first term in office in which the primary goal of all presidents is to assure reelection, with electoral logic suggesting that Africa is not a priority for the

² Peter J. Schraeder, "Fini la rhétorique, vive la géopolitique: Premières tendances de la politique africaine de l'administration Bush (2001)," *Politique africaine*, no. 82 (juin 2001): 133-50.

vast majority of the voting public. Even Bush's highly trumpeted visit to five African countries (Botswana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda) in July 2003 failed to reverse and in fact reinforced perceptions of Africa's neglect in the Bush White House. African reporters, who dubbed Bush's visit as that of a "cowboy in Africa" and representative of "Tarzan politics," were especially critical of the short nature of the stopovers (often lasting only a few hours) that were limited to small choreographed audiences, suggesting that the visit was designed more to achieve sound-bites destined for audiences in the U.S. (most notably the African-American community) than to provide serious engagement with African policymakers and their peoples³.

The U.S. Congress, which constitutes the outer circle of the policymaking process, also has historically neglected Africa relative to other regions of perceived greater interest due to a variety of factors that have remained constant during the cold war and 9/11 eras. Reelection pressures and time constraints imposed by terms of office (two years for representatives and six years for senators) force them to select and prioritize the domestic and the international issues that will receive their attention. Since the primary objective of most members is to be reelected, and since most U.S. citizens know or care very little about the African continent, conventional wisdom suggests that it is politically unwise to incur the possibility of alienating their constituencies by focusing on Africa. Membership on the Africa subcommittees is also among the least desired congressional positions in both houses of Congress, and is therefore relegated to relatively junior representatives and senators. As a result, even highly motivated chairpersons of Africa subcommittees, who have held a limited number of hearings on Africa's place within the Bush administration's war on terrorism⁴, face an uphill task in pushing African issues to the forefront of congressional debate. The likelihood of congressional activism in Africa is further hindered by the

³ Seul Mouammar Kaddafi, "La politique de Tarzan," *Jeune Afrique l'Intelligent*, no. 2218, juillet 13-19, 2003, pp. 17-20; and Francis Kpatindé, "Un cow-boy en Afrique," *Jeune Afrique l'Intelligent*, no. 2217, juillet 6-12, 2003, pp. 56-58.

⁴ See, for example, U.S. House of Representatives, Africa and the War on Global Terrorism, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, November 15, 2001, p. 17.

⁵ As of June 2005, there was also one vacancy.

small margins of Republican control of both houses of Congress in the aftermath of the November 2004 elections. Whereas the Republicans hold a majority of fifty-five seats in the Senate as opposed to forty-four seats for the Democrats and one for the Independents, they hold 231 seats in the House as opposed to 202 for the Democrats and one for the Independents⁵. In both cases, slim partisan majorities militate against activist policies in regions considered to be of minor concern (i.e., Africa), as both parties seek to avoid missteps in preparation for the midterm congressional elections of November 2006.

The net result of White House and congressional neglect of Africa is that U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, perhaps more so than that toward any other region of the world, remains largely delegated to the high-level bureaucrats and political appointees within the bureaucracies of the executive branch. Exceptions of course exist, such as the willingness of both the White House and the Congress to pressure Sudan's government to seek a peaceful resolution of civil conflict in the southern portion of the country, but these are rare occurrences typically due to pressures from grass-roots constituencies that have the ear of the president and senior congressional leaders and that most importantly are considered crucial to reelection. (In the case of Sudan, for example, a wide array of Christian groups deemed essential to Republican victories in 2004 effectively lobbied the White House to "do something" to stop what they perceived as a genocidal policy that a northern-based Islamic regime was carrying out against a southern-based, predominantly Christian population, including the practice of southern Christians being sold as slaves in northern Sudan.) In order to fully understand the U.S. approach to the global war on terrorism in Africa, one must therefore focus on the policies and interactions of the African affairs bureaus of the traditional national security bureaucracies, such as the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA, as well as their

counterparts within the increasingly important economic realm, most notably the Department of Commerce. To be sure, the Bush White House sets the overall parameters of policy of this global war, as was the case of its predecessors during the cold war. But the unique nature of the U.S. policymaking system ensures that specific policy initiatives often emerge from and are coordinated by the national security bureaucracies with little White House input. The net result of what can be referred to as “bureaucratic influence” in the policymaking process has been a series of State Department and especially Pentagon-inspired initiatives designed to integrate the African continent into the Bush administration’s global war on terrorism.

Regional Strategic Initiatives

The Bush administration entered office with a realist-oriented foreign policy that did not perceive the African continent as an important part of the overall international strategic landscape⁶. This geopolitical vision was altered by the events of 9/11, as the Bush administration made anti-terrorism the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. The interventionist assumption behind Africa’s rising geopolitical stakes is the belief that many African countries are susceptible to and in turn will potentially become exporters of terrorism, either due to the existence of radical regimes that are sympathetic to the goals and ideologies of these organizations and therefore are willing to host them on their soil (e.g., Sudan’s willingness to host Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996), the inability of weak central governments to effectively monitor outlying regions where terrorist organizations can organize and thrive (e.g., the vast Sahelian hinterlands of Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania), or the threat of state collapse and the loss of state control over the territory as a whole (e.g., Somalia since 1991).

⁶ Schraeder, “Fini la rhétorique, vive la géopolitique,” pp. 133-50.

Several regional security initiatives demonstrate Africa's integration into the war on terrorism. The first involves the Pentagon's establishment in Djibouti of the headquarters for the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which is charged with waging war on Al Qaeda and its supporters in the Greater Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan) and Yemen⁷. Land operations are primarily conducted by over 1,000 U.S. Special Forces who are based at Camp Lemonier. Coastal patrols are undertaken by U.S. Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150), which also includes naval contingents from other countries, such as Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The CJTF-HOA also coordinates with CIA paramilitary operations, including the launching of Predator drone aircraft against suspected terrorist targets. One such operation involved the use in November 2001 of Predator drone-launched missiles to attack and kill an alleged Al Qaeda leader and four other individuals traveling by car in Yemen.

Djibouti, which sits astride the Straits of Bab el Mandeb at the entrance of the Red Sea and across the Gulf of Aden from the Arabian Peninsula, is the geographical anchor of the CJTF-HOA. Djibouti's leadership is courted, as witnessed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's visit to Djibouti in December 2002⁸. The country enjoys the distinction of hosting the only formal U.S. military base on African soil and is one of only three African countries to be designated by the Bush administration as a "front-line state in the war on terrorism."⁹ The country also hosts Radio Sawaa, Washington's post-9/11 Arabic-language program that is beamed to all Middle Eastern countries and Sudan, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, as part of the State Department's aggressive Public Diplomacy Program for the Middle East. U.S. appreciation for Djibouti's willingness to stand "shoulder to shoulder with the United States"¹⁰ is demonstrated by a substantial foreign aid program for a country of

⁷ Andrew Feickert, "U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia," Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, February 4, 2005, pp. 7-8.

⁸ Cherif Ouazani, "L'Enquete Djibouti: En première ligne contre El-Qaïda," *Jeune Afrique Intelligent*, no. 2195, 2-8 février 2003: 36-41.

⁹ State Department, "Congressional Budget Justification. Foreign Operations. Fiscal Year 2006" (hereinafter referred to as "Bush Administration Foreign Aid Request for 2006"), p. 253.

¹⁰ Ibid.

less than 400,000 people (more than \$9 million proposed for 2006), making it one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. aid in Africa. Not surprisingly, the growing U.S. military presence initially fueled minor tensions with France, due to Djibouti's special status as host to France's largest permanent military force on the African continent and the continued perception among French policymakers of Djibouti constituting part of France's *chasse gardée*¹¹.

A second regional security program also launched by the Pentagon is the Pan-Sahelian Initiative (PSI), which includes four Sahelian countries (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) at the intersection of North and West Africa. This program was launched in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to ensure that the four partner countries were capable of controlling the vast, largely uninhabited portions of the Sahel that fall under their individual jurisdictions, such that the region did not become a safe haven for terrorist groups fleeing direct U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan in 2002 and later in Iraq in 2003. Indeed, it was commonplace in the aftermath of U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan for Pentagon officers to make exaggerated claims that the Sahelian region was a "new Afghanistan" with "well-financed bands of Islamic militants recruiting, training and arming themselves."¹² The PSI sought to counter these efforts by dispatching teams of U.S. Special Forces to carry out on-the-ground training with local troops and providing basic equipment, such as pickup trucks and Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment, for tracking hostile forces. Although limited in scope (training was carried out at the company level) and financing (the entire program cost \$6.25 million), the program was credited with achieving several successes, most notably the capture of some leaders of the Algerian-based Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC).

¹¹ Jean-Philippe Remy, "A Djibouti, l'ex-base de la Legion est devenue la tête de pont de la guerre contre le terrorisme dans la Corne de l'Afrique," *Le Monde*, 27 janvier 2003, pp. 2-3.

¹² Craig Smith, "U.S. Looks to Sahara as New Front in Terror War," *International Herald Tribune*, May 12, 2004. See also International Crisis Group (ICG), "Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?" ICG Africa Report no. 92, 31 March 2005, especially pp. 30-31.

Pentagon officials who were pleased with PSI's success nonetheless perceived the Sahel as but the core of a potentially larger threat that incorporates the entire Sahara region. As a result, \$500 million (\$100 million a year over five years) was budgeted beginning in 2005 to support an expanded Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) that will enlarge the PSI to include Algeria and Senegal, with three additional countries (Nigeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) serving as observer countries. The addition of Senegal is deemed logical due to the country's geographical location and status as the Bush administration's "most important francophone partner" in Sub-Saharan Africa¹³. The Bush administration remains especially appreciative of President Abdoulaye Wade's early and firm support for U.S. counter-terrorism measures in the aftermath of 9/11, including Senegal's hosting of a meeting in Dakar in October 2001 to express solidarity with the U.S. and to prompt his African counterparts to ratify the 1999 Algiers Convention Against Terrorism, even though this meeting achieved few if any concrete diplomatic results. Algeria nonetheless is perceived as the anchor of an expanded TSCTI, due to its geographical location at the crossroads of the Sahara and its status as a country that is successfully emerging from a "decade of terrorist violence."¹⁴ Pentagon planners often state that the U.S. has much to learn from Algeria as concerns the war on terrorism, ranging from how Algerian insurgents defeated French military forces during the 1960s to how the current Algerian government has defeated Islamic insurgent forces during the 1990s. The official launching of the TSCTI took place in June 2005 with the holding of Exercise Flintlock 2005, in which U.S. Special Forces will take part in training exercises at the battalion level with their counterparts from TSCTI countries.

A third and final regional security program is the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), which is inclusive of

¹³ "Bush Administration Foreign Aid Request for 2006," pp. 294-95.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 443.

Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. This program, launched in 2003 with over \$100 million in funding, is principally driven by the State Department. The EACTI funds a variety of law enforcement and border control programs in East Africa that are designed to disrupt longstanding Al Qaeda networks within the region and to prevent a repeat of Al Qaeda's August 1998 attacks against U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and November 2002 attacks against Israeli targets in Mombasa. One such program is the Safe Skies for Africa (SSFA) initiative, which promotes improvements in aviation safety, security, and air navigation. This program provides funding for an East African Aviation Security Advisor who is based in Nairobi and who is responsible for developing civil aviation security programs for the region. Kenya serves as the anchor of EACTI counter-terrorism programs. The country's leadership provided strong support to the U.S. during the cold war, and the same has been true of the post-9/11 era. It supported the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003 as an official coalition partner and, like Djibouti, is designated by the Bush administration as a "front-line state in the war on terrorism."¹⁵

Together these regional security programs provide useful insights into the evolving nature of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. First, these programs serve as the core of an evolving foreign policy approach that divides Africa into at least four spheres of variable foreign policy interest: (1) those regions (North and East Africa) destined to receive priority attention due to their proximity to the Middle East, the perceived epicenter of the global war on terrorism; (2) regional powers, typically Nigeria and South Africa but also including Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal, that are perceived as crucial to the maintenance of regional stability and therefore as "regional anchors" of counter-terrorism efforts; (3) countries deemed important to U.S. economic interests, most notably oil-producing countries in the

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 268-69.

Gulf of Guinea region (discussed below); and (4) the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa which remains relegated to the backburner of U.S. foreign policy. Not surprisingly, U.S. foreign policy is increasingly focusing on those countries in which core foreign policy interests intersect, as in the case of Algeria, a regional power with oil resources that is considered crucial to combating perceived terrorist threats in North Africa.

The heart of the Bush administration's new regional security initiatives is the reemergence of a "globalist" logic reminiscent of the cold war, that identifies international influences as the primary cause of instability and conflict in individual African countries, subsequently ushering in a new era of "containment" and "rollback" policies (as opposed to a "regionalist" logic that primarily focuses on the internal shortcomings of African regimes, and therefore the need to promote reformist policies, including support for the protection of human rights, the promotion of socio-economic development, and the adoption of democratic practices)¹⁶. The core elements of this globalist logic, as was the case during the cold war, are threefold: (1) a tendency to view Africa as a battlefield for proxy wars between the U.S. and foreign-sponsored terrorist elements; (2) a perception of African allies as the means for solving non-African problems (in this case, international terrorism); and (3) the evolution of U.S. relationships with these regimes according to their relative importance within the global war on terrorism.

Not surprisingly, such logic is also fostering the most egregious shortcomings associated with the cold war¹⁷. When the normative goal of promoting democracy clashes with the strategic goal of containing terrorist threats, the latter almost certainly wins, thereby more closely associating the U.S. with some of the worst abusers of human rights in North and East Africa, such as the Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak. The U.S. also runs the risk of becoming mired in internal African conflicts that have

¹⁶ For an overview of the regionalist-globalist debate, see Charles F. Doran, "The Regionalist-Globalist Debate," in Peter J. Schraeder, ed., *Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Third World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).

¹⁷ Michael Clough, *Free at Last? U.S. Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992).

little if anything to do with the global war on terrorism, as local leaders denounce domestic opponents as “terrorist threats” and the U.S. government turns a blind eye as U.S.-supplied weapons become the means for extinguishing those “threats.” This phenomenon is already occurring in the Pan-Sahelian region, where the U.S. has been prone to accept characterizations of domestic insurgencies, especially those influenced by Islamic principles, as terrorist groups¹⁸. In short, an overriding preoccupation with terrorist threats is leading Washington once again to overlook the authoritarian excesses of African regimes in favor of their willingness to support U.S. national security objectives (i.e., the war on terrorism).

¹⁸ ICG, “Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?”

It is important to understand, however, that the above-noted regional security programs neither originated from nor are coordinated at the level of the White House. They instead constitute bureaucratically inspired responses to the global war on terrorism, fashioned according to the established organizational missions of the three core bureaucracies (State Department, Pentagon, and the CIA) that were historically created to deal with different aspects of the foreign policy relationship. There is no doubt, for example, that the Pentagon has served as the primary driving force in the creation and expansion of most of the current regional security initiatives in Africa (including the CJTF-HOA, the PSI, and the TSCTI). Not surprisingly, the Pentagon’s approach emphasizes the military dimension, including U.S. military training for local militaries, the provision of military aid, and the sale and transfer of U.S. weapons.

One of the dilemmas associated with what essentially constitutes bureaucratic influence in the policymaking process is that U.S. policies toward Africa tend to become fragmented and interpreted differently, often leading to a less than harmonious relationship marked by bureaucratic politics, depending on which bureaucracy is taking the lead in a particular African

¹⁹ Madagascar is included in the Pacific Command.

²⁰ Richard Wilcox, "An American Proconsul for Africa," *International Herald Tribune*, October 15, 2004, p. 8.

country. Tensions have emerged within the Pentagon between the U.S. Central Command (which is responsible for the Middle East and the Horn of Africa) and the U.S. European Command (which is responsible for Europe and most of the remainder of Africa)¹⁹ over funding levels for the CJTF-HOA (administered by the Central Command) and the PSI and TSCTI (administered by the European Command). Funding levels aside, this bureaucratic division has hindered the effective coordination of counter-terrorism policies, leading policy analysts from across the political spectrum to argue for the creation of an integrated U.S. African Command that would be responsible for the African continent as a whole²⁰. Further difficulties arise when coordination is sought with other bureaucratic entities that do not adopt the same geographical divisions as the Pentagon. The State Department's ability to provide effective input into the TSCTI is hindered, for example, due to the enduring bureaucratic split between its bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs (which is responsible for the Middle East and North Africa) and African Affairs (which is responsible for the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa). In short, the U.S. needs to rethink its organizational structure if it is going to play an effective, long-term role in countering terrorism on the African continent.

Military Dimension Of The War On Terrorism

The Bush administration entered office with a strong aversion to direct U.S. military involvement in either peacekeeping or peacemaking operations on the African continent, often derisively referred to during the 2000 presidential campaign as ill-conceived exercises in nation building. It is for this reason that in 2003 the Bush administration resisted initial pleas from within the West African region and the international community to

commit large numbers of U.S. troops to stem fighting in Liberia, offering instead a limited deployment of small numbers of U.S. troops designed to provide logistical support to a larger West African peacekeeping force led by Nigeria. Even in the post-9/11 era, in which policymakers have recognized that weak and failed African states run the risk of becoming breeding grounds for terrorist activities, the Bush administration remains reluctant to authorize the involvement of U.S. troops, preferring instead to rely on the interventionist efforts of three sets of actors: United Nations-led peacekeeping forces, as in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, although this option is limited due to distrust among administration neoconservatives and the Republican-controlled Congress for UN-sponsored solutions; former colonial powers, as in the case of French intervention in Cote d'Ivoire or British intervention in Sierra Leone; and African regional powers or regional organizations with direct stakes in the conflict, as in the case of Nigerian-led intervention in Liberia.

Three military programs demonstrate the Bush administration's desire to strengthen the capacity of especially African militaries (as opposed to UN or European military forces) to bear the brunt of counter-terrorism activities. The first, International Military Education and Training (IMET), sends foreign soldiers, especially officers, to the U.S. for military training and to introduce them to American culture. The expectation, of course, is that military personnel who have spent time in the U.S. will not only be better able to coordinate with their U.S. military counterparts on the battlefield, but that they will return to their home countries with a more positive, long-term image of the United States. Especially during the cold war, when regime change in Africa typically occurred as a result of military coups d'état, the IMET program was designed to ensure that the soldiers who assumed the reins of power would be pro-American and

therefore willing to support the U.S. in its ideological competition with the Soviet Union.

The IMET program has emerged as an important tool in the Bush administration's war on terrorism. Forty-one countries in Sub-Saharan Africa received IMET aid in 2005, and forty-five are slated to receive such aid in 2006. (Unless otherwise noted, all foreign aid figures are drawn from the White House's foreign aid request for 2006, which offers a unique insight into Bush administration priorities in Africa.)²¹ The larger Middle East, inclusive of North Africa, is especially noted as a priority region, not least of all due to the expectation that some of the military officers of today will emerge as the political leaders of tomorrow. Every country in North Africa receives IMET assistance except for Libya, and levels of IMET assistance have significantly increased in the post-9/11 era. Morocco and Tunisia have especially benefited, receiving \$1.875 million each in 2005, with the same amount being requested for both in 2006. Although at first glance these may not appear to be large sums of money, the potential impact of the IMET program becomes clearer when one determines the actual number of military students funded. In Tunisia, the IMET program during three years (2004 to 2006) will have trained 255 military officers in the U.S. (roughly eighty-five each year). When examined over the lifespan of this program, it is impressive to note that the vast majority of Tunisian military officers have spent some time in the U.S., with President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali himself having participated in the IMET program prior to taking the reins of power in 1987. Tunisia is not unique, but indicative of the long-term impacts of a carefully crafted program that has been expanded in the post-9/11 era.

A second military program that has been expanded in the post-9/11 era is Foreign Military Financing (FMF). This program is designed to ensure that governments friendly to the U.S. are able to procure U.S. military equipment and training such that

²¹ "Bush Administration Foreign Aid Request for 2006."

they are able to “strengthen and modernize their self-defense capabilities, safeguard their borders and territorial waters, meet their legitimate indigenous security needs, increase their interoperability with U.S. forces and support coalition efforts in the war on terrorism.”²² The vast majority (84 percent or nearly \$3.9 billion) of FMF is devoted to the Middle East. Of the thirteen countries from the African continent that are expected to receive FMF in 2006, three are from North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco) and five are from East Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda)²³. Egypt, along with two other countries (Israel and Jordan), receive the lion’s share of FMF devoted to the Middle East. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the two leading recipients are Kenya (\$7 million) and Djibouti (\$4 million), indicative of the leading roles of these two countries as regional anchors for U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in the Greater Horn of Africa.

A final military program falls under the rubric of the recently launched Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), for which the Bush administration has requested \$114 million in global funding for 2006. The African component of this program (with a requested funding level of \$37 million) is the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which in turn replaced the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The primary difference between ACRI (created by the Clinton administration in 1996) and ACOTA (created by the Bush administration in 2002) is that the latter focuses on training for offensive military operations, including the ability of African troops to conduct operations in hostile environments in the Greater Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA initiative), East Africa (EACTI initiative), and the Pan-Sahelian region (PSI and TSCTI initiatives). Whereas Mali and Niger have served as the primary PSI recipients of ACOTA training, EACTI countries include Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.

²² Ibid.

²³ The remaining countries are Botswana, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Uganda.

The net result of these military programs, which are primarily driven by the Pentagon's vision of the military necessities associated with the war on terrorism, is the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa that harkens back to the cold war. The current period is nonetheless unique, however, due to the Pentagon's determination to create what General James L. Jones (head of the U.S. European Command) refers to as a "family of bases" that will enable the U.S. military to undertake a more proactive, aggressive, and direct military approach on the African continent as part of the doctrine of preemption that characterizes U.S. military strategy in the post-9/11 era. Two types of military facilities are being pursued "forward operating sites" inclusive of logistical facilities (airstrip or port) and weapons stockpiles to be maintained by a small permanent crew of U.S. military technicians (but no combat units); and bare bones "cooperative security locations" only for use in crisis situations that will be maintained by military contractors and host-country personnel²⁴. In both cases, generous military assistance programs are considered critical to "greasing the wheels" with African leaders who previously may have been reluctant to accept such basing arrangements. The primary risk of such a policy approach, of course, is that these military bases and the U.S. military largesse which fuels them will potentially be used by authoritarian regimes to silence domestic dissent and to undertake military actions against domestic insurgencies that have little if anything to do with the war on terrorism.

The list of African countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda) currently under Pentagon review as potential sites for new U.S. military facilities also demonstrates the growing nexus between the Bush administration's war on terrorism and the more classic U.S. national security objective of ensuring access to diverse sources of foreign oil²⁵. Three of these coun-

²⁴ Michael T. Klare, "Imperial Reach," *The Nation*, April 25, 2005, p. 1-2. On-line article accessed at www.thenation.com.

²⁵ Michael T. Klare and Daniel Volman, "Africa's Oil and American National Security," *Current History* (May 2004): 226-31. See also Stephen Ellis, "Briefing: West Africa and Its Oil," *African Affairs*, vol. 102, no. 406 (January 2003): 135-38; and Jean-Pierre Favennec and Philippe Copinschi, "Les nouveaux enjeux pétroliers en Afrique," *Politique Africaine*, no. 89 (mars 2003): 127-48.

tries comprise part of the Gulf of Guinea region, which in the eyes of U.S. policymakers stretches along the coast from Nigeria to Angola, inclusive of Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe (with some policymakers also including Chad in this arrangement, due to the fact that Chadian oil is exported to the coast via a pipeline through Cameroon). Oil is the principal reason for Washington's interest in this region, which is expected to provide as much as 25 percent of U.S. oil needs by 2015.

The growing U.S. strategic interest in African oil is demonstrated by a fledgling series of Pentagon initiatives that can be referred to as the Gulf of Guinea initiative, the primary goal of which is to gradually build up an effective regional security program capable of ensuring the safe transport of the region's oil resources to the United States. This initiative includes the revival of annual cooperative naval exercises that began in 1975 under the auspices of a program known as the West African Training Cruise (WATC). In January 2005, for example, the U.S. Sixth Fleet undertook a Gulf of Guinea naval deployment that included 1,400 U.S. Sailors and Marines and participants and observers from Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, and São Tomé and Príncipe, which in turn built on a Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Conference that was held in Naples, Italy, in October 2004²⁶. This Gulf of Guinea deployment is buttressed by a more general foreign aid initiative, the Africa Coastal/Border Security Program (AC/BST), both of which undoubtedly will be expanded as imports of Gulf of Guinea oil continue to rise in the future.

The primary risk posed by expanding U.S. ties with Africa's oil-rich countries is the potential blurring of the strategic goals of counter-terrorism and ensuring access to oil. When one adds to this mix that the majority of Africa's petroleum-producing countries constitute dictatorships in which oil wealth controlled by the few leads to resentment, unrest, and in the extreme insurgencies by the many determined to enjoy their fair share

²⁶ "USS Emory S. Land Begins Gulf of Guinea Deployment," EUCOM Press Release, January 28, 2005.

of these profits, the mix can be explosive. Even in the case of oil-rich Nigeria, which has made a transition to a more democratic form of governance and which receives significant amounts of U.S. military assistance, the regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo, “continues to rely on brute force to resist demands by the Ogonis and other ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta region for a larger share of the nation’s oil wealth – most of which is derived from wells in the Delta.”²⁷

²⁷ Klare and Volman, “Africa’s Oil and American National Security,” p. 231.

Simply put, how will policymakers respond when an oil-producing, authoritarian ally in the Gulf of Guinea region seeks U.S. military support (or at least a U.S. blessing) to suppress a domestic insurgency born out of economic disenfranchisement but denounced by the regime in power as a “terrorist threat”? If history is our guide, the lines between counter-terrorism and access to oil will be blurred by administration officials who will choose oil over democracy, and who will be tempted to label the insurgency a terrorist group. Indeed, according to many policy analysts, the lines are already becoming blurred, and will only become more so as the U.S. finds itself increasingly dependent on African sources of oil in the decades to come. “From the Pentagon’s perspective, the protection of oil and the war against terrorism often amount to one and the same thing,” explains Michael Klare²⁸. “Thus, when asked whether the United States was prepared to help defend Nigeria’s oil fields against ethnic violence,” General Charles Wald, deputy commander of the U.S. European Command, responded: “Wherever there’s evil, we want to go there and fight it.”²⁹

²⁸ Klare, “Imperial Reach,” p. 4.

²⁹ Ibid.

Strategic Imperatives Of An Evolving Foreign Aid Program

Africa’s incorporation into the Bush administration’s war on terrorism is also demonstrated by the strategic imperatives

imbedded in the evolving u.s. foreign aid program (apart from the already discussed regional security initiatives and military assistance programs). One shift in the foreign aid budget concerns the expansion of security-related programs in North and East Africa that are included under the awkwardly titled budget item, Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related (NADR) programs, which received \$351 million and \$399 million for global activities in 2004 and 2005, and for which the Bush administration sought \$440 million in 2006. Several programs serve as the core of NADR counter-terrorism initiatives.

Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF) assists countries whose financial systems are considered vulnerable to terrorist financing. This program was a direct outgrowth of Washington's freezing of assets of presumed terrorist-related financial networks, such as the Somali-based al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAT) and the Barakaat remittance company, in the immediate post-9/11 era. A second program, Counter-Terrorism Engagement, provides aid to support specific counter-terrorism initiatives of allied countries. An example is u.s. funding to support Algeria's opening of a counter-terrorism center in Algiers. Finally, the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) provides countries with the computer software to monitor the potential movement of terrorists across borders through the installation and maintenance of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) at sea, air, and land points of entry. Participating countries in Africa which have installed the PISCES technology include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania, and Uganda.

The most lavishly funded NADR counter-terrorism program is Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA), which received \$96 million and \$118 million for global activities in 2004 and 2005, and for which the Bush administration sought \$134 million in 2006. ATA is devoted to expanding "the skills and abilities of foreign

law enforcement officials who have primary responsibility in their nations for taking decisive action against international terrorists and networks that seek to target U.S. citizens, businesses and other interests.”³⁰ Both in-country and U.S.-based programs focus on very specific forms of training, including “detection and rendering safe explosive devices, post-blast investigation techniques, VIP protection, senior leadership crisis management, hostage negotiations, and a variety of other courses.”³¹ Kenyan security forces have been an important beneficiary of the ATA program. A total of \$14 million was spent in 2004 and 2005 to support the training of the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit, and another \$3 million was requested for 2006.

The NADR program also provides funding for a number of other security initiatives related to the war on terrorism. The Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction (SALW) program funds the destruction of surplus and illicit stocks of military weaponry, most notably Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS). The importance of this program, which has funded the destruction/disabling of over 10,500 MANPADS since 2003, became evident in the aftermath of Al Qaeda’s failed attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner taking off from an airport in Mombasa with a surface-to-air missile. A second program, Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS), seeks to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), their missile delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons through the strengthening of border controls. Three of the four African countries proposed to receive such aid in 2006 are from North or East Africa, including Kenya, Tanzania, and Libya. A final NADR program, the Non-Proliferation of WMD Expertise (NPWMDE), “redirects” WMD knowledge to alternative employment activities for scientists of participating countries, most notably Libya, that are in the process of dismantling their WMD programs. A joint U.S.-United Kingdom study has determined

³⁰ “Bush Administration Foreign Aid Request for 2006,” p. 142.

³¹ U.S. House of Representatives, Fighting Terrorism in Africa, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, April 1, 2004, p. 6.

that as many as 250 key personnel and 1,500 support personnel from Libya will require some form of financial support. The Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund (NDF) provided \$500,000 for start-up activities in 2004 and \$2.5 million for training purposes in 2005, with the Bush administration requesting an additional \$1 million in NPWMDE funds for 2006.

NADR programs in general have not generated a great deal of criticism for a variety of reasons, most notably that they are perceived as fulfilling important technical roles, such as the retraining of Libyan scientists under the NPWMDE program, that ultimately will make the U.S. safer. If anything, critics typically argue that these programs are underfunded, especially when one considers their often expansive objectives, such as the destruction of illicit small arms and light weapons under the SALW program. Of greater controversy is the role of Economic Support Funds (ESF) in the foreign aid hierarchy. Although technically falling under the category of economic assistance, ESF aid historically has been targeted toward countries that are considered to be strategically important. Not surprisingly, six of the fourteen African countries targeted for bilateral ESF aid in 2006 are from North or East Africa (Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, and Sudan), and these six are slated to receive the lion's share (85 percent or \$568 million) of that devoted to the African continent.

The ESF program has become the home of the Middle East Peace Initiative (MEPI), the official mandate of which is to promote reform in the wider Middle East, including North Africa. One of the administration's often-stated arguments in favor of fostering especially political reform in the Arab world is that authoritarian Arab regimes, especially those closely tied to the U.S., breed anti-American sentiment, as witnessed by the fact that most of the attackers on 9/11 hailed from two of the most authoritarian and pro-American regimes in the Middle East

(Egypt and Saudi Arabia). MEPI's budget has expanded from \$29 million in 2002 (its first year of operation) to \$74.4 million in 2005, although this latter figure demonstrates a decrease from \$100 million provided in 2003 and \$89 million provided in 2004. The budget request for 2006 is \$120 million, \$25 million of which is reserved for the creation of a Middle East Foundation (along the lines of existing Asia and Eurasia Foundations) that will assume control away from the State Department over the day-to-day running of the program. MEPI is typically heralded by local U.S. Embassies as proof of the Bush administration's commitment to democratization in the Arab world.

The primary shortcoming of the MEPI program is that it follows the tradition of ESF aid in general, namely the provision of assistance to strategically located, typically authoritarian allies for programs that their elites desire and that in reality do not question their hold over power. "The projects it [MEPI] has funded to date are a scattering of well-intentioned but soft-edged initiatives favoring economic and educational issues, which Arab governments much prefer to the thornier questions of political reform," explains Thomas Carothers³². These sentiments are echoed by the Brookings Institution, which concludes that "MEPI has chosen to nibble at the margins of the reform problem by funding a wide variety of uncontroversial programs and largely working within the boundaries set by Arab governments."³³ Even the Bush administration has ironically reinforced these perceptions by lauding MEPI's role in promoting trade and economic liberalization, including the signing of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the United States (as in the case of the FTA signed with Morocco in March 2004), movement toward a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA), and supporting the specific program initiatives of the Group of Eight's (G-8's) Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) that was launched at the 2004 Sea Island summit held in the United States. Indeed, official rhetoric

³² Thomas Carothers, "A Better Way to Support Middle East Reform," Policy Brief no. 33 (February 2005), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 2. See also his seminal book.

³³ Ibid.

notwithstanding, the MEPI program fails to address the fundamental issue of political reform, preferring instead to channel resources to important regional allies.

The case of Tunisia is particularly enlightening. Boasting an authoritarian dictatorship that is nonetheless perceived in Washington as a “strong U.S. ally in the Arab world” and a “valuable partner in the war on terrorism,” Tunisia has been actively courted by the Bush administration³⁴. The capital, Tunis, is home to a rising number of U.S. facilities commensurate with its increasingly close relationship with Washington, including a new \$42 million U.S. Embassy, a State Department office for assessing regional threats, a Pentagon regional training center for U.S. Special Forces destined for combat in the Arab world, a Foreign Service Institute for teaching Arabic to U.S. government personnel who are preparing to work in Arabic-speaking countries, and a regional MEPI office for promoting and coordinating all MEPI activities in North Africa (the only other such regional office is in the United Arab Emirates).

The “soft-edged” nature of MEPI programs is clearly demonstrated by categories of programs funded by the U.S. Embassy in Tunis, such as the “Commercial Law Development Program,” “Judicial and Legal Reform,” and “U.S. Business Internships for Young Arab Women.”³⁵ Indeed, any question as to whether democracy promotion or national security objectives dominate the U.S.-Tunisian relationship was best demonstrated by Secretary of State Colin Powell’s response to a question while on an official visit to Tunis in December 2003. When asked about President Ben Ali’s use of repression to silence dissent and ensure his unrivaled control over the Tunisian political scene since assuming power via extraordinary means in 1987, Powell’s response was that this was “a matter between him [Ben Ali] and the Tunisian people.”³⁶ Two months later in February 2004, Ben Ali’s strong support for U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives was rewarded with

³⁴ “Bush Administration Foreign Aid Request for 2006,” p. 460.

³⁵ “U.S.-Tunisian Cooperation.” Handout provided by the U.S. Embassy, Tunis, Tunisia.

³⁶ Christopher Marquis, “In North Africa, Powell Prods Some and Praises Some,” International Herald Tribune, December 4, 2003, p. 5.

a highly coveted head-of-state visit to Washington, including a White House visit with President Bush (his first, and one that had been denied him by all previous U.S. administrations), amid a rising chorus of criticism by human rights activists³⁷.

The debate over MEPI constitutes part of a larger policy debate over the Bush administration's foreign aid priorities in Africa. To its credit, the Bush administration has made the necessity of fighting HIV/AIDS an important theme of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, with its Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAi) constituting 75 percent of the administration's 2006 foreign aid request for Sub-Saharan Africa. Critics correctly note, however, that actual funding for GHAi has fallen far short of the original \$10 billion that President Bush in 2003 promised would be spent over a five-year period, and that even if fully funded, the promised figure remains woefully inadequate to effectively respond to the HIV/AIDS pandemic³⁸. Of even greater disappointment has been the administration's track record in implementing its highly touted Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), designed to reward countries undertaking reforms that, for example, foster reduced levels of corruption and greater levels of national investment in education and health care. Although announced in 2002 and funded by Congress in 2004, the MCA has deemed only eight African countries eligible for funding, and only one country (Mozambique) has been granted funding (although funds have yet to be disbursed). In short, promised foreign aid programs outside of the war on terror remain significantly underfunded, with remaining resources being increasingly targeted toward counter-terrorism and other national security objectives at the expense of development. This is especially true for those regions of the African continent most closely tied to the Bush administration's war on terrorism. In the case of North Africa, for example, 71 percent of the Bush administration's 2006 foreign aid request is for pure security assistance.

³⁷ Kamel Labidi, "U.S. Should Shun Tunisia's Dictator," *International Herald Tribune*, February 25, 2004, p. 7.

³⁸ Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan, "'Compassionate Conservatism' Comes to Africa," *Current History* (May 2004): 232-36.

Toward The Future

The importance of spreading democracy throughout the world, most notably in the Middle East, served as the central foreign policy theme of President Bush's inaugural address in January 2005. Despite President Bush's lofty rhetoric, it is important to note that democracy promotion has never served as the principal foreign policy objective of the northern industrialized democracies, including the United States³⁹. At best it has played a secondary role behind more self-interested foreign pursuits. Equally important, rhetoric has not always conformed to actual policies. Especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration has had to weigh the benefits of democracy promotion when such a policy would potentially alienate important allies in the war on terrorism. In the Horn of Africa, for example, a decision to make democracy promotion the principal U.S. foreign policy objective would have precluded the decision to make Djibouti the only site of a formal U.S. military base on African soil. Indeed, all three of Washington's North African allies (Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia) in the war on terrorism lack democratic political systems.

The logic of current policy was succinctly captured by an officer of the U.S. Embassy in Tunis in 2003. "In short, foreign policy is about choosing, and in this case there is no question that the security interest of combating global terrorism with our allies in North Africa is more important than the degree to which the peoples of these countries enjoy democratic forms of governance."⁴⁰ Official rhetoric notwithstanding, there is no doubt that this statement effectively captures Bush administration foreign policy toward all regions of the African continent, with the hierarchy of foreign interests being (1) counter-terrorism; (2) U.S. economic interests, especially ensuring access to African oil; and (3) subsidiary goals, including democracy promotion, socio-

³⁹ See, for example, Peter J. Schraeder, ed., *Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

⁴⁰ Personal Interview. Tunis, Tunisia.

economic development, and combating HIV/AIDS. The problem with such a hierarchy of interests is that the emerging anti-terrorist consensus in U.S. foreign policy has fostered a return to a strategic approach to the African continent reminiscent of the cold war in which national security interests overshadowed normative goals such as democracy promotion. Specifically, an overriding U.S. preoccupation with the war on terrorism has led the Bush administration to overlook the authoritarian excesses of allied regimes in favor of their willingness to support U.S. counter-terrorism policies.

PORTUGAL, OS EUA E A ÁFRICA AUSTRAL

Francisco Ribeiro Telles

Embaixador de Portugal em Cabo Verde

1. Introdução

Cabo Verde é indubitavelmente um pequeno país insular, sem recursos naturais significativos e extremamente vulnerável à conjuntura económica internacional. Mas todas as moedas têm duas faces. E Cabo Verde é também uma “história de sucesso” e uma referência de boa governação, de respeito pelos direitos fundamentais e de desenvolvimento económico na África Sub-sariana. É um Estado de Direito em vias de consolidação, uma democracia representativa estável com uma economia aberta ao exterior. Em termos humanos, é o país africano que mais se aproxima do conceito de “Estado-Nação” étnica, linguística e religiosamente homogéneo e com uma matriz cultural própria. A sua abertura ao exterior é reforçada pela presença de comunidades significativas na Europa – Portugal, França, Países Baixos e Luxemburgo – e nos EUA, países com quem mantém relações privilegiadas, nomeadamente com Portugal, por força da “língua comum” e da diversidade e volume das relações económicas bilaterais. Estrategicamente, a importância de Cabo Verde excede largamente o espaço marítimo que ocupa na parte meridional do Atlântico Norte, pois é simultaneamente ponto de passagem incontornável nas rotas marítimas e aéreas entre a Europa e a América do Sul e entre África e a América do Norte. Apesar de distar apenas 400 milhas da costa ocidental africana, Cabo Verde tem, por tudo isto, uma identidade muito própria que gera alguma discussão sobre se será um país africano com uma vocação atlântica ou um país atlântico de matriz africana. Qual-

quer que seja a resposta a esta questão há que reconhecer que pelos modelos político e económico que adoptou, pelos valores que perfilha, e pela sua postura na Comunidade Internacional, Cabo Verde é um *like-minded country*.

2. Vulnerabilidades. Riscos. Ameaças

Neste quadro, várias questões se levantam quanto ao futuro do país. Com o que se deve preocupar uma pequena nação insular como Cabo Verde? O que poderá melhorar ou ameaçar a sua segurança? E como pode tirar proveito das suas vantagens e lidar com actuais ou potenciais ameaças à sua segurança pois “sem segurança, não há desenvolvimento e sem desenvolvimento não há paz, nem segurança”?

A primeira constatação que se retira da análise da problemática de segurança de Cabo Verde é a de que a sua existência como Estado soberano não está ameaçada. Cabo Verde não tem contenciosos com os Estados da costa ocidental africana que lhe estão mais próximos, nem com qualquer outro país e é um membro respeitado da comunidade internacional.

Mas embora a segurança de Cabo Verde não passar no futuro previsível pelo reforço das suas capacidades para enfrentar uma agressão externa, existem riscos reais susceptíveis de ameaçar o seu modelo de organização político-económica, livremente escolhido pelo seu povo e que, repito, assenta no Estado de Direito, na democracia representativa e na economia de mercado.

Permitam-me que aborde os três riscos que me parecem mais graves e prementes. Em primeiro lugar, Cabo Verde situa-se no terço meridional do Atlântico Norte que, como é do domínio público, não se encontra abrangido pelo sistema de defesa e segurança colectiva criado pelo Tratado de Washington que instituiu a NATO. Quer isto dizer que a área marítima envolvente de Cabo

Verde se caracteriza por um “vazio de segurança” que é aproveitado para o trânsito de estupefacientes entre a América do Sul, a Europa e a América do Norte. À semelhança do que já sucedeu noutros países, o narcotráfico e o branqueamento de capitais que lhe está associado, constituem uma ameaça real à ordem constitucional vigente em Cabo Verde. E o país não tem meios para patrulhar eficazmente a sua vastíssima Zona Económica Exclusiva.

Em segundo lugar, olhando para a costa ocidental africana depara-se-nos um quadro desolador de conflitos intra e inter-estaduais (Costa do Marfim, Guiné, Libéria, Serra Leoa e que podem vir, inclusivamente, a atingir a Nigéria) que ameaçam a estabilidade de um importantíssimo mercado abastecedor de matérias-primas e, a curto/médio prazo, também de petróleo para as economias desenvolvidas. Além de constituírem focos de instabilidade política, são campos férteis para a prática de crimes e de tráficos ilícitos transnacionais que desviam fundos do desenvolvimento sócio-económico das populações para financiar conflitos armados e corrupção, já ameaçam a segurança da rota marítima do Cabo, nas imediações do Golfo da Guiné, e estão na origem das vagas migratórias que, via arquipélago das Canárias, se dirigem para a Europa, em busca de condições de sobrevivência e de uma vida condigna.

Finalmente, a fronteira entre o Magrebe e a África Subsariana é ocupada por Estados (Mauritânia, Mali, Níger), em que partes substanciais dos respectivos territórios escapam ao exercício da actividade soberana. São “terras de ninguém” extremamente vulneráveis ao aparecimento, treino e base de operações de grupos terroristas.

3. A nova política africana da EU e dos EUA

Quer a Europa, quer os Estados Unidos, por razões diferentes, tiveram de repensar a sua política africana, em função destes acontecimentos. Do lado da Europa, as circunstâncias de ser o

destino final dos tráficos ilícitos de pessoas e bens com origem na África Ocidental e a pressão das opiniões públicas, particularmente activas nas antigas potências coloniais; do lado dos EUA, a eliminação de grupos e campos terroristas e a reconstrução dos “Estados falhados”, presas fáceis do terrorismo internacional. Mas estas sensibilidades, se podem ser predominantes num ou no outro lado do Atlântico, não deixam de ser preocupações partilhadas pela comunidade euro-atlântica no seu todo. E, além do mais, há interesses comuns, tais como o livre acesso aos países produtores de matérias-primas, a liberdade e a segurança das rotas aéreas e marítimas, a realização dos objectivos do milénio, a repressão da criminalidade organizada, entre outros.

Ao permitir alargar para sul o espaço estruturado de segurança existente na maior parte do Atlântico Norte, a situação geoestratégica de Cabo Verde assume uma importância acrescida para a Aliança Atlântica, para a União Europeia e para os Estados Unidos da América. Trata-se de uma oportunidade a não perder. É óbvio que o sucesso deste desafio dependerá de uma adequada divisão de trabalho entre os três actores atrás referidos.

Podemos assim concluir que se assiste, por parte da EU e dos EUA, a uma reavaliação da sua política africana que passa pelo aumento da importância estratégica da África Ocidental, em resultado da natureza das novas ameaças, da instabilidade regional e do controlo de recursos naturais escassos. Por isso, a procura de aliados estratégicos locais e a cooperação na área de segurança têm vindo a assumir uma importância crescente.

4. A dimensão estratégica de Cabo Verde: a aproximação à EU e à NATO

É neste novo contexto regional que o peso estratégico de Cabo Verde é relevante, ao mesmo tempo que a sua maior vulnerabi-

lidade advém do enorme espaço marítimo e aéreo que está sob o seu controlo, mas não sob a sua soberania. Hoje, a realidade é esta: a existência de Cabo Verde como um estado soberano da comunidade internacional não está ameaçada por qualquer navio de guerra que queira atacar as ilhas e partir de novo, como alguns o fizeram no passado. Existem outros factores, como as actividades ligadas ao narcotráfico, ao tráfico de pessoas e à criminalidade organizada que podem, de facto, pôr em causa o funcionamento de um Estado democrático, plural e credível.

Foi consciente destas novas ameaças que o actual governo caboverdiano erigiu como principais desígnios, em termos de política externa, uma relação mais estreita com a EU e uma aproximação à NATO. Ambos os modelos de cooperação ainda estão por definir.

Duas razões estão na origem de uma maior inserção de Cabo Verde na EU: a possibilidade de serem canalizados fundos comunitários para a ajuda ao desenvolvimento, num momento em que Cabo Verde foi graduado no Grupo de Países de Desenvolvimento Médio (PDM), o que significa que, passado um período transitório de 3 anos, perderá ajudas substanciais de que usufruiu ao longo das últimas três décadas, e a melhoria das condições de vida da diáspora caboverdiana que vive nos países europeus, através de uma maior liberdade de circulação no espaço comunitário. Sublinho que os argumentos de Cabo Verde para uma maior aproximação à Europa assentam numa realidade geográfica que se enquadra no contexto da chamada Macaronésia composta pelo arquipélago dos Açores, Madeira, Canárias e Cabo Verde; na sua matriz política, cultural e religiosa que tende claramente para referências europeias; na paridade, por via do Acordo Cambial com Portugal, entre o escudo caboverdiano e o ouro; e, na consolidação de uma política económica e financeira dentro dos parâmetros do Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento.

Coincidente com a pretensão de Cabo Verde estabelecer uma relação estreita com a EU, o Primeiro-Ministro José Maria Neves advoga uma aproximação à Nato alicerçada em três factores: especificidade e importância crescente da sua posição geoestratégica no Atlântico Sul; a impossibilidade de Cabo Verde, por si só, garantir a segurança, a repressão do terrorismo e a criminalidade organizada no seu território e na vasta Zona Económica Exclusiva sob sua jurisdição; e, a ameaça para a estabilidade do país e do seu sistema democrático constituída pelo aumento significativo da imigração clandestina proveniente da África Ocidental, do crime organizado e dos tráficos ilícitos, designadamente o narcotráfico que se serve, em larga escala, do arquipélago, para transporte de estupefacientes com destino à Europa.

5. A transformação estratégica da NATO

Enquanto Cabo Verde se defronta com novas ameaças – impen-sáveis há cinco anos atrás – a NATO, após o 11 de Setembro, introduziu alterações estratégicas na sua doutrina através da adopção de um novo conceito militar para a defesa contra o terrorismo; da criação de uma Força de Reacção Rápida para a intervenção fora de área; do desenvolvimento das relações com países do Centro e do Leste europeu; e do aprofundamento das suas parcerias estratégicas com os países da margem sul do Mediterrâneo”.

Embora a África Ocidental esteja excluída destas iniciativas (de cooperação e de parceria estratégica), a NATO abriu um precedente conceptual em relação ao estabelecimento de diálogos e parcerias estratégicas fora da Europa. Aliás, a doutrina estratégica da Aliança Atlântica não inclui limites geográficos rigorosos, salvo em caso da defesa colectiva, ao contrário do seu alargamento institucional, que se tem limitado até agora à adesão de

países europeus. Refiro, a este propósito, que em Abril 2003, o SACEUR, o General James Jones afirmava que a “África constitui cada vez mais uma região de atenção para a Nato” que deve “reagir perante as realidades do flanco sul”. Também o próprio Secretário-Geral da Aliança, num discurso proferido no Instituto Australiano de Defesa Nacional, justificava a política de parcerias bilaterais da organização ao constatar que se vive num “mundo de insegurança globalizada” e que o processo de transformação da NATO passava por um processo de transformação de uma “aliança eurocêntrica” para uma instituição “mais flexível com o objectivo de projectar estabilidade para as áreas onde os interesses comuns de segurança” estão ameaçados, o que pressupõe uma política de parcerias sem limites geográficos. Refira-se que, para além do princípio da flexibilidade geográfica, existem dois critérios que têm definido as políticas da NATO em relação ao estabelecimento de diálogos e parcerias estratégicas: a importância estratégica de uma região ou país; e a sua importância no combate às novas ameaças como o terrorismo e a proliferação de armas de destruição maciça. Como vimos atrás, estes critérios aplicam-se inteiramente à África Ocidental.

Ainda nesta perspectiva, a flexibilidade da doutrina estratégica da Aliança permite considerar, com algum realismo político, a aproximação de Cabo Verde à NATO.

A realização em Cabo Verde, no passado mês de Junho, do exercício *Steadfast Jaguar*, em que a escolha do arquipélago como cenário para as operações pautou-se não apenas por critérios militares, mas também por outros de natureza política e estratégica, serviu como um primeiro contacto e exemplo das potencialidades de cooperação entre a NATO e Cabo Verde a que importa, agora, dar sequência.

Para voltarmos ao princípio, é vital para um pequeno estado como Cabo Verde, incrustado numa vasta área naval e aérea, poder vir a estar associado a uma estrutura de segurança que

reforce os seus níveis de segurança e de prevenção contra o terrorismo, o tráfico de pessoas e estupefacientes, a criminalidade transnacional organizada, e as ameaças ambientais.

Para a NATO, tratar-se-ia de um parceiro estável e empenhado na prossecução de interesses mútuos e comuns tendo em vista a estabilidade do Atlântico Médio.

6. O posicionamento de Portugal, Cabo Verde, a CPLP e os EUA

Neste contexto, o Atlântico Médio pode vir a constituir um espaço privilegiado de uma nova projecção estratégica de Portugal. A três níveis: com Cabo Verde, com a CPLP e com os EUA.

Portugal e Cabo Verde partilham a mesma língua, têm matrizes culturais afins, e têm relações económicas e de cooperação estreitíssimas. Actualmente é, talvez, o país africano de língua oficial portuguesa com quem Portugal tem uma relação mais densa e intensa. É por isso que o nosso país está na linha da frente no apoio à negociação de um acordo com a EU pretendido por Cabo Verde e na procura de uma ligação institucional à Aliança Atlântica. Por outro lado, a importância que a CPLP pode vir a assumir enquanto comunidade multicontinental, com mais de 200 milhões de luso-falantes, dispersos por quatro continentes, mas com uma concentração quer populacional quer de recursos naturais, muito significativa no Atlântico Médio, deve ser valorizada também como plataforma facilitadora de fluxos comerciais entre os membros da organização.

A título de exemplo, refiro que somente as fronteiras marítimas do Brasil (fundador do Mercosul) e Angola (membro proeminente do SADC) perfazem cerca de 9.000 Km no Atlântico Médio. Estes dois países lusófonos totalizam perto de 190 mil-

hões de habitantes com uma projecção para 2015 de mais de 220 milhões de habitantes. Ambos são produtores de petróleo, detêm grandes bacias hidrográficas nos continentes onde estão inseridos, acesso directo e amplo ao mar, recursos naturais estratégicos e essenciais e com uma parte significativa da população com menos de 20 anos. Todas estas constatações ilustram as condições privilegiadas para o desenvolvimento de uma política de recursos estratégicos entre os países de língua portuguesa, que contribuirá certamente para a afirmação do perfil português na NATO e na União Europeia.

Servem também para exemplificar o potencial de um possível e desejado triângulo – Portugal, Brasil e Países Africanos luso-falantes. Comparativamente às outras comunidades linguísticas a CPLP, pela sua dimensão, tem a vantagem de ter somente oito países em que o nível de entendimento e o clima de confiança é bastante positivo. Em consequência, é uma comunidade com enormes potencialidades, em que cinco dos seus membros se encontram em África e quase todos com razoáveis recursos minerais e energéticos.

Uma última referência para a necessidade de Portugal avaliar as vantagens duma aliança estratégica com os EUA para o Atlântico Médio. Em matéria de política africana, encontramos pela primeira vez e, após décadas de divergências e atritos, numa sintonia de interesses. As áreas de cooperação são múltiplas e vastas e podem ir desde a fiscalização de rotas marítimas ao treino e preparação conjunta de forças militares africanas. Esta aliança alargaria, afinal, ao Atlântico Médio a tradição portuguesa de relações privilegiadas com a potência marítima dominante.

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War has been liberating for Africa. Freed from the limited ideological options imposed by the post-WWII period, the new era of globalization has presented the continent with expanded choices in its external relationships. Now, the choice is no longer limited between two poles and a non-aligned posture; the new emphasis on economic factors allows Africa to choose among a variety of suitable partners as it attempts to survive, if not thrive, in the new globalized arena. Although the former Soviet Union is no longer one of the favorite partners, the United States and several other major powers – including China and India – offer the promise of rewarding strategic partnerships for Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular. The choices about partners currently being made at both the continental and sub-continental levels will have a profound and long-lasting effects on Africa's domestic development prospects and international presence for decades to come.

This paper seeks to evaluate Africa's strategic choices in the post-Cold War period. It argues that, although short-term rationales may point to rewarding relationships with China and India – and to a lesser degree with smaller powers like Russia and even Iran – Africa's long-term strategic benefits clearly depend on a deepening relationship with the United States. But given the uneven power attributes of this strategic partnership, it will

have to be mediated by third parties. Here, Western Europe – particularly Portugal in the case of Southern Africa – will play an increasingly central role in bridging the strategic interests of both Africa and the United States.

This paper first succinctly assesses China and India's attraction as Southern Africa's new potential strategic partners. It then presents an argument suggesting that, on balance, a closer strategic relationship with the us and the West will be most beneficial to Africa.

New Strategic Challengers: China And India

The us faces increasing competition in southern Africa from China and, increasingly, from India. In many ways, both countries are simply reestablishing their old connections with the continent – now somewhat more aggressively due to changing global conditions. While in the 1960s and 1970s both Chinese and Indian policies toward Africa rested heavily on ideological solidarity – i.e. two large but still “developing countries” providing support for newly independent African states against the “imperialist” designs of the West – their current interests are now much more pragmatic and revolve around trade and energy.

China has clearly identified Africa as a region of key economic and strategic interest. The number of recent high level official contacts between China and Africa certainly attests to the growing importance and intensity of Sino-African relations. China's renewed focus on Africa is clearly driven primarily by domestic factors, specifically the need to secure external sources of energy to sustain its impressive economic growth. With 700 million consumers, Africa is also an important market for Chinese manufactured goods.

But China's presence in Africa complicates US policy toward the continent – and, more generally, American national inter-

ests – in important ways. It represents an alternative to the United State's long-term vision of a stable, prosperous Africa that embraces liberal democracy, free market economics, and the rule of law. Instead, China proposes a development model that, while emphasizing the uniqueness of each country, promises rapid economic development within a political structure dominated by a single party. This is an appealing development model for African regimes that half-heartedly made the transformation from single-party systems only after the end of the Cold War and under pressure from the world's only remaining superpower.

In important respects China is an even better model of non-Western development than the discredited Soviet model ever was for African countries who remain unconvinced that the West provides a desirable, even realistic, model to follow. For many African countries, the Western model simply ensures their underdevelopment in the sense that "catching-up" to the industrialized countries is seen as an impossibility if they play by the rules of the game developed and managed by the West for its own interests.

The broader security implications for the us are potentially very significant. As several countries throughout Africa have recently demonstrated, they are eager to have China as a political, economic, security, and diplomatic partner. Politically, China's embrace provides an important level of internal legitimacy for weak states still confronted with important tasks of state-building. Economically, China is quickly establishing impressive credentials as a reliable partner in the exploration of natural resources but also as a provider of cheap goods and credit. As a direct result of the establishment of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF) in 2000, the volume of trade and investment between China and Africa has grown significantly. In 1999, the annual volume of trade between China and Africa was \$5.6 billion. By 2005, it was \$32.2 billion. Granted, the volume of trade

between the United States and Africa also increased remarkably, more than doubling from \$26.9 billion in 1999 to nearly \$60 billion in 2004. The critical point, however, is that African trade with China is growing at a much faster rate: an average of more than 50 percent annually since 2002.

In addition to expanding its economic presence in Africa, China is also playing an increasingly important role as a weapons supplier. It supplied \$200 million worth of fighter aircraft and military vehicles to Zimbabwe in 2004 despite US and European-led attempts to impose an international arms embargo against this southern African country. In fact, it was the West's constant "meddling in Zimbabwe's internal affairs" that prompted president Robert Mugabe to look East towards China as a way both to resist international isolation and ensure internal survival. In China, the Mugabe regime has found a partner that strictly adheres to its stated policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. China is clearly also assuming the role once played by the former Soviet Union in providing diplomatic solidarity for African countries that fall out of favor with the United States. But unlike Africa's past relationships with the Soviets, the new relationships with China have no visible strings attached.

India also presents an important challenge to American interests in Africa. India and Africa have a long and rich history of contacts across the Indian Ocean. These ties were further deepened during their common struggles against colonialism and, in the South African case, against apartheid. Now, no longer dictated by ideological or racial conflicts, both India and Africa are partners in the struggle against underdevelopment and poverty within the broader transnational constraints and opportunities presented by the new globalization.

India's relationship with Africa has been developed mainly within the broad framework of mutually beneficial South-South

cooperation. As the generic drugs debate of a few years ago demonstrated, India is a potentially crucial partner for Africa. In April 2001, the South African government won the case against multinationals to import generic AIDS drugs thus ensuring access to cheap generic AIDS drugs. India is also able to export affordable Information Technology to Africa and thus narrow the “digital divide” between the continent and the rest of the world.

India has been equally generous in investing in peace in Africa. It has contributed troops to peace missions in Angola (1989-91, 91-95), Mozambique (1992-94), Somalia (1993-94), Liberia (1993-97), Rwanda (1993-95), Sierra Leone (1999-2000), DRC (2000 –) and Ethiopia/Eritrea (2001 –). More generally, India has played an important role in training several African defense forces.

Ultimately, growing Chinese and Indian presence will erode American standing in Africa: from the oil fields to the capital cities. As their global power and influence grows it is reasonable to expect that China and India will become increasingly comfortable in challenging us and Western interests in Africa. The critical question revolves around whether African states can forge positive-sum relationships with both the us and China. Given the fundamental incompatibilities of the American and Chinese models and many African regimes’ authoritarian tendencies, it is reasonable to expect that they will be attracted toward China. China’s attractiveness for African regimes is also a consequence of the United States’ ambivalent views about the continent.

Africa-U.S. Strategic Partnership

As the National Security Strategy of the United States (2006) notes, Africa is “linked to the United States by history, cul-

ture, commerce, and strategic significance.” From a historical perspective, the forced relocation of several million Africans to the “new world” has created an unbreakable tie between Africa and the us.

Economically, Africa is often described as the global economy’s “last frontier.” Most African economies are undergoing reform and their 700 million or more consumers’ thirst for American goods has the potential to have a positive impact on the us economy both in terms of increased exports and higher job growth. The us is already Africa’s biggest market and, as mentioned above, there is a healthy \$60 billion trade flow between the two markets.

Energy security increasingly binds the us and Africa. The us already imports about 18 percents of its oil supplies from Africa. Industry estimates predict that the us will import upward of 25 percent of its oil from Africa in the next ten years. In other words, as far as the United State’s energy security is concerned, Africa’s relative importance will continue to rise. In addition, Africa is a key American supplier of several “strategic minerals.”

Broader aspects of security – including terrorism, weapons proliferation, disease, narcotics flows – also make Africa important to the us. With several African countries still potential candidates for “failed state” status – and likely incubators of major global security threats – Africa will remain important to the national security of the us for decades to come.

Paradoxically, however, in many respects Africa does not matter much for the United States or, more generally, for the international system. As many afro-pessimists argue, Africa’s weight on the global political economy is hardly noticeable in the sense that it receives the least amount of foreign direct investment and African countries are yet to make the transition to producing processed goods for export. Also significantly in this information age, Africa is less “wired” than almost any

other region of the world. Consequently, with a few exceptions in Southern Africa, African countries are mostly unprepared to benefit from globalization. This and other aspects of Africa's lightweight condition only serves to reinforce the competing American view of the continent as unimportant.

“Marginal” Africa and U.S. National Security Policy

Africa has consistently been relegated to a secondary position within the global security calculus of the United States. No vital American interest was ever at stake in Africa. Historically, the United States' main security preoccupations were in its “backyard” – Latin America. In the aftermath of WWII, the new demands of global leadership required a stronger presence in Europe and Asia to defend Western interests. Europe, not the United States, was expected to play a hegemonic role in Africa.

Africa's geostrategic and political importance after the end of WWII increased somewhat with European disengagement at the end of the colonial period. African decolonization was set to give birth to an unprecedented large number of new states that, together, could potentially alter the balance of power within the emerging post-war bipolar system. The US responded by establishing diplomatic relations and setting up embassies in all new African states. But it left to the former colonial powers, mainly Britain and France, to take the lead in the West's interaction with Africa. Direct American intervention occurred only in response to the unique difficulties experienced by the decolonization processes in the former Belgian and Portuguese colonies of Congo and Angola – both strategically located and possessing important natural resources. In both cases, the US intervened in an attempt to prevent these countries from falling unopposed into the Soviet-dominated camp. It succeeded

in Congo, albeit at the considerable political cost of having to support the notorious dictatorship of Mobutu Sesse Seko. It failed in Angola.

With the end of the Cold War, the us began the process of redefining the policy framework for engagement with Africa – away from purely ideological and geostrategic interests. It could now afford to try new approaches. The end of the Cold War had, among many things, lifted the ideological veil covering many African states and exposed human-level crises of varying degrees of severity. The United States' response came in the form of "humanitarian intervention." But in the aftermath of the Somalia debacle the us quickly abandoned this and similar forms of intervention in Africa even when, three years after Somalia, a similar humanitarian intervention could have prevented the killing of nearly a million people in Rwanda. Instead, us policy shifted toward helping Africans solve their own problems. Specifically, as far as security was concerned, the us helped to establish the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 1996.

In many respects ACRI was created to facilitate American engagement while avoiding the perils of a Somalia-type operation and shielding the us from international criticism of the kind generated by its reluctance to intervene in Rwanda. As far as the us was concerned – given Africa's security environment and the UN inability to respond to all Africa's security emergencies, coupled with insufficient regional and sub-regional capacity – there was an evident need for a military force with the capacity to intervene and prevent state collapse. Through ACRI, the us would provide training to the military forces of several African countries who could then, on short notice, assemble a capable contingent for peace operations on the continent. The us benefited in two important ways. First, it was seen as doing something to improve African countries' capacity to carry out

peace operations in the continent. Secondly, in the process of providing training, us Army Special Forces were also able to practice their skills and acquire important first-hand knowledge about Africa from African soldiers and officers. But ACRI also had important shortcomings. First, this was a modest program at best. It did not deal with many of the handicaps in command and control, logistics, planning, and mobility facing most African military establishments.

Africa's importance in American security calculations only increased again after 9/11.

Africa In The Global War On Terrorism

The events of 9/11 awoke the us from its post-Cold War slumber and placed the global war on terrorism at the very top of its national security agenda. This war would be unlike any other the us had ever fought before. The enemy was unseen and had a deadly resolve to inflict indiscriminate punishment upon the us and its allies. In many ways, not unlike during the Cold War, the us was faced with another existential struggle. Also as in the Cold War, it quickly became clear that, its position as the world's only superpower notwithstanding, the us did not have the capacity to confront and prevail against the new threat alone. Thus, all countries around the world – including African – were asked to make a clear choice, for or against the us, in this new war.

The us reengaged Africa after 9/11 for two main reasons. First, by proclaiming a “global war” on transnational terrorism, the Bush administration could not ignore such an important geographic space. Second, and more importantly, Africa contains some of the weakest states in the world. In many cases, African governments are unable to exercise effective control

much beyond their capital cities because, among other things, weak states tend to have weak militaries. Equally important as far as their national security is concerned, weak states are often defined by their lack of national consensus – including about security threats. In the context of the global war on terrorism, this is reflected in the lack of consensus within many African states that Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network represent a threat to their national security. In fact, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, some Africans do regard bin Laden and Al Qaeda as heroes. The security concern, from an American perspective, is that some of the weaker states – even if not sympathetic to Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist networks – could become convenient hiding/training spaces for such groups. The post-9/11 American reengagement is driven by a desire to strengthen African states (especially in East Africa due to its proximity to the Middle East and those with large Muslim populations) – politically, economically, and militarily – so that they can become true partners in the American-led war on terrorism. For Africa, marginalized again at the end of the Cold War, this American reengagement is timely in the sense that it reestablishes some level of Africa's relevance within the international system. It is also timely because of their inability to handle alone often well organized transnational networks whose operations in these countries – especially in money laundering and drug trafficking – further erode the internal security of these countries. With only one superpower left on the international scene, many African countries are all too willing to accept American offers of help.

Unsurprisingly, Africa features significantly in the United States' national security strategy framework (2002) developed in the aftermath of 9/11 to face "catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few" who have little compunction to inflict untold suffering upon the United States and its allies.

The us aims to “help make the world not just safer but better” by promoting political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. The us has set out to achieve these broad goals through several more specific objectives: “champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.” In 2006, the us added another goal to its strategy, i.e. “engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.”

Africa is especially relevant as far as the United States’ objectives of defusing regional conflicts and promoting global economic growth are concerned. According to the us national security strategy document, “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic priority – combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.”

Recognizing the complexities in dealing with Africa, the us has defined three “interlocking strategies” that emphasize bilat-

eral agreements. First, it identifies four “anchors for regional engagement:” Nigeria in the West, South Africa in the South, Kenya in the East, and Ethiopia in the Horn region. Second, it emphasizes “coordination” with European allies and international organizations to mediate conflicts and undertake peace operations. And, third it seeks to strengthen “capable reforming states” and sub-regional organizations as key players in sustained responses to transnational threats.

Africa also continues to draw attention from the US due to its propensity to generate regional conflicts. As the National Security Strategy of the United States (2006) notes, such conflicts are the result of a variety of factors – poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. Given the many and concurrent challenges facing a continent lacking the capacity to address most of them, many of these regional conflicts tend to fester. Therein lies a major security concern because, regardless of their causes, these regional conflicts have similar outcomes: “failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.” For Africa, therefore, the US has responded primarily at the political and economic levels through conflict prevention and resolution, conflict intervention, and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

Using liberal formulations of democratic peace theory that postulates that democracies do not fight each other, US long-term strategy for conflict prevention and resolutions rests squarely on the promotion of democracy in Africa. While African states make the slow transition to democracy, however, the US is prepared to intervene and restore stability when regional conflicts pose a “grave threat” to its “broad interests and values.” Such interventions, however, will likely be carried out through NATO or by African troops trained under the Global Peace Operations Initiative introduced by the US at the 2004 G-8 Summit in Sea

Island, Georgia. The us is also increasingly paying attention to post-conflict efforts to heal societies traumatized by conflict and has focused on increasing governance capacity – including the establishment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces and functioning justice systems – as critical conditions for establishing the legal and economic frameworks upon which development can flourish.

Conclusion

Globalization presents Africa with important challenges and opportunities.

As mentioned above, Southern Africa is uniquely positioned to deepen its engagement with the us. The region's economic weight – mainly a reflection of its immense mineral wealth – has historically attracted American interests. At the political level, with the exception of Zimbabwe, the region has successfully made the political transition away from conflicts of various nature, length and intensity and has achieved a remarkable level of stability. Moreover, from a security perspective, the region includes two countries – South Africa and Angola – with some of the best military forces on the continent. At these three levels, there are important opportunities for the us to help shape new regional dynamics as the sub-region consolidates recent gains and attempts to play a more significant role in the global arena.

But there are important challenges. At the global level, as North Korea has shown, it is nearly impossible for Africa to remain on top of the international policy agenda even when there is what the us has described as a genocide currently taking place on the continent. At the domestic level, Africa is faced with the pressing challenges of providing citizens with opportunities for a dignified existence. To meet this challenge,

Africa is again confronted with the choice between East and West. Although the Eastern model may be very appealing to Africa due to the promise of fast economic growth and political stability, its undemocratic character makes it ill-suited for the continent's long-term development prospects. Ultimately, a deeper and mutually beneficial partnership with the US constitutes a better long-term option for Africa.

ESTRATÉGIA
E SEGURANÇA
NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL



Estratégia e Segurança na África Austral
Perspectivas Políticas

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*Strategy and Security in Southern Africa
Political Perspectives*

ESTRATÉGIA E SEGURANÇA NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL

Maria Cristina Fontes Lima

Ministra da Defesa Nacional de Cabo Verde

A oportunidade e importância do tema proposto para esta IV Conferência Internacional – Estratégia e Segurança na África Austral – foram reafirmadas pela adesão e pelo nível dos participantes e das contribuições que aqui trouxeram.

Com efeito, a forma como, ao que sei, decorreu esta IV Conferência Internacional veio servir para confirmar o que era apenas uma presunção: profundidade de análises, abordagens inovadoras, informações diversificadas e actualizadas aliadas ao pluralismo de opiniões defendidas com brilho, contribuindo para dar uma perspectiva dos cenários que poderão conduzir à necessária elaboração do projecto de arquitectura da segurança africana, com enfoque especial, aqui, na segurança regional na África Austral.

Quero atrever-me a pensar que não estamos a falar de uma região qualquer do globo, mas sim de uma região africana com um peso particular para a segurança, estabilidade e desenvolvimento do continente africano e que tem uma importante contribuição a dar para a causa da Paz e do Desenvolvimento desta nossa aldeia global, cada vez mais interdependente mas ainda extremamente desnivelada no plano das garantias à sobrevivência e a uma vida com um mínimo de dignidade humana. É por isso que se torna de grande urgência a necessidade de se concretizar os oito grandes Objectivos do Desenvolvimento do Milénio (ODM) aprovados no incontornável quadro multilateral das Nações Unidas e que, como se sabe, elegem o combate à pobreza como uma das suas bandeiras mais importantes e, simultaneamente, oferecem-nos o pretexto para aprofundar as

nossas reflexões sobre as causas e consequências da pobreza, enquanto ameaça à Segurança Humana.

Essas reflexões têm podido contar com contribuições de grande qualidade de políticos, pesquisadores e intelectuais africanos, das quais poderíamos salientar a criação e o papel da Nova Parceria para o Desenvolvimento da África (NEPAD), da União Africana, da Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADC) e os incontornáveis estudos publicados, sendo de destacar as Perspectivas Económicas em África (PEA), obra conjunta do Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento e do Centro de Desenvolvimento da OCDE.

Sem contrariar a necessidade de se ter em conta a sua própria História e, sobretudo, o seu passado recente e a sua identidade, essas importantes abordagens vieram colocar África e os africanos, em especial as suas lideranças, perante novos paradigmas – e responsabilidades – que procuram articular a situação política, económica e social em África, com a governação e a globalização, buscando os novos caminhos que podem ajudar a ultrapassar o ciclo vicioso da pobreza e do subdesenvolvimento e entrar definitivamente e de forma sustentada no ciclo virtuoso do desenvolvimento.

Já em 1998, no seu importante Relatório sobre a África, o ganiano Kofi Anan, Secretário-Geral cessante da ONU, chamava a atenção para o facto de não se poder persistir na explicação de todas as causas da difícil situação política e social africana com recurso ao legado histórico. Mesmo que esse legado histórico e em especial certas redes de interesses que permaneceram e ou se desenvolvem nos bastidores das políticas oficiais continuem a constituir causas exógenas, não negligenciáveis, dos défices democráticos, institucionais, de crescimento económico e de desenvolvimento de muitos países africanos – é preciso dizê-lo também.

Nessa ordem de ideias, não é possível deixar de ter em conta que a concentração dos indicadores mais preocupantes ligados à

pobreza estão no continente africano e que da lista dos chamados “Estados frágeis” ou “fracos” – que alguns chegam a designar de “Estados falhados” ou mesmo “Estados colapsados” – seis dos primeiros dez são Estados africanos e que dos “Estados fracos” existentes metade são africanos.

Apesar das suas eventuais deficiências, próprias das matérias ligadas às Ciências Humanas, a seriedade dos estudos existentes acerca dos critérios de enquadramento e classificação dos Estados, de acordo com a sua prática e a sua capacidade de traduzir a governação na gestão do bem comum na base de resultados, não nos permite aceitar a acusação que considera preconceituosa tal abordagem. É antes nossa opinião de que se trata de um importante instrumento de análise que pode e deve ser utilizado pelos países africanos para combater a má governação, enquanto ameaça à segurança das populações e à estabilidade política dos Estados.

A aceitação desses estudos é hoje, como se sabe, de tal forma importante que se tornaram essenciais na afectação da Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento (APD) e permitiram inscrever na agenda política africana questões como a responsabilização dos governantes, a estabilidade política e a ausência de violência, a escolha e substituição dos governos, a liberdade e a independência dos meios de comunicação, a efectividade dos governos e dos serviços públicos e a capacidade da regulação, como a demonstração da capacidade de prover às necessidades básicas, bem como o funcionamento do Estado de direito e o controle da corrupção. Concordarei com os que, com compreensível impaciência ou ansiedade, constataam, entretanto, que muitas vezes tal agenda se limita a ser vazada em textos, leis ou em declarações “politicamente correctas” sem a correspondente e necessária convicção que determina a sua não concretização ao ritmo necessário e esperado por sociedades civis cada dia mais exigentes e também impacientes.

O Estado “frágil” pode assim ser considerado pela sua incapacidade em disponibilizar à comunidade “os bens políticos essenciais», neles se destacando a segurança, a justiça e o primado do Direito (*the rule of law*), e pela sua conflitualidade. A exclusão política e social de grupos de cidadãos é outra característica que normalmente acompanha esta categoria de Estados.

É minha convicção que, ao lado do VIH-SIDA e da malária – preocupantes ameaças para todo o continente africano, com incidência particular nos países da África Austral – a existência de Estados com as características próprias dos Estados que hoje se tende a designar por “frágeis” ou “falhados”, onde impera a má governação, onde a incapacidade de se poder prover às necessidades básicas das populações é total porque não chega a ser apropriada por uma vontade política, são as principais ameaças à Segurança e ao Desenvolvimento do continente africano. Constituem também tais Estados, dir-se-á a seguir, potenciais ameaças para a segurança global por se tornarem, dada a sua fragilidade institucional, presa fácil de redes de criminalidade organizada, de tráficos de todo o tipo e até de redes terroristas.

A apropriação do conceito de Segurança, essencialmente como Segurança Humana, e a sua interdependência em relação ao Desenvolvimento é ainda uma questão prévia e doutrinária que se coloca para a grande maioria dos Estados africanos.

A Fundação Luso-Americana e o Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais, organizadores desta IV Conferência Internacional, conseguiram realizar com bom êxito os objectivos propostos ou seja:

- Sublinhar a consciência crescente da nova importância estratégica de África;
- Debater a actual competição estratégica global e analisar a forma como afecta e se repercute na África Austral;

- Explorar as possibilidades de aprofundar a colaboração e articular esforços entre os aliados transatlânticos e os parceiros africanos.

Para atingir estes objectivos a IV Conferência foi estruturada em painéis animados por comunicações de elevado teor científico, integrando diversas abordagens da questão estratégica aplicada ao continente africano e particularmente à África Austral, onde não faltaram nem as indispensáveis parcerias inter-africanas e internacionais nem a dimensão africana da política mundial, com destaque particular para as relações com a União Europeia, Portugal, os Estados Unidos e a China. Os recursos estratégicos da África Austral e a questão energética mereceram também o devido destaque.

Considerada como um continente em permanente estado de conflitos, África – infelizmente não ao ritmo necessário, repito, – procura hoje, sobretudo através da NEPAD e dos organismos de integração regional, dar a devida importância às medidas de política para assegurarem a paz e a segurança e a programação de capacidades para a prevenção e gestão de conflitos. A democracia, o respeito pelos direitos humanos, são parte desta iniciativa onde o pluralismo político e a existência de um Estado forte e de uma economia estável, procurando a melhor inserção na economia global, podem ser condições para o Desenvolvimento. Entre as iniciativas deste tipo que poderão ser citadas pelo impacto positivo em todos os países do continente e, particularmente, nos países da África Austral, figuram a medida institucional da NEPAD de criação do Mecanismo Africano de Avaliação pelos Pares (a abordagem do *peer review*), instrumento comumente acordado para o acompanhamento pelos governos membros dos valores políticos, económicos e dos códigos e padrões políticos existentes na Declaração sobre Democracia, Política e Boa Governação. Outras importantes medidas que merecem desta-

que são as iniciativas para o desenvolvimento sustentável, também no quadro da NEPAD, a transformação da SADCC em SADC acompanhada da sua reestruturação e de um Plano Estratégico Indicativo Regional (RISDP) que pode contar com um contexto internacional favorável consubstanciado nas novas oportunidades da Agenda da Organização Mundial do Comércio, o Acordo de Cotonou entre a U.E. e os países ACP e a Lei das Oportunidades para a África (AGO), entre os Estados Unidos e África.

Os Estados membros da África Austral têm seguramente a responsabilidade de continuar a criar um ambiente macroeconómico favorável à promoção do investimento e ao estabelecimento de mecanismos que valorizem o sector privado e as parcerias com o sector público. Procedendo deste modo, estarão contribuindo para valorizar o potencial estratégico desta importante região do continente africano, consolidar a Segurança Humana na região, de forma a contribuírem para aquilo a que alguns já chamam o «Renascimento Africano».

Centro a última parte da minha intervenção no posicionamento e nos desafios do meu país nesse contexto.

Como país africano que, fruto do esforço consentido nos 32 anos como país independente e com a ajuda da comunidade internacional, se prepara para sair do grupo dos países menos avançados (PMA) e fazer a sua afirmação como país de desenvolvimento médio (PDM), Cabo Verde conta hoje com um largo consenso quanto ao facto de dispor de condições para consolidar os valores e os critérios da boa governação e assume abertamente novos desafios nesse quadro. Estes ligados agora à consolidação da sua abertura em relação à economia global, a necessidade de medidas internas de aperfeiçoamento e reforma do Estado e da Administração Pública, à qualificação da sua democracia e das condições de participação dos cidadãos, à necessidade, considerada vital de continuar a garantir a segurança e a estabilidade necessárias à projecção de novos patamares de desenvolvimento em benefício das populações.

Procurando atingir esses grandes objectivos, Cabo Verde tem atribuído a devida prioridade ao relacionamento com economias dinâmicas e capazes de exercer influências positivas no seu crescimento, que se deseja contínuo e auto-sustentado. Tem também buscado, na base de interesses e benefícios mútuos e numa perspectiva de segurança cooperativa, desenvolver parcerias que lhe garantam as condições para enfrentar os enormes desafios que se lhe apresentam no domínio das novas ameaças em matéria de segurança e defesa, ligadas quase todas ao intenso tráfico de drogas que se desenvolve na zona em que está inserido.

Com referiu o Primeiro-Ministro de Cabo Verde, Dr José Maria Neves, numa intervenção durante a recente visita que efectuou aos EUA, e cito livremente, Cabo Verde continua a cumprir a sua secular vocação de ponte atlântica entre continentes e civilizações. Entre dramas humanos e mundos desenvolvidos “where dreams may come true”. Entre o abrir de caminhos para o comércio internacional que cruza as nossas águas e os obscuros interesses de poderosas organizações que levam a cabo todo o tipo de tráficos – de drogas a seres humanos passando por armas e crimes conexos. É neste contexto, e continuo a citar o Primeiro-Ministro, que somos chamados a ter uma leitura clara dos interesses vitais do país, procurando reflectir o nosso constante objectivo de manter a segurança e a estabilidade interna, a vitalidade da nossa democracia e a sustentabilidade do nosso desenvolvimento. Esta é a preocupação que hoje enforma os paradigmas básicos da nossa política externa e determina a escolha das ancoragens e a natureza das alianças com os nossos parceiros.

O Governo de Cabo Verde tem, assim, assumido a articulação virtuosa do binómio Segurança e Desenvolvimento no plano internacional e no plano interno, e não foi por acaso que atribuiu a devida prioridade à assinatura de convenções internacionais pertinentes, como é o caso dos relacionados com a luta antiterrorista e com a criminalidade transnacional organizada

e mais recentemente com a fiscalização das extensas águas sob jurisdição nacional, de que destacamos aqui o recente Tratado assinado com Portugal e a que se seguirão outros Acordos com outras nações amigas. Também não descuidou a sua entrada para a Organização Mundial do Comércio, nem a preparação das suas instituições para os efeitos advenientes desses importantes compromissos internacionais.

Pela sua História, pela sua Geografia e pela sua Cultura, Cabo Verde assume com naturalidade as suas múltiplas pertenças.

Procura potenciar favoravelmente a sua pertença à CPLP, entidade que lhe permite uma rede de relações com várias áreas geográficas do Mundo, através dos seus parceiros falantes da língua portuguesa.

Como membro da CEDEAO, Cabo Verde tem procurado contribuir para o equacionamento dos problemas que afectam a região oeste-africana. Tem, por exemplo, participado em exercícios de fiscalização marítima com países vizinhos, procurando reduzir as vulnerabilidades desta vasta área atlântica. Nesta matéria, o grande objectivo prosseguido pelo governo é contribuir para que a vasta bacia do Atlântico Médio seja cada vez mais uma região segura e deixe de ser tão atractiva para os tráficos e o crime internacional organizado que, como se sabe, propiciam condições favoráveis à instalação de redes terroristas através da porosidade que conseguem criar. Procuramos igualmente dar uma contribuição válida para a resolução de conflitos, consolidação da paz e das instituições em alguns países aos quais nos unem laços históricos, culturais ou de amizade. Por outras palavras, Cabo Verde pretende contribuir para a construção de uma Bacia de Segurança e Desenvolvimento no Atlântico Médio.

Como arquipélago atlântico, Cabo Verde desenvolve relações igualmente consideradas estratégicas com os seus mais próximos vizinhos europeus, a norte – o arquipélago espanhol das Canárias, bem como os arquipélagos portugueses dos Açores e da Madeira.

O Governo de Cabo Verde tem ainda em conta o quadro de valores inerentes à Liberdade e à Democracia e a construção de uma rede de interesses que passam necessariamente pelos países que acolhem tradicionalmente comunidades caboverdianas espalhadas pelo Mundo. Como não podia deixar de ser, somos sensíveis aos interesses destes nossos parceiros tradicionais, mas procuramos aprender a identificar os nossos próprios interesses e a defendê-los num quadro de parceria e de intercâmbio equitativo.

Este esforço de identificação de interesses conduz-nos necessariamente à identificação de países e regiões de cariz estratégico prioritário e a África Austral tem sido sempre uma constante ao longo da nossa história de país independente.

Cabo Verde foi sempre muito sensível à importância da Segurança e da Paz na África Austral e deu a sua modesta contribuição para os encontros históricos que permitiram o diálogo e a harmonização de posições entre os principais líderes dos conflitos que opuseram irmãos africanos nesta região, particularmente em relação ao início das conversações entre o MPLA e a UNITA, entre o MPLA e a África do Sul do «apartheid» e o apoio a Moçambique para que o Acordo de N'Komati tivesse a melhor aceitação possível, particularmente junto de países africanos.

Para nós, caboverdianos, não é possível dissociar a valorização da posição estratégica do nosso arquipélago situado na parte oriental do Atlântico Médio, da valorização da rota do Cabo – a sul do continente africano – e às indispensáveis condições de Segurança Atlântica, em geral, da subregião africana, a que pertencemos, e ao Golfo da Guiné.

A condição de ponte entre continentes constitui, para nós, um potencial estratégico que desejamos que seja cada vez mais valorizado para a causa da Segurança e da Paz, e colocado à disposição da Cooperação e do Desenvolvimento do continente africano.

Cabo Verde e os caboverdianos, em geral, acreditam que os países europeus e os Estados Unidos partilham uma visão de longo prazo sobre interesses mútuos e comuns na resposta aos desafios da estabilidade em África e acreditam na sua própria capacidade de fazer convergir os seus interesses com os da economia global representada por esses conjuntos. Ao aceitar a realização no seu território do último exercício militar da NATO que teve como objectivo testar a capacidade das suas forças de intervenção rápida – as NRF –, o Governo de Cabo Verde pretendeu demonstrar a sua convicção acerca dos laços que deseja continuar a tecer com estas entidades, enquanto parceiros indispensáveis no combate ao terrorismo, ao narcotráfico, à criminalidade organizada, à reforma e modernização das suas Forças Armadas e à promoção de uma verdadeira cultura de prevenção de conflitos.

Como afirmam os organizadores desta IV Conferência Internacional «A paz, a estabilidade, a segurança e o desenvolvimento em África são factores estruturantes que definem novas prioridades para a segurança europeia e ocidental».

Cabo Verde e o seu Governo também se assumem como parte desta estratégia para a elaboração e aperfeiçoamento de uma arquitectura de Segurança e Desenvolvimento para África e pretendem continuar a ser úteis para as acções coordenadas visando a materialização dos objectivos inscritos nos textos constitutivos da União Africana como sejam a construção de uma Paz duradoura, de um desenvolvimento sustentável e de Estados democráticos e de Direito.

O nosso «Bem-haja» à Fundação Luso-Americana e ao Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais, organizadores desta IV Conferência Internacional e a todos os ilustres conferencistas e participantes que contribuíram para a sua elevada qualidade.

ESTRATÉGIA E SEGURANÇA NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL

Nuno Severiano Teixeira

Ministro da Defesa Nacional de Portugal

A IV Conferência Internacional FLAD/IPRI-UNL dedicou estes dois dias à «Estratégia e Segurança na África Austral». Os trabalhos deste ano— como aliás acontece desde a primeira conferência organizada por estas duas instituições, em 2003 — recaem sobre um tema fundamental para a análise das nossas relações internacionais e, em particular, para o relacionamento entre Portugal, os Estados Unidos e o continente africano.

Para realizarmos esta análise, seja do ponto de vista académico, seja do ponto de vista político, não podemos passar ao lado do continente africano, cuja importância estratégica é hoje incontornável.

E é incontornável por quatro razões fundamentais:

Em primeiro lugar, pela necessidade de integração do continente africano no contexto político global, seja através da participação dos Estados africanos nas diversas organizações internacionais e nas suas actividades, seja através da própria integração das organizações regionais africanas num quadro global.

Em segundo lugar, pela importância que o respeito pelos princípios da boa governação e do Estado de Direito, pelos Direitos Humanos e pela diversidade cultural têm para o desenvolvimento sustentável e para melhoria das condições de vida não só dos povos de África mas também, e consequentemente, para a paz e estabilidade ao nível global.

Em terceiro lugar, pela necessidade de cooperação dos Estados africanos na luta contra o terrorismo, na luta contra a corrupção, contra o tráfico de seres humanos e todos os actos contrários aos valores da ordem, da justiça e do progresso económico e social.

E finalmente, é fundamental pela crescente importância dos recursos energéticos disponíveis em África, recursos esses que originam um igual acréscimo do interesse das potências internacionais pelo continente africano – é, por exemplo, o caso dos Estados Unidos e da China, cujas razões foram amplamente analisadas ao longo desta conferência.

Não podemos esquecer que África, todos o sabemos, é uma das regiões mais pobres do mundo. Mas isso não poderá levar a que seja encarada, unicamente, como destino de ajuda humanitária e ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Pelo contrário. Em paralelo, e com um carácter cada vez mais prioritário, África deverá ser o destino de acções de formação, da capacitação de recursos humanos e de instrumentos que permitam responder às legítimas necessidades e expectativas dos povos africanos. Aquilo a que designamos o princípio da *Africa ownership*.

E é isso procuramos fazer no quadro da cooperação entre Portugal e os países africanos, com especial destaque para os países de expressão portuguesa.

No início deste ano foi apresentado o Programa de Apoio às Missões de Paz em África, conhecido como PAMPA, que se destina, precisamente, a formar e a capacitar as Forças Armadas dos países africanos para participar em missões de paz no seu próprio continente.

Portugal, que recentemente apresentou este programa no quadro da CPLP, pretende, em coordenação com os países africanos, criar Centros de Excelência para diversos ramos e áreas de intervenção das Forças Armadas, para que os militares possam ser formados no quadro da sua região e ao mesmo tempo formarem formadores que disseminarão os conhecimentos adquiridos a nível nacional e regional.

Mas este programa tem um objectivo ainda mais ambicioso, mas importante para a segurança regional africana e para a segurança global. E este objectivo é o de ajudar à participação de forças

de paz das organizações regionais africanas, no contexto de outras organizações internacionais como a NATO e a União Europeia.

A crescente importância estratégica do continente africano tem despertado o interesse da comunidade internacional e nomeadamente de grandes potências como os Estados Unidos e a China. Em ambos os casos, já aqui discutidos, podemos observar uma mudança geopolítica importante no sentido de prestar maior atenção à generalidade do continente africano, e com particular destaque para o Golfo da Guiné, em muito devido à riqueza de recursos naturais – como petróleo, gás e outros minerais não-combustíveis.

Não nos equivoquemos. África poderá vir a ser, a médio prazo, uma das principais regiões produtoras de petróleo, podendo mesmo substituir o Médio Oriente – cuja produção e exportação de recursos petrolíferos é prejudicada pela instabilidade na região. Este é, sem dúvida, um elemento central na importância estratégica de África.

E é por esta importância crescente que Portugal e a União Europeia, não podem ficar alheios aos desenvolvimentos no continente africano.

O Conselho da União Europeia, em Dezembro de 2005, aprovou um documento que define os princípios basilares da parceria estratégica entre a União Europeia e África, baseados nos designados Objectivos do Milénio das Nações Unidas, na promoção do desenvolvimento sustentável, na segurança e na boa governação.

A União Europeia está, aliás, activamente envolvida na segurança do continente africano, tal como demonstram as missões na República Democrática do Congo, quer a missão de apoio ao processo eleitoral – no quadro das Nações Unidas – quer a missão de apoio à reforma do sector de segurança.

Portugal, como membro da União Europeia e por todas as ligações que nos unem a África, está presente em ambas as

missões e procura, no quadro das suas disponibilidades, colaborar activamente nas missões que possam ajudar ao desenvolvimento, à paz e estabilidade do continente africano. E fá-lo num quadro multilateral e bilateral.

No quadro multilateral, para além do que já referi em relação à União Europeia, fá-lo também, por exemplo, no contexto da Aliança Atlântica. Recordo, por exemplo, que no passado mês de Junho decorreu em Cabo Verde, com grande sucesso, um exercício militar da NATO – o exercício *Steadfast Jaguar 06* – que envolveu mais de sete mil efectivos e que testou a capacidade da NATO Response Force (NRF) num cenário fora da área geográfica tradicional de actuação da Aliança. Este exercício é, aliás, revelador da importância estratégica que África adquire para a segurança atlântica e, em também, da importância estratégica de Cabo Verde.

Mas Portugal desenvolve também uma actividade importante no quadro bilateral. E, neste contexto, permitam-me destacar as relações com Cabo Verde. Como todos saberão, no passado mês de Setembro, Portugal assinou um tratado com Cabo Verde no domínio da fiscalização de espaço marítimos sob soberania ou jurisdição da República de Cabo Verde. E este foi, sem dúvida, um momento inédito no relacionamento entre os dois países que iniciaram uma nova fase, que abriram um novo espaço de cooperação no domínio da Defesa e Segurança. Com este tratado Portugal inicia uma aliança especial com Cabo Verde e assume um compromisso com a segurança do arquipélago caboverdeano. É importante destacar que a atenção que devemos prestar a África não se deve basear apenas em questões de tradição histórica, nem apenas em razões de natureza securitária, económica, ética ou jurídica. É mais do que isso. Hoje deparamo-nos com factores verdadeiramente políticos e estratégicos que devem impulsionar a cooperação e o relacionamento mútuo entre a comunidade internacional e o continente africano, entre Portugal e África.

E há uma razão fundamental sobre a qual se baseia tudo isto. É que o conceito de segurança nos nossos dias não é o das fronteiras nacionais e não é só o das fronteiras regionais. É cada vez mais baseado na promoção da estabilidade das regiões que nos são vizinhas e, conseqüentemente, na estabilidade internacional.

É por isto que para Portugal, e para a comunidade internacional, é fundamental atribuir a devida importância estratégica a África, analisá-la e compreendê-la, para que possamos acompanhar de forma atenta e participar de forma activa da promoção da paz, estabilidade e segurança do continente africano.

ESTRATÉGIA
E SEGURANÇA
NA ÁFRICA AUSTRAL



Notas Biográficas

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Biographical Notes

Agostinho Zacarias

Coordenador Humanitário Residente das Nações Unidas e Representante do PNUD.

Anterior Assistente Especial para África no Gabinete do s.g. das Nações Unidas, Agostinho Zacarias é formado em geologia e ciência política. É doutorado pela London School of Economics e é diplomado pela escola Diplomática de Moçambique. É autor de numerosas publicações sobre as questões de segurança em África.

António Monteiro

Embaixador de Portugal em Paris

Antigo Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros

Diplomata de carreira, foi Alto Representante do Secretário Geral da ONU para as Eleições na Costa do Marfim, Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros do VII Governo Constitucional, Embaixador em Paris entre 2001 e 2004, Representante Permanente junto da ONU, em Nova Iorque e nessa capacidade representou Portugal no Conselho de Segurança (1997-1998). Foi Director Geral de Política Externa, Coordenador do Comité de Coordenação Permanente da CPLP (1994-1996) e chefiou a Missão Temporária de Portugal junto das Estruturas do Processo de Paz em Angola.

Assis Malaquias

Associate Dean for International and Intercultural Studies,

Associate Professor of Government, St. Lawrence University, Canton, NY

Professor of Government at St Lawrence University, Dr. Assis Malaquias holds degrees in Economics and Political Science from Dalhousie

University, Canada. His areas of specialization include International Relations, International Political Economy, and African Politics.

Dr. Malaquias' current research focuses on security in central and southern Africa. His recent publications include "Peace Operations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State?" *Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 55(2), Spring 2002; "Dysfunctional Foreign Policy: Angola's Unsuccessful Quest for Security since Independence," in Korwa G. Adar and Rok Ajulu, eds., *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States Foreign Policy-Making Process: A Comparative Perspective of Southern Africa*. Bookfield: Ashgate, 2002; "Making War and Lots of Money: The Political Economy of Protracted Conflict in Angola," *Review of African Political Economy* Vol.28 (90), December 2001, pp.521-536; "The Political Economy of Angola's Ethnic Conflict," in Sandra McLean, Fahim Quadir & Timothy M Shaw (eds) *Crises of Governance in Asia & Africa: Globalizing Ethnicities*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001; "Humanitarian Intervention," in Joel Krieger (ed.) *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001; "Diamonds are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: the impact of illicit wealth on insurgency strategy," *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 22(3) 2001; "Reformulating International Relations Theory: African Insights and Challenges," in Dunn, Kevin C & Timothy M. Shaw (eds) *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* London: Palgrave, 2001. Dr. Malaquias has also been an invited speaker at several venues, including the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

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Christopher Coker

*Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics
and Adjunct Prof Staff College, Oslo*

He is the author of *The Future of War: the re-enchantment of war in the*

Twenty-First Century (Blackwell 2004), *Waging War without Warriors* (2002), *Humane Warfare* (2001); *War and the Illiberal Conscience* (1998); *The Twilight of the West* (1997); *War and the Twentieth Century* (1994); *Britain's Defence Policy in the 1990s: an intelligent person's guide to the defence debate* (1992); *A Nation in Retreat* (1991); *Reflections on American Foreign Policy* (1989) and in a previous incarnation many publications on South Africa and African security.

Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century was published in 2002 as an Adelphi Paper for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). *Empires in Conflict: the growing rift between Europe and the United States* was published as a Whitehall Paper for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) the following year.

He was a NATO Fellow in 1981. He has served two terms on the Council of the Royal United Services Institute. He is a serving member of the Washington Strategy Seminar; the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Cambridge, Mass); the Black Sea University Foundation; the Moscow School of Politics and the LSE Cold War Studies Centre. He is a member of Council on the 21st Century Trust. He was a Visiting Fellow of Goodenough College in 2003-4 and is an Associate Fellow of the Institute for the Study of the Americas (United States Programme). He is also President of the Centre for Media and Communications of a Democratic Romania.

He is a former editor of *The Atlantic Quarterly* and *The European Security Analyst*. He is on the Editorial Board of *Millennium* and *The Journal of Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*.

He has advised several Conservative Party think-tanks including the think-tanks Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies and the Centre for Policy Studies and helped to draw up the Party's defence platform in the 1996 European Parliamentary Elections.

He has written for *The Wall Street Journal*; *The Wall St Journal (Europe)*; *The Times*; *The Independent*; *The European*, *The Spectator*, *The Times Literary Supplement* and *The Literary Review*.

Francisco da Cruz

Director, BP Angola

Francisco da Cruz has been Government & International Affairs Director, BP Angola since February 2006. Prior to that he was Communication & External Affairs Manager, BP Angola.

(2003-2006), Political Affairs Manager, BP Angola (2002-2003). As a diplomat he was posted as Minister Counsellor in the Embassies of Angola to South Africa (2001-2002); to the United States of America (1994-2000); as First Secretary to the Angola Observer Mission to the Organization of American States (OAS) (1991-1994).

Francisco da Cruz holds an MBA – Strayer University, Washington, DC-USA, 1995. Most recently he has published books on “US-Angola Relations: Challenges and Opportunities in the new Millennium – Angola, 2002” and “The Diversity US Workforce and Competitiveness – USA”, 1995

Francisco Ribeiro Telles

Embaixador de Portugal em Cabo Verde

Diplomata de carreira, foi Chefe de Gabinete do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros (1996-1999), Assessor Diplomático do Primeiro Ministro (1983-1985) e do Presidente da República (1986-1987; 1995-1996). Esteve em posto na Embaixada em Madrid e anteriormente na Missão Permanente de Portugal junto das Nações Unidas (1987-1994), responsável pelo acompanhamento do Conselho de Segurança, 4.^a Comissão e Assuntos Políticos; membro das delegações portuguesas às negociações sobre Timor Leste.

Embaixador de Portugal em Cabo Verde desde 2002.

Jakkie Cilliers

Research Fellow, Institute for Security Studies

Jakkie Cilliers has B Mil (BA), Hons BA, MA (*cum laude*) and D Litt et Phil degrees from the Universities of Stellenbosch and South Africa. He co-founded the Institute for Defence Policy during 1990 which subsequently became the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Since 1993 Dr Cilliers has served as *Executive Director of the ISS*. Awards and decorations include the Bronze Medal from the South African Society for the Advancement of Science and the H Bradlow Research Bursary. Dr Cilliers has presented numerous papers at conferences and seminars and is a regular commentator on local and international radio and television. He regularly lectures on security issues and has published, edited and contributed to a large number of journals, books and other publications, serving on a number of boards and committees.

João Marques de Almeida

Professor, Adviser to the President of the European Commission

Director of the Portuguese Institute of National Defense (2004-2006), Associated Professor of International Relations at the Lusíada University, Lisbon, Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Portuguese Catholic University, and Associated Research Fellow at the Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI). João Marques de Almeida is a specialist in International Relations Theory, International and European Security, and Portuguese Foreign Policy. He has published numerous articles in scientific journals. In 2004, he published, with Vasco Rato as co-author, *A Encruzilhada: Portugal entre a Europa e os Estados Unidos*.

João Marques de Almeida was educated at Lusíada University, and received his M.A. in International Relations from the University of

Kent at Canterbury, U.K., and his Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics.

Kurt Shillinger

Research Fellow, South African Institute of International Affairs

Kurt Shillinger's research interests include Islam in Africa and the possibilities for external radicalisation; weak states and terrorist activity on the African continent; Africa's role in global security and counter-terrorism; African music tradition and the social dynamics of political transition.

An award-winning former journalist, he was deputy foreign editor of *The Christian Science Monitor* before covering Congress and presidential politics for the paper for nine years. In 1997 he moved to South Africa to cover the African continent for *The Boston Globe*, reporting from 18 countries during six years. He was former chairman of the Foreign Correspondents' Association of Southern Africa, and rounded out 17 years in journalism as managing editor of the SAIIA monthly online magazine *eAfrica*. Currently he is conducting case studies on the growth and character of Islam in African states seen as most prone to external influence and liaising with policymakers on and off the African continent on security, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. He is also conducting research into the impact of post-apartheid regional political change on the music of Mozambique for a Masters degree in ethnomusicology at the University of the Witwatersrand.

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Leonardo Simão

Director Executivo da Fundação Joaquim Chissano

Membro do Parlamento de Moçambique desde Outubro de 1994, Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros entre Dezembro de 1994 e Fevereiro de 2005, Ministro da Saúde entre 1988 e 1994.

Manuel Lobo Antunes

Secretário de Estado Adjunto e dos Assuntos Europeus

Anterior Secretário de Estado da Defesa Nacional e dos Assuntos do Mar do XVII Governo Constitucional, é diplomata de carreira desde 1983. Licenciado em Direito e pós-graduado em Estudos Europeus pela Universidade Católica Portuguesa, 1982, foi Consultor da Casa Civil do Presidente da República (1984). Esteve em posto nas Embaixadas na Haia, 1988; Harare, 1994; Director dos Serviços da África Subsariana da Direcção-Geral das Relações Bilaterais, 1996; Assessor Diplomático do Primeiro Ministro, 2001; Director-Geral dos Assuntos Comunitários, 2004.

Manuela Franco

Investigadora do IPRI-UNL, Bolsa Abade Correia da Serra, MNE/FLAD/IPRI-UNL, 2005-]

Diplomata de carreira, Investigadora Associada Júnior do Instituto de Ciências Sociais, U. Lisboa, foi Secretária de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Cooperação do XV Governo Constitucional [2003-2004].

Maria Cristina Fontes Lima

Ministra da Defesa Nacional de Cabo Verde

Ministra da Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, da Reforma do Estado e da Defesa Nacional de Cabo Verde

Ministra da Justiça e Adjunta do Primeiro Ministro, Ministra da Justiça e Administração Interna, Consultora em Assuntos Jurídicos e Gestão em Lomé (Togo), Advogada e Consultora Jurídica na Praia, Deputada da Nação, Directora do Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento do MNE, Assessora do Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Chefe da Divisão de Assuntos Jurídicos e Tratados.

É licenciada em Direito (Portugal) e Mestre em Administração Pública (USA).

Nuno Severiano Teixeira

Ministro da Defesa Nacional de Portugal

Anterior Ministro da Administração Interna (2000-2002), foi Professor Visitante do Departamento de “Government” da Universidade de Georgetown (2000) e Director do Instituto de Defesa Nacional (1996-2000).

Anterior Director do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais – Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Membro do Conselho Científico do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Professor no Departamento de Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais na Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da mesma universidade.

Os seus temas de investigação académica são Relações Internacionais; Segurança Internacional; História e Teoria da Integração Europeia; História Militar; Política externa; Política de Defesa em Portugal.

De entre as suas publicações, destacam-se *L' Entrée du Portugal dans la Grande Guerre. Objectifs Nationaux et Stratégies, Politiques,*

Economica, Paris, 1998, *Portugal e a Guerra- História das intervenções militares portuguesas nos grandes conflitos mundiais do século xx*, Colibri, Lisboa, 1999. Em colaboração com António Costa Pinto, *Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union*, Nova York, 2002; É organizador da Nova História Militar de Portugal, 5 volumes, Círculo de Leitores, Lisboa, 2003.

É Licenciado em História pela Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa (1981); Doutorado em História das Relações Internacionais Contemporâneas pelo Instituto Universitário Europeu de Florença (1994).

Peter Schraeder

Professor, Department of Political Science at Loyola University, Chicago

In addition to teaching at the University of Tunis in Tunisia (2002-03, with several follow-up grants during 2004-06) and at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Senegal (1994-96) as part of the Fulbright scholar exchange program, Schraeder has held visiting appointments at Somali National University (1985), the U.S. Embassy in Djibouti (1987), the French Institute of African Research in Zimbabwe (1996), and the University of the Antilles in Guadeloupe (1999). He most recently spent two years (2003-05) teaching at Loyola's John Felice Rome Center in Italy. Schraeder's research interests include comparative foreign policy, U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and the Middle East, and African and Middle Eastern politics. His research has been published in such diverse scholarly journals as *African Affairs*, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *The Journal of Politics*, *Middle East Journal*, *Politique Africaine*, and *World Politics*. He is the author or editor of 9 books, including *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation* (2nd ed., 2004), *Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality* (2002), *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism*,

Crisis, and Change (1994), and *Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Third World* (1992). He is currently working on a book, “Beyond the ‘Big Man’: Democratization and its Impact on the Formulation and Implementation of African Foreign Policies.” Fluent in English and French, Schraeder is also actively involved in a wide number of international research networks, most notably in France and francophone Africa.

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira

Austin Robinson Research Fellow at Sidney Sussex College

He is also an Associate of the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, and a Fellow of the Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin. Ricardo holds a BA in Politics from the University of York, an MPhil in International Relations and a PhD, both from the University of Cambridge. He was a visiting scholar at the Centre d’études et recherches internationales (Sciences-Po) in Paris and a Joseph C. Fox Fellow at the Centre of International and Area Studies at Yale University. Ricardo has worked in the field of governance and the energy sector for the World Bank, the European Commission, Catholic Relief Services, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the French Ministry of Defence, among others.

R. Soares de Oliveira is the author of the forthcoming “Petroleum and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea” and a contributing author to “Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor” (Catholic Relief Services, 2003).

Steve Stead

Admiral, Deputy-Director, The Brenthurst Foundation

Rear Admiral (JG) Steve Stead was commissioned into the Navy after completion of National Service in 1967. Studies at the Military Academy followed and in 1971 he spent a year in minesweepers and frigates before volunteering for submarine service in 1972. He progressed through the various posts to command in 1983 until the end of 1985. He completed Staff Course in 1986 and was posted to Maritime Intelligence for 1987-88. Three years as Naval Attaché in Paris from 1989 to 1991 followed and on return to South Africa was appointed to command the Submarine Flotilla until 1995. He completed the Joint Staff Course in 1993 and performed the functions of ceremonial ADC to Presidents De Kierk and Mandela from 1993 to 95. Appointed as standing Naval Task Group Commander in 1996/97, he planned and executed the fleet review for the Navy 75 celebrations in 1997. A term as Director Maritime Operations at Naval HQ from 1998 to 2001 followed and then as Director Capability Development at Joint Operations HQ from 2002 to 2006. The challenge of making a contribution to the objectives of the Brenthurst Foundation persuaded him to terminate his career in the military and led to his joining the Foundation in August 2006.

